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Preface to the Second Edition (2019)
An international debate started in the 1970s and continues to haunt the inter-
national community in coming to grips first with de- colonization and now with 
globalization. This ongoing debate is vividly represented by the decision taken on 26 
June 2014 by the Human Rights Council to establish a process to elaborate an inter-
national, legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other busi-
ness enterprises.1 Significantly, the resolution was adopted by a majority vote with 
twenty countries in favour, fourteen against (including the US and Member States 
of the European Union), and thirteen abstentions.2 The proponents of the reso-
lution pointed to an imbalance in the current international legal system: binding 
international law affords significant protection to foreign companies, whereas the 
victims of harmful corporate activities can only rely on international voluntary in-
struments, with national law often being inadequate to sufficiently protect them. 
Those that voted against the resolution argued that international guidelines and 
national law, rather than an international treaty, are the most suitable approaches 
to address harmful corporate conduct.3
This book aims to assess the degree to which corporate environmental account-
ability is addressed in public international law.4 It explores the evolving role of 
international law in directing and controlling the conduct of business enterprises, 
in particular multinational corporations. It focuses on the identification of inter-
national standards of corporate environmental accountability and their imple-
mentation by international organizations. This assessment aims to contribute to 
the ongoing international debate5 on the need for international oversight of private 
 1 Res. 26/ 9 of 26 June 2014 on the elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises.
 2 ‘Council extends mandates on extreme poverty, international solidarity, independence of 
judges, and trafficking in persons’ (26 June 2014), at http:// www.ohchr.org/ en/ NewsEvents/ Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14785&LangID=E#sthash.oEXXs44o.dBWOFzwf.dpuf.
 3 Ibid.
 4 The difficulty in ascertaining precisely what ‘binds together’ the disparate developments on 
global corporate accountability is affirmed by P. Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights, Social Responsibility 
and the Regulation of International Business:  The Development of International Standards by 
Intergovernmental Organizations’ (2003) 3 Non- State Actors and International Law 23, 130.
 5 Eg P. Hansen and V. Aranda, ‘An Emerging International Framework for Transnational 
Corporations’ (1990) 14 Fordham International Law Journal 881; J. Bendell and D. Murphy, ‘Towards 
Civil Regulation:  NGOs and the Politics of Corporate Environmentalism’ in P. Utting (ed.), The 
Greening of Business in Developing Countries (London: Zed Books in association with UNRISD, 2002) 
244, 264; The International Council on Human Rights Policy, Beyond Voluntarism:  Human Rights 
and the Developing International Legal Obligations for Companies (Versoix: International Council on 
Human Rights Policy, 2002) 8; M. Mason, The New Accountability: Environmental Responsibility Across 
Borders (London: Earthscan, 2005) 15.
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companies, particularly multinationals, in order to avoid the most serious envir-
onmental harm caused by them. It also serves to appreciate the progress already 
made at the international level, through the growing practice of international or-
ganizations, to increasingly engage the private sector in attaining global goals for 
the protection of the environment and to conceptually and operationally clarifying 
the international community’s expectations about acceptable corporate conduct.
The first edition of this book concluded that international standard- setting ini-
tiatives on corporate environmental accountability were increasingly characterized 
by a significant degree of normative convergence.6 Since the early 2010s, this trend 
has accelerated and became more explicit. The current edition explores the intensi-
fication of the convergence of international standard- setting efforts on corporate 
environmental accountability, in light of the prominent role now played by inter-
national developments in business and human rights, and advances in the under-
standing of the inter- relationship between human rights and the environment. The 
second edition also explores the emergence of substantive international standards 
of corporate environmental responsibility, as a result of the development of inter-
national sectoral guidelines. As standards become more detailed, the remaining 
divergences reflect differing views among States and other actors about the degree 
to which evolving international law has sufficiently settled on a certain substantive 
point. Furthermore, the second edition explores the extent to which the outcomes 
of international monitoring activities, which are carried out by a plethora of actors, 
also show increasing signs of cross- fertilization.
Similar to the first edition, the current edition builds both on doctrinal re-
search and on empirical observation of international standard- setting activities. 
In the early 2000s, I had the opportunity to assist with legal research feeding into a 
non- governmental organization (NGO) position paper for the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, calling for the launch of international negotiations for 
a binding convention on corporate accountability and liability.7 Since 2004 I have 
attended international environmental negotiations on behalf of the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development/ Reporting Services8 that have allowed 
me to monitor the development of relevant international guidelines under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Furthermore, since the publication 
of the first edition, I have served as an international consultant for the European 
Commission, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO) on questions related to the evolution of international law and corporate 
 6 E. Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’ in P.- M. Dupuy 
and J. Viñuales (eds), Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection: Incentives 
and Safeguards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 321.
 7 As an intern at the London- based Foundation for International Environmental Law and 
Development.
 8 http:// www.iisd.ca.
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environmental accountability. In particular, I have been involved in the preparatory 
studies for the adoption of two sets of international guidance: the 2014 Principles 
on Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems of the Committee on 
Food Security,9 and the 2016 FAO- OECD Guidance on Responsible Agricultural 
Supply Chains.10 In parallel, thanks to a five- year research programme funded by 
the European Research Council,11 I have been able to deepen my understanding of 
the interactions of international biodiversity and human rights law on corporate 
accountability in a dialogue with UN negotiators in different international fora 
(through side- events) and with community activists and advisors in Argentina, 
Greece, Malaysia, Namibia, and South Africa.
Assessing the growing, multi- faceted— yet largely convergent— international 
practice, this book examines the progress, limitations, and tensions in the progres-
sive development of international law in light of social change.12 The gradual emer-
gence of international standards on corporate environmental accountability and 
responsibility may be understood as part of the constant evolution of international 
law in general, and of international environmental law in particular, in response to 
societal concerns that are increasingly expected to be formally addressed by law.13
Between widespread expectations that public international law needs to provide 
oversight of corporate conduct and the perception of the limitations of existing 
law to address harmful corporate activities, the fine line between positive law and 
law in fieri may not be clearly defined.14 This book, therefore, explores the border-
line between current and developing international law, from where international 
standards emerge as the current response to the calls for ‘a new legal order that 
brings multinational actors within . . . the principle of accountability’.15
E.M. April 2020
 9 The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) endorsed the Principles for Responsible Investment 
in Agriculture and Food Systems on 15 October 2014, at http:// www.fao.org/ 3/ a- au866e.pdf.
 10 FAO- OECD, Guidance on Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains (2016) https:// www.oecd- 
ilibrary.org/ agriculture- and- food/ oecd- fao- guidance- for- responsible- agricultural- supply- chains_ 
9789264251052- en.
 11 ‘BENELEX: Benefit- sharing for an equitable transition to the green economy— the role of law’, 
which is funded by the European Research Council Starting Grant (November 2013– October 2018)— 
Grant Number: 335592: https:// www.strath.ac.uk/ research/ strathclydecentreenvironmentallawgovern
ance/ benelex/ 
 12 N. Bobbio, Dalla struttura alla funzione:  nuovi studi di teoria del diritto (Milano:  Edizioni di 
Comunità, 1977) 53 and G. Abi- Saab, ‘Cours general de droit international public’ (1987) 207 Recueil 
des cours 9, 33.
 13 Paraphrasing Abi- Saab, ibid. 204– 05.
 14 Ibid.
 15 C. Weeramantry, ‘Human Rights and the Global Marketplace’ (1999) 25 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 27.
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Introduction
The international community has debated the need for international regulation 
and oversight of multinational companies for about fifty years.1 While States have 
hitherto resisted developing an international legally binding instrument on the 
matter,2 voluntary multi- stakeholder initiatives3 and international soft- law in-
struments with inter- governmental backing have proliferated to support and en-
courage an environmentally sound conduct of multinational and other companies.
This chapter illustrates the need for an international approach to address the 
question of acceptable corporate environmental conduct. It explains such need 
both on the basis of egregious cases of environmental damage and day- to- day 
negative impacts of corporations that appear to defy States’ regulations and con-
trols. It also points to the desirability of private companies’ proactive contribu-
tion to the attainment of internationally agreed goals. The chapter then provides 
a historical and conceptual introduction to evolving approaches in addressing 
corporate environmental conduct in the framework of public international law,4 
with a view to introducing two key concepts in this study— corporate responsi-
bility and corporate accountability. The chapter explains how these two concepts 
have emerged, and how they have reached different stages of development and 
acceptance in international environmental law. The chapter further relates these 
concepts to what has become the mainstream term of reference— ‘business respon-
sibility to respect human rights’ under the influential UN Framework on Business 
and Human Rights.5 These factual, historical, and conceptual premises will serve 
to explain the aims and approach of this book.
 1 Eg ECOSOC Res. 1721 (LIII) 28 July 1972; see discussion in Ch. 3.
 2 Although in 2014, a process to develop an international legally binding instrument on trans-
national corporations and other business enterprises got underway (Human Rights Council, Res. 26/ 9, 
26 June 2014), the outcome of the negotiations is uncertain at the time of writing.
 3 This is notably the case of international public- private partnerships, which were endorsed as an 
official outcome of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. See C. Streck, ‘The World 
Summit on Sustainable Development: Partnerships as the New Tool in Environmental Governance’ 
(2003) 13 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 21.
 4 An early version of this chapter was published as ‘From Stockholm to Johannesburg:  From 
Corporate Responsibility to Corporate Accountability for the Global Protection of the Environment?’ 
(2004) 13 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 214.
 5 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie. ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’ (2008) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 8/ 35, paras 25 and 58 
(the Human Rights Council recognized the need to operationalize the framework through Resolution 
8/ 7 of 2008, para. 2)— Hereinafter, UN Framework on Business and Human Rights. This is discussed in 
more detail in Ch. 3.
 
 
2 Introduction
1. The case for an international approach to corporate 
environmental accountability
Multinational corporations have established themselves as major actors in the 
world economy since the 1940s, through their ability to combine factors of pro-
duction around the world and achieve economic efficiency on a global scale.6 More 
than 80,000 corporations, 800,000 subsidiaries, and millions of suppliers dominate 
the world’s economic growth.7 New investment policy measures tend to focus on 
investment liberalization and promotion, while controls over corporations become 
more and more challenging due to the increasing complexity of internal ownership 
structures and the resulting blurring of investor nationality.8 As a result, the global 
reach of multinational corporations has significantly and rapidly increased their 
capacity to act at a pace and scale that neither governments nor international or-
ganizations can match.9 Multinationals have long been seen as:
[a] triumph of economic power and legal ingenuity operating on a scale, which 
transcends and at time dwarfs the authority of individual States and for which 
the existing legal order makes no appropriate provision. It is inevitable that . . . so 
much economic power and so much legal ingenuity should sometimes be tempted 
to take advantage of the complexity of political and legal systems to create a world 
of their own which must accommodate itself in the conduct of its operations to 
many legal systems but is not in any real sense subject to any of them.10
McBarnet explains the phenomenon from a socio- legal perspective. Multinationals 
take advantage of the limited development of global institutions regulating busi-
ness to experiment in ‘regulatory arbitrage’, choosing to base their operations in 
countries with limited regulation and enforcement, and in ‘creative compliance’11 
by ‘fall[ing] outside the ambit of disadvantageous law and beyond the reach of 
 6 K. P. Sauvant and V. Aranda, ‘The International Legal Framework for Transnational 
Corporations’ in A. A. Fatouros (ed.), Transnational Corporations: The International Legal Framework 
(London: Routledge, 1994) 83, 88; and A. Perry- Kessaris, ‘Corporate Liability for Environmental Harm’ 
in M. Fitzmaurice, D. Ong, and P. Merkouris (ed.), Research Handbook on International Environmental 
Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010) 361.
 7 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the 
issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ (21 March 
2011) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 31, para. 15.
 8 UNCTAD, Key Messages in World Investment Report 2016— Investor Nationality:  Policy 
Challenges (UNCTAD/ WIR/ 2016).
 9 UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- 
General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises’ 
(22 February 2006) UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ 2006/ 97, paras 12 and 16.
 10 C. W. Jenks, ‘Multinational Entities in the Law of Nations’ in W. Friedmann, L. Henkin, and O. 
Lissitzyn (eds), Essays in Honor of Philip C. Jessup (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) 70, 73.
 11 D. McBarnet, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law and For Law’ in D. 
McBarnet, A. Voiculescu, and T. Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 1.
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legal control’.12 In addition, multinational companies are notoriously able to in-
fluence the development and implementation of both national and international 
law through lobbying, negotiations, compromise, and weakening of controls.13 In 
response, the law has increasingly been used in ‘subtle, indirect and creative ways’, 
also in the absence of government action,14 to shift corporate focus from profit 
maximization to responsibility towards a broader range of stakeholders.15 This is 
ultimately seen as having the potential to lead business to review its attitude to law, 
shifting from minimum compliance with the letter of the law to compliance with 
the spirit of the law.16
Due to multinational corporations’ economic power, often shadowing States’ 
gross domestic product (GDP), and worldwide scale of activities, their impacts 
have been considered highly significant for the global protection of the envir-
onment. They adversely affect globally relevant resources through the release of 
greenhouse gases, the unsustainable use of biodiversity, and the production of toxic 
and hazardous substances and waste.17 At the same time, the increasing acceler-
ation of international financial flows linked with foreign investments has outpaced 
States’ capacity or delayed their efforts to regulate or control multinationals for the 
protection of the environment.18 Privatization of services related to the manage-
ment of natural resources (such as water utilities) raises particular concerns, for 
instance governments may not be able to regulate multinationals appropriately so 
as to ensure fair prices for basic services and the proper consideration of envir-
onmental impacts.19 In all, ‘the internationalisation of production of goods and 
services by multinationals increases the likelihood of any related environmental 
damage to a greater number of countries and to a larger part of the world’s en-
vironment’.20 Concerns over the negative impacts of multinationals on the global 
environment are usually justified with reference to their institutional functioning, 
guided by preoccupations for short- term performance, competition, and a piece-
meal or minimalistic approach to environmental management.21
 12 Ibid. 48.
 13 Ibid.
 14 Ibid. 5.
 15 Ibid. 1.
 16 Ibid. 61.
 17 For an early overview of perceived unsustainable practices of multinational corporations, 
D. Santillo and P. Johnston, ‘Ethical Standards and Principles of Sustainability’ in M. K. Addo (ed.), 
Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (The Hague:  Kluwer 
Law International, 1999) 351. UN Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), Climate 
Change and Transnational Corporations: Analysis and Trends (Geneva: UN, 1993); cited in UNCTAD, 
Environmental Management in Transnational Corporations. Report on the Benchmark Corporate 
Environmental Survey (New York: UN, 1993) 101.
 18 World Resources Institute, World Resources 2002– 2004: Decisions for the Earth: Balance, Voice, and 
Power (Washington DC: World Resources Institute, 2003) 164.
 19 Ibid. 94.
 20 UNCTAD, Environment (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2001) 7.
 21 R. Welford, Environmental Strategy and Sustainable Development: The Corporate Challenge for the 
21st Century (London: Routledge, 1995) 39.
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Major accidents due to substandard operations of multinationals have illustrated 
these points. Between 1983 and 2002, there were 150 significant environmental 
accidents in the mining sector alone: in many cases companies, response bodies, 
and communities were not fully prepared or sufficiently informed to deal with the 
incidents, so companies exacerbated environmental contamination problems and 
public health risks.22 To name but a few specific examples, widespread water pol-
lution, deforestation, over- exploitation of natural resources, and soil erosion was 
caused by Texaco’s oil extracting practices in Ecuador in the 1990s. Texaco’s op-
erations resulted in 464 million barrels of wastewater contaminated with hydro-
carbon and other carcinogenic metals being discharged into the river systems. 
This affected not only the Ecuadorian indigenous peoples’ ancestral lands and a 
national park, but also some of Peru’s river systems.23 As a result, 30,000 represen-
tatives of indigenous peoples and farmers from Ecuador and 25,000 downstream 
residents in Peru filed a class action lawsuit in the US against the multinational oil 
company Texaco, seeking personal and environmental damages. A transnational 
litigation saga has ensued for over twenty years, which has not yet provided an ap-
propriate response.24
Another egregious environmental disaster resulted from the massive pollution 
of the Ok Tedi River in Papua New Guinea, due to the direct release in the 1990s of 
about 40 million tons of waste rock and 30 million tons of mine tailings per year by 
the subsidiary of an Australian mining company.25 This irreparably damaged the 
river ecosystem and the adjacent rain forest, destroying the traditional livelihoods 
of indigenous peoples living along the watercourse.26 More than twenty years later, 
the mine waste has continued to be disposed into the river, and while communi-
ties received some compensation, this did not include mitigation of environmental 
impacts.27
 22 World Bank, ‘Striking a Better Balance: The World Bank Group and the Extractive Industry’ in 
World Bank, The Final Report of the Extractive Industries Review (Washington DC: World Bank, 2003) 
26; and World Resources Institute, Mining and Critical Ecosystems: Mapping the Risks (Washington 
DC: World Bank, 2003).
 23 Inter- American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights 
in Ecuador, OEA/ ser. L/ V/ II.96, doc.10 rev. 1, 24 April 1997. See J. Kimerling, ‘Disregarding 
Environmental Law: Petroleum Development in Protected Natural Areas and Indigenous Homelands 
in the Ecuadorian Amazon’ (1991) 14 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 849; and S. 
Holwick, ‘Transnational Corporate Behaviour and its Disparate and Unjust Effects on the Indigenous 
Cultures and the Environment of Developing Nations: Jota v. Texaco, a Case Study’ (2000) 11 Colorado 
Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 183.
 24 For updates, see https:// business- humanrights.org/ en/ texacochevron- lawsuits- re- ecuador. See T. 
Lambooy, A. Argyrou, and M. Varner, ‘An Analysis and Practical Application of the Guiding Principles 
on Providing Remedies with Special Reference to Case Studies Related to Oil Companies’ in S. Deva 
and D. Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond Corporate Responsibility to Respect? 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 329, 335– 70.
 25  Amnesty International, Injustice Incorporated: Corporate Abuses and the Human Right to Remedy 
(London: Amnesty International, 2014) 81– 96.
 26  Ibid.
 27 Ibid.
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Another paradigmatic case was caused by the leak of lethal gas from a chem-
ical storage facility of an American multinational company’s subsidiary in Bhopal, 
India in 1984. The leak resulted in the deaths of between 7,000 and 10,000 people 
within three days; the chronic, debilitating illness of at least 12,000 people; and pol-
lution of groundwater and soil with toxins in concentrations exceeding six to 600 
times the limits recommended.28 Much of the environmental damage had not been 
redressed twenty years after the accident.29 The lack of comprehensive clean- up is 
allegedly still causing damage to the environment and people’s health, and trans-
national litigation spanning over twenty- five years is still ongoing.30
While corporate activity has led to significant environmental damage, deteri-
oration of environmental conditions in turn negatively affects business opportun-
ities. The 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment— a global scientific process 
commissioned by the UN Secretary- General to assess the consequences of eco-
system change on human well- being— indicated that the decline or increased cost 
of natural resources that have been freely available will affect the framework con-
ditions with which businesses operate. Environmental degradation may lead to in-
creased regulatory constraints, risk to reputation and brand image that could affect 
business most directly tied to threatened ecosystems and services, substantially 
higher costs of inputs, increased vulnerability of assets to floods and disasters, as 
well as conflict and corruption.31 Corporate access to capital and insurance can 
also be impacted by environmental conduct. Biodiversity loss is increasingly rec-
ognized as a material risk for business by investors, financial institutions, and in-
surance companies. For industries that depend for their operations on biodiversity, 
its components, or on the ecosystem services supported by biodiversity, the decline 
in the availability of these resources and services is a production risk that could 
lead to insecure supply chains, decreased productivity, unreliable service, and poor 
product quality. Insurance companies are taking new approaches to setting rates 
that reflect growing risks from degradation of ecosystem services and reflecting 
the environmental uncertainties and potential for proximate cause in pricing and 
coverage exclusions.32 Consequently, companies that minimize their negative im-
pacts on the environment are helping to guarantee the sustainability of their own 
businesses. A company’s biodiversity positive record, for instance, may influence 
 28 Amnesty International, Clouds of Injustice:  Bhopal Twenty Years On (London:  Amnesty 
International, 2004).
 29 Greenpeace, The Bhopal Legacy: Toxic Contaminants at the Former Union Carbide Factory Site, 
Bhopal, India (1999) <https:// www.cseindia.org/ the- bhopal- legacy- greenpeace- international- 1999- 
7847>. See also comments in S. Deva, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Violations:  Humanizing 
Business (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012) ch. 2.
 30 Amnesty International (n. 25) 33– 64.
 31 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well- Being:  Opportunities and 
Challenges for Business and Industry (Washington DC: World Resources Institute, 2005) 9.
 32 Ibid. 17– 18.
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its ability to access land, sea, and other natural resources essential for its operations, 
as well as its ability to obtain both the legal and social right to operate in an area.33
2. The case for corporate engagement 
in environmental protection
Conversely, ‘multinational corporations can play a critical role in a sustainable 
managed world’.34 Multinationals financial, managerial, and research and devel-
opment (R&D) resources may significantly contribute to the development and 
transfer of clean technologies and environmentally sound management prac-
tices.35 Arguably sustainable development provides an opportunity for corpor-
ations to do ‘what they do best, innovation, creativity, adaptation to new conditions 
and shaping new markets and new production possibilities’.36
To get ‘business on board’ of the global environmental agenda, emphasis has 
been increasingly placed on the opportunities that global environmental protec-
tion can create for business, including renewable energy, agroforestry, eco- tourism, 
and ecological restoration.37 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment underlined 
the growing demand for more efficient or different ways to use ecosystem serv-
ices38 for mitigating impacts or to track or trade services.39 It also indicated that 
new markets and product opportunities may be identified in an effort to address 
 33 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD Secretariat), Private Sector Engagement 
in the Implementation of the Convention, (2005) UN Doc. UNEP/ CBD/ WG- RI/ 1/ 8, paras 12– 15.
 34 H. Gleckman, ‘Transnational Corporations’ Strategic Responses to “Sustainable Development” ’ 
in H. O. Bergenses, G. Parmann, and Ø. B. Thommessen (eds), Green Globe Yearbook of International 
Cooperation on Environment and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 93.
 35 UNCTAD (n. 20) 7. Welford (n. 21) 89; and J. H. Faulkner, ‘The Role of Business in International 
Environmental Governance’ in M. Rolén, H. Sjöberg, and U. Svedin (eds), International Governance on 
Environmental Issues (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997) 150. E. Morgera and K. Kulovesi, 
‘Public- private Partnerships for Wider and Equitable Access to Climate Technologies’ in A. Brown 
(ed.), Environmental Technologies, Intellectual Property and Climate Change: Accessing, Obtaining and 
Protecting (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013) 128.
 36 N. Choucri, ‘Corporate Strategies toward Sustainability’ in W. Lang (ed.), Sustainable Development 
and International Law (London: Graham & Trotman/ Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 189.
 37 CBD Secretariat (n. 33) paras 12– 15.
 38 Ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems, such as: food, water, timber, 
and fibre; regulating services that affect climate, floods, diseases, wastes, and water quality; cultural 
services that provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits; and supporting services such as soil 
formation, photosynthesis, and nutrient cycling: see generally Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (n. 
31). Note that in 2017, the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) 
proposed replacing the term ecosystem services with ‘nature’s contributions to people’ to refer to ‘all 
the positive contributions or benefits, and occasionally negative contributions, losses or detriments, 
that people obtain from nature’ and ‘explicitly embracing concepts associated with other worldviews 
on human- nature relations and knowledge systems’: IPBES- 5/ 1: Implementation of the first work pro-
gramme of the Platform (2017) III, paras 8– 9, and discussion in U. Pascual, P. Balvanera, S. Díaz, G. 
Pataki, E. Roth, M. Stenseke, R. T. Watson, E. B. Dessane, M. Islar, E. Kelemen, and V. Maris, ‘Valuing 
Nature’s Contributions to People: The IPBES Approach’ (2017) 26– 27 Current Opinion in Environmental 
Sustainability 7, 15 and 8– 9.
 39 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (n. 32) 2.
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scarcities in ecosystem services, with additional benefits in terms of enhanced cor-
porate image and reputation, political capital, and brand value from genuine pro-
active management of environmental issues. There may be cost and operational 
advantages derived from early recognition and action with regard to ecosystem 
service scarcity,40 in particular to address developing countries’ needs and enhance 
or build local capacities sustainably.41 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
concluded that it is in business self- interest to promote and invest in technologies 
that can augment the availability of ecosystem services or reduce pressures on eco-
systems, even if technology will not be able to provide a substitute for all ecosystem 
services.42
More recently, the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB)— a global 
study focusing on ‘the global economic benefit of biological diversity, the costs of 
the loss of biodiversity and the failure to take protective measures versus the costs 
of effective conservation’— identified emerging business models that deliver bio-
diversity benefits and ecosystem services on a commercial basis, and reviewed the 
enabling frameworks needed to stimulate private investment and entrepreneurship 
to realize such opportunities, as well as obstacles.43 It concluded that ‘businesses 
that fail to assess their impacts and dependence on biodiversity and ecosystem 
services carry undefined risks and may neglect profitable opportunities’.44
In light of these predictions, certain voluntary changes in corporate behaviour 
have been observed, to limit negative impacts on the environment and take ad-
vantage of environment- related business, investment, and employment opportun-
ities. Such modifications, however, are often seen as piecemeal and contradictory, 
leaving considerable gaps between corporate rhetoric and practice45 and that ‘the 
dominant strategy of economic growth continues to be business as usual’.46 Even in 
the hypothesis of a strategic model of corporate social responsibility, whereby the 
expectation is that investment in stakeholders’ well- being will lead to economic 
returns for shareholders in the long term, there are some ‘built- in limits’ due to re-
liance on cost- benefit analysis.47
 40 Ibid. 9.
 41 Ibid. 22.
 42 Ibid. 28.
 43 TEEB, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity in Business and Enterprise 
(London: Earthscan, 2012).
 44 TEEB— The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity Report for Business: Executive Summary 
(TEEB, 2010)  at http:// img.teebweb.org/ wp- content/ uploads/ Study%20and%20Reports/ Reports/ 
Business%20and%20Enterprise/ Executive%20Summary/ Business%20Executive%20Summary_ 
English.pdf.
 45 P. Utting, ‘Towards Corporate Environmental Responsibility’ in P. Utting (ed.), The Greening of 
Business in Developing Countries (London: Zed Books in association with UNRISD, 2002) 1, 6.
 46 P.  Utting, ‘Corporate Environmentalism in the South:  Assessing the Limits and Prospects’ in 
Utting (n. 45) 268, 269.
 47 D. Millon, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Sustainability’ in B. Sjåfjell 
and B. Richardson (eds), Company Law and Sustainability:  Legal Barriers and Opportunities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 35, 37– 38.
8 Introduction
3. History and definitions
Against this background, the search for standards for corporate sustainable be-
haviour has received increasing attention at the international level. One way to as-
sess this trend is by focusing on major UN summits on the environment: a textual 
analysis of their outcome documents (in different translations) highlights contro-
versies and consensus- based choices among different conceptual approaches and 
their possible legal implications. These historical and conceptual insights will pro-
vide a basis to analyse more specific international legal materials on corporate en-
vironmental accountability in the following chapters.
3.1 From Stockholm to Johannesburg
As early as during the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, the role 
of business in the global protection of the environment and the necessity of inte-
grating environmental concerns into corporate decision- making were discussed.48 
As a result, the preamble of the Stockholm Declaration49 made a broad reference to 
the environmental responsibility of business in the following terms:
To achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of responsibility 
by citizens and communities, and by enterprises and institutions at every level, all 
sharing equitably in common efforts. [Emphasis added.]
The role of private companies, particularly multinationals, and environmental pro-
tection was more extensively discussed at the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.50 Indeed the ‘Earth Summit’ was the first 
international conference where industrial leaders participated along with diplo-
mats and scientists in discussing the role of business in aiming at sustainable devel-
opment.51 Nonetheless, the Rio Declaration52 did not specify what the contribution 
 48 ‘Business and the UNCED Process’ in UNCTC, ‘Activities of Transnational Corporations and 
Management Division and its Joint Units:  Follow- up to the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development as related to Transnational Corporations’ (1993) UN Doc. E/ C.10/ 1993/ 7, which in-
dicated that more than 900 firms were involved in the preparatory process of the Conference on the 
Human Environment. Gleckman (n. 34) 95.
 49 ‘Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment’ (16 June 1972) UN 
Doc. A/ CONF.48/ 14/ Rev.1, para. 7 (Stockholm Declaration).
 50 This was in accordance with the 1989 UN General Assembly resolution convening the Conference, 
which explicitly focused attention upon transnational corporations’ ‘activities in sectors that have 
an impact on the environment’, and their correlated ‘specific responsibility’: UNGA Res. 44/ 228 (22 
December 1989) para. 10.
 51 G. Thurdin, ‘Political Dimensions of International Environmental Governance Issues’ in Rolén, 
Sjöberg, and Svedin (eds), International Governance on Environmental Issues (Dordrecht:  Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1997).
 52 ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ (13 June 1992) UN Doc. A/ CONF.151/ 6/ 
Rev.1 (Rio Declaration).
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of multinationals to sustainable development should be, which has been con-
sidered a lost opportunity.53 On the other hand, the emphasis placed in the Rio 
Declaration (Principle 16) upon the necessity of internalizing environmental costs 
through economic instruments has some direct relevance for corporations.54 The 
polluter- pays principle55 was in fact the underlying concept for the international 
provisions on civil liability of enterprises for nuclear damage56 and oil pollution.57
Agenda 21, instead, dedicated a whole chapter (Chapter 30) to ‘Strengthening 
the Role of Business and Industry’, explicitly and implicitly58 making reference to 
the role of transnational corporations. This has been considered as one of the most 
important contributions of the blueprint: it provided an unprecedented framework 
for corporate environmental responsibility59 and acknowledged the importance of 
governments in encouraging improved corporate environmental management.60 
Agenda 21, therefore, is based upon the idea that sustainable development cannot 
be achieved without the cooperation of business.61 In particular, Chapter  30 
starts by requiring the ‘full participation’ of business ‘in the implementation and 
evaluation of activities related to Agenda 21’.62 Furthermore, the introduction to 
Chapter 30 exhorts business enterprises to recognize environmental management 
as among the highest corporate priorities and as a key determinant to sustainable 
development.63 Some authors have recognized in this recommendation a reflec-
tion of the need for private companies to integrate sustainability concerns64 and 
even the interests of future generations in their business operations.65
Agenda 21 Chapter 30 then put forward two programme areas for private com-
panies. The first, ‘Promoting Cleaner Production’,66 focused on efficient resource 
 53 Gleckman (n. 34) 93– 95.
 54 J.  H. Faulkner, ‘The Role of Business in International Environmental Governance’ in Rolén, 
Sjöberg, and Svedin (n. 51) 150, 153.
 55 P. Schwartz, ‘Principle 16: The Polluter- Pays Principle’ in J. Viñuales (ed.), The Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 429.
 56 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna, 21 May 1963) Arts I(1)(k) 
and II(1).
 57 Brussels International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels, 29 
November 1969) Arts II and III(1)).
 58 ECOSOC, ‘Follow- up to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development as 
related to Transnational Corporations: Report of the Secretary- General’ (1993) UN Doc. E/ C.10/ 1993/ 
7, nn. 44, 35, indicates that multinational enterprises were referred to with the following terms ‘foreign 
direct investment, multinationals, commerce and industry including multinational companies’, etc.
 59 UNCTAD (n. 20) 42 and 51.
 60 UNCTAD (n. 17) 167.
 61 W. L. Thomas, ‘Wither from Here? American Enterprise and the Journey towards Environmentally 
Sustainable Globalization following WSSD’ (2003) 12 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 39, 41; and M. Iovane, ‘Soggetti privati, società civile e tutela internazionale 
dell’ambiente’ in A. Del Vecchio and A. Dal Ri Jr (eds), Il diritto internazionale dell’ambiente dopo il 
vertice di Johannesburg (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2005) 133, 140– 42.
 62 ‘Agenda 21’ (13 June 1992) UN Doc. A/ CONF.151/ 6/ Rev.1, para. 30.1.
 63 Ibid. para. 30.3.
 64 N. Choucri, ‘Corporate Strategies toward Sustainability’ in Lang (n 36), 189, 198.
 65 T. Juniper, ‘The Corporate Transition to Sustainable Development’ in Addo (n. 17) 77.
 66 Agenda 21, para. 30.5– 16.
10 Introduction
utilization (reuse and recycling of residues, and waste reduction); partnership; 
and reporting and codes of conduct on best environmental practices. More rele-
vant for the purposes of this chapter is the second programme area, ‘Promoting 
Responsible Entrepreneurship’,67 which requires the implementation of sustain-
able development policies by enterprises68 and ‘responsible and ethical man-
agement of products and processes from the point of view of health, safety and 
environmental aspects’.69 It is noteworthy that while the Spanish text appears in 
line with the English version,70 the French version lacks any reference to the con-
cept of responsibility, but rather mentions ‘rational and rigorous management of 
products and processes’.71
Overall, it has been observed that Agenda 21 made more substantial references 
to the responsibility of multinationals and other business enterprises in the area 
of sustainable development than any other area considered by the UN General 
Assembly in that period.72 So much so, that expectations arising from the Rio pro-
cess encompassed the inclusion, in accordance with the objectives of Agenda 21, 
of environmental norms in an international agreement on foreign investment that 
was, however, never concluded.73 Nevertheless, what was expressed by Agenda 21 
represented the explicit political intention of the vast majority of States74 that the 
private sector should no longer avoid responding to the challenge of sustainable 
development.75
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, 
discussions on the role of the private sector were even more intense than in the 
previous international conferences. A  broad coalition of non- governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) presented a proposal for a legally binding treaty on corporate 
accountability, including provisions for corporate liability.76 While not eliciting 
sufficient State support,77 the proposal suggested that international minimum 
 67 Ibid. para. 30.17– 30.
 68 Ibid. para. 30.18(b).
 69 Ibid. para. 30.26.
 70 By referring to ‘responsabilidad empresarial’ and to ‘gestión responsible y ética de los productos’ 
(literally ‘responsible entrepreneurship’ and ‘responsible and ethical management of products’ 
respectively).
 71 The French translation only refers to an unqualified ‘initiative des entrepreneurs’ (literally ‘entre-
preneurship’) in the title of the programme area, and then to ‘gestione rationnelle et rigoureuse des 
produits et des procédés’.
 72 Gleckman (n. 34) 98.
 73 Juniper (n. 65) 80. This is the Multilateral Investment Agreement that was being negotiated under 
the aegis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), discussed in Ch. 3.
 74 D. Ong, ‘The Impact of Environmental Law on Corporate Governance:  International and 
Comparative Perspectives’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 685.
 75 Choucri (n. 64) 198.
 76 Friends of the Earth, Towards Binding Corporate Accountability (Position paper for the WSSD, 
January 2002). World Resources Institute, World Resources 2002– 2004: Decisions for the Earth: Balance, 
Voice, and Power (Washington DC: World Resources Institute, 2003) 129.
 77 R. Annerberg, General Overview of WSSD Outcomes on Globalisation, Trade, Corporate 
Accountability and the Hierarchy of Multilateral Environmental Agreements vs. Trade Rules (Public 
Hearing organized by the European Parliament and Heinrich Böll Foundation, 6 March 2003) 3.
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environmental standards were increasingly expected to be directly applicable to 
multinationals, based on existing international environmental treaties, with a view 
to imposing duties to take them into account in decision- making and report on 
their application.78
Notwithstanding the opposition of some national delegations,79 both final texts 
of the Summit refer instead to corporate responsibility,80 on the basis of the gen-
eral recognition that the private sector has a ‘duty to contribute to the evolution of 
equitable and sustainable communities and societies’.81 This has been interpreted 
as an indication that the international community has ‘recognized a responsibility 
to protect international public (environmental) values by influencing the private 
sector directly, not only through States’.82
The WSSD Political Declaration83 includes two references to the role of busi-
ness for sustainable development: a ‘duty’ of the private sector ‘to contribute to the 
evolution of equitable and sustainable communities and societies’,84 and a ‘need 
for private sector corporations to enforce corporate accountability, which should 
take place within a transparent and stable regulatory environment’.85 The latter 
was agreed after considerable controversy,86 and was welcomed by civil society as 
a ‘significant new basis on which to build stronger, binding standards for global 
companies’.87 Interestingly, the term ‘accountability’ appears for the first time as 
a concept linking corporations and environmental and sustainable development 
concerns. Certain conceptual insights can be derived from comparing the dif-
ferent translations of the WSSD outcome documents, as the term ‘accountability’ 
does not have an exact equivalent in other official languages. Indeed, the words 
‘responsabilité’ in French88 and ‘responsabilidad’ in Spanish89 encompass three 
 78 K. Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 238– 370.
 79 See in particular the reservation expressed by the US delegation, specifying that the references to 
corporate accountability should only apply to existing agreements and not to new ones, in ‘Report of the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development’ (4 July 2002) UN Doc. A/ CONF.199/ 20 (WSSD Report) 
145, para. 20.
 80 Summary table in M. C. Cordonier Segger, ‘Sustainability and Corporate Accountability 
Regimes: Implementing the Johannesburg Summit Agenda’ (2003) 12 Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law 295, 306.
 81 WSSD Report (n. 79) para. 27.
 82 A. Nollkaemper, ‘Responsibility of Transnational Corporations in International Environmental 
Law:  Three Perspectives’ in G. Winter (ed.), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental 
Change: Perspectives from Science, Sociology and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) 179, 193.
 83 WSSD, Political Declaration (4 July 2002) UN Doc. A/ CONF.199/ 20, 2002, Resolution 1 (WSSD 
Declaration).
 84 Ibid. para. 27
 85 Ibid. para. 29
 86 Cordonier Segger (n. 80) 305.
 87 T. Bigg, The World Summit on Sustainable Development:  Was it Worthwhile? 
(Winnipeg: International Institute for the Environment and Development, 2003) 4.
 88 Robert Collins French- English Dictionary (Harper Collins Publishers, 1990) 5 and 619.
 89 Collins Spanish Dictionary (Harper Collins Publishers, 2002) 496 and 610.
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different concepts expressed by the English language with: accountability, respon-
sibility, and liability. Accountability is thus translated, inconsistently, in the French 
version as transparency,90 and as responsibility in the Spanish version.91 These dis-
crepancies can also be found in the WSSD Plan of Implementation.92 Paragraph 49 
of the Plan of Implementation, whose significance has been emphasized by civil 
society93 and scholars,94 urges States to:
[a] ctively promote corporate responsibility and accountability, based on the Rio 
principles including through the full development and effective implementation 
of intergovernmental agreements and measures, international initiatives and 
public- private partnerships and appropriate national regulations, and support 
continuous improvement in corporate practices in all countries.95
In this case, the French translation only refers to responsibility,96 whereas in 
Spanish accountability has this time been translated as ‘answerability’.97 Finally, the 
Plan of Implementation states that ‘[T] he international community should . . . pro-
mote corporate responsibility and accountability’.98 In this case, the Spanish trans-
lation refers again to accountability as answerability,99 whereas the French one to a 
‘reporting obligation’.100
Compared to the 1992 Rio Conference, the Johannesburg Summit more effect-
ively drew attention to the international level of action, rather than solely focusing 
 90 The French translation of para. 29 omits the first part of the sentence, namely the reference to 
‘corporate accountability’, and highlights instead, in a rather weaker formulation, the need for a trans-
parent and stable framework:  ‘nous accordons à penser que les entreprises du secteur privé doivent 
fonctionner dans un encadrement transparent et stable’ (we agree to consider that private enterprises 
must function within a transparent and stable framework). Note that the French version of the Political 
Declaration does not diverge from the formulation of para. 27 in the English version.
 91 The Spanish translation in effect utilizes stronger language than the English version, stating 
the necessity for enterprises to assume ‘plena responsabilidad de sus actos en un entorno regulatorio 
transparente y estable’ (full responsibility for their acts within a transparent and stable regulatory 
framework).
 92 With accountability being translated as transparency in French (‘Promouvoir la responsabilité 
écologique et sociale et la transparence dans le monde des affaires’— ‘promote the ecological and social 
responsibility and transparency of the business world’); and omitted in the Spanish version (‘Promover 
la responsabilidad en los círculos empresariales’— ‘promote the responsibility of business circles’).
 93 World Resources Institute (n. 76) 129.
 94 Cordonier Segger (n. 80) 305– 07, where the author examines different options for an ‘intergov-
ernmental agreement’.
 95 It is worth noting how this paragraph was further endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005, 
in its resolution on the ‘Role of the United Nations in Promoting Development in the context of 
Globalization and Interdependence’, UNGA Res. 58/ 225 (23 December 2003) para. 11, albeit without 
reference to the Rio Principles.
 96 ‘[E] ncourager activement les entreprises à adopter une attitude responsable, sur la base des 
Principes de Rio’ (‘actively encourage companies to adopt a responsible attitude, on the basis of the Rio 
Principles’).
 97 ‘Rendición de cuentas’, which is the equivalent to ‘answering of one’s actions’.
 98 Para. 140(f).
 99 ‘la responsabilidad y la rendición de cuentas de las empresas’.
 100 ‘la responsabilité et l’obligation redditionnelle des entreprises’.
History and definitions 13
on domestic measures for environmental liability.101 In addition, the WSSD also 
expanded the scope of corporate responsibility delineated in Agenda 21, beyond 
purely environmental concerns, thus linking broader regimes for sustainable de-
velopment to the concept of corporate accountability.102
Three conceptual observations can be made. First, all these instruments referred 
consistently to corporate ‘responsibility’ in the field of environment and sustain-
able development. Secondly, none of these instruments referred to ‘liability’ of 
multinational corporations in the field of environmental protection. This reflects 
preference in international law- making processes. States have preferred to strictly 
limit indications of liability of the private sector to a very narrow ambit of ultra- 
hazardous activities at the international level.103 Thirdly, the concept of ‘account-
ability’, as discussed below,104 was utilized for the first time during the negotiations 
in 2002, but its differing translations into Spanish and French reflect the difficulty 
in defining its legal implications.
3.2 Rio+20 and the green economy
The most recent UN environmental summit, the ‘Rio+20’ Conference on 
Sustainable Development105 did not build upon the concepts of corporate respon-
sibility and accountability. Attention was rather focused on the theme ‘a green 
economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication’.106 
This was seen as ‘a lens for focusing on and seizing opportunities to advance eco-
nomic and environmental goals simultaneously’.107 But the concept of green 
economy proved controversial: delegates did not agree upon a consensus defin-
ition and merely ‘encourage[d] each country to consider the implementation of 
green economy policies’ as one of the different approaches available to achieve sus-
tainable development.108 This half- hearted outcome is due to challenges in framing 
the concept from the perspective not only of developed countries but also devel-
oping ones.109 Nonetheless, related sections of the Rio+20 outcome document have 
 101 Cordonier Segger (n. 80) 308.
 102 Ibid. 305 and 309.
 103 Ong (n. 74) 696– 702. See Ch. 2.
 104 Section 4.2.
 105 This section draws on E. Morgera and A. Savaresi, ‘A Conceptual and Legal Perspective on 
the Green Economy’ (2012) 21 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental 
Law 14– 28.
 106 Implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, and 
the outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (UNGA Resolution A/ RES/ 64/ 236, 24 
December 2009) para. 20(a).
 107 Objective and Themes of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Report 
of the Secretary- General (UN Doc. A/ CONF.216/ PC/ 7, 22 December 2010) (‘Objective and Themes’) 
para. 24.
 108 The Future We Want (UN Doc. A/ RES/ 66/ 288, 11 September 2012), Annex, paras 56 and 62.
 109 P. Kohona, ‘The Future We Wanted— The Future We Will Get’ (2012) 42 Environmental Policy and 
Law 137, 138.
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contributed to provide the green economy with a broad environmental remit, as 
opposed to one limited to a low- carbon economy that was dominating the prepara-
tory process leading to the Rio+20 Conference.110 The outcome document empha-
sized also socio- cultural inclusiveness, taking into account human rights and the 
specific contributions of indigenous peoples and local communities to environ-
mental management.111 These are the two themes that reflect broader develop-
ments in other international initiatives on corporate environmental accountability.
Besides these general references to the interplay between economic develop-
ment and environmental protection, however, the Rio+20 outcome did not take 
stock of more specific advances made by the international community on corporate 
responsibility and accountability since the WSSD. Norway and the EU attempted 
to include reference to international guidelines112 such as the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises113 and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights,114 without success. Similarly, a draft invitation to business to ‘act 
in accordance with the UN Global Compact’115 was replaced by a ‘call on the pri-
vate sector to engage in responsible business practices, such as those promoted by 
the United Nations Global Compact’.116 Instead, the Rio+20 outcome document 
merely ‘invite[s] business and industry as appropriate and in accordance with na-
tional legislation to contribute to sustainable development and to develop sustain-
ability strategies that integrate, inter alia, green economy policies.’117 It also focuses 
on the need for national regulatory and policy frameworks enabling business ‘to 
 110 See references to ‘maintaining the healthy functioning of the Earth’s ecosystems’ in The Future We 
Want (n. 108) para. 56; to ‘sustainable resource management, resource efficiency and waste reduction’ 
at para. 60; and to ‘sustainable production and consumption, and conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity and ecosystems’ at para. 61. See also Report of the UN Secretary- General, Objective and 
themes of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (UN Doc. A/ CONF.216/ PC/ 7), 
22 December 2010, para. 118.
 111 See references to ‘enhancing social inclusion, improving human welfare and creating opportun-
ities for employment and decent work for all’ at para. 56; to ‘[p] romote sustained and inclusive eco-
nomic growth, foster innovation and provide opportunities, benefits and empowerment for all and 
respect of all human rights’ at para. 58(d); to enhancing ‘the welfare of indigenous peoples and their 
communities, other local and traditional communities and ethnic minorities, recognizing and sup-
porting their identity, culture and interests, and avoid endangering their cultural heritage, practices and 
traditional knowledge, preserving and respecting non- market approaches that contribute to the eradi-
cation of poverty’, at para. 58 (j); and to ‘the welfare of women, children, youth, persons with disabilities, 
smallholder and subsistence farmers, fisherfolk and those working in small and medium- sized enter-
prises, and improve the livelihoods and empowerment of the poor and vulnerable groups in particular 
in developing countries’ at para. 58(k).
 112 A. Schulz et al., ‘Summary of the Third Round of UNCSD Informal Consultations: 29 May— 2 
June 2012’ (2012) 27(40) Earth Negotiation Bulletin 6– 7.
 113 OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Publishing, 2011), which will be dis-
cussed in Ch. 3.
 114 ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to implement the UN Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework’ (2011) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 31, adopted by the Human Rights Council in Res. 17/ 
4 (6 July 2011), which will be discussed in Ch. 3— hereinafter, UN Guiding Principles.
 115 Draft of the Rio+20 Outcome Document (2 June 2012) para. 63 (bracketed language), on file with 
author. UN Global Compact, https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/ , discussed in Ch. 3.
 116 The Future We Want (n. 108) para. 46.
 117 Ibid. para. 69.
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advance sustainable development initiatives, taking into account the importance 
of corporate social responsibility’.118 Elsewhere, however, the Rio+20 outcome 
document employed more assertive language in specific relation to mining, by
recogniz[ing] the importance of strong and effective legal and regulatory frame-
works, policies and practices for the mining sector that  . . .  include effective 
safeguards that reduce social and environmental impacts, as well as conserve bio-
diversity and ecosystems, including during post- mining closure, . . . call[ing] on 
governments and business to promote the continuous improvement of account-
ability and transparency.119
It is arguably with regard to corporate sustainability reporting that the Rio+20 
Summit made an original contribution to the international policy discourse on 
corporate environmental accountability.120 Compared with WSSD, the Rio+20 
outcome document ‘encourage[s] industry, interested governments and relevant 
stakeholders with the support of the United Nations system, as appropriate, to 
develop models for best practice and facilitate action for the integration of sus-
tainability reporting, taking into account experiences from already existing 
frameworks and paying particular attention to the needs of developing countries, 
including for capacity- building.’121
4. Corporate responsibility and/ or corporate accountability?
As opposed to purely voluntary approaches (which are usually captured with 
the expression ‘corporate social responsibility or CSR’),122 it is argued here that 
the concepts of corporate responsibility and accountability refer to soft- law123 
approaches addressing the role of business, and multinationals in particular, 
in the global protection of the environment. Soft law fills the normative space 
between multinationals being oblivious to international law and their having 
obligations or being liable directly under international law. The above analysis 
 118 Ibid. para. 46.
 119 Ibid. para. 228.
 120 Cordonier Segger (n. 80) 308.
 121 The Future We Want (n. 108) para. 47. This was followed up by the creation of a group of ‘Friends 
of paragraph 47’ led by Brazil, Denmark, France, and South Africa to support corporate sustainability 
reporting in their respective countries and the exchange of experiences with the rest of the world: UNEP 
press release, ‘Brazil, Denmark, France and South Africa Join in Commitment to Sustainable Reporting, 
20 June 2012, http:// www.unepfi.org/ fileadmin/ events/ 2012/ Rio20/ Press_ release_ Rio_ outcome_ 
document.pdf.
 122 CSR is the label used to group efforts and initiatives that are purposely voluntary in their approach 
to sustainable corporate conduct. Even voluntary initiatives may have, however, legal implications or 
relevance. See McBarnet et al. (n. 11).
 123 The relevance of soft law for present purposes is discussed in Ch. 3.
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of UN summit outcomes seems to point to an unspecified substantive expect-
ation in as far as corporate responsibility is concerned, and a more defined pro-
cedural approach in as far as corporate accountability is concerned. The UN 
General Assembly implicitly recognized such duality in 2005, when framing 
the mandate of the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights 
in terms of ‘identify[ing] and clarify[ing] standards of corporate responsibility 
and accountability’.124 The following sections will propose an understanding of 
each expression and place them in the context of the 2008 UN Framework on 
Business and Human Rights and its second pillar on business responsibility to 
respect human rights.
4.1 The concept of corporate responsibility
The concept of corporate responsibility125 is arguably based on the expectation that 
private companies should no longer base their actions on the needs of their share-
holders alone, but be more broadly responsive to the needs of the society in which 
they operate on the basis of internationally recognized values.126 This finds reflec-
tion in the work leading to the adoption of the UN Framework on Business and 
Human Rights. While the UN Framework emerged from the rejection of the idea 
that there are direct legal obligations arising of international law for companies,127 
the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights pointed to inter-
national standards that are in ‘the process of being socially constructed’128 in the 
face of the ‘fluid’ applicability of international legal principles to companies’ acts.129 
He thus referred to corporate responsibility as ‘the legal, social or moral obligations 
imposed on companies’.130 In his subsequent report, the Special Representative re-
ferred to ‘corporate responsibility to respect human rights’ as the baseline expect-
ation for all companies in all situations to do no harm, that is, ‘to manage the risk of 
 124 Commission on Human Rights Res. 2005/ 69 (20 April 2005).
 125 Standards of conduct, rather than the legal consequences arising out of a breach of international 
law (secondary rules), are understood with reference to primary rules, as pointed out by Nollkaemper 
(n. 82) 181.
 126 UNCTAD, Social Responsibility (Geneva: UN, 2001) 3.
 127 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises:  Mapping International Standards 
of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts (2007) UN Doc A/ HRC/ 4/ 35, paras 33– 35, 
where it is stated ‘[the question as to whether] any legal responsibilities corporations may have for other 
human rights violations under international law is subject to far greater existential debate . . . prelim-
inary research has not identified the emergence of uniform and consistent State practice establishing 
corporate responsibilities under customary international law’.
 128 UNCHR, ‘Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’ UN Doc E/ CN.4/ 2006/ 
97 (2006) para. 55.
 129 Ibid. para. 64.
 130 Report of the Special Representative (n. 127) para. 6 (emphasis added).
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human rights harm with a view to avoiding it’.131 He substantiated his argument on 
the understanding that corporations are under growing scrutiny by international 
human rights mechanisms and have been the object of international standard- 
setting in light of ‘social expectations by States and other actors’.132 Such practice 
was considered by the Special Representative as ‘blurring the lines between [what 
is] strictly voluntary, and mandatory’ and recognizing the need to ‘exercise shared 
responsibility’.133
While this has been criticized for lack of normative ambition,134 it is a fair assess-
ment of the current state of development of international law, as demonstrated by 
the continued opposition to the proposed treaty on business and human rights.135 
Nonetheless, this is a step forward conceptually from a traditional understanding 
that international law does not matter for corporations if not through the State. 
Critically, corporate responsibility expects companies to go beyond compliance 
with national laws, in order to respond to the international society’s expectation 
that granting multinational companies their right to existence and the possibility 
of operating internationally through trade and investment liberalization should 
be balanced by proportionate responsibility.136 The 2011 Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, which support the implementation of the UN 
Framework, have confirmed that there is a ‘global standard of expected conduct 
for all business enterprises wherever they operate’, that exists independently of 
States’ abilities and willingness to fulfil their human rights obligations. Such global 
standard operates ‘over and above compliance with national laws and regulations 
protecting human rights’, basically requiring business entities to take adequate 
measures to prevent, mitigate, and remediate adverse human rights impacts.137 In 
other words, companies can no longer be oblivious to international law.138
 131 J. Ruggie, ‘Presentation of the work of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary- General on 
Business and Human Rights to the 7th Inter- Committee meeting of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ 
(Geneva, 24 June 2008).
 132 Report of the Special Representative (n. 127) paras 6, 44– 46.
 133 Ibid. paras 61– 62.
 134 G. Handl, ‘Book Review of Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law’ (2010) 
19 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 128.
 135 See the majority voting on Human Rights Council Res. 26/ 9 of 26 June 2014 on the elaboration 
of an International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises.
 136 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1999:  Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of 
Development (Geneva: UN, 1999) 345– 47.
 137 UN Special Representative on Human Rights and Business Enterprises, ‘Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights to implement the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’, UN Doc. 
A/ HRC/ 17/ 31 (2011) para. 11 (the Guiding Principles were adopted by the Human Rights Council by 
Resolution A/ HRC/ 17/ 4 (2011); see also Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights press 
release, ‘New Guiding Principles on Business and human rights endorsed by the UN Human Rights 
Council’, 16 June 2011).
 138 P. Muchlinski, ‘Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications 
for Corporate Law, Governance and Regulation’ (2012) 22 Business Ethics Quarterly 145– 77, argues that 
this may have legal consequences via company law and corporate governance.
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As a substantive standard, business responsibility to respect human rights con-
sists of the prevailing societal expectation that companies ‘do no harm’, which is an 
expectation of positive action rather than just ‘passive avoidance’.139 Former UN 
Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie, however, in-
dicated that the scope of this substantive standard is to be defined on a case- by- case 
basis, depending on the actual and potential human rights impacts generated by 
business, in light of international recognized human rights.140 Companies are ex-
pected to prioritize the prevention and mitigation of most severe impacts or those 
that a delayed response would make irremediable.141 In other words, corporate re-
sponsibility presupposes an increasing demand on multinationals to consider im-
plications of their actions regardless of whether specific legal obligations require 
them to do so at the national level.142
This resonates with the approach to corporate environmental responsibility, 
which aims at preventing environmental harm and promoting sustainable devel-
opment, through environmentally sound policies, practices, and technologies.143 
But substantive environmental standards for multinationals have been slow to 
emerge internationally. It has mainly been since the 2010s that international 
standard- setting initiatives have focused more on substantive standards of cor-
porate environmental responsibility, in connection with international develop-
ments on the linkages between human rights and the environment.144
4.2 The concept of corporate accountability
The concept of accountability has developed in the broader context of the debate 
on global environmental governance.145 In the process of economic globalization 
 139 Ibid. 148. Contra, on the negative content (rather than substantive nature) of the ‘no harm’ re-
sponsibility, and of the positive content (rather than procedural nature) of due diligence, see D. Cassell 
and A. Ramasastry, ‘White Paper: Options for a Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ (2016) 6 Notre 
Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law 1, 7.
 140 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, ‘Business and Human Rights:  Towards 
Operationalising the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (2009) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 11/ 13, 15.
 141 UN Guiding Principles, para. 24.
 142 Ong (n. 74) 686. See contra Deva (n. 29), 22– 23.
 143 UNCTAD (n. 20) 68.
 144 Chs 3– 5.
 145 World Resources Institute (n. 76) and UNDP, Human Development Report 1999 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) 100, where it was stated: ‘Multinational corporations are already a dominant 
part of the global economy— yet many of their actions go unrecorded and unaccounted. They must 
however go far beyond reporting just to their shareholders. They need to be brought within the frame 
of global governance.’ More generally on accountability as part of good governance, see E. Brown 
Weiss and A. Sornarajah, ‘Good Governance’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, online edition, 2010) paras 16 and 28– 29; and M. 
Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’ (2007) 13 European Law 
Journal 447.
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and its increasing demands on transboundary environmental management, multi-
nationals as ‘global citizens’ are expected to be included in the design of a more 
coherent and effective global framework for environmentally relevant decision- 
making at all levels.146 Against this background, ‘accountability’ refers in general 
to the way in which public and private actors are considered answerable for their 
decisions and operations, and are expected to explain them when they are asked by 
stakeholders.147 They are required to be open in their decision- making processes to 
be examined and judged by other interested parties. This is reflected in the under-
standing of the concept of accountability emerging from the translations of the 
WSSD outcome documents: transparency, answerability, and reporting. It is also 
reflected in the definition of accountability proposed by UN Special Representative 
on Business and Human Rights as ‘the mechanisms for holding corporations to 
[certain] obligations’ based on participation, transparency and review.148
Consequently, corporate accountability implies, on the one hand, widening the 
scope of stakeholders within a company beyond shareholders, so as to include all 
interest groups affected by the company’s activities, such as:  governments, em-
ployees, boards of directors, investors, consumers, suppliers, local communities 
in and around areas where the company operates, civil society, and the public at 
large.149 This aspect appears to be in line with the translation of accountability in 
Spanish as answerability.150 It seems also in line with the plethora of voluntary 
codes of conduct enacted by several multinationals, that arguably reflect the ac-
ceptance by the corporate world that they must address public expectations of 
environmentally sound behaviour beyond their shareholders.151 On the other 
hand, corporate accountability appears to be dependent on disclosure of informa-
tion and, therefore, on the concept of transparency,152 as suggested by the French 
translation of the WSSD Plan of Implementation. To connect business to stake-
holders, public access to information and reporting153 may serve as preconditions 
for enhanced public scrutiny, by enabling NGOs to play the role of ‘watchdogs’ for 
corporate accountability on at least three levels: demanding transparency of busi-
ness operations; ‘shaming’ corporations into better environmental behaviour by 
widely informing about their conduct; and raising awareness about corporate be-
haviour at the local level.154 These transparency approaches may encourage better 
 146 N. Yamamoto, ‘Comment on the Paper by Nazli Choucri’ in Lang (n. 36), 203– 06 (emphasis 
added).
 147 World Resources Institute (n. 31) 108.
 148 Report of the Special Representative (n. 127) paras 6 and 56.
 149 See generally Muchlinski (n. 138).
 150 M. Mason, The New Accountability:  Environmental Responsibility Across Borders 
(London: Earthscan, 2005) 3.
 151 World Resources Institute (n. 76) 116.
 152 Ibid. 19. See also J. Harrison, ‘Establishing a Meaningful Human Rights Due Diligence Process 
for Corporations: Learning from Experience of Human Rights Impact Assessment’ (2013) 31 Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal 107– 17.
 153 Mason (n. 150) 108.
 154 World Resources Institute (n. 76) 73.
20 Introduction
environmental behaviour of corporations that depend on reputation and market 
power in the face of stakeholders.155
Overall, accountability, as opposed to responsibility, seems to make reference to 
the means rather than the result that should be achieved by environmentally sound 
corporate conduct in light of public expectations. Rather than referring to social 
control, accountability is more related to the idea of ‘social direction’ through in-
centives and prevention.156 The concept of accountability takes into account that 
the protection of the environment cannot be the sole or main task of the private 
sector, given the importance of many other, also endogenous, factors. At the same 
time, it serves to define the reasonable efforts, including a transparent and partici-
patory framework for decision- making, that are expected to be put in place, ac-
cording to international standards, by private companies towards the protection of 
a certain interest or the attainment of a certain environmental result.
It can be argued that corporate accountability corresponds to the procedural 
dimension of the business responsibility to respect human rights— companies’ 
‘due diligence’’157 In effect, due diligence has been broken down into its procedural 
elements in the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as: (i) 
assessing actual and potential impacts with meaningful consultations with poten-
tially affected groups and other stakeholders at regular intervals; (ii) integrating the 
assessment findings in internal decision- making, budget allocation, and oversight 
processes; (iii) tracking responses (including by drawing on feedback from af-
fected stakeholders); and (iv) communicating how impacts are addressed to right- 
holders in a manner that is sufficient for stakeholders to evaluate the adequacy of 
the company’s response.158 These are all elements that have been identified in inter-
national environmental law.
An element that has not emerged quite as clearly in the context of inter-
national environmental law policy debates, however, is that, according to the UN 
Framework, enterprises ‘should establish or participate in’ grievance mechanisms. 
These should be legitimate, transparent, predictable, equitable, right- compatible, 
and directly accessible to individuals and communities that may directly be af-
fected by their business operations. They seek both to support the identification of 
adverse impacts and systematic problems, and remedy adverse impacts.159
These international developments can be usefully related to the scholarly in-
terpretation of accountability as a ‘system of power control’ – a means to furnish 
substantial reasons or a convincing explanation of one’s actions, and a system of 
 155 Ibid. 110; contra R. O. Keohane, ‘The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of 
Force’ (2003) 24 Michigan Journal of International Law 1121, where the author argued that the concept 
of accountability not only implies answering for one’s own actions but also being exposed to sanctions.
 156 N. Bobbio, Dalla struttura alla funzione:  nuovi studi di teoria del diritto (Milano:  Edizioni di 
Comunità, 1977) 54.
 157 UN Framework on Business and Human Rights, paras 25 and 58.
 158 UN Guiding Principles, paras 17– 21.
 159 Ibid. paras 29 and 31.
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‘quasi- juridical’ answerability based on standards that are internationally defined 
and implemented.160 Indeed, some authors assert that the international commu-
nity is moving towards the implementation of a mechanism for enhanced demo-
cratic control over business, with a view to preventing corporate environmental 
damage.161
For present purposes, Boven’s narrow concept of accountability appears particu-
larly suitable: ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has 
an obligation to explain and justify his/ her conduct, the forum can pose questions 
and pass judgement [on the adequacy of the information provided and or the le-
gitimacy of a conduct], and the actor can face consequences.’162 The latter includes 
‘implicit and informal’ consequences such as having to render account publicly or 
being affected by negative publicity generated by the process.163 Accordingly, ac-
countability can be social, without hierarchical relations.164 It can have a marked 
learning dimension, in that it is aimed at improving effectiveness, trust, and accept-
ance of power through openness and reflexivity that ‘forces reflection on successes 
and failures, including for those [companies] that are not immediately involved in 
a particular accountability process’.165
Corporate accountability needs, therefore, to be differentiated from the con-
cept of corporate governance, which in turn refers to an internal process within a 
business entity to respond to societal expectations concerning its environmentally 
sound conduct,166 such as the ‘organization of ownership, participation, disclosure 
and decision- making in corporations’.167 Corporate governance refers to the phe-
nomenon of self- regulation, to the policies and practices that business voluntarily 
adopts internally because of its perceptions of the relevance of international law 
to its operations and pressure from civil society.168 Corporate accountability, con-
versely, is grounded in soft- law and quasi- judicial dimensions based on standard- 
setting and review mechanisms that function outside companies— without being, 
however, a formal part of the judicial institutions at the national or international 
 160 N.  Rosemann, The UN Norms on Corporate Human Rights Responsibilities:  An Innovating 
Instrument to Strengthen Business’ Human Rights Performance, Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung Occasional 
Geneva Papers n. 20, 2005, 15.
 161 Ong (n. 74) 719.
 162 Bovens (n. 145) 451.
 163 Even if developed with actors exercising public powers in mind:  ibid. 452.
 164 Ibid. 460.
 165 Ibid. 464.
 166 Definition in OECD, ‘Principles of Corporate Governance’ (2004) <http:// www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/ 32/ 18/ 31557724.pdf>, whose preamble reads:  ‘Corporate governance involves a set of re-
lationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, 
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.’
 167 P. Muchlinski, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ in P. Muhclinski, F. Ortino, and C. Schreuer 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
637, 645.
 168 Report of the Special Representative (n. 127) para. 63.
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level. Nonetheless, corporate governance may experience a certain degree of 
cross- fertilization with corporate accountability, in adopting similar standards, 
and thus providing an indication of business’ acceptance of international stand-
ards.169 Corporate governance can provide tools for the implementation of inter-
national corporate environmental accountability and responsibility standards, by 
embedding them in the managerial decision- making structure of a company.170
5. Aim and structure of the book
As will be discussed in this book, corporate accountability has gathered quicker 
acceptance internationally than corporate responsibility. Several aspects of due 
diligence, as framed under the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights, 
have drawn on procedural environmental approaches171 for private companies to 
be more transparent, participatory, and proactive in their efforts to respond to the 
expectations of the international community based on international law. More pre-
cise substantive standards of corporate environmental responsibility, in turn, have 
started to emerge internationally since the 2010s, including as a result of the ad-
vancements in the debate on human rights and the environment.
This book aims to assess the extent to which public international law has con-
tributed to the identification of corporate accountability and responsibility stand-
ards against which multinationals have to explain their conduct, as well as the 
development of mechanisms to support transparency, prevention, monitoring, 
and learning. The analysis is premised and informed by the shortcomings of trad-
itional legal solutions to ensure the environmentally sound conduct of multi-
national companies through national and international law (Chapter 2).
The central part of the book reveals the emergence of converging international 
standards for corporate environmental accountability and responsibility in various 
initiatives undertaken by different international organizations, at different points 
in time, and with varying degrees of inter- governmental involvement. Attention 
is first devoted to the elaboration of international standards of corporate envir-
onmental accountability and responsibility in the framework of the UN, the 
OECD, and the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank group 
(Chapter 3). The following chapters assesses the influence of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity on the level of normative detail and the degree of international 
 169 Such weaknesses have been identified also by the UN Special Representative as fol-
lows:  ‘Companies do not necessarily recognize those [human] rights on which they may have the 
greatest impact, and when drawing from international instruments, the language they use is rarely iden-
tical and their interpretations are so elastic that the standards lose meaning.’ Ibid. para. 74.
 170 Muchlinski (n. 167) 645.
 171 E. Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’ in P.- M. Dupuy 
and J. Viñuales (eds), Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection: Incentives 
and Safeguards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 321, 333.
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acceptance of emerging international standards of corporate environmental ac-
countability (Chapter 4) and corporate environmental responsibility (Chapter 5). 
The practical relevance of the international standards for corporate environmental 
accountability and responsibility is assessed in the final chapter of this book, which 
focuses on the tools for compliance that international organizations have at their 
disposal and the extent to which these tools provide consequences (Chapter 6). 
This provides an opportunity to assess convergence in the interpretation and ap-
plication of international standards, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of 
these approaches vis- à- vis traditional legal solutions. The conclusions take stock of 
the overall state of development of international law on corporate environmental 
accountability and responsibility, and outlines areas for further research and more 
systematic dialogue with other areas of scholarship and practice.
Corporate Environmental Accountability in International Law. Elisa Morgera. Oxford University Press (2020).  
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 The Shortcomings of Traditional 
Legal Solutions
The limitations inherent in relevant parts of national and international law are the 
reasons for the emergence of international standards of corporate environmental 
accountability and responsibility. This chapter will discuss how control over multi-
national enterprises at the national level— the legal control over a subsidiary of a 
multinational company by the host State, and the legal control over a multinational 
parent company by the home State— is ineffective. Despite the surge in efforts at 
the national level (by States and non- State actors) since the endorsement of the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011,1 the proposal to 
develop a new international treaty in this area in 2014 indicates a continuing sig-
nificant level of dissatisfaction with the current approaches at the national level.2
Even more significant limits affect the possibility of ensuring the environmen-
tally sound conduct of business under the international law on State responsibility, 
civil and criminal liability in international environmental law, or international 
criminal law. Meanwhile, multinationals enjoy a significant degree of protection 
under international investment law, which adds to the reasons behind the re-
course to international standards of corporate environmental accountability and 
responsibility. International human rights law, in turn, while also affording certain 
protection to private companies, has over the last decade emerged as the most dy-
namic area of international law to address unresolved questions about the conduct 
of multinational enterprises, including from an environmental perspective.
1 The shortcomings of national control
National control over private companies, in particular multinational companies, 
has proved ineffective, as a result of the fact that ‘corporations are present nowhere; 
their activities through their agents may be present everywhere and the location of 
 1 ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to implement the UN Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework’ (2011) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 31, adopted by the Human Rights Council in Res. 17/ 
4 (6 July 2011)— hereinafter, UN Guiding Principles, which will be discussed in detail in Ch. 3.
 2 Human Rights Council Res. 26/ 9 of 26 June 2014 on the elaboration of an International Legally 
Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises.
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these activities may change almost instantaneously’.3 The following sections will 
discuss the shortcomings of host and home State control, in turn.
1.1 Host State control
The most immediate legal system for ensuring the environmentally sound conduct 
of private enterprises is that of the State in which they operate. According to the 
principle of national sovereignty, foreign investors, such as multinationals, are also 
subject to the control of the host State— the State in which they operate.4 Control 
by the host State entails unilateral action for the protection of national interests 
in two stages: before the entry of a foreign investor into the host State and after its 
establishment there.
Before a multinational enters the host State, the latter enjoys great discretion 
in permitting or conditioning the company’s entrance. This discretion is generally 
regulated by national foreign investment laws. They not only provide for guaran-
tees against expropriation and for dispute settlement, and tax and non- tax incen-
tives, but also detail a screening process of entry through administrative agencies 
and often require a feasibility study.5 Feasibility studies often include an environ-
mental impact assessment.6 In concluding the screening process, conditions could 
be attached by the administrative agency to the entry of the foreign investor into 
the host State and to the manner in which it operates its business. Such conditions 
may include requirements on local collaborations, capitalization, export targets, 
local equity, and environmental protection.7 In this regard, it should be highlighted 
that an investment project or agreement can be cancelled, even after it has com-
menced, if it can be shown that an environmental condition has not been fulfilled, 
and, according to some authors, also if harm to the environment is irreversible or 
outweighs the benefits of the project.8
The second stage of host State control is after the establishment of the enter-
prise in the host State. Then, corporations have to abide by all national laws and 
regulations— including environmental ones, as the investor voluntarily subjects 
himself to the regime of the host State.9 In this phase, permits may need to be 
obtained and further administrative controls over foreign direct investment 
 3 V. Lowe, ‘Corporations as International Actors and International Law Makers’ (2004) 13 Italian 
Yearbook of International Law 23, 32.
 4 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) ch. 2.
 5 P. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) ch. 5.
 6 Sornarajah (n. 4) 109.
 7 Ibid. 109– 11.
 8 Ibid.
 9 For a complete review of host State methods of controlling foreign investors, Muchlinski (n. 5) ch. 
3; and C. D. Wallace, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2002).
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operations may take place. The pre- and post- establishment phases are strictly 
interlinked, as the first often leads to conditions to be applied in the second.
There exists no right of establishment for foreign investors in any country as 
a general rule of international law, and administrative screening of foreign direct 
investment is common prior to entry.10 But the right of the State to control such 
entry often is limited by other international obligations to which the country has 
subjected itself. As will be discussed in more detail below, host States are usually 
parties to bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, under which they have ac-
cepted limitations to their discretion to allow the entry of foreign investors into 
their territory.
In addition, some significant factual constraints on States’ exercise of their sov-
ereignty in this realm should be considered. In light of the competition among host 
States to receiving foreign investment,11 the bargaining power of the foreign in-
vestor is at its highest at the time of entry. The foreign investment contract, re-
sulting from the acceptance of foreign direct investment by the host State, is 
therefore often drafted with as many contractual guarantees as possible for the pro-
tection of the investment after establishment in the host State, usually linking it 
to external legal systems or tribunals for protecting investors against risks.12 As a 
result, the host State may be limited in its capacity to change (refine, or update) its 
environmental laws, because this may adversely affect the foreign investment and 
could entail the payment of compensation to foreign companies.13
Besides the international obligations embodied in bilateral and other invest-
ment treaties and contractual limitations agreed upon with specific investors, other 
significant shortcomings affect the capacity of host States to effectively control the 
environmental conduct of multinationals after their establishment in the host 
country. First, difficulties derive from the limited financial and human resources 
that the host State may have in effectively implementing and enforcing their na-
tional environmental laws.14 Second, lack of information as to the technology and 
the risks of the activities of the multinationals within a State’s territory may further 
hinder the control of the host State. Third, even when the host State is able to hold 
a multinational accountable for environmental damage, the very structure of the 
multinational may prevent the host State from obtaining full compensation and re-
dress for victims. This is the case when a subsidiary with limited financial resources 
 10 M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (The Hague:  Kluwer Law 
International, 2000) 69.
 11 O. de Schutter, Towards Corporate Accountability for Human and Environmental Rights Abuses, 
discussion paper for the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (April 2007) 3.
 12 Sornarajah (n. 4) 102.
 13 Eg L. Cotula, ‘Expropriation Clauses and Environmental Regulation: Diffusion of Law in the Era 
of Investment Treaties’ (2015) 24 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental 
Law 278.
 14 Eg M. Taylor, ‘Putting OK Tedi in Perspective’ in G. Banks and C. Ballard (eds), The Ok Tedi 
Settlement: Issues, Outcomes and Implications (Canberra: National Centre for Development Studies and 
Resource Management, 1997) 12.
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causes environmental harm.15 This is the effect of the ‘corporate veil’— the separate 
legal personality between different entities of the same multinational group. It 
serves to protect one corporate entity from the liabilities of other corporate entities 
within the same multinational enterprise.16
Furthermore, conflicts of interests may arise for host State courts dealing with 
the environmental damage caused by the operations of a foreign company within 
their territory. Particularly in the case of developing countries, the revenues from 
the concessions to the multinational may well represent a considerable share of the 
State’s gross domestic product (GDP)17 and a far larger source of external finance 
than Official Development Assistance.18,19 The host State may also have author-
ized the foreign company’s operations causing environmental damage, so it may be 
considered at least partly responsible for the damage.20 Or, host States may join the 
business venture, thus becoming even more directly involved in the operations of 
the multinational.21
 15 T. Scovazzi, ‘Industrial Accidents and the Veil of Transnational Corporations’ in F. Francioni and 
T. Scovazzi (eds), International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (London: Graham & Trotman, 
1991) 395; O. De Schutter, ‘Towards a New Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ (2016) 1 Business and 
Human Rights Journal 41, 47– 54.
 16 A. Palmer, Community Redress and Multinational Enterprises (London:  Foundation for 
International Environmental Law and Development, 2003) 8– 9.
 17 For instance, the case of pollution of Guyana’s Essequibo River due to gold mining activities in 
1995 by a Canadian multinational subsidiary. A class action was brought by 23,000 Guyanese victims 
before the Canadian Superior Court, which dismissed it on grounds of forum non conveniens. Since the 
mine was the source of 20 percent of Guyana’s GDP, there were serious concerns as to whether a fair 
hearing could be held in the host country. Recherches Internationales Quebec v. Cambior Inc., Canada 
Superior Court, Quebec, no. 500– 06- 000034– 971)] 1998 QJ N2554 (QL). For a full account of the case, 
S. Seck, ‘Environmental Harm in Developing Countries caused by Subsidiaries of Canadian Mining 
Corporations: The Interface of Public and Private International Law’ (1999) 37 The Canadian Yearbook 
of International Law 139; and R. Unger, ‘Brandishing the Precautionary Principle through the Alien 
Tort Claims Act’ (2001) 9 New York University School of Law Environmental Law Journal 638, 638.
 18 P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 1056.
 19 This was explicitly stated, for instance, by the Superior Court of Bogotá when deciding that neither 
the State nor a multinational company were responsible for damage caused by oil drilling activities re-
sulting in deforestation, pollution, ecosystem degradation, and damage to natural resources tradition-
ally used by the U’wa indigenous tribe in an adjacent reservation, refusing to impair the host country’s 
essential economic interest by suspending oil exploration. Initially, the Colombian Constitutional 
Court had revoked the oil company’s environmental licence, holding that the relevant EIA did not take 
into consideration the impacts on the U’wa tribe of the oil operations, which threatened the people’s 
ethnic, cultural, and economic identity. A. Gibson, ‘The Real Price of Oil: Cultural Survival and the 
U’wa of Colombia’ (2000) 34 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 139; J. A. 
Cohan, ‘Environmental Rights of Indigenous Peoples under the Alien Tort Claims Act, the Public Trust 
Doctrine and Corporate Ethics, and Environmental Dispute Resolution’ (2001– 02) 20 UCLA Journal of 
Environmental Law and Policy 133, 142.
 20 In the Montedison case, for instance, public servants responsible for authorizing a private company 
to discharge industrial waste at sea, were held liable for environmental damage, as held by Cassazione, 
Sez. Unite, 25 January 1989, n. 440, reprinted in 1989 Rivista Giuridica dell’Ambiente 97. A. Postiglione, 
‘Danno ambientale e Corte di Cassazione’ (1989) Rivista giuridica dell’Ambiente 97; A. Kiss, ‘Un cas de 
pollution internationale: l’affaire des boues rouges’ (1975) 102 Journal du Droit International 207; T. 
Scovazzi, ‘Immersione di sostanze inquinanti in mare e risarcimento del danno’ (1986) Rivista giuridica 
dell’ ambiente 105.
 21 For instance, the case of the OK Tedi pollution in Papua New Guinea, discussed in Banks and 
Ballard (n. 14).
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Moreover, there are several practical barriers to seeking redress in host coun-
tries when a multinational causes environmental damage.22 For instance, plaintiffs 
may lack standing when the environmental damage is too general, or not specific 
to a certain individual/ group. Or they may lack financial and legal resources to file 
the claim, if these are not provided by the State. Finally, in some countries the level 
of damages that can be awarded or the fines that can be imposed against companies 
are so low, that it is often cheaper for corporations to pay damages than to invest in 
management or structures to prevent environmental harm from occurring.23
The corporate veil, coupled with the transboundary character of multinationals’ 
operations, makes it extremely difficult for the host State to effectively control cor-
porate conduct. For all these reasons, the host State may not represent an available 
venue for the full protection of the interests of the victims of environmental deg-
radation.24 Yet host State control is often considered the most significant level of 
regulation of multinationals, because of the limited development of international 
initiatives on the matter.25
1.2 Home State control
Control over corporate environmental conduct even when companies operate 
abroad can be exercised by the State in which the multinational is incorporated 
or headquartered, through the extraterritorial application of national standards of 
the home State26 or international standards27 over the multinationals’ operations 
abroad. Such control has already been put in place for promoting foreign direct in-
vestment through risk insurance, tax exemptions, and anti- trust and export control 
 22 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24 on State 
Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Context 
of Business Activities, section (2017) UN Doc. E/ C.12/ GC/ 24, paras 42– 43.
 23 The International Council on Human Rights Policy, Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the 
Developing International Legal Obligations for Companies (Versoix: International Council on Human 
Rights Policy, 2002) 79.
 24 The consideration has also been formulated in relation to the Bhopal case by H. Hosein, 
‘Unsettling: Bhopal and the Resolution of International Disputes Involving an Environmental Disaster’ 
(1993) 16 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 285, 299.
 25 Muchlinski (n. 5) 107.
 26 For a complete review of host State methods of controlling foreign investors, Sornarajah (n. 
4) ch. 3; and Muchlinski (n. 5) ch. 5. See also J. Zerk, ‘Corporate Liabilty for Gross Human Rights 
Abuses: Towards a Fairer and More Effective System of Domestic Law Remedies’, report prepared for 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2012); Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Report to the Human Rights Council: Improving accountability and access to remedy 
for victims of business- related human rights abuse (2016) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 32/ 19; and Improving 
Access to Remedy in the area of Business and Human Rights at the EU Level: Opinion of the European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (10 April 2017).
 27 F. Francioni, Imprese multinazionali, protezione diplomatica e responsabilità internazionale 
(Milano: Giuffré Editore, 1979).
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laws.28 Accordingly, it has been argued that home State control could also include 
other areas of public interest, such as human rights and environmental liability.29
This may be justified on the assumption that developed States owe to the inter-
national community a duty of control over multinationals, because these States 
have better means of exercising such control. As multinationals’ activities even-
tually benefit the home State’s economic prosperity, they should not be secured 
through injury to other States or to the welfare of the international community as 
a whole.30 This is particularly the case when the home State is not effectively en-
suring compliance with international environmental law.31 It can also be argued 
that the exercise of sovereignty resulting in negative impacts on the territory of an-
other State requires ‘by analogy’ that considerations of environmental protection 
apply when the State exercises a right under international law within the territory 
of another State.32
Home State control of multinationals is, however, a limited way of ensuring the 
responsible conduct of multinationals. First and foremost, it poses a broad issue of 
respect for the national sovereignty of foreign countries. Extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion is not prohibited by international law when there is enough connection with 
the home State to justify it, and as long as there are no protests from host States. 
While some States have manifested their willingness to have the home State con-
trolling multinationals in their territory,33 other countries, however, may view it 
with suspicion when home State standards conflict with the host State’s regulation 
of foreign direct investment and protection of the environment.34 In particular 
with regard to the extraterritorial protection of social, economic, and cultural 
rights, commentators have identified the risk of ‘normative competency conflicts’ 
between home and host States due the distributive justice questions inherent in 
this group of human rights. This arguably leads to the situation where ‘what is con-
sidered a human rights violation in one (developed) country may be considered a 
legitimate exercise of state authority in another (developing) country’.35
In the case of home States willing to apply their domestic standards to their 
multinational operating abroad, this approach can also lead to the application 
of different environmental regulations to different multinationals operating in 
 28 Ibid. 24 and 112– 31; Sornarajah (n. 4) 144– 71 Francioni (n. 27) 24.
 29 Sornarajah (n. 4) 149– 53.
 30 Francioni (n. 27) 141; Sornarajah (n. 4) 164– 68.
 31 Iron Rhine Railway Arbitration (Belgium and the Netherlands), Award of the Arbitral Tribunal (24 
May 2005) para. 223.
 32 Ibid.
 33 India in the Bhopal case (Re Union Carbide Corat Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supat 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986), aff ’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2nd Cir. 1987) and Ecuador in the Texaco case (Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ 
7527 (VLB), 1994 U.S. Dist. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) 22– 23).
 34 Palmer (n. 16) 12; Muchlinski (n 5) 109.
 35 D. Augenstein and D. Kinley, ‘Beyond the 100 Acre Wood: In Which International Human Rights 
Law Finds New Ways to Tame Global Corporate Power’ (2015) 19 International Journal of Human 
Rights 828.
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the same sector and same foreign country, depending on their country of origin, 
thereby conferring a competitive advantage to those multinationals whose home 
State has lower environmental standards.36 Even where home States apply inter-
national standards endorsed also by the host State, this approach still gives rise to 
major logistical, financial, and technical questions in terms of monitoring compli-
ance with home State norms in foreign countries.
Nevertheless, the difficulties in litigating environmental cases in host States have 
led victims to seek redress in home State courts,37 based on the idea of a ‘mono-
lithic multinational’, according to which victims of accidents are entitled to sue the 
multinational in the State where the decision- making centre of the corporation 
is located, because of the exclusive knowledge of the risks involved in the multi-
nationals’ activities and inherent obligation to provide warnings of potential haz-
ards.38 Home States have an international duty to provide access to remedies in 
their domestic courts for violations of international human rights and environ-
mental law occurring in a host State when victims do not have access to effective ju-
dicial remedy in that State, as discussed below,39 but there are objections to viewing 
this as settled in international law. The phenomenon of transnational litigation 
has thus emerged as an effort to bring to justice at the national level the decision- 
making centre of the multinational structure, in order to seek redress beyond the 
financial limitations of the corporate entities of the same group. This phenomenon, 
also labelled ‘foreign direct liability’,40 has particularly concerned countries such as 
the US, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada, and Australia,41 arguably allowing for ‘a 
de facto globalization of law that is driven by necessity’, in the absence of other ef-
fective remedies.42
 36 J. P. Eaton, ‘The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, 
and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment’ (1997) 15 Boston University International Law 
Journal 261, 276; T. M. Kerr, ‘What’s Good for General Motors Is Not Always Good for Developing 
Nations:  Standardizing Environmental Assessment of Foreign- Investment Projects in Developing 
Countries’ (1995) 29 The International Lawyer 153, 153.
 37 A. Khokhryakova, ‘Beanal v.  Freeport- Mcmoran, Inc.:  Liability of a Private Actor for an 
International Environmental Tort under the Alien Tort Claims Act’ (1998) 9 Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law 463, 463.
 38 T. Gladwin, ‘A Case Study of the Bhopal Tragedy’ in C. Pearson (ed.), Multinational Corporations, 
Environment, and the Third World (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987) 223; Scovazzi (n. 15) 408 and 
413; Hosein (n. 24) 295 and B. Desai, ‘The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Litigation: An Overview’ (1994) 
Asian Yearbook of International Law 163.
 39 Section 2.3. See De Schutter (n. 15) at 54– 55, referring to UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights ‘Analytical Study on the Relationship between Human Rights and the Environment’ (2011) UN 
A/ HRC/ 19/ 34, para. 72.
 40 H. Ward, ‘Securing Transnational Corporate Accountability through National Courts: Implications 
and Policy Options’ (2001) 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 451, 454.
 41 H. Ward, Governing Multinationals: The Role of Foreign Direct Liability (London: Royal Institute 
for International Affairs, 2001); F. Calder and M. Culverwell, Following up the WSSD Commitments 
on Corporate Responsibility & Accountability (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2004) 
50– 51 <http:// www.riia.org/ pdf/ research/ sdp/ WSSD.pdf>.
 42 H. Ward, ‘Towards a New Convention on Corporate Accountability? Some Lessons from the Thor 
Chemicals and Cape PLC Cases’ (2002) 13 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 105, 109.
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There are several potential advantages to this level of action. Resort to foreign 
direct liability may help raise international attention on the alleged facts and put-
ting international pressure for obtaining remedial action on the multinational.43 
Secondly, the preparation of a foreign direct liability claim usually leads to the 
building of global alliances with international non- governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and leading experts, exposing new audiences to questions about corporate 
accountability and the protection of the environment. Finally, prospects of home 
State litigation may serve as a deterrent for multinationals’ environmentally irre-
sponsible conduct,44 particularly if punitive damages may be awarded.45 Foreign 
direct liability may also play a role in reducing the incentive for multinationals 
to lobby against higher environmental standards in host countries, because of 
the availability of home country levels of compensation even for damages caused 
abroad.46
Many limitations, however, characterize the resort to foreign direct liability.47 
First and foremost, home State courts are in a conflict of interests as to deciding 
cases involving national companies abroad. This attitude is exemplified by the use 
of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, namely the discretion of a court to re-
fuse to hear a case if the forum is inappropriate or inconvenient to the defendant. 
In the case of Texaco/ Chevron oil pollution in Ecuador, for instance, after several 
unsuccessful attempts,48 a US court49 established in 2002 the jurisdiction of the 
Ecuador courts so that their judgment could be enforceable against Texaco’s as-
sets in the US.50 This led an Ecuadorian court in 2011 to award damages of $8.6 
billion and clean- up costs. This was, however, followed by a US court ruling that 
the Ecuadorian judgment should not be enforced as it was obtained by corrupt 
means.51 Questions of jurisdiction have placed unfair obstacles in the way of for-
eign plaintiffs, thereby implicitly favouring multinationals.52 Undeniably, this 
 43 In the case of mine waste pollution of OK Tedi River in Papua New Guinea, for instance, the com-
pany reviewed and modified its environmental management policies voluntarily, due to the significant 
public attention attracted by a case brought before Australian courts: Palmer (n. 16) 11.
 44 S. Zia- Zarifi, ‘Suing Multinational Corporations in the US for Violating International Law’ (1999) 
4 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 81, 146.
 45 F. Rivera, ‘A Response to the Corporate Campaign against the Alien Tort Claims Act’ (2003) 14 
Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 251, 258.
 46 Ward (n. 41) 137.
 47 G. Skinner, R. McCorquodale, and O. De Schutter, with A. Lambe, The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial 
Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business (ICAR, CORE, and ECCJ, 2013).
 48 Aguinda v. Texaco [1996] S.D.N.Y., 945 F. Supp 625; Aguinda v. Texaco [2001] S.D.N.Y. No. 93 Civ 
7527. See discussion in T. Lambooy, A. Argyrou, and M. Varner, ‘An Analysis and Practical Application 
of the Guiding Principles on Providing Remedies with Special Reference to Case Studies Related to Oil 
Companies’ in S. Deva and D. Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 329, 338– 41.
 49 Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470 (S.D.N.Y. 11 March 2002).
 50 J. Miller, ‘Court of Appeals Ruling Re- Ignites Possibility that Texaco will Answer for its Alleged 
Degradation of Ecuador’s Rainforests in US Courts’ (1999) Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy Yearbook 139.
 51 https:// business- humanrights.org/ en/ texacochevron- lawsuits- re- ecuador.
 52 P. Prince, ‘Bhopal, Bougainville and OK Tedi: Why Australia’s Forum Non Conveniens Approach 
is Better’ (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 573.
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doctrine has determined the practical outcome of several cases, to the point that 
‘issues of jurisdiction and liability are becoming harder to separate in view of the 
fact that evidence of parent company control that is sufficient to establish forum 
jurisdiction may also be sufficient to establish the liability’.53 The application of the 
forum non conveniens doctrine ‘may amount to a denial of justice if no effective 
local redress is available or the plaintiffs are prevented by intimidation, corruption, 
civil war or cost from resorting to local courts’.54
Another sign of conflict of interests can be discerned in the unwillingness of the 
home State court to pierce the corporate veil,55 usually depending on whether it 
has been proven that the parent company exercises a certain level of control over 
the subsidiary abroad.56 In effect, ‘the function of forum non conveniens is often 
analogous to that of the corporate veil of separate legal personalities: both doc-
trines are used to insulate the parent company from liability carried out abroad’.57 
In the Amoco Cadiz oil spill case,58 for instance, the claim for pollution damages 
and clean- up costs was filed by France before the US courts, alleging that the ship 
owner, the vessel’s manager, and the parent company were each independently 
negligent in the design, construction, and maintenance of the vessel.59 The argu-
ment was received favourably by the court, which found that the parent company 
was ‘initially involved in and controlled the design, construction and manage-
ment of ’ the Amoco Cadiz and treated it ‘as if it were its own’.60 Complexity and 
unpredictability, however, still characterize these kind of cases, as the choice of law 
can vary for different aspects of the case: in the Amoco Cadiz case, US courts ap-
plied US law to determine the liability, and French law to determine the amount of 
compensation due.61
Besides the tendency of home State courts to favour the interests of their multi-
nationals and rule accordingly,62 national judges may also be concerned about af-
fecting foreign relations between the home and host State by unilaterally imposing 
liability on a multinational that was allowed to enter and operate in the host State.63 
This concern is exemplified by a case before US courts regarding the operation 
 53 P. Muchlinski, ‘The Bhopal Case:  Controlling Ultrahazardous Industrial Activities by Foreign 
Investors’ (1987) 50 Modern Law Review 545, 580.
 54 P. Birnie, A. Boyle, and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 3rd edn 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 309.
 55 Scovazzi (n. 15) 395.
 56 Palmer (n. 16) 12.
 57 M. J. Rogge, ‘Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy: Challenging 
the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re:  Union Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and Aguinda’ 
(2001) 36 Texas International Law Journal 299, 300.
 58 For the full account of the case from the parent company’s point of view, R. Jarashow, ‘The Lessons 
for Multinationals of the Amoco Cadiz’ (1986) Energy Law 789.
 59 Ibid. 791.
 60 Amoco Cadiz, District Court of Chicago, 18 April 1984, (1984) 2 Lloyds Rep. 304.
 61 Birnie et al. (n. 54) 312.
 62 Muchlinski (n. 53) 580.
 63 Khokhryakova (n. 37) 490.
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of UK and Australian multinational mining companies causing environmental 
damage on the island of Bougainville, in Papua New Guinea, which was dismissed 
at the request of the US State Department on grounds of the political question 
doctrine.64
A further difficulty lies in the high standard of proof required by home State 
courts in terms of the factual basis of the claims, considering that most of the infor-
mation is usually in the hands of the multinationals or of a host State unwilling to 
cooperate.65 Issues of enforcement of judgments are equally relevant in the case of 
home and host State litigation: the order by the home State court to clean up a con-
taminated site in the host State may be difficult to monitor or enforce.66
Clearly, foreign direct liability is extremely expensive and time- consuming, for 
which victims may not have the resources. The transnational character and com-
plexity of the cases involving a multinational often cause considerable delays in the 
hearing of the merits, which implies considerable delays in compensation,67 in the 
few cases in which compensation is eventually awarded.
1.2.1  Application of international law by national courts
Home State case law may, in principle, contribute to the identification of a growing 
body of international law applicable to the environmental disasters caused by 
multinationals’ operations. This has mainly been attempted in a limited number of 
jurisdictions.68
Lawsuits advocating the application of international standards to the irrespon-
sible environmental conduct of multinationals have been traditionally filed in the 
US, under the Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA).69 The Act allows US district courts 
to have ‘original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, com-
mitted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’.70 This has 
led to ‘the largest body of domestic jurisprudence regarding corporate responsi-
bility for violations of international law’.71 ATCA litigation ‘can be used to illustrate 
 64 N. L. Bridgeman, ‘Human Rights Litigation under the ATCA as a Proxy for Environmental Claims’ 
(2003) 6 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 1, 2 and in n. 142, where it quotes Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto Plc., 1204: ‘the court to conclude that the United States’ interests are aligned, or at least not incon-
sistent, with those of Papua New Guinea, in a way that suggests it would be appropriate to refrain from 
exercising jurisdiction in this case’.
 65 Zia- Zarifi (n. 44) 122.
 66 This was the reason why, in 2003, a US court dismissed the Bhopal case: Khokhryakova (n. 37) 492. 
Bano v. Union Carbide Corat, No. 99 Civ. 11329 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y., March 18, 2003); Bano v. Union Carbide 
Corat, No. 03– 7416 (S.D.N.Y., March 17, 2004).
 67 Muchlinski (n. 53) 581.
 68 Palmer (n. 16) 11. M. D. Goldhaber, ‘Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non- US Courts: A 
Comparative Scorecard’ (2013) 3 University of California Irvine Law Review 127.
 69 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1993). For a discussion from an international law perspective, M. Karavias, 
Corporate Obligations under International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 106– 11.
 70 For an introduction to ATCA and its recent evolution, Zia- Zarifi (n. 44) 88– 93.
 71 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Clarifying the Concepts of 
‘Sphere of influence’ and ‘Complicity’ (2008) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 8/ 16, para. 29.
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the conceptual problems involved in bringing a human rights claim against a cor-
poration’.72 ATCA litigation had a ‘limelight effect’ in bringing issues of corporate 
accountability to the fore and a ‘leverage effect’ in enhancing victims’ bargaining 
position and leading to out- of- court settlements.73 But of thirty- six ATCA cases 
involving companies (on environmental and other corporate misconduct) before 
2006, twenty were dismissed, three settled, and none decided in favour of the plain-
tiffs.74 This is due to the limited international environmental law bases that can be 
invoked in the US and a more recent, restrictive interpretation of this recourse.
Given that the US is not party to any international treaty channelling liability 
to private actors responsible for environmental damage and has ratified only a re-
stricted number of international environmental treaties in general,75 most envir-
onmental cases have alleged violations of international customary law.76 Several 
plaintiffs have thus based their allegations on the due diligence obligation to pre-
vent transboundary pollution, according to the formulation of Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration,77 which is a well- established international customary 
norm.78 Nevertheless, US courts did not seem sympathetic to this argument. In 
1991, for instance, a US court dismissed the case against a US corporation re-
garding an unauthorized shipment of hazardous waste for lack of subject- matter 
jurisdiction, since it did not find that customary international law was at stake. It 
rather found that Stockholm Principle 21
[r] efer[s] only in a general sense to the responsibility of nations to insure that ac-
tivities within their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environment beyond 
their borders.79
 72 P. Muchlinski, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ in P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, and C. Schreuer 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
637, 674.
 73 S. Deva, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Violations:  Humanizing Business (Abingdon, 
Routledge: 2012) 74.
 74 Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises (2006) UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ 2006/ 
97, para. 62.
 75 Khokhryakova (n. 37) 465.
 76 L. Lambert, ‘At the Crossroads of Environmental and Human Rights Standards: Aguinda v. Texaco 
Inc: Using the Alien Tort Claims Act to Hold Multinational Corporate Violators of International Laws 
Accountable in U.S. Courts’ (2000) 10 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 109, 120.
 77 ‘Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment’ (16 June 1972) UN 
Doc. A/ CONF.48/ 14/ Rev.1. Principle 21 reads as follows: ‘States have, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’ (hereinafter, Principle 21).
 78 ICJ, Gabčíkovo- Nagymaros Project (Hungary- Slovakia), Judgment (25 September 1997), para. 53.
 79 Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corat, 775 F. Supat 668, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). A. Rosencranz and R. 
Campbell, ‘Foreign Environmental and Human Rights Suits against U.S. Corporations in U.S. Courts’ 
(1999) 18 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 145, 155– 56. But see Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ 7527 
(VLB), 1994 U.S. Dist. (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) 22– 23 and comments by Cohan (n. 19) 162.
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Another argument based on customary international law was brought be-
fore US courts. Plaintiffs alleged the violation of a ‘customary obligation to avoid 
causing long- term, widespread and severe environmental damage that prejudices 
the health or survival of a population, or that deprives a people of its means of sub-
sistence,’80 in light of the prohibition of this type of environmental harm under the 
law of war which was considered of international concern regardless of whether 
State action was involved.81 The respective decisions did not take note of this argu-
ment, however.
In other ATCA cases, arguments were based on principles of international en-
vironmental law. In the Beanal v. Freeport- McMoran case, the repeated dumping of 
massive quantities of toxic mine tailings into local river ways in Indonesia by a US 
multinational mining company82 led the leader of the Amungme indigenous tribe, 
Beanal, to allege the violation of the precautionary, polluter- pays, and proximity 
principles by the company.83 The court rejected these arguments, holding that the 
invoked environmental principles were not customary, because there was no ‘uni-
versal consensus in the international community as to their binding status’.84 In 
addition, it was held that even if the principles were customary, they did not apply 
to private actors, but only to States.85 The court expanded on its decision during the 
appeal, in the following terms:
The principles merely refer to a general sense of environmental responsibility 
and state abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable stand-
ards and regulations to identify practices that constitute international environ-
mental abuses or torts  . . .  federal courts should exercise extreme caution when 
adjudicating environmental claims under international law to ensure that envir-
onmental policies of the United States do not displace environmental policies of 
other governments. Furthermore, the argument to abstain from interfering in a 
sovereign’s environmental practices carries persuasive force especially when the 
alleged environmental torts and abuses occur within the sovereign’s borders and 
do not affect neighboring countries.86
 80 For an overview of the lawsuit from the viewpoint of amicus curiae Earthrights, <http:// www.
earthrights.org/ bhopal/ index.shtml>.
 81 See also Amici Curiae Brief presented by Earthrights International, Kiss, Shelton, and Anaya 
among others in the Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp. case (3 December 2002) https:// earthrights.
org/ publication/ amicus- brief- in- flores- v- southern- peru- copper- corporation/ ; Amici Curiae Brief by 
Earthrights International in the Texaco case (November 2001) http:// www.earthrights.org/ legaldocs/ 
jota_ v._ texaco_ and_ aguida_ v._ texaco.html; Amici Curiae Brief by Sierra Club and Earthrights 
International in the Beanal v. Freeport McMoran case (13 November 1998) <http:// www.earthrights.
org/ legaldocs/ beanal_ v._ freeport_ mcmoran.html>.
 82 For a full account of the case, Khokhryakova (n. 37).
 83 Ibid. 472.
 84 Beanal v. Freeport- McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supat 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (No. 96– 1474).
 85 Khokhryakova (n. 37) 116. Beanal v. Freeport- McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supat 362 (E.D. La. 1997) (No. 
96– 1474) 383– 84.
 86 Beanal v. Freeport- McMoRan, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166– 67 (5th Cir. 1999) 167 (emphasis added). 
Unger (n. 17) 646.
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This extract typifies the ‘restrictive view of international environmental law’ 
under ATCA.87 As the above statement was not discussed further or supported by 
any citation other than previous jurisprudence, certain American scholars did not 
consider the decision a valid precedent.88 But subsequent judgments under ATCA 
made express reference to these findings to dismiss other environmental cases.89
Overall, US judges have appeared reluctant or even suspicious as to the applica-
tion of international environmental law under ATCA,90 much more so than those 
based on human rights violations.91 This may be motivated by the uncertainty 
about their legal status,92 leading to the conclusion that ‘[US] courts do not yet 
believe that international environmental law has achieved the level of universality 
and specificity for supporting ATCA jurisdiction’.93 Nevertheless, ATCA continues 
to be the subject of attention by legal scholars and human rights activists around 
the world, including from the perspective of protecting the rights of indigenous 
peoples in conjunction with the protection of the environment.94
The 2013 Kiobel decision of the US Supreme Court95 has significantly limited op-
portunities to eventually develop national practice on universal civil jurisdiction.96 
The Kiobel decision underscored a presumption against extraterritorial application 
to avoid interferences with foreign policy,97 pointing towards a more restrictive ap-
proach to direct foreign liability on the basis of customary international law in the 
future. It has been argued, however, that the Kiobel decision does not necessarily 
close the door to suits against US98 corporations on the basis of ‘federal common 
 87 Zia- Zarifi (n. 44) 117.
 88 Ibid; Unger (n. 17) 645.
 89 Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 22 and n. 43, where it stated that ‘documents [presented by 
the plaintiffs] are insufficiently relevant or weighty to warrant discussion in the circumstances of the 
present case’.
 90 R. Herz, ‘Litigating Environmental Abuses under the Alien Tort Claims Act:  A Practical 
Assessment’ (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law Association 545, 572, where the author re-
fers to ‘the judiciary’s general mistrust of international law’. Birnie et al. (n. 54) 327.
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law, some of which is derived, in part, from customary international law’.99 The 
Supreme Court confirmed a 2004 cautious indication that ATCA claims must ‘rest 
on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th- century paradigms’ such 
as piracy.100 This was seen by commentators as a ‘continuing, seemingly visceral 
resistance to treating modern international law in both treaty and customary form 
as law of the US . . . with results that are incompatible with the long- term inter-
ests of the United States in furthering the rule of law among States’.101 It was fur-
ther seen as disregarding ‘contemporary “affirmative” forms of substantive law for 
resolving communal problems, like environmental degradation and egregious 
human rights violations’.102 The decision has even been interpreted as excluding al-
together international environmental law as actionable norms under the Statute.103 
Effectively, US courts’ limited engagement with and conservative understanding 
of international law precludes arguments based on the progressive development 
of international environmental law,104 including on the basis of international soft 
law with a view to holding ‘decision- makers to take into account the interests of a 
greater proportion of the relevant stakeholders— including the interests of foreign 
stakeholders’.105
Paradoxically,106 however, while the continued relevance of US courts for cor-
porate (environmental) accountability is in doubt, national courts in the UK107 
and the Netherlands108 are playing an increasing role, on the basis of national tort 
law or criminal law (and therefore not international law). This trend is emerging 
from the overcoming of the forum non conveniens barrier under EU law.109 But it 
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is encountering opposition from governments:110 both the US and the UK have 
taken measures that undermine access to justice (limiting the potential for cor-
porate abuse victims to seek redress in US courts, and limiting legal fees for lawyers 
bringing human rights claims that would be borne by the opposing party).111
It can be concluded that recourse to national law and transnational litigation for 
holding corporations to account in light of international law remains a highly com-
plex and experimental area of legal practice that has evolved into a burgeoning area 
of scholarship of its own right. This is set to continue to grow in importance also 
in connection with the expanding phenomenon of climate litigation.112 This book 
cannot do justice to the extent and depth of the current debate. Rather, it limits it-
self to underscoring the importance of this area of practice and research as a back-
ground to the development, and an alternative to the application, of international 
standards that are examined in detail in the following chapters. More research is 
needed to better understand mutual influences among transnational litigation and 
international standards, as well as transnational contractual practices that seek to 
avoid the shortcomings identified in transnational litigation.113
2 The limits of international law
International law does not, in principle, envisage a special role for private com-
panies, but rather provides for States to enact the necessary legislation to direct 
and control the conduct of these actors in their territory and under their jurisdic-
tion.114 International law could thus be relevant in an inter- State dispute over one 
State’s failure to regulate and monitor adequately private companies under its con-
trol, under the international law on State responsibility. In addition, international 
environmental law includes regimes for civil liability that aim to specifically target 
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certain operators. International regimes for criminal responsibility could also 
target the private sector. All these international approaches, however, are charac-
terized by significant drawbacks, as will be discussed in the following sub- sections. 
This serves to justify the focus of this book on international environmental stand-
ards for corporate accountability and responsibility, as an alternative and com-
plementary way of addressing the environmentally irresponsible conduct of 
multinationals and other companies at a point in time when States seem unable or 
unwilling to use traditional international law instruments to directly address cor-
porate conduct.
This section will also investigate the link between international environmental 
law and other branches of public international law, such as international human 
rights law and international investment law. On the one hand, the search for an 
international system of corporate environmental accountability will be contrasted 
with the international protection of foreign investment, in as far as multinationals 
are concerned. On the other hand, actual and potential synergies between inter-
national legal instruments and processes for human rights protection and those 
for environmental protection will be explored, particularly in light of the exponen-
tial growth of international human rights practice concerning corporate account-
ability of the last decade.
2.1 International law on State responsibility
A traditional solution under international law that has been considered to hold 
multinationals and other companies accountable for environmental damage is the 
international law on State responsibility. This is a realm, however, in which ‘almost 
nothing is certain’.115 As State responsibility is the consequence of violations of 
international norms committed by State organs, one can argue that State respon-
sibility can exist when a State instructed, directed, or controlled an entity,116 such 
as a private company, that violated international environmental norms. Such a hy-
pothesis may only cover a minority of cases of environmentally irresponsible con-
duct of private enterprises worldwide. It could, however, still be significant in cases 
in which private entities carry out functions traditionally discharged by the State, 
 115 R. Higgins, Problems and Processes. International Law and How We Use it (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994) 146. For a discussion of international law on State responsibility from an environmental 
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on Environment and Development:  A Commentary (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2015) 351, 
351– 59.
 116 Art. 8, ILC ‘Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, Report of 
the International Law Commission (2001) UN Doc. A/ 56/ 10, Ch. V. annex to General Assembly Res. 
56/ 83 (12 December 2001), and corrected UN Doc. A/ 56/ 49(Vol. I)/ Corr.4.
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such as the provision of water.117 It could be relevant if corporate activities result in 
less affordable or worse- quality goods and services that are dependent on natural 
resources and that are necessary for the enjoyment of basic economic, social, and 
cultural rights.118 Other authors suggest that national governments should bear re-
sponsibility for actions of private companies abroad that have received foreign aid 
or export credit guarantees, on the basis of complicity.119
Alternatively, the attribution of private conduct to a State for the purpose of 
invoking that State’s international responsibility could be arguably based on the 
State’s failure to exercise the due diligence required by international norms in 
preventing or punishing certain conduct by the private company in its territory.120 
In this case, the international law of State responsibility is said to apply to the host 
State in the event of transboundary environmental harm caused by private entities 
operating within its territory.121 In addition, State responsibility can arguably be 
applied to home States for the damage caused by their multinationals abroad, on 
the basis of a breach of due diligence over the parent company.122 In this case, the 
transboundary element of the environmental damage would consist in the export 
of hazardous substances or technologies.123 In both instances, it is necessary to 
prove a ‘double due diligence standard’, namely, that the company failed to exercise 
due diligence in carrying out its activities and that the State omitted to exercise due 
diligence in overseeing the activities of the company.124
Other authors suggest that State responsibility should function as a residual com-
plement to civil liability and insurance regimes for environmental damage.125 An 
operator fully complying with applicable domestic rules, standards, and govern-
ment controls may be exempted from liability in case of environmental damage,126 
so claims for damages should be brought against the State.127 These authors, there-
fore, affirm that a dual system would combine civil liability under domestic law, 
 117 A. McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights (Abingdon:  Routledge, 2010) 
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which will generally represent the most efficient means of securing redress for 
transboundary environmental damage, and State responsibility as a subsidiary 
remedy of last resort, when private parties are not liable or are insolvent.128 This 
was indeed one of the ideas behind the work of the International Law Commission 
(ILC) on the study ‘International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not 
Prohibited by International Law and Protection of the Environment’.129 State li-
ability arises directly from harm resulting from an activity permitted under inter-
national law, irrespective of the State’s fault, negligence, or unlawful conduct. 
Liability originates automatically from the conduct of private operators acting in 
its territory or under its jurisdiction, on the assumption that it would be inequit-
able to leave the burden of unavoidable harm to lie where it falls merely because 
the source State has acted with all due diligence. The consequence of the damage is 
that the State is to pay compensation, and the activity that caused the damage can 
continue. The level of compensation is determined by negotiation, according to 
an equitable, rather than full, compensation standard. It could be counter- argued, 
however, that State liability is not widely supported at the international level nor 
is liability for any type of activity located within the territory of a State in the per-
formance of which no State officials or agents are involved.130 Another criticism is 
that non- performance of private entities’ due diligence cannot easily be attributed 
to the State as conduct justifying attachment of liability.131 In response to these 
critiques and as a reaction to the continuing reluctance of States to proceed with 
the topic, the ILC decided in 1997 to separate its articles on liability from those 
on prevention of environmental harm, and to postpone work on the former.132 In 
effect, the text adopted by the ILC on prevention of transboundary harm from haz-
ardous activities133 envisages obligations of prevention and compensation on the 
State, not the operator.134 On the other hand, one of eight draft principles on the 
allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activ-
ities, adopted by the Commission in 2006, calls upon States to impose liability on 
the operator.135 Such decision has been considered ‘against all logic’, after the ILC 
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work had emphasized the lawfulness of activities and the possible implication that 
prevention of harm is not an absolute duty.136
During the discussions on State liability within the ILC, developing countries 
expressed their concern that multinationals lacked any duty to notify their home 
States of all the risks involved in the export of hazardous technology or to manage 
their operations with the same standards of safety and accountability as were ap-
plicable in the country of origin. They reiterated the argument that a duty might 
be placed on the State of origin to ensure that multinationals’ export of hazardous 
technologies conform to international standards, and to accept a share in the allo-
cation of loss resulting from any accident causing transboundary harm. The issue 
of the effective home or host State control over multinationals seems the most 
controversial point for the purpose of establishing international liability.137 This 
is due to the recognition of the difficulty in exercising effective State control over 
multinationals, particularly in the case of developing countries, because of multi-
nationals’ ‘financial power and the sole custody of knowledge on advanced science 
and technology’.138
One could also envisage a more complex scenario where both the home and 
the host State could incur independently joint responsibility for different breaches 
of their international law obligations to regulate foreign corporations operating in 
their own territories and to control their corporations operating abroad, respect-
ively.139 Or it could be possible for them to share international responsibility when 
the home and host State established a joint consortium through which they both 
empowered a company to exercise governmental authority.140 There is no inter-
national or national case law on either scenario.141
Even if the resort to State responsibility could be successfully argued in the event 
of corporate environmental harm, several additional limits would undermine 
its effectiveness. First of all, the affected country has full discretion in deciding 
whether to bring the case against another State, thus leaving to foreign policy con-
siderations the decision to seek clean- up costs and redress for victims.142 Victims 
would thus be subject to the goodwill of States and, in any event, subject to long 
waits before compensation— a situation which would lead to great uncertainty for 
victims and possibly inequitable distribution of compensation.143 Furthermore, in 
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the specific case of environmental damage, it may be particularly difficult to estab-
lish State responsibility, when the legal status or content of the invoked environ-
mental rule is uncertain.144 Uncertainty surrounding liability standards, the type 
of environmental damage that is recoverable, and the role of equitable balancing, 
means that the outcome of any claim remains inherently unpredictable.145
Most importantly, international practice has shown the unwillingness of States 
to remedy environmental damage through the traditional rules of State respon-
sibility. A  very small percentage of international environmental accidents has 
given rise to such claims.146 For example, in the Sandoz case, when a multinational 
operating in Switzerland caused a widespread mercury spill into the Rhine, the 
Swiss government offered to restore the damaged ecosystem and pay compensa-
tion to the French government, without acknowledging its international responsi-
bility.147 None of the downstream States sought other remedies from Switzerland 
for a breach of international law either, even though Switzerland’s failures to pre-
vent transboundary environmental harm or to inform other affected countries 
in a timely manner were quite evident.148 Characteristically, States are hesitant in 
adding detailed norms on State responsibility.149 International practice has, there-
fore, relied on a sort of ‘soft responsibility’: States pay compensation for damage 
caused, avoiding or deliberately excluding admissions of responsibility at the inter- 
State level.150
It has also been argued that a multinational that is aiding and abetting the 
host State’s violation of international human rights law could incur ‘derivative 
responsibility’ due to the causal connection with the State’s international respon-
sibility.151 This would depend on the multinationals being aware that the State 
conduct would most likely contribute to a human rights violation (deriving such 
knowledge from publicly available information such as international or domestic 
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cases, NGO reports, communications from local communities) and significantly 
contribute to the violation.152 Such a situation could involve a multinational pro-
viding technological, logistical, or financial support to the State, such as making 
possible mining operations in violation of the human rights of local popula-
tion.153 But such a hypothesis on derivative responsibility under international 
law for multinationals is necessarily premised on the argument that multi-
nationals are directly bound by international human rights obligations,154 which 
remains a matter of contention.
2.2  International regimes on civil liability for environmental 
damage: en impasse?
International environmental law includes several civil liability regimes targeting 
the private operator for environmental damage,155 having led to the development 
of a ‘web of related liability regimes’ in the field of oil pollution, transport of haz-
ardous goods by land and sea, transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, 
nuclear energy generation, maritime activity and human activity in Antarctica.156 
These treaties impose liability on operators.157 They provide for the international 
harmonization of minimum standards of liability in national law, in specific in-
stances where the environmental responsibility of the private sector is considered 
paramount. This approach in international law aims to deter harmful acts and 
remedy environmental damage by transferring the question from the inter- State 
level to interpersonal level, from public to private international law.158 In practice, 
it seeks to prevent resort to the international law of State responsibility.159 While it 
has been argued that these treaties ‘directly address’ corporations by specifying ob-
ligations of conduct upon them,160 they still operate through domestic law to reach 
private operators.161
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Generally civil liability regimes in international environmental law opt for strict 
limited liability of the operator in specific sectors of environmental protection,162 
with State responsibility remaining as a residual option.163 This approach entails 
channelling liability to the polluter (operator or owner), irrespective of his/ her 
fault, on the assumption that the party with the most effective control of the risk at 
the time of the accident should be primarily liable.164 Strict limited liability is gen-
erally coupled with the provision of additional funding sources to meet claimed 
damage. Additional funding is derived from public funds of State budgets, or from 
a common pool of funds created by contributions either from operators of the 
same type of dangerous activities or from entities for whose direct benefit the dan-
gerous activity is carried out.165
Existing international environmental liability regimes are sector- specific, 
limited to specialized international schemes for ultra- hazardous activities.166 
Being usually characterized by a narrow scope,167 they offer a piecemeal solu-
tion to environmental harm caused by the private sector.168 In addition, they may 
not provide sufficient incentive to the operator to take strict measures of preven-
tion or to meet all the legitimate demands of innocent victims for reparation in 
case of injuries,169 thus only implementing in part the polluter- pays principle.170 
Most importantly, the low rate of ratification and lack of entry into force of sev-
eral civil liability treaties highlights States’ reluctance to commit themselves to 
consequences for breach of international obligations or damage,171 because of the 
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financial implications that liability schemes have for public budgets and private 
entities, including the insurance sector.172 It can be concluded that ‘while States 
have significantly developed environmental rules, they have been rather reluctant 
to simultaneously agree on the pertinent rules on responsibility and liability’.173 
This may explain the recent turn towards an administrative approach to prevent 
and restore environmental harm in international rules on civil liability for envir-
onmental damage.174
2.3 International environmental crimes?
Another potential means of establishing individual and companies’ responsibility 
for environmental harm under international law is defining crimes as a way of 
enforcing international environmental law. This would also add an incentive to re-
frain from harmful conduct by allowing more stringent enforcement measures or 
penalties to be imposed,175 such as the seizing and forfeiting of corporations’ assets 
to compensate victims.176
The 1996 draft Code of Offences Against Peace and Security of Mankind177 of 
the ILC included international environmental crimes as war crimes, referring to 
the use of methods or means of warfare which are ‘intended, or may be expected, 
to cause widespread long- term, and severe environmental damage to the natural 
environment’ and acts of individuals ‘who willfully cause or order the causing of 
widespread long- term and severe environmental damage to the natural environ-
ment’. The offence could only be committed during armed conflict, only when the 
methods and means of warfare were not justified by military necessity, and only 
when the intended environmental damage gravely prejudiced the health or sur-
vival of a population.178
10 December 1999; not in force); and Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (London, 3 May 1996; not 
in force), which has meant to be superseded by a 2010 Protocol (London, 30 April 2010; not in force).
 172 Orrego Vicuña (n. 126) 181.
 173 Ibid. 135.
 174 Nagoya– Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety (Nagoya, 15 October 2010; in force in force 5 March 2018). See R. Lefeber, ‘The 
Legal Significance of the Nagoya– Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol: The Result of a Paradigm 
Evolution’ (Amsterdam Law School, 2012); S. Jungcurt and N. Schabus, ‘Liability and Redress in 
the Context of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’ (2010) 19 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law 197; and E. Orlando, ‘From Domestic to Global? Recent Trends in 
Environmental Liability from a Multi- level and Comparative Law Perspective’ (2015) 24 Review of 
European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 289, 299– 300.
 175 Orlando (n. 174) 284.
 176 Karavias (n. 69) 99– 101 and 114.
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as a war crime’ (1996) UN Doc. A/ 51/ 10, ch. II(A), paras 43– 44. Sands (n. 18) 894– 96.
 178 Birnie et al. (n. 54) 329– 33.
 
The limits of international law 47
The draft Code influenced the drafting of the 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which followed the same approach by including, 
among the list of enumerated offences, ‘internationally launching an attack in the 
knowledge that such an attack will cause . . . widespread long- term and severe en-
vironmental damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated’. 179 
This, however, applies only to international armed conflicts.
The hypothesis of ‘willful and severe damage to the environment’ as a crime 
against peace and security of humankind was addressed by the ILC in one of the 
drafts of the Code, but was not included in the final text. No similar proposal was 
made at the Rome Conference.180 The question as to whether international envir-
onmental crimes, in such restricted circumstances, can be committed by a multi-
national has not been addressed by the Rome Statute, which does not contemplate 
any jurisdiction over juridical persons.181
Some authors have argued that serious and widespread environmental harm is 
prohibited by norms of ius cogens providing legal standing to all States.182 The 1980 
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility183 listed international crimes affecting 
the ‘human environment’ in an effort to typify an international crime in connec-
tion with environmental obligations of essential importance, such as those pro-
hibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.184 However, the final 
ILC codification on State responsibility in 2001 did not contain this draft provi-
sion.185 Therefore, the idea of an international environmental crime in peacetime, 
within the category of crimes against humanity, has not been accepted by the inter-
national community.186 This may explain why, when in 2014 Ecuadorian com-
munities made a complaint to the ICC against Chevron CEO for environmental 
degradation and attempts to evade remediation as a crime against humanity, the 
ICC Prosecutor did not consider these allegations international crimes under the 
Court’s jurisdiction.187
 179 Art. 8(2)(b)(iv), Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome, 17 July 1998).
 180 P. Robinson, ‘The Missing Crimes’ in A Cassese, P. Gaeta, and J. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of 
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Multinational Corporations under International Law’ (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 139.
 186 Birnie et al. (n. 54) 331– 33.
 187 https:// www.business- humanrights.org/ en/ texacochevron- lawsuits- re- ecuador.
48 The Shortcomings of Traditional Legal Solutions
More generally the Rome Statute does not include corporate crimes, although 
at least
The protracted debates leading to the adoption of the Statute stand as testament to 
the renewed significance attached to international criminal law as an appropriate 
and effective means of curbing the involvement of corporate entities in the com-
mission of crimes under international law.188
In sum, there are currently no corporate ‘crimes under international law’ (ie 
directly punishable under international law without the intermediary of domestic 
law)189 including in relation to the environment. That said, a 2015 Policy Paper 
providing guidance on how the ICC Office of the Prosecutor exercises its discre-
tion in the selection and prioritization of cases, concerns ‘international crimes’ that 
are found in domestic law on the basis of international treaties obliging States to 
criminalize certain corporate conduct.190 In relation to cases not selected for inves-
tigation or prosecution, the Prosecutor’s Office is expected to seek to cooperate and 
provide assistance to States, upon request, with respect to conduct which consti-
tutes a serious crime under national law, such as the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources, land grabbing, or the destruction of the environment, in light of the goal 
of the Statute to combat impunity and prevent the recurrence of violence by com-
bining the activities of the Court and national jurisdictions.191
It remains unclear at the time of writing to what extent these guidelines will 
lead to a greater role for the ICC in environmental matters, by focusing on inter-
national crimes under national law (allowing the ICC to support national pros-
ecution of multinationals, possibly in the form of complicity192). As was already 
noted in 2007, ‘there is growing potential for companies to be held liable for inter-
national crimes— with responsibility imposed under domestic law but reflecting 
international standards of individual responsibility’.193 Some international treaties 
require States to impose liability on companies for their involvement in relation to 
corruption, organized crime, and financing of terrorism.194 The Malabo Protocol 
 188 Karavias (n. 69) 99.
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Environmental Crimes under International Criminal Law? The Impact of the Office of the Prosecutor 
Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization on the Current Legal Framework’ (2018) 43 Columbia 
Journal of Environmental Law 181.
 193 This view was supposed by J. Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International 
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to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights makes corporations criminally 
liable for certain international crimes, including trafficking of hazardous waste and 
illicit exploitation of natural resources,195 but it has not attracted any ratification 
yet.196 The practice remains uneven and ‘criminal punishment of business involve-
ment in such crimes is rare, as is the imposition of proportional civil sanctions 
against corporations’.197
2.4 Balancing the international protection of foreign investment
Several attempts at ensuring corporate accountability are directed at multinational 
companies, in consideration of the protection offered to these companies by inter-
national investment law, which is not balanced by corresponding duties at the 
international level.198 International investment law199 will be taken into account 
in this book in as much as it relates specifically to foreign direct investment— 
the ‘transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one country to another for the 
purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth under the total or partial 
control of the owner of the assets’.200 In other words, this should be distinguished 
from investment undertaken by financial intermediaries, which is increasingly 
addressed through socially responsible investment instruments201 and is not ad-
dressed in this book. The discussion on international law and foreign direct invest-
ment will serve to highlight the general tendency to liberalization,202 the resulting 
international rights of multinationals and some contradictions.
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International investment law has built on the customary international law on 
the protection of aliens’ property and its gradual extension from tangible assets to 
other investors’ rights.203 This has limited the sovereignty of host States over their 
natural resources, and enlarged the sphere of corporate interests protected at the 
international level. Such limitation to host States’ discretion in admitting and con-
ditioning the entry of foreign investors is significantly strengthened by the mush-
rooming of bilateral investment treaties (BITs)204 setting out the rules according 
to which investment made by the nationals of the two States parties in each other’s 
territory will be protected.205 In addition, several regional free trade agreements 
include provisions on foreign investment.206 These instruments tend to be drafted 
in favour of foreign investors, although more recent ones also address concerns 
about preserving the regulatory function of the State in areas such as environ-
mental protection.207 The actual impact of these more recent provisions, however, 
remains doubtful as international tribunals tend to read down their effects, empha-
sizing the function of these treaties to protect investment.208
One of the most prominent features of the international protection of foreign 
investment is private actors’ direct resort to international dispute settlement, 
which further strengthens the position of multinationals as opposed to other busi-
ness ventures. The 1965 Washington Convention209 established the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and created an obligation 
to submit disputes regarding foreign investment to international arbitration, ra-
ther than leaving it to the parties to decide the appropriate tribunal. The impact of 
this Convention increased significantly in the 1990s, when a sudden proliferation 
of BITs referred to ICSID arbitration.210 As a result, private investors can file a case 
before an international tribunal not only for breach of State contract, but also for 
breach of a BIT concluded between the host and home State.211
ICSID decisions are particularly relevant for this study as they focus on whether 
controls instituted by the host State on environmental grounds can be regarded as 
compensable takings.212 As highlighted by Viñuales, these disputes for the large 
Press, 2016) 26 and F. Ortino and N. M. Tabari, ‘International Dispute Settlement: The Settlement of 
Investment Disputes concerning Natural Resources— Applicable Law and Standards of Review’ in 
Morgera and Kulovesi (ibid.) 496.
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 204 For a detailed discussion on BITs, Muchlinski (n. 5)  617 and ch. 17; and also Sornarajah 
(n. 4) ch. 5.
 205 Sornarajah (n. 4) 172– 224.
 206 Sornarajah (n. 10) 53.
 207 Sornarajah (n. 4) 225– 27.
 208 L. E. Peterson, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy- Making 
(Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2004) 23.
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part favour investors (in more than 70 per cent of the cases on jurisdiction and 
60 per cent on merits).213 The practice of international investment arbitration 
has ‘played an unbalancing role by overemphasizing the protection of investors 
over the authority of host State and public interest’ (which is often not aligned 
with interests of investors and host State).214 In Metalclad Corporation v. United 
Mexican States, for instance, the host State’s environmental protection regula-
tion was considered an indirect expropriation because it limited the investors’ 
reasonably- to- be- expected economic benefits.215 As a result, host States are con-
fronted with the prospects of costly arbitrations, and potentially onerous damage 
claims by private companies. Consequently, host States may exercise greater cau-
tion in their law- making, as investment arbitral tribunals may be particularly in-
sensitive to internationally protected environmental values through national law. 
In the Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica case,216 
the arbitral tribunal held that the justification of the State’s action under inter-
national environmental law, namely the protection of a site rich in biodiversity, 
was not relevant in deciding the amount to be paid to foreign investors negatively 
impacted by a lawful expropriation. In other words, environmental protection ob-
jectives, which justified the expropriation and were supported by applicable inter-
national norms, did not have a bearing on the quantification of compensation.217  
 213 Viñuales (n. 202) 33– 34.
 214 Ibid. 42.
 215 ICSID, Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, Case No. ARB(AF)/ 97/ 1, Award (30 
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Final Award (17 February 2000), (2000) 39 ILM 1317.
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In the S.D. Meyers case,218 the arbitral tribunal recognized that genuine environ-
mental measures, based on international environmental agreements, may pre-
vail over foreign investors’ interests, on the condition that the host State proves it 
selected the least investment- detrimental measure for the protection of the envir-
onment.219 In this respect, it should be considered that different environmental 
measures have different costs, and choosing the least detrimental to foreign in-
vestors may well be too expensive an option for certain governments. Scholars 
suggested that environmental takings, based on international environmental law, 
should be considered by an arbitral tribunal against investors’ liability for envir-
onmental harm, with a view to reducing the amount of compensation payable, or 
requiring multinationals to pay compensation in excess of the value of the taking 
when the harm is severe.220
Reliance by the host State on broadly framed international environmental ob-
ligations remains vulnerable to challenges on grounds of proportionality or due 
process.221 This is clearly demonstrated by Chevron’s successful international in-
vestment arbitration against Ecuador in the Texaco legal saga mentioned earlier. 
Ecuador was found to be in violation of a US- Ecuador BIT for unduly influencing 
the judiciary to condemn Chevron for environmental damages to the tune of 
US$9.51 billion. The international investment arbitration tribunal condemned 
Ecuador to pay USD$112 million in compensation to Chevron.222 Nonetheless, 
foreign investors are arguably increasingly expected to include the monitoring 
of national developments aimed at implementing international environmental 
rules as part of their assessment of regulatory risk.223 In Chmatura v. Canada, for 
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 219 The case involved a ban on exports of hazardous waste imposed by Canada, on the basis of sig-
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instance, an investment tribunal upheld a targeted environmental measure224 by 
reference to relevant international environmental obligations.225
Overall, the imbalance between the international rights of multinationals and 
the absence of duties to protect the environment or other interests of host States in 
return226 remains a matter of concern in international law.
As aptly put by Miles,
International investment law continues to reflect imperialistic conceptualizations 
of the environment in two central ways— i) the non- engagement of international 
investment law with the impact of investor activity on the local communities and 
the environment of the host state; and ii) the framing of environmental regulation 
as a violation of investment treaties.227
2.5 Synergies with international human rights law
The international accountability of multinationals has been increasingly explored 
in the realm of international human rights law.228 Human rights have become the 
dominant frame for the international debate on corporate accountability, as crys-
tallized in the inter- governmental endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights. This development, combined with significant ad-
vances in the understanding of the relationship between international human rights 
and international environmental law,229 provides for a critical field of research for 
corporate environmental accountability in international law. Interestingly, human 
rights have generally been a ‘late arrival’ in the context of international corporate 
accountability standards,230 compared with environmental ones. Along similar 
lines, there are only exceptional cases in which human rights treaties have provided 
for the harmonization of domestic rules to ensure liability of private companies.231
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The factual connection between the environment and human rights in rela-
tion to corporate accountability needs to be discussed first.232 A survey conducted 
by the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights indicated that 
nearly a third of cases of alleged environmental harm had corresponding impacts 
on human rights. The connection between the right to health, life, adequate food 
and housing, minority rights to culture, as well as the right to benefit from scientific 
progress; and environmental concerns were raised with respect to all business sec-
tors.233 As discussed above, human rights violations have often been alleged before 
national courts when corporate environmental damage is the result of gross neg-
ligence or deliberate indifference and caused severe, long- lasting, and widespread 
harm on people.234 This has been particularly the case of environmental degrad-
ation caused by multinational companies in areas traditionally occupied by indi-
genous peoples and local communities,235 such as the case of the environmental 
damage and human rights violations arising from Texaco/ Chevron’s oil explor-
ation in Ecuador.236 The arguments regarding the existence of an international pro-
hibition on causing intra- pollution put forward before US courts under the ATCA 
were also at the borderline between international environmental and human 
rights law. In addition, other cases alleged unsuccessfully that serious human 
rights abuses linked to environmentally damaging natural resource development 
amounted to cultural genocide partly caused by environmental degradation.237
Corporate environmental harm has also emerged in international human rights 
case law,238 mainly in an indirect way. In effect, international human rights case 
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law has provided an avenue to hold host States accountable for their inability or 
unwillingness to control private companies’ environmental conduct, particularly 
when the life, health, and culture of indigenous and tribal peoples were nega-
tively affected. In the seminal Awas Tingni case, for instance, the Inter- American 
Court of Human Rights looked into the effects of a logging concession to a Korean 
multinational in Nicaragua, which led to the violation of the human rights of in-
digenous communities that traditionally occupied the area concerned through a 
communal form of land tenure.239 The filing of the case before the Inter- American 
Court created such political pressure that the logging concession was revoked.240 
In its second environmental case, the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights condemned Kenya for its opening of the Endorois land to ruby mining ac-
tivities that would have impeded the right of these tribal peoples to access water.241 
This resulted in the mining company abandoning the project.242
While international human rights monitoring bodies have not indicated that 
companies themselves can breach directly international human rights norms, they 
have increasingly noted their role in the context of human rights violations. In the 
1990s, the Inter- American Commission of Human Rights investigated the impacts 
of Texaco/ Chevron’s oil exploitation in Ecuador243 and concluded, in an unpre-
cedented statement, ‘Both the State and the companies conducting oil exploration 
activities are responsible for these anomalies, and both should be responsible for cor-
recting them. It is the duty of the State to ensure that they are corrected’,244 including 
on the basis of international environmental law instruments, such as the Stockholm 
and Rio Declarations and the Convention on Biological Diversity.245 Another case 
in point is the Belize Report, in which the Inter- American Commission expressly 
stated that the direct cause of the damage was the activity of the multinational, 
and implicitly noted its partial responsibility together with the State.246 This was 
also the case for the recommendations of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights on Shell’s environmental damage in Nigeria.247
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A more notable case was the 2015 decision of Inter- American Court on Human 
Rights in the Case of Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname. The Court cited the 
UN Framework on Business and Human Rights in noting the role of private com-
panies in causing adverse impacts on the environment and indigenous peoples’ 
rights from mining activities. The Court underscored businesses’ responsibility to 
respect indigenous and tribal peoples’ human rights and called upon them to ‘pay 
special attention when such rights are violated’.248 This was reiterated in the Inter- 
American Court’s Advisory Opinion on Human Rights and the Environment in 
2017.249 The Court then focused on the role of the State in regulating, monitoring, 
preventing, punishing, and ensuring redress from corporate activities leading to 
human rights violations.250
2.5.1  Legal arguments
International human rights treaties have varying membership and are gener-
ally far from reaching universality. As opposed to international environmental 
law, they tend not to specify the scope of States’ duties to control companies.251 
Nonetheless, international human rights bodies have clarified by way of interpret-
ation that States have positive obligations to protect human rights in the relation-
ships between individuals and private entities, so that host States that are party 
to relevant international human rights treaties have an international obligation to 
regulate corporate conduct within their jurisdiction.252 Specifically, host States are 
‘expected to take all measures that could reasonably be taken, in accordance with 
international law, to prevent private actors from adopting conduct that may lead 
to human rights violations’. In addition, they have to provide for access to rem-
edies because their international responsibility would be engaged when violations 
could have been prevented without incurring in an unreasonable burden for the 
State.253 Horizontality in international human rights law has substantiated a wealth 
of case law concerning sub- standard corporate environmental conduct.254 As aptly 
observed by Karavias, this
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and 225.
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[c] orporate conduct has been recognized as a source of ‘interference’ with the en-
joyment of human rights. But, in no case has a human rights treaty body accepted 
to go a step further and recognize corporations themselves as addressees of inter-
national norms.255
As a result, the relevant obligations for corporations operate at the domestic 
level: it is still the State that is obliged under international law ‘to adopt legisla-
tion, to change its administrative practices, to investigate and to punish violations 
of human rights’ caused by corporate actors.256 In addition, international human 
rights case law has clarified that States cannot escape international responsibility 
by delegating obligations to private bodies, including through privatization.257 As 
Ruggie observed, ‘[t] he increasing focus on protection against corporate abuse by 
the UN treaty bodies and regional mechanisms indicates a growing concern that 
States either do not fully understand or are not always able or willing to fulfill this 
duty’.258
The human rights obligations of States vis- à- vis corporations and other busi-
ness entities should be understood in conjunction with the clarification provided 
by former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment John 
Knox on States’ duty to regulate corporations and companies’ responsibility to re-
spect environmental human rights.259 States’ procedural human rights obligations 
include the duty to provide for impact assessment, public participation in envir-
onmental decision- making, and access to effective remedies. States’ substantive 
obligations include the establishment of legal and institutional frameworks to pro-
tect against environmental harm to human rights; and heightened procedural and 
substantive duties with respect to groups in vulnerable situations, such as women, 
children, and indigenous peoples.
In addition, home States are also responsible for regulating the activity of cor-
porations under their jurisdiction (if these companies are registered under its laws, 
have their principal place of business under the state’s jurisdiction, or have located 
their main administrative centre on the state’s territory) even when they operate 
abroad,260 if they are able to influence them through legal or political means in 
 255 Karavias (n. 69) 44.
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accordance with international law.261 They are responsible also when they operate 
outside territorial jurisdiction on the basis of extraterritorial human rights obli-
gations (corporations established under the laws of another State that are man-
aged, controlled, or owned by persons having the nationality of the first State or 
having their main place of business administration on the territory of that State262). 
Extraterritorial obligations are however not recognized by all States.263,264
The relevance of these international human rights arguments for the envir-
onment has been clarified by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. The Committee indicated that the customary international law rule on 
transboundary environmental damage has been interpreted as extending to 
human rights violations. On that basis, it pointed to a State’s extraterritorial obliga-
tions to control activities of corporations domiciled in its territory or jurisdiction 
with a view to influencing their conduct outside their territory,265 especially when 
the remedies available to victims before the domestic courts of the State where the 
harm occurs are unavailable or ineffective.266 The Committee indicated that States 
also have obligations to take reasonable measures to prevent human rights viola-
tions associated with extractives. They also have international responsibility even 
if other causes have contributed to the occurrence of the violation, and even if the 
State had not foreseen a violation that was reasonably foreseeable.267 State obli-
gations of international cooperation extend to cross- border cooperation between 
enforcement agencies and judicial bodies to ensure access to remedies in trans-
national cases.268 This implies an obligation to remove substantive, procedural, and 
practical barriers to remedies, by establishing parent company or group liability 
regimes, providing legal aid, enabling class actions and public interest litigation, 
facilitating access to information, and collection and use of evidence abroad.269
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From a conceptual viewpoint, the use of human rights law and approaches to 
address corporate environmental damage facilitates tackling the power imbalances 
between corporations, governments, and communities, which emerge when trad-
itional legal remedies will not be sufficient to redress the damage.270 It has been 
argued, for instance, that when corporations exercise ‘ultimate authority’ on in-
dividuals, they should be treated as duty bearers under human rights law. This 
usually occurs when States fail to regulate private actors because of weak govern-
ment and corruption; or when corporations have so much power over government 
that they essentially control State decision- making.271 In addition, international 
human rights law allows international scrutiny of State behaviour in situations be-
yond the reach of international environmental law, which is when environmental 
damage is not transboundary or does not have global impacts on human rights.272 
Nonetheless, neither system has ‘proposed a systematic structure for approaching 
environmental harm to humans’.273
As Cotula argued, while both international human rights and investment law 
set minimum standards and judicial review mechanisms with regards to the exer-
cise of State sovereignty over natural resources, they are characterized by different 
historical trajectories, philosophical and conceptual approaches, and different 
standards of protection.274 International investment law provides stronger pro-
tection to multinationals than international human rights law does to victims of 
corporate abuses, both in terms of substantive standards and in terms of accessi-
bility and enforceability of remedies.275 For one thing, access by foreign investors 
to international arbitration does not require or is interpreted as not requiring 
exhaustion of local remedies, which gives foreign investors a clear advantage 
over victims of corporate abuses who can have access to the international level 
via human rights redress mechanisms only after having exhausted local rem-
edies.276 In addition, multinational companies sometimes also benefit from the 
protection of international human rights law: human rights standards on access 
to justice have in fact been invoked by multinational companies against States in 
arbitrations based on bilateral investment treaties,277 and breaches of bilateral 
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investment treaties have been brought before human rights bodies, on similar 
grounds.278
While these conceptual linkages have been sufficiently addressed in the lit-
erature, little academic attention has yet been devoted to the usefulness of inter-
national environmental law in addressing human rights- related concerns about 
corporate conduct. Concepts developed under international environmental law, 
including re- elaborated as international standards of corporate environmental ac-
countability, have been increasingly taken up in the development of international 
standards on business responsibility to respect human rights. The UN Framework 
on Business and Human Rights, for instance, is built on a due diligence process 
implying concepts and approaches279 that have been developed and/ or signifi-
cantly experimented with in the environmental sphere, notably:  (i) impact as-
sessment; (ii) stakeholder involvement in decision- making; and (iii) life- cycle 
management.280
2.6 The status of multinational companies in international law
The question of multinationals’ accountability on the international plane is related 
to the question of their legal personality.281 A significant part of legal scholarship 
acknowledges the need for some form of limited legal recognition of the presence 
of multinationals in international affairs in order to cope better with the problems 
they create,282 and their influence on the international law- making process.283 The 
‘long- standing scholarly arguments, however, over whether corporations could be 
“subjects” of international law . . . impeded conceptual thinking on . . . the attribu-
tion of direct legal responsibility to corporations’.284
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Law within Investor- State Arbitration (Rights & Democracy, 2009), cited in Savaresi (n. 277) 72.
 279 Sinden (n. 234) 14.
 280 E Morgera, Expert Report Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in the Environmental 
Sphere, European Commission- funded project ‘Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the 
Environment Applicable to European Enterprises Operating outside the European Union’, May 2010, 12 
(on file with author) .
 281 N. Jagers, ‘The Legal Status of the Multinational Corporation under International Law’ in M. 
K. Addo (ed.), Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 259, 261. S. Ratner, ‘Business’ in Bodansky, Brunnee, and Hey 
(n. 160) 807, 811– 13.
 282 A. A. Fatouros, ‘Looking for an International Legal Framework for Transnational Corporations’ 
in A. A. Fatouros (ed.), Transnational Corporations:  The International Legal Framework 
(London: Routledge, 1994) 1, 18.
 283 A. Alkoby, ‘Non- State Actors and the Legitimacy of International Environmental Law’ (2003) 3 
Non- State Actors and International Law 23.
 284 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises:  Mapping International Standards of 
Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts (2007) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 4/ 35, para. 20.
 
The limits of international law 61
Traditionally, only States are considered subjects of international law,285 whereas 
multinationals are not recognized as independent subjects despite their international 
economic and political power, in many instances dwarfing that of States. In accord-
ance with this traditional view, international law encompasses rights and duties of 
States and international organizations, while multinationals remain under the sover-
eignty of the States in which they operate. Although the opinion that multinationals do 
not have personality under international law has often been used as a reason against 
the development of rules addressing multinationals, this has not prevented the devel-
opment of a treaty establishing multinationals’ right to resort to international dispute 
settlement under international investment law.286
A way of recognizing multinationals’ role in international relations is to consider 
them as significant actors,287 indispensable interlocutors to States.288 Alternatively, 
Higgins suggested defining multinationals as participants, rather than subjects, in a 
system of international law seen as a decision- making process.289 It appears difficult 
to further define ‘actor’ or ‘participant’ in strict legal terms,290 although this approach 
is useful in grasping the reality of the development of international law as a process. It 
is also helpful to underscore that the ‘conservative’ concepts of ‘subjects, and objects 
of international law’ have provided ‘an intellectual prison of our own choosing’ that is 
often seen as ‘an unalterable constraint’.291
Another approach would be that of recognizing the status of multi-
nationals as members of the international community, together with indi-
viduals.292 On that basis, it could be argued that customary norms, being 
binding on the whole of the international community293 or on the whole of 
the subjects of the international legal order,294 could also bind multinational 
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companies.295 Even if there is no international rule opposing the creation of inter-
national custom regulating directly corporate conduct, however, it remains a 
widely held view that no customary rules of such nature have emerged in inter-
national human rights and criminal law.296 This is compounded by the difficulty 
of convincingly making the case for the existence of relevant customary norms 
of international environmental law. So, this line of reasoning represents a limited 
ground for advancing the debate.297
Alternatively, it has also been suggested that multinationals should be defined as 
‘entities sui generis’, whose treatment and the treatment of whose actions in inter-
national law needs to be approached on a pragmatic, case- by- case basis to reflect 
the functions they perform.298 In turn, Pierre- Marie Dupuy persuasively argued 
that multinationals have a ‘limited and functional legal personality’ under inter-
national law, in accordance with their international rights and obligations,299 by 
analogy with the recognition by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of such 
characteristics for international organizations.300 International rights for multi-
nationals can be identified in their ability to conclude international contracts 
with States, and have access to international alternative dispute resolution mech-
anisms.301 These ‘are conducted in a manner that is practically indistinguishable 
from inter- State arbitrations’ and whose awards ‘are commonly cited alongside 
inter- State awards as authorities on propositions of international law’.302 In add-
ition, multinationals have direct obligations and rights under certain internation-
alized functional contracts, such as those of deep- seabed mineral prospectors with 
the International Seabed Authority.303 In those cases, multinationals’ international 
legal personality is ‘coterminous with the scope of the obligations imposed upon 
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them by States’, including in terms of duration of these obligations in case these 
arise from contracts.304
International human rights law is an area where the question of the international 
legal personality of multinationals has been most studied. On the one hand, private 
companies are recognized as holders of the international human rights to fair trial, 
privacy, and freedom of expression, by the European Court of Human Rights,305 
where they have a right to petition the Court.306 Multinationals themselves have 
relied on international human rights law also in international investment dis-
pute settlement.307 On the other hand, the letter and the purpose of international 
human rights documents arguably suggests that multinationals are the subject 
of international obligations,308 because ‘everyone’ is a duty- bearer,309 But inter-
national human rights law has essentially been developed with natural persons in 
mind, and therefore does not easily fit the reality of legal persons.310
Overall, it can be concluded that, ‘at this stage in the development of inter-
national law the classification of corporations is a matter of choice’.311 In addition, 
‘much of the debate on international legal personality of transnational corpor-
ations . . . is rather abstract and may be of little help in an actual understanding of 
the form and scope of corporate accountability’.312
The continuing lack of an agreed, authoritative definition of multinational 
companies attests to the additional difficulties not only of classifying, but also of 
identifying multinationals, due to their continual state of change, and being sub-
ject to changing political attitudes and policy approaches.313 In the earlier attempts 
to regulate the conduct of the private sector at the international level, during the 
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1970s, the UN draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations314 referred to 
groups of companies under a single home State owner, focusing on their common 
system of decision- making and a link between various enterprises that allowed 
some to exercise significant influence over others, as well as sharing knowledge, 
resources, and responsibilities over the others.315 The definition in the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Corporations similarly emphasizes the large struc-
ture of the business entities with activities in more than one country, and more 
than one owner in more than one home State, and the link that allows for coord-
ination of their operations.316 In legal literature, reference is made to their most 
salient characteristics, such as dimension, possession of scientific- technological 
innovation and know- how, international management, and the dichotomy be-
tween economic unity among, and legal diversity between, subsidiaries.317 Other 
commentators, however, decided against the need to specifically define them.318 In 
effect, as highlighted by the OECD,
International business has experienced far- reaching structural change . . . With 
the rise of service and knowledge- intensive industries and the expansion of the 
Internet economy, service and technology enterprises are playing an increas-
ingly important role in the international marketplace. Large enterprises still 
account for a major share of international investment, and there is a trend to-
ward large- scale international mergers. At the same time, foreign investment by 
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the activities of the others and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources and responsibilities with the 
others.’
 316 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations (31 October 2001)  DAFFE/ IME/ 
WPG(2000)15/ FINAL, Section1.3, which reads:  ‘[Multinational enterprises] usually comprise com-
panies or other entities established in more than one country and so linked that they may coordinate 
their operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a signifi-
cant influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary 
widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, state or mixed. The 
Guidelines are addressed to all the entities within the multinational enterprise (parent companies and/ 
or local entities).’ OECD, Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011) para. 
4, adds that ‘According to the actual distribution of responsibilities among them, the different entities 
are expected to co- operate and to assist one another to facilitate observance of the Guidelines.’ The 
OECD Guidelines are discussed in Ch. 3.
 317 Francioni (n. 27) 13– 16.
 318 C. Wells and J. Elias, ‘Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on the International 
Stage’ in P. Alston (ed.), Non- State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2005) 141, 148– 50; Kamminga and Zia- Zarifi (n. 185); and J. Ebbesson, ‘Transboundary Corporate 
Responsibility in Environmental Matters:  Fragments and Foundations for a Future Framework’ in 
Winter (n. 135) 200, who refers to ‘transboundary economic organizations’.
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small- and medium- sized enterprises has also increased and these enterprises 
now play a significant role on the international scene. Multinational enter-
prises, like their domestic counterparts, have evolved to encompass a broader 
range of business arrangements and organisational forms. Strategic alliances 
and closer relations with suppliers and contractors tend to blur the boundaries 
of the enterprise.319
The OECD Guidelines, therefore, consider a definition of multinationals un-
necessary,320 due also to the diversification of multinationals into manufacturing, 
domestic market development, and services, as well as the emergence of multi-
nationals based in developing countries,321 and the varying degree of autonomy 
within entities within a multinational.322
In addition, the need to address other business entities has been increasingly em-
phasized internationally. First, adhering countries to the OECD Guidelines are to 
encourage also small- and medium- sized enterprises to observe the Guidelines.323 
Second, the supply chain is addressed: governments are to ‘encourage, where prac-
ticable, business partners, including suppliers and sub- contractors, to apply prin-
ciples’ of corporate accountability.324 The more detailed guidance under the OECD 
has focused on supply and value chains, leading to more specific standards of cor-
porate environmental responsibility.325
Within the UN, attention has been focused both on the ‘transnational corpor-
ation’,326 but also to ‘other business enterprises’:
any business entity, regardless of the international or domestic nature of its ac-
tivities, including a transnational corporation, contractor, subcontractor, sup-
plier, licensee or distributor; the corporate, partnership, or other legal form 
used to establish the business entity; and the nature of the ownership of the 
entity.327
 319 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) Preface, para. 2.
 320 Ibid. ch. I, para. 4.
 321 Ibid. Preface, para. 3.
 322 Ibid. ch. I, para. 4.
 323 Ibid. ch. I, para. 6.
 324 Ibid. ch. II, para. 13. See also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 24 (n. 22) para. 33.
 325 See Ch. 5.
 326 ‘An economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities oper-
ating in two or more countries— whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of 
activity, and whether taken individually or collectively.’
 327 UNCHR Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human 
Rights’ (26 August 2003) UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ Sub.2/ 2003/ 12/ Rev.2, para. H(20); and Report of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability 
for Corporate Acts (2007) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 4/ 35, para. 3 (see Ch. 4).
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This is in recognition of the fact that all businesses are essential competitors in 
the global market, and that drawing distinctions based on size or localization of 
activities could prove difficult, given the plethora of diverse control structures, and 
forms of ownerships.328 In addition, locally owned private companies, which are 
less monitored than multinationals, may resort to the ‘worst safety and environ-
mental practices’.329 Some assert that multinationals generally have a better record 
in relation to environmental concerns than local enterprises in developing coun-
tries.330 For all these reasons, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights make clear that business responsibility applies to ‘all enterprises regardless 
of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and structure . . . [although] the 
scale and complexity of the means through which enterprises meet that responsi-
bility may vary according to these factors and with the severity of the enterprise’s 
adverse human rights impacts.’331 And thus they did not make reference to control, 
influence, or coordination of activities.332
In 2017, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also 
stressed that States’ obligations to ensure corporate responsibility concern ‘all ac-
tivities of business entities, whether they operate transnationally or whether their 
activities are purely domestic, whether fully privately owned or State- owned, re-
gardless of size, sector, location, ownership and structure’.333 As discussions con-
tinue on sphere of influence,334 linkages and leverage among different enterprises 
 328 D. Weissbrodt and M. Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International 
Law 901, 910.
 329 W. Lepwowski, ‘The Disaster at Bhopal— Chemical Safety in the Third World’ in C. Pearson (ed.), 
Multinational Corporations, Environment, and the Third World (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987) 
240, 246.
 330 R. J. Fowler, ‘International Environmental Standards for Transnational Corporations’ (1995) 
25 Environmental Law Review 1, 13; and P. Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights, Social Responsibility 
and the Regulation of International Business:  The Development of International Standards by 
Intergovernmental Organizations’ (2003) 3 Non- State Actors and International Law 23, 136, where the 
author favours avoiding the risk of an inadequate definition.
 331 UN Guiding Principles, Principle 14. See also controversy over a footnote in the HRC Resolution 
on the negotiations of a legally binding instrument on ‘transnational corporations and other business 
entities’, which expressly excluded ‘local business registered in terms of relevant domestic law’ (HRC 
Res. 26/ 9 (2014) para. 9) and discussion in Cassell and Ramasastry (n. 195) 40– 41, on the basis of 
John Ruggie’s criticisms expressed in ‘Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights 
Treaty Sponsors’ (2014), Institute for Human Rights and Business, accessible at https:// www.ihrb.
org/ other/ treaty- on- business- human- rights/ quo- vadis- unsolicited- advice- to- business- and- human- 
rights- treaty- sponsors. See also C. Lopez and B. Shea, ‘Negotiating a Treaty on Business and Human 
Rights: A Review of the First Intergovernmental Session’ (2015) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 
111, 111– 14.
 332 Muchlinski (n. 72) 658.
 333 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24 (n. 22) section II, 
para. 3.
 334 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Global Compact, E- 
Learning, Module 2, https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/ library/ 3; as discussed in Report of the Special 
Representative (n. 71) paras 7– 8.
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along the supply/ value chain, 335 and complicity,336 as well as on the role of small- 
and medium- sized enterprises,337 this study will investigate the concept of cor-
porate accountability and responsibility as referring generally to the private sector, 
focusing, where necessary, on the challenges and consequences for multinationals 
in particular.338
3. Concluding remarks
The prolonged and still ongoing international debate on corporate accountability 
and responsibility is a stark illustration of the limitations of national and inter-
national law in effectively regulating and controlling the impacts of corporate 
activities on the environment and on human rights, because of tensions among 
different bodies of international law. Multinationals benefit from the protection 
of international investment law and from gaps in international criminal and civil 
liability regimes with respect to environmentally damaging corporate conduct.339 
International environmental law is characterized even more by open- ended stand-
ards of protection and softer enforcement mechanisms.340 This translates, at the 
local level, to stronger protection for large- scale, and foreign, operators to the det-
riment of local actors, particularly indigenous peoples and local communities, 
with little negotiating power and significant vulnerability to environmental deg-
radation in the context of natural resource development.341
While practice and scholarship at the intersection of international human rights 
law and international investment law has been increasing, there has been limited 
cross- fertilization of the human rights and the environment linkages for business 
and human rights. There is still limited reflection, therefore, on how the com-
bined reading of international human rights law and international environment 
law can contribute to make headway between the two areas of law with the result 
that much remains to be clarified with a view to contributing to the ongoing treaty 
 335 S.  Michalowski, ‘Due Diligence and Complicity:  A Relationship in Need of Clarification’ in 
Deva and Bilchitz (n. 48), 193; and F. Wettstein, ‘Making Noise about Silent Complicity: The Moral 
Inconsistency of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ in Deva and Bilchitz (n. 48) 243.
 336 UN Global Compact (http:// www.unglobalcompact.org), Principle 2; Ruggie (n. 71) paras 26– 72.
 337 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises on opportunities for small- and medium- sized enterprises in the implemen-
tation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2017) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 35/ 32.
 338 While bearing in mind that ‘the issue of the scope of enterprises to be covered by [a potential new] 
treaty [on business and human rights] is far from resolved . . . This is likely to remain one of the stickiest 
issues in the process’: Lopez and Shea (n. 331) 114.
 339 Birnie et al. (n. 54) 326– 29.
 340 See generally F. Francioni, ‘Environment’ in A. Cassese (ed.), Realizing Utopia:  The Future of 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 443.
 341 Cotula (n. 274) 104, 129, and 151. See also Miles (n. 227) and P. Simons, ‘International Law’s 
Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability for Violations of Human Rights’ (2012) 3 
Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 5.
 
68 The Shortcomings of Traditional Legal Solutions
negotiations on business and human rights, or supporting national legislative and 
judicial developments.
The following chapters will thus assess to what extent the emergence of inter-
national standards on corporate environmental accountability and responsibility 
represent the capacity of international law to renew itself, over time and in many 
subtle ways, to address new challenges by forging synergies across, and tapping 
into the relative strengths of, international human rights and environmental law 
respectively. The following chapters will thus ascertain to what extent international 
human rights law instruments and practices have contributed to advance inter-
national standards for corporate environmental accountability and responsibility. 
Equally they will assess to what extent environmental standards have contrib-
uted to advance the international framework on business and human rights more 
generally.
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3
 The Emergence of International Standards
This chapter1 analyses the varied international standard- setting attempts to address 
the responsible conduct of multinational corporations, and of business in gen-
eral, with reference to the protection of the environment. The UN has supported a 
series of initiatives over time: the ill- fated draft Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations, the ongoing UN Global Compact, the now shelved UN norms on 
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with regard to Human Rights, the influential UN Framework on Business and 
Human Rights and its Guiding Principles, and the ongoing negotiations of a legally 
binding instrument on business and human rights. In response to varying political 
undercurrents, these developments have been characterized by different concep-
tual approaches: international regulation, partnership with business, and a human 
rights- based approach. The chapter relates these developments to long- standing 
initiatives under the aegis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), that have 
also evolved over time in parallel, and increasingly in response to, UN initiatives.
First, the chapter will provide a short theoretical discussion of the role of 
standards, as opposed to rules and principles, in the progressive development of 
international law. The conceptual and legal relevance, and the legacy for current 
debates of each initiative, independently of whether it was successful or not, will 
be assessed. This aims to underline an increasing normative convergence among 
the respective international standards on corporate accountability and responsi-
bility in as far as the environment is concerned. Second, the chapter reflects upon 
how human rights, which are a latecomer in the debate on corporate account-
ability, have become the dominant frame at the international level.2 This reflec-
tion will lead to an assessment of the extent to which current human rights- based 
approaches have built upon the earlier consolidation of international corporate 
 1 This chapter builds on: E. Morgera, ‘The UN and Corporate Environmental Responsibility: Between 
International Regulation and Partnerships’ (2006) 15 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 93; E. Morgera, ‘An Environmental Outlook on the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises: Comparative Advantages, Legitimacy and Outstanding Questions in the 
Lead- up to the 2006 Review’ (2006) 18 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 751; and 
E. Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’ in P.- M. Dupuy 
and J. Viñuales (eds), Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection: Incentives 
and Safeguards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 321.
 2 C. Rodríguez- Garavito, ‘Conclusions’ in C. Rodríguez- Garavito (ed.), Business and Human 
Rights: Beyond the End of the Beginning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 186, 188.
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environmental accountability standards and the extent to which they contribute to 
further detailing these standards. Third, the chapter will foreshadow how sectoral 
approaches to international standard- setting have developed on the basis of more 
general international standard- setting initiatives at the intersection of human 
rights and the environment.
1 International standards and the sources of international law
While controversy continues as to the potential sources of international law that 
may be applicable to private companies,3 and as to how companies’ liability might 
be triggered and enforced through the application of international law,4 in the face 
of States’ continued resistance to using international treaties to create direct obliga-
tions for corporations,5 a more promising line of inquiry has focused on whether 
international environmental law principles are directly applicable to companies. 
A 1991 resolution of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) already re-
fers to the observance by multinationals of international environmental principles, 
particularly the polluter- pays principle, prevention, and precaution.6 Principles 
are considered ‘potentially applicable to all members of the international commu-
nity across the range of the activities they carry out or authorize and in respect 
of the protection of all aspects of the environment’.7 Ong underlined the import-
ance of prevention, the polluter- pays principle, and precaution for corporate gov-
ernance (the internal regulation of companies). 8 Environmental integration has 
further been highlighted as the legal basis for environmental interests to be in-
cluded within a corporate governance regime.9 The international standard- setting 
initiatives discussed later in this chapter, such as the UN Global Compact,10 the 
 3 The limited relevance of international treaties has already been discussed in Ch. 2.
 4 M. Karavias, Corporate Obligations under International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013) 11– 16.
 5 See Ch. 2; and P. Birnie, A. Boyle, and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 3rd 
edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 327; and from an international human rights perspective, 
see also Karavias (n. 4) 17. The current negotiations on an international legally binding instrument on 
business and human rights do not foresee the creation of international obligations immediately binding 
on companies (as discussed at the end of this chapter, Section 7).
 6 ECOSOC Res. 1991/ 55 (26 July 1991) paras 28(c) and (i).
 7 P. Sands, International Environmental Law. Emerging Trends and Implications for Transnational 
Corporations (New York: UN, 1993) 231.
 8 D. Ong, ‘The Impact of Environmental Law on Corporate Governance:  International and 
Comparative Perspectives’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 685, 693– 98. Similar prin-
ciples were singled out by J. Ebbesson, ‘Transboundary Corporate Responsibility in Environmental 
Matters:  Fragments and Foundations for a Future Framework’ in G. Winter (ed.), Multilevel 
Governance of Global Environmental Change:  Perspectives from Science, Sociology and the Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 200, 208.
 9 P- M. Dupuy, ‘Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment’ (1991) 12 Michigan 
International Law Journal 420.
 10 http:// www.unglobalcompact.org.
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OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,11 and the UN Norms on the 
Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,12 
also made reference to international environmental law principles.13 These sources 
are also framed in inter- State terms, however, but have proven able to translate into 
benchmarks for corporate conduct.14
In effect, among the calls for ‘international legal obligations for companies’15 or 
‘norms and rules promoting democratic accountability for transnational environ-
mental harm’,16 legal principles, norms, guidelines, or responsibilities of private com-
panies in relation to international law,17 the term ‘standard’ is used most often,18 
although no definition or specification as to its legal status is provided.19 As De 
 11 OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011); see Ch. 4.
 12 UNCHR Sub- Commission, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’ (26 August 2003) UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ Sub.2/ 
2003/ 12/ Rev.2 (UN Norms). See Ch. 4.
 13 ‘The applicability of international legal principles to acts by companies is a rapidly evolving sub-
ject’, according to M. Robinson, ‘Commentary on the Interim Report of the Special Representative 
on Business and Human Rights’ (2006) <http:// www.business- humanrights.org/ Links/ Repository/ 
246742>; Ch. 5.
 14 A. Nollkaemper, ‘Responsibility of Transnational Corporations in International Environmental 
Law: Three Perspectives’ in Winter (n. 8) 179, 185. See Chs. 4– 5.
 15 The International Council on Human Rights Policy, Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the 
Developing International Legal Obligations for Companies (Versoix: International Council on Human 
Rights Policy, 2002) 2. C. Wells and J. Elias, ‘Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players 
on the International Stage’ in P. Alston (ed.), Non- State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) 141, 170.
 16 M. Mason, The New Accountability:  Environmental Responsibility Across Borders 
(London: Earthscan, 2005) 3 and 174.
 17 It is significant, in this respect, to consider the different titles successively considered for the work 
of the Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights with regard to transnational 
corporations and other business entities: UNCHR Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights, ‘Principles related to the Human Rights Conduct of Companies’ (2000) UN Doc. 
E/ CN.4/ Sub.2/ 2000/ WG.2/ WP.1; ‘Draft Universal Human Rights Guidelines for Companies’ (2001) 
UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ Sub.2/ 2001/ WG.2/ WP.1/ Add.1; ‘Principles and Responsibilities for Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Commentary on the Principles’ (2002) UN Doc. E/ 
CN.4/ Sub.2/ 2002/ XX/ Add.2; and finally ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’ (26 August 2003) UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ 
Sub.2/ 2003/ 12/ Rev.2 (emphasis added).
 18 P. Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights, Social Responsibility and the Regulation of International 
Business: The Development of International Standards by Intergovernmental Organizations’ (2003) 
3 Non- State Actors and International Law 123, 130; UN Special Representative on Human Rights 
and Business Enterprises, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights to implement the UN 
Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’ (2011) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 17/ 31, adopted by the Human 
Rights Council in Res. 17/ 4 (6 July 2011); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 24 on State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in the Context of Business Activities, section (2017) UN Doc. E/ C.12/ GC/ 24, para. 5.
 19 UNCTC, ‘Transnational Corporations and Issues Relating to the Environment— Report of the 
Secretary General’ (1990) UN Doc. E/ C.10/ 1990/ 10, 13, eg, reads as follows: ‘guidelines taking the form 
of environmental principles should incorporate existing standards and recommendations . . . an inter-
governmentally recognized format would contribute to . . . the articulation of acceptable international 
practices and standards for transnational corporations’. See also the allegations by victims of envir-
onmental damage and international non- governmental organizations (NGOs) in Brief for Plaintiffs, 
Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (No. 93– 7527) 27. Finally, see P. Kohona, 
‘Implementing Global Environmental Standards: Is the Non- State Sector a Reluctant Convert or an 
Eager Devotee?’ (2003– 04) 11 Asian Yearbook of International Law 69, 88; The International Council 
on Human Rights Policy (n. 15) 5; and UNCHR Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
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Schutter observed, the variability of States’ obligations under international human 
rights law, which is due to States being party to different international human 
rights treaties, also substantiates the need for standards that ‘provide an inter-
national level playing field based on the minimum requirements of international 
human rights law’.20
Along similar lines, Lowe considers international standards needed to ‘mod-
erate’ the application of broad international principles upon non- State actors such 
as private companies that are expected to act as partners with governments in 
the implementation of international law.21 While the traditional catalogue of the 
sources of international law does not include standards,22 these provide a much- 
needed ‘translation’23 of international environmental law principles into normative 
benchmarks of conduct applicable to the private sector, which are flexible enough 
to adapt from case to case and from one area to another of corporate activity. These 
standards are identified on the basis of their normative and practical usefulness 
in defining acceptable/ unacceptable conduct with reference to the protection of 
the environment and sustainable development according to values defined and 
protected by traditional sources of international law.24 The idea of standards that 
could be accepted through inter- governmental negotiations and be based on inter-
nationally agreed- upon instruments already emerged in a 1991 report of the UN 
Secretary- General to the Commission on Transnational Corporations.25 In the 
same years, the first legal study on international environmental law and its con-
sequences for private companies, in particular transnational corporations, was 
commissioned by the UN Department of Economic and Social Development to 
Philippe Sands. In the final report, entitled Emerging Trends and Implications for 
Transnational Corporations in International Environmental Law,26 Sands con-
cluded that ‘taken as a whole, the developments identified suggest that certain min-
imum international standards of environmental protection have emerged which 
Human Rights, ‘Report of the 3rd Session of the Working Group’ (2001) UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ Sub.2/ 2001/ 
9, para. 24.
 20 O. de Schutter, ‘Towards Corporate Accountability for Human and Environmental Rights Abuses’, 
discussion paper for the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (April 2007) 2.
 21 V. Lowe, ‘Corporations as International Actors and International Law Makers’ (2004) 13 Italian 
Yearbook of International Law 23, 25 and 27.
 22 ICJ Statute, Art. 38.
 23 According to Nollkaemper (n. 14), 185, ‘Because the main principles of international environ-
mental law are written for public rather than private entities, they need to be “translated” to the private 
sector’.
 24 Indeed, this was also the intention expressed in the early 1990s within the UN, when it was recom-
mended that ‘environmental conventions, standards and guidelines can help to achieve an international 
consensus on minimum standards of corporate environmental behaviour’, in UNCTC, ‘Transnational 
Corporations and Sustainable Development: Recommendations of the Executive Director’ (1991) UN 
Doc. E/ C.10/ 1992/ 2.
 25 ECOSOC, ‘Report of Secretary- General: Transnational corporations and Issues relating to the 
Environment’ (1991) UN Doc. E/ C.10/ 1991/ 3.
 26 Sands (n. 7).
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could be adopted by transnational corporations as the basis for their global activ-
ities’.27 Sands therefore indicated, at a time when international environmental law 
was fast developing but far from the level of sophistication that we know today, that 
international environmental standards relevant for multinationals could already 
be identified and considered applicable directly to private companies, if adopted 
voluntarily by companies themselves. Encouraging private companies to do so was 
premised on the negative implications of the changing international regulatory en-
vironment for companies’ production costs and processes, foreign investment de-
cisions, disclosure requirements, marketing practices, and corporate liabilities.28 
The specific international environmental standards identified by Sands’ 1992 study 
as relevant for business were: sustainable use of natural resources, environmental 
impact assessments, and disclosure of information to citizens and international 
authorities.29
In light of the clear resistance of some sectors of the international community 
to acknowledge the existence/ emergence or promote the definition of companies’ 
obligations in international law,30 this section will explore the legal status of ‘stand-
ards’ under international law within the broader category of primary rules defined 
by Hart.31 This understanding will then serve as the lens through which to analyse 
the growing practice of addressing matters related to corporate environmental ac-
countability and responsibility in the context of international organizations.
1.1 The distinctive nature of legal standards
In the first instance, standards will be distinguished from rules and principles. 
Rules stricto sensu provide an ‘objective limitation of what is permitted or of what 
is protected’,32 or as Pound put it, ‘a precept attaching a definite detailed conse-
quence to a definite detailed state of facts’.33 As opposed to rules, standards are 
characterized by their lack of ‘a sufficient normative content’, without denying their 
legal character.34 According to Hart, standards imply the idea of a ‘level or model 
 27 Ibid. 37.
 28 Ibid.
 29 Ibid, where Sands also identifies other trends, such as emissions in the atmosphere and in the 
marine environment, and waste management, which have direct implications for business but are more 
related to regulatory action by the State.
 30 The International Council on Human Rights Policy (n. 15) 156.
 31 H. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
 32 Union Académique Internationale, Dictionnaire de la terminologie du droit international 
(Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1960) 581, citing P. Roubier, Théorie générale du droit: Histoire des doc-
trines juridiques et philosophie des valeurs sociales (Paris: Dalloz, 1951).
 33 R. Pound, Social Control through Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942) 45.
 34 J. Salmon, Dictionnaire de Droit International Public (Bruxelles: Bruylant/ AUF, 2001) 1049; A. 
Sanhoury, Les restrictions contractuelles à la liberté individuelle de travail dans la jurisprudence anglaise. 
Contribution à l’étude comparative de la règle de droit et du standard juridique (Paris: Marcel Giard, 
1925); and M. Stati, Le standard juridique (DPhil thesis, Paris, 1927).
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to which to conform and with reference to which one can evaluate or critically 
appraise certain behaviour’.35 In other words, they provide a legal benchmark al-
lowing an appreciation of the conduct of individuals based on a model.36 Pound, 
along the same lines, defines standards as ‘measures of conduct prescribed by law 
from which one departs at his peril of answering for resulting damage’.37 Dworkin 
considers standards a ‘consideration of justice or fairness’, a goal to be reached.38
Standards involve an idea of reasonableness, of what is acceptable conduct in the 
circumstances, thus functioning as a model against which to evaluate certain behav-
iours. The most common examples of standards are due care, fair conduct,39 or fair 
and equitable treatment.40 In order to define what is reasonable under the circum-
stances, standards require a balancing technique: ‘when the sphere to be controlled 
is such that it is impossible to identify a class of specific actions to be uniformly 
done or forborne and to make the subject of a simple rule, yet the ranges of cir-
cumstances varies but covers familiar features of common experience’, a common 
judgment weighs up and strikes ‘a balance between the social claims which arise in 
various unanticipated forms’.41 Legal standards, therefore, have a ‘normative char-
acter, but their content and object are only partially normative, making reference 
to elements beyond law such as social custom or human reasonability’, namely the 
ideas of normality, average or common practice.42 Standards ‘enter the realm of 
law’ when they are used as the ‘yardstick for correct behavior’.43
It follows that legal standards are usually imprecise and vague, making refer-
ence to undetermined types of behaviour, whose actual content depends on the 
legal operators that apply them in concrete cases.44 Their strength actually lies in 
such generality and abstraction, which allow for their application in different cir-
cumstances.45 The legal character of standards rests on their prescriptive purpose 
whose normative threshold can only be reached through the concrete application 
on a case- by- case basis.46 Thus, standards can be characterized as an ‘intermediary 
class of norms’47 that practice operationalizes in those instances in which it would 
 35 These elements are suggested by Hart (n. 31) 32, cited by Salmon (n. 34) 1049.
 36 Union Académique Internationale (n. 32) 581.
 37 Pound (n. 33) 44– 49.
 38 R. Dworkin, ‘Is Law a System of Rules?’ in R. Dworkin (ed.), The Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977) 38, 43.
 39 Pound (n. 33) 48.
 40 For an overview of legal standards in the fields of intentional investment law, see: P. Daillier and A. 
Pellet, Droit International Public (Paris: LGDJ, 1999) 1065; P. Juillard, ‘L’évolution des sources du droit 
des investissements’ (1994) 250 Recueils de Cours 133.
 41 Hart (n. 31) 132.
 42 Cercle de Sociologie et Nomologie Juridiques, Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de 
sociologie du droit (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1993) 581.
 43 C. Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Century’ 
(1999) 281 Recueil des cours 9, 352.
 44 Salmon (n. 34) 1049.
 45 Ibid.
 46 Ibid. 1050.
 47 P. Weil, ‘Le droit international en quête de son identité. Cours général de droit international public’ 
(1992) 237 Recueil des Cours 203, 214.
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be ‘unreasonable to attempt to formulate a definition of reasonable’48 ex ante. In 
sum, standards are a legal notion with an indeterminate or variable content.49
The idea of reasonableness underlying standards could serve to capture the 
expectations voiced by the international civil society that international envir-
onmental law is relevant to assess the conduct of private companies around the 
world. It chimes with John Ruggie’s observation that ‘standards [of corporate ac-
countability and responsibility] are in the process of being socially construed’50 
by the international community. More generally, legal standards embody a social 
element, which can derive from the participation of different actors in their forma-
tion.51 The underlying reasonable expectations of a community is based on experi-
ence or on moral sentiment.52 Standards encapsulate ‘normative expectations and 
pave the way for the consolidation of patterns of behaviour’.53
Standards are particularly useful when facing temporal gaps in which the legal 
system is not yet ready to regulate emerging problems, and interested parties ‘find 
solutions inspired by good faith and common sense’.54 Such can be the specific 
case of normative gaps due to the relation between international law- making and 
State sovereignty,55 which is exactly the reason for lack of agreement at the inter- 
governmental level on international obligations on corporate responsibility.56
In a way, legal standards favour the normative power of international organ-
izations in bending the conditions of classic ‘access to normativity’, ‘accelerating 
the evolution of international law with the hope to overcome States’ resistance or 
the inertia of the traditional mechanisms of law- making’.57 It should also be noted 
that legal standards may have non- legal functions that can support the realization 
of human rights, namely by contributing to actual recognition, public discussion, 
 48 Pound (n. 33) 48.
 49 Cercle de Sociologie et Nomologie Juridiques (n. 42) 581.
 50 Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises’ (2006) UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ 2006/ 
97 (hereinafter, Special Representative’s Interim Report) para. 54.
 51 Lowe (n. 21) 25.
 52 Pound (n. 33)  80; see references to expectations in UN Guiding Principles, Principle 11 and 
Commentary; and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24 
on State Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
Context of Business Activities, section (2017) UN Doc. E/ C.12/ GC/ 24, para. 5.
 53 L. Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Policy Guidance and Compliance:  The World Bank Operational 
Standards’ in D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance— The Role of Non- Binding Norms in the 
International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 281, 301.
 54 Weil (n. 47) 206.
 55 Ibid.
 56 See the opposition of the State members of the UN Commission on Human Rights to the UN 
Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations, discussed in the next chapter.
 57 Weil (n. 47) 240. For a discussion of the movements towards law in the context of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) debates, see L. Catá Backer, ‘Rights and Accountability in Development (“RAID”) 
d Das Air and Global Witness v Afrimex: Small Steps towards an Autonomous Transnational Legal 
System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 258, 265– 66; and K. Buhmann, ‘Public Regulators and CSR: The “Social Licence to Operate” in 
Recent United Nations Instruments on Business and Human Rights and the Juridificaiton of CSR’ 
(2016) 136 Journal of Business Ethics 699.
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and education that may be more effective than legal approaches in changing behav-
iour. As such, standards provide tools of communication, advocacy, exposure, and 
informed public discussion that may back effective human rights claims without 
necessarily resort to legal coercion.58
The above discussion has referred to legal standards, which should thus be dif-
ferentiated from technical standards. The latter have been created in the field of 
international environmental law through technical appendices to multilateral en-
vironmental treaties.59 Legal standards are, therefore, different from the so- called 
product or process standards, which may still be based on international environ-
mental law. Basically the latter refer to setting quantitative or qualitative emission 
or discharge limits for pollution activities or specific procedural steps for envir-
onmental auditing, accounting, and environmental management programmes.60 
Technical standards are also those developed by the International Standards 
Organization, the central body for negotiating and promoting technical industry 
standards.61
As opposed to technical standards, legal standards referred to in the present 
study are based on international environmental principles and treaty provisions 
(normative core) and represent the growing expectation as to the acceptable con-
duct of business, due to its ‘relation to and position in society’.62 Legal standards 
are also different from operational standards, which embody an international 
organization’s internal instructions to its staff, although these can evolve to be con-
sidered normative benchmarks to assess an organization’s activities.63
The flexibility of legal standards fits well with the idea of international law as a 
process, a varied system of formal and informal law- making directed towards the 
attainment of certain declared values.64 As such, international law is made up of 
a variety of phenomena, including claims and counterclaims, State practice, and 
 58 A. Sen, ‘Human Rights and the Limits of Law’ (2005– 06) 27 Cardozo Law Review 2913, 2920– 21.
 59 P. Contini and P. H. Sand, ‘Methods to Expedite Environmental Protection:  International 
Ecostandards’ (1972) 66 American Journal of International Law 37, 41, where the authors argue that 
‘technical standards (usually appended to the basic treaty in the form of annexes or schedules) pro-
vide detailed rules and codes of practice, drafted by technicians or scientists rather than diplomats or 
lawyers, and periodically revised by a designated international body’. P- M. Dupuy, La responsabilité 
internationale des états pour les dommages d’origine technologique et industrielle (Paris: Pedone, 1976) 
272– 4, where the author elaborated on eco- standards in relation to international State responsibility. 
Technical ‘environmental protections standards’ are also discussed by C. Pearson, ‘Environmental 
Standards, Industrial Relocation and Pollution Havens’ in C. Pearson (ed.), Multinational Corporations, 
Environment, and the Third World (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987) 113.
 60 As advocated by R. J. Fowler, ‘International Environmental Standards for Transnational 
Corporations’ (1995) 25 Environmental Law Review 1, 18– 25.
 61 V. Haufler, A Public Role for the Private Sector (Washington DC:  Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2001) 36– 37.
 62 S. Deva, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Violations:  Humanizing Business (Abingdon, 
Routledge: 2012) 150 (emphasis in the original).
 63 Boisson de Chazournes (n. 53) 282– 84.
 64 Juillard (n. 40) 131; R. Higgins, Problems and Processes. International Law and How We Use it 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) vi; J. Pauwelyn, R. Wessel, and J. Wouters (eds), Informal International 
Lawmaking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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decisions by a variety of authorized decision- makers.65 Seeing international law as 
a process may pragmatically assist in explaining the emergence of legal standards 
at a time when international obligations have not formally or completely emerged. 
According to Higgins, substantial non- compliance over a period of time implies 
that the concerned norms begin to lose their normative character, because the legal 
obligation no longer reflects community expectations that claim requirements 
of behaviour.66 A contrariis it can be argued that legal standards backed up by a 
growing community expectation are gradually increasing their normative char-
acter, thus acquiring binding character in the measure in which they are accepted 
and function as such,67 on the basis of what ‘the actors (most often States, but not 
necessarily only States) believe normative in their relations with each other’.68
From a different perspective, the emergence of international standards can 
be ascribed to the idea of the ‘objectivization’ of international law. As articulated 
by Dupuy, that is the prevalence of the content, the substance (unité materielle) 
of international law over its form (unité formelle). The substantive core of inter-
national law is based on the priority of moral imperatives for the coordinated man-
agement of a universal public order that includes also non- State actors, whereas its 
form concerns the origin of international law as the expression of the will of States 
about their legal obligations.69 Thus, the flexibility and the social and fairness com-
ponents of international legal standards reflect the dynamics of the international 
legal system in its substance, which is characterized by the incorporation of ethics 
into law, particularly through the work of the UN. This has been seen as an ex-
pression of certain political and ideological choices that at certain points of history 
evolve from moral potential rules to new normative concepts.70
It should also be clarified that these standards are not part of ‘transnational law’, 
which was defined by Jessup as ‘the law that regulates actions or events that tran-
scend national frontiers’, thus including both civil and criminal aspects, both public 
and private international law, and both public and private national law.71 As will be 
argued more in detail with reference to international environmental law, the legal 
standards mentioned in this study are essentially drawn from international law. 
The emergence of these standards shows how public international law is being ac-
cepted as the ‘yardstick’ that should guide the conduct not only of States,72 but also 
of other actors. The ‘collective wisdom’ and ‘basic values’ contained in international 
law are considered capable of ‘indicating the right direction for new answers to 
 65 Higgins (n. 64) 10.
 66 Ibid. 19.
 67 Hart (n. 31) 235.
 68 Higgins (n. 64) 18. See also J. Brunnée and S. J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
 69 Dupuy (n. 9) 399.
 70 Ibid. 209.
 71 P. Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956) 2.
 72 As argued by Tomuschat (n. 43) 26.
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new problems’73 and as the ‘common regime setting binding standards for hu-
mankind as a whole’.74 In the same direction, this study argues that legal stand-
ards are the translation of the basic values that underpin inter- State obligations 
and principles in international law into an operative benchmark for measuring the 
environmental performance of business enterprises. That said, these international 
standards emerge from a variety of mutual interactions between international law 
and other legal orders, that draw on the practice of non- State actors, particularly 
international organizations, international networks of experts, international civil 
society, bilateral donors, indigenous peoples, and local communities and the pri-
vate sector.75
In sum, in the absence of (settled) international environmental norms directly 
binding upon private companies or multinational corporations in particular,76 this 
chapter will assess to what extent international legal standards are emerging as a 
bridge between the traditional, State- centred approach in international environ-
mental law and the possibility of qualifying the private sector’s conduct according 
to international environmental law objectives and principles.77 Do international 
environmental legal standards allow for the determination of the acceptability of 
certain corporate behaviour on the basis of international expectations, on a case- 
by- case basis? Do these standards usefully describe the reasonable conduct of 
business, so as to fill with content the abstract idea of due diligence for business 
responsibility to respect human rights with internationally recognized values and 
approaches for the protection of the environment?
1.2 International standards as soft law
Soft law is the expression used to define law whose normativity or legal character is 
ambiguous,78 with the understanding that normativity is not necessarily based on 
an obligatory character or justiciability.79 As Georges Abi- Saab so aptly described, 
soft law allows the exploration of new areas for the expansion of law, by articulating 
 73 Ibid. 28.
 74 Ibid. 29.
 75 Rather, the emergence of international standards can be linked to global environmental law: E. 
Morgera, ‘Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests? Non- judicial Enforcement of Global 
Public Goods in the Context of Global Environmental Law’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International 
Law 743; and K. Kulovesi, M. Mehling, and E. Morgera, ‘Global Environmental Law:  Context and 
Theory, Challenge and Promise’ (2019) 8 Transnsational Environmental Law 405.
 76 Special Representative’s Interim Report (n. 50) para. 64.
 77 Contra Nollkaemper (n. 14) 183, where he asserts ‘[corporate] responsibility has nothing to do 
with international law. It is neither based on the violation of norms that according to the sources of 
international law are binding on transnational corporations, nor are the consequences of a violation of 
standards of conduct in any way determined by international law.’
 78 G. Abi- Saab, ‘Cours général de droit international public’ (1987) 207 Recueil des cours 9, 206.
 79 Ibid. 208.
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a common interest or value and defining guidelines that States are encouraged to 
further in normative elaboration.80 At the same time, soft law represents the rec-
ognition by the international community of the need for a new legal rule, pro-
viding some provisional measures for the protection of a future legal interest by 
influencing the way in which the existing law is applied.81
International environmental law itself has been developed to a significant ex-
tent on the basis of soft law.82 Soft law is carefully negotiated and drafted. It con-
tains at least an element of good faith commitment by States, thereby influencing 
their practice and the progressive development of international law.83 Although 
the support of States members of the international organizations under the aegis 
of which these instruments of soft law have been adopted do not express an 
opinio juris (the conviction to the effect that the conduct at stake is required or 
permitted as a matter of law), but rather a political commitment, States are no 
longer in a position to raise objections against the general orientation indicated 
in these documents.84
Soft law addresses not only States, but also other members of the international 
community such as individuals and corporations.85 It can thus provide a pragmatic 
(interim) response to the uncertainty as to the legal status of corporations under 
international law.86 The flexibility of soft law ensures the continuous adaptation to 
the changing conditions in which private companies operate. It enables a follow- up 
process to monitor not only State practice, but also companies’ practices.87 Thus, 
this study will assess whether the role of soft law is to provide ‘an answer to the 
demands of international civil society that action be taken while preserving to pol-
itical elites the freedom to curtail their obligations’,88 with ‘the necessary flexibility 
to enable the international community to progress and address problems new to 
international cooperation’.89
 80 Ibid. 210.
 81 Ibid. 210– 11.
 82 A. Kiss, ‘The Environment and Natural Resources. Commentary and Conclusion’ in Shelton (n. 
53) 223; and P. Sands, J. Peel, A. Fabra, and R. MacKenzie, Principles of International Environmental 
Law, 4th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 116– 19.
 83 Birnie et al. (n. 5) 25– 26. A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 211– 29.
 84 Tomuschat (n. 43) 352.
 85 Sands (n. 7) 124; and S. Ratner, ‘Business’ in D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée, and E. Hey, The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 807, 815.
 86 Discussed in Ch. 2, Section 2.6.
 87 K. P. Sauvant and V. Aranda, ‘The International Legal Framework for Transnational 
Corporations’ in A. A. Fatouros (ed.), Transnational Corporations: The International Legal Framework 
(London: Routledge, 1994) 83, 109– 10.
 88 C. Chinkin, ‘Normative Development in the International Legal System’ in D. Shelton (ed.), 
Commitment and Compliance— The Role of Non- Binding Norms in the International Legal System 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 21, 41.
 89 Kiss (n. 82) 239.
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Many soft- law initiatives in the field of corporate accountability have been de-
veloped by international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector, in a ‘beyond- 
State’ process of standard- setting.90 This has effectively ‘downplay[ed] the role of 
States as the broker of standards’ on the assumption that States’ de facto consent is 
already embodied in the underpinning treaties and soft- law instruments used as 
basis for standard- setting.91 In examining specific international standard- setting 
initiatives, the following sections will distinguish between documents negotiated 
and approved by national delegations on the one hand, and international experts’ 
documents on the other. The latter, in the absence of any inter- governmental en-
dorsement, enjoy a residual legitimacy, by reflecting primarily the experts’ contri-
bution to the rationalization and clarification of international norms.92
The significance of the international (albeit soft) law character of these 
standards93 lies in providing a uniform and legitimate benchmark, instead 
of the plethora of different criteria currently adopted by disparate initiatives. 
Uniformity contributes to the avoidance of a situation in which different actors 
adopt different standards leading to a situation of uncertainty that is detrimental 
to victims, governments, and companies themselves. In addition, these stand-
ards assure a certain degree of legitimacy, because they translate international 
environmental law that can count on the consent or endorsement of the inter-
national community.
This chapter therefore investigates the making of international standards that 
are based on, but separate from, international environmental law principles and 
treaties. International standards provide an additional and immediate way of con-
tributing to other international efforts, without assuming that other solutions 
cannot be developed by the international community to address the shortcom-
ings of traditional legal approaches. As soft law, they contribute to the making of 
international law.94
 90 This is indeed the main finding of D. Coleman, ‘The United Nations and Transnational 
Corporations:  From an Inter- Nation to a “Beyond- State” Model of Engagement’ (2003) 17 Global 
Society 339. See also Catá Backer (n. 57) 265.
 91 Coleman (n. 90) 340– 41.
 92 P- M. Dupuy, ‘Formation of Customary International Law and General Principles’ in Bodansky 
et al. (n. 85) 449. This was a critical consideration in the elaboration of the 2016 FAO- OECD Guidance 
on Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains: see FAO- OECD, International Standards considered in 
the OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains (undated) 1, which reads ‘The 
standards meet the following three criteria established by the multi- stakeholder Advisory Group that 
led the consultation process to develop the Guidance: (i) they have been negotiated and/ or endorsed 
through an inter- governmental process; (ii) they are relevant to agricultural supply chains; and (iii) they 
target in particular the business/ investor community’:  http:// mneguidelines.oecd.org/ OECD- FAO- 
Guidance_ International- Standards.pdf.
 93 Special Representative’s Interim Report (n. 50) para. 53, where he also highlighted that the weak-
ness of most international initiatives on corporate social responsibility is the fact that they choose their 
own definitions and standards, rarely based on internationally agreed standards.
 94 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 211– 29.
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1.3 The functions of international standards
Once international standards have been identified, the next logical question is 
whether and how these standards can be put into practice. Standards may operate 
in different ways, and each can potentially make a distinctive contribution to cor-
porate environmental accountability and responsibility. From the viewpoint of vic-
tims and international NGOs, standards provide a ‘template . . . that [is] intended to 
serve as common substantive reference points’ for advocacy and litigation, as well 
as for third- party benchmarking exercises.95
Standards can also serve to clarify States’ obligations to develop and enforce 
legislation, and provide access to justice, to ensure that businesses exercise due 
diligence.96 Standards can influence judicial practice.97 They can inform national 
law- making, providing the basis upon which States may decide to hold corpor-
ations directly responsible by extraterritorial application of domestic law or as the 
basis for establishing some form of international jurisdiction.98
From an international investment law perspective, these standards could be in-
tegrated in international investment treaty- making (a reconceptualized bilateral 
investment treaty model) and dispute resolution (as interpretative tools), thereby 
potentially ‘reorient[ing] the sole focus on investor protection that currently dom-
inates international investment law’.99 This may be facilitated by greater openness 
and accountability of international arbitration,100 with a view to moving away from 
a ‘narrow, asocial perception of investors’ legitimate expectations concentrated on 
the conduct of the host country alone’.101 For instance, standards of corporate en-
vironmental accountability and responsibility could contribute to delineate the 
 95 For instance, the Global Reporting Initiative’s standardized reporting developed by an NGO- led 
coalition including also companies, academics, and accounting firms, was designed explicitly to com-
plement the UN Global Compact (discussed in Section 3): C. Metcalf, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility 
as Global Public Law:  Third Party Rankings as Regulation by Information’ (2010– 11) 28 Pace 
Environmental Law Review 145, 148 and 154, who ultimately notes insufficient empirical research to 
determine whether this is an effective approach.
 96 Draft General Comment on State Obligations under the ICESCR in the context of Business 
Activities, UN Doc. E/ C.12/ 60/ R.1, paras 17– 21 (2016) and Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 24 (n. 18); Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Report to the Human Rights Council: Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of 
business- related human rights abuse (2016) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 32/ 19, Annex, paras 1.5– 6 and 12.3– 4, 
calling upon States to develop domestic public and private law regimes that ‘communicate clearly the 
standards of management and supervision expected’ of corporate entities for impacts associated with or 
arising from group operations and within their supply chains (emphasis added).
 97 Birnie et al. (n. 5) 327.
 98 Special Representative’s Interim Report (n. 50) para. 65.
 99 K. Miles, The Origins of International Investment Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 224– 25 and 238.
 100 P. Muchlinski, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ in P. Muhclinski, F. Ortino, and C. Schreuer 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
637, 683. On the topic, L. Cotula, ‘Expropriation Clauses and Environmental Regulation: Diffusion 
of Law in the Era of Investment Treaties’ (2015) 24 Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 278. As discussed in Ch. 2, Section 2.4.
 101 Muchlinski (n. 100) 683.
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‘fair and equitable treatment’ that host States owe to foreign investors, to deter-
mine the poor judgment of an investor and its objectionable conduct as a defense 
for host States in international investment disputes.102 States could also include in 
their agreement with investors an obligation for the latter to respect international 
corporate environmental accountability standards with communities, determining 
goals and minimum parameters to be respected in the investor– community agree-
ment.103 This would allow governments to monitor and enforce possible violations 
of investor– community contracts, including by sanctioning them with the termin-
ation of State– investor agreements.104
An aspect that is particularly promising but has yet to receive sufficient atten-
tion in practice and scholarship is the use of corporate environmental standards in 
‘internationalized functional contracts’ between international organizations and 
corporations, akin to those concluded by the International Seabed Authority and 
the World Bank, which could allow standards to turn into international obliga-
tions upon companies subject to international responsibility and amenable to be 
brought before international dispute settlement bodies.105
From the viewpoint of corporations, international standards have a significant 
and growing commercial relevance. International standards for corporate envir-
onmental accountability may enhance the process of project review by expanding 
the substantive criteria applicable to risk assessment and creating additional layers 
of corporate compliance beyond national law and possibly also beyond inter-
national treaties to which the host State is a party.106 The increasing number of 
direct commitments of private companies to key provisions or goals of multilat-
eral environmental agreements, and their direct involvement in international 
standard- setting on corporate environmental accountability107 helps companies in 
anticipating and preparing for future legal developments and improve their image 
with consumers.108 They can also influence the behaviour of private companies in 
their voluntary efforts. Arguably, ignoring global standards would be ‘contrary to 
 102 P. Muchlinski, ‘Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications 
for Corporate Law, Governance, and Regulation’ (2012) 22 Business Ethics Quarterly 145, 172– 73 
drawing from M. Sornarajah, ‘The Fair and Equitable Standard of Treatment: Whose Fairness? Whose 
Equity?’ in F. Ortino, L’ Liberti, A. Sheppard, and H. Warner (eds), Investment Treaty Law, Current 
Issues II (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2007) and P. Muchlinski, 
‘Caveat Investor? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor under the Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 527.
 103 Albeit to the extent allowed by the State’s bilateral investment treaties: L. Cotula and K. Tienhaara, 
‘Reconfiguring Investment Contracts to Promote Sustainable Development’ (2013) 2011– 12 Yearbook 
of International Investment Law and Policy 281, 303 and 294; and E. Morgera, ‘Under the Radar: Fair and 
Equitable Benefit- sharing and the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities con-
nected to Natural Resources’ (2019) 23 International Journal of Human Rights 1098, 1120.
 104 Cotula and Tienhaara (n. 103) 303 and 293.
 105 Karavias (n. 4) 116– 62.
 106 A. Meyerstein, ‘Global Adversarial Legalism:  The Private Regulation of FDI as a Species of 
Global Administrative Law’ in M. Audit and S. Schill (eds), Transnational Law of Public Contracts 
(Brussels: Bruylant, 2016) 799.
 107 N. Affolder, ‘The Market for Treaties’, 11 Chicago Journal of International Law (2010) 159, 186.
 108 Sands (n. 7).
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the requirement of due diligence under the UN Guiding Principles’.109 As put by 
Miles, ‘the interplay of actors, instruments and differing forms of CSR implemen-
tation is also leading to the internalization of a CRS rationale within the business 
community— in other words, the normalization or mainstreaming of CSR within 
the private sector’, as well as ‘gradually altering the cultural environment in which 
transnational business is conduct’.110 International standards may also inform 
criteria of reasonableness at the domestic level, in company law (with regard to a 
broad understanding of shareholders’ interests or ‘enlightened shareholder value’) 
or tort law.111 They can also guide commercial lawyers in their capacity as ‘wise 
counsellors’ to companies that are interested in engaging in collaborative and 
capacity- building approaches with subcontractors, rather than including ‘boiler-
plate language’ in the contracts and engage in top- down audits of their suppliers,112
The following sections will, therefore, investigate the conceptual, normative, and 
operational contribution of the development and implementation of international 
standards for corporate environmental accountability and responsibility, as part of 
the ‘work in progress’, rather than an ‘established and fully functioning system of, 
international regulation of private corporate conduct.’113
2 Attempts at international regulation: the UN draft Code 
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations
Since the 1970s, relevant discussions within the UN system have focused on multi-
nationals’ cross- border activities, their status as major international economic 
actors, and the consequent difficulty for individual States to regulate them effect-
ively.114 The first major initiative within the UN in the field of corporate responsi-
bility arose, against the backdrop of decolonization, from early discussions initiated 
by the Group of Developing Countries and China (G- 77), in the UN General 
Assembly115 on the question of the international regulation of multinationals.
 109 R. McCorquodale, ‘Waving Not Drowning: Kiobel Outside the United States’ (2013) 107 American 
Journal of International Law 846, 848.
 110 Miles (n. 99) 226 and 231.
 111 See also their relevance in domestic law:  Muchlinski, ‘Implementing the New UN Corporate 
Human Rights Framework’ (n. 102) 157– 60.
 112 J. Ruggie and J. Sherman, ‘Adding Human Rights Punch to the New Lex Mercatoria: The Impact 
of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights on Commercial Legal Practice’ (2015) 
6 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 455. See also D. Baumann- Pauly, ‘Bridging Theory and 
Practice through Immersion:  Innovations for Teaching Business and Human Rights at Business 
Schools’ (2018) 3 Business and Human Rights Journal 139.
 113 Muchlinski, ‘Caveat Investor’ (n. 102) 681.
 114 S. K.  B. Asante, ‘The Concept of Good Corporate Citizen in International Business’ in A. A. 
Fatouros (ed.), Transnational Corporations: The International Legal Framework (London: Routledge, 
1994) 169.
 115 J. M. Kline, ‘Business Codes of Conduct in a Global Political Economy’ in O. F. Williams (ed.), 
Global Codes of Conduct:  An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Notre Dame, Ind:  University of Notre 
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The General Assembly provided a forum in which developing countries were 
using their numerical advantage and their relatively strong bargaining power116 for 
the adoption of resolutions on the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources.117 The principle was particularly significant at a time when most foreign 
direct investment was natural resources- related.118 The concerns of the G- 77 with 
regards to multinationals were mainly based on the inaccessibility of full informa-
tion on these companies, their international mobility, size, and resources, which 
prevented arm’s- length bargaining, and their ability to call upon the home State for 
protection.119
Against this background, the G- 77 led the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC), in 1972, to acknowledge the lack of an international 
policy on, or regulatory mechanism for, multinationals; and establish a Group of 
Eminent Persons to observe, analyse, and discuss issues related to transnational 
corporations.120 Such a decision has been interpreted as an explicit assumption 
of responsibility to deal with multinationals- related issues at the international 
level.121 In 1974, the Report of the Eminent Persons’ Group122 recommended the 
elaboration by the UN of a code on multinationals. The recommendation was ac-
cepted by ECOSOC, which created a permanent body, the UN Commission on 
Transnational Corporations (UNCTC),123 with the mandate to:  monitor multi-
nationals’ activities and report on developments in international investment activ-
ities; provide developing countries with expertise and advice in their dealings with 
multinationals; and draft proposals for normative frameworks governing multi-
nationals’ activities. The last task was consistently given the highest priority in the 
agenda of the UNCTC.124 A Working Group charged with the drafting of a UN 
Dame Press, 2000) 39, 43; K. P. Sauvant, ‘The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Conduct on 
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and Trade 11.
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draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations began work in 1977. The 
first draft was presented in 1982 and negotiations on it lasted until 1992.125
The draft Code represented the first attempt at a universal and complete instru-
ment on multinationals, both because of its global scope and of its comprehen-
sive subject- matter.126 It was initially agreed that it would reflect, to some degree, 
existing regulatory agreements or other relevant instruments under development 
in other international fora.127 According to developing country proponents, the 
UN draft Code was to deal only with the regulation of multinationals’ activities.128 
However, in 1980, a compromise was reached to have two sections in the draft. 
One was to focus on regulating multinationals’ activities, providing rules of con-
duct directly applying to them. The other was to concentrate on their treatment (ie 
their protection), providing rules of conduct applying to capital- importing coun-
tries.129 This decision was meant to strike a balance between the rights and the re-
sponsibilities of multinationals and of governments in a single document.130 Thus, 
the objective of the draft Code was two- fold: to contribute to ensuring a stable, 
predictable, and transparent framework for the strengthening of international in-
vestments; and to help minimize the negative effects of multinationals, while pro-
moting their contribution to development efforts of host States.131 The first section, 
on the activities of multinationals, covered, inter alia: respect for national sover-
eignty, adherence to the economic and development goals of host States, respect 
for human rights, non- interference with the host countries’ internal affairs, absten-
tion from corrupt practices, employment conditions, and consumer and environ-
mental protection. Its aim was not to oppose the establishment of multinationals in 
developing countries, but rather to require their regulation to ensure their contri-
bution to development.132 The second section, on the treatment of multinationals, 
focused on compensation for nationalization, jurisdiction, and dispute settlement.
While fundamental disagreement persisted on the second part of the code (re-
garding the protection of foreign direct investment),133 substantial agreement was 
Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations’ (1977) 18 Harvard International Law Journal 
273, 273.
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already reached on the first part (containing the environmental protection section) 
by 1981.134 The remaining disagreement, however, led to the collapse of the ne-
gotiations in 1992, since the draft Code was discussed as a package deal.135 The 
following sections will explore the environmental content of the draft Code, and 
its legacy.
2.1 Environmental content
The question of the legal nature of the draft Code was from the start a contentious 
issue, so much so that the Working Group decided to postpone it to a subsequent 
phase of the negotiations.136 As a result, the language of the draft Code was vague 
and exhortatory.137 Nonetheless, its most significant contribution was the unprece-
dented attribution to the international community of the task of developing a set of 
international general standards on multinationals’ expected conduct.138Although 
still containing the words ‘shall/ should’, reflecting disagreement as to the legal ef-
fects desired,139 the fact that agreement could be reached on the wording of its 
environmental protection section shows how this issue was capable of attracting 
broader consensus. In particular, the draft Code prescribes that multinationals 
should carry out their activities with ‘due regard to relevant international stand-
ards’,140 with a view to taking steps to protect the environment and, where dam-
aged, to restore it.141 The environmental provisions of the draft Code were drafted 
in a sufficiently flexible manner, thus permitting the adoption of different national 
implementing measures.142 Shelton identified an inherent tension between the 
draft Code requirement of non- interference with the internal affairs of the host 
State, and adherence to international environmental standards that the host States 
may have not accepted.143
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The draft Code further required multinationals supply to the competent authorities 
the host States of all relevant information concerning products, processes, and services. 
The detailed list of required information is considered to be one of the main contribu-
tions of the draft Code to the definition of corporate environmental accountability,144 
and remains a critical aspect of successive UN initiatives to clarify international stand-
ards for corporate environmental accountability.145 Finally, the draft Code expected 
multinational companies to cooperate not only with national governments, but also 
with international organizations, for the protection of the environment.146
In addition to supporting the Code negotiations, the UNCTC engaged in fur-
ther regulatory activities in the field of corporate environmental accountability. In 
its preparations for the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development, 
the UNCTC elaborated a set of recommendations for large industrial enterprises 
and sustainable development, for possible inclusion in the drafting of Agenda 
21,147 noting that clear environmental guidelines and coordinated international, 
regional, and national policies were required for supporting corporate efforts in 
global environmental management.148 These criteria, however, failed to be adopted 
at the Rio Summit.149
The UNCTC was eventually relocated to the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in Geneva, in 1993, as UNCTAD’s Division 
on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development. The result of this reloca-
tion was to place the responsibility for multinationals- related issues in the part 
of the UN system directly responsible for economic development, and to base it 
in Geneva, which also hosts the headquarters of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).150 UNCTAD has continued work on multinationals, focusing in par-
ticular on the economic development aspect of the corporate social accountability 
agenda, advising, for example, on how to ensure the creation by multinationals 
of additional employment opportunities in the host country, linkages with local 
suppliers, and technology transfer to local business.151 From an environmental 
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perspective, UNCTAD has kept under evaluation the self- regulation instru-
ments put in place by industries against the relevant provisions of Agenda 21.152 
In 2004, UNCTAD’s contribution was formally endorsed by the member States 
of the Conference, which conferred for the first time an explicit mandate on ‘cor-
porate social responsibility’ (CSR).153 In 2008, UNCTAD was tasked to identify 
best practices for maximizing the development impact of corporate activities.154 
Since 2011, UNCTAD has been co- organizing annual Interagency Roundtables 
on CSR to bring together experts from international organizations, including the 
UN Environment Programme, to explore current topics in CSR, share experiences, 
and identify opportunities for collaboration.155 In addition, UNCTAD’s 2015 
Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development provides guidance for 
developing national investment policies and designing international investment 
agreements that support sustainable development, including by calling on govern-
ments to promote corporate accountability standard- setting, monitor compliance 
with them, and possibly enshrine them in national legislation to provide them with 
legally binding force.156
2.2  Legacy
Understanding the failure of the draft Code implies a further analysis of the his-
torical and ideological background to its negotiation. The discussions in the 1970s 
were characterized by two major contexts: the Cold War and the process of decol-
onization.157 The contraposition between the capitalist and non- capitalist blocks, 
as well as the North/ South divide, polarized the debate on multinationals around 
two main positions: either the protection of foreign investors against undue restric-
tions by host governments, or host States’ need to protect their own interests and 
freedom of action with regard to the impact of multinationals.158 At the national 
level, this second attitude was reflected in developing countries’ widespread prac-
tice of establishing regulatory frameworks which directly targeted multinationals 
by restricting their market shares, imports and profit repatriations, technology 
transfer, and domestic participation in investment projects.159
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 155 http:// www.csrroundtable.org/ .
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The debate on multinationals within the UN was further linked to that of the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO),160 an attempt at radically restruc-
turing the global economic system by prioritizing the objective of development. 
Within the NIEO framework, the growing expansion of multinationals was inter-
preted by the newly independent States as a continuation of the colonial ties in 
economic terms, which could threaten their political independence and develop-
mental process.161 As a consequence, the right to self- determination was affirmed 
to encompass also the right of the State to control the activities of multinationals 
operating within its territory, on the understanding that attainment of economic 
independence is a necessary aspect of political sovereignty.162 The NIEO provided 
the context for the concept of national sovereignty over natural resources to sup-
port the self- determination of states and of peoples to decide about the economic, 
social, and cultural aspects of human development.163 In both cases, the NIEO 
called for international cooperation on the basis of need and for shifting away from 
legal techniques that serve to perpetrate economic domination by a minority of 
States.164 The question of the regulation of multinationals was thus entangled with 
that of national sovereignty over natural resources and the highly controversial ex-
propriation debate,165 which eventually led the negotiations on the draft Code to 
turn into a ‘shouting match’.166
By the late 1980s, the historic and ideological background to the drafting of 
the Code was further complicated by several changes, which— combined— led 
to the concluding phase of the negotiations. Due to an acute shortfall in foreign 
direct investment in developing countries and the debt crisis, the main purpose 
of the debate shifted from the control of the potentially adverse impacts of multi-
nationals to the question of how to best reintegrate developing countries into the 
world economy, ensuring inflows of new investment capital.167 This was reflected 
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in a gradual reformulation of the draft Code closer to that preferred by capital- 
exporting States. Other factors also contributed to the suspension of the nego-
tiations in 1992,168 such as the overly ambitious goal of universality for the draft 
Code,169 the persistent disagreement about its legal status,170 along with the op-
position by multinationals themselves to possible binding standards,171 and the 
limited participation in the drafting process of non- State actors, and particularly 
of the business community.172 In the 1990s, wider concerns about the role of the 
private sector in the attainment of sustainable development have characterized 
the relevant debate within the UN, on the assumption that globalization is ‘forging 
new relationships between business and society, which demand the application of 
ethical standards of conduct by business’.173
The NIEO has thus formally disappeared from the international agenda, its pro-
ject of overhauling the international economic order having been abandoned fol-
lowing the creation of the World Trade Organization.174 However, the discourses 
on equitable globalization and the principle of sustainable development have been 
seen as ‘direct reminders’ of the NIEO’s call for equity among states175 and for a 
rights- based approach to development.176 To a still significant extent, the NIEO 
has thus evolved into a general approach to the making of international environ-
mental law aimed at solidarity and cooperation to the benefit of the least- favoured 
countries.177 And it has been enriched by the recognition of cultural diversity 
among and within States, resulting in the protection of the rights of marginal-
ized individuals and communities over natural resources in order to protect their 
cultural identity and livelihoods.178 As a result, national sovereignty over natural 
resources has been progressively qualified by duties and responsibilities towards 
other States and towards communities179 (including communities outside States’ 
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own borders180), which finds resonance in the most recent developments related to 
corporate accountability.
Although the UN draft Code of Conduct was never approved, it left a legacy 
for corporate environmental accountability in international law. With regard to its 
impact on the UN, undeniably its failure had ‘substantial psychological and polit-
ical implications’181 that have been reflected in the new strategies adopted within 
the UN to contribute to tackle the issue of corporate accountability, such as the 
partnership approach of the UN Global Compact and the human rights- based 
approach.
Certainly, the draft Code’s failure showed the lack of political will of negotiating 
States to have an international instrument regulating foreign direct investment and 
multinationals’ responsibility, particularly due to the changed political and eco-
nomic background to the negotiations. This was further exemplified in the failed 
negotiations of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment within the OECD in 
1998.182 Nonetheless, one should not underestimate the ‘impressive achievement 
of the UNCTC’, namely the wide measure of consensus reached over the first part 
of the draft (on the activities of transnationals) which constituted a quite compre-
hensive elaboration of the expectations on acceptable corporate conduct.183 As it 
appears less controversial now than it did in the 1970s and 1980s, the draft seems 
sufficiently broad in subject- matter to encompass many issues of the contemporary 
international agenda on corporate responsibility and accountability.184
3 Subsequent practice of the UN in the 1990s:  
the partnership approach
By the late 1990s, the UN aimed at ensuring further understanding of multi-
nationals’ activities and their impacts on development, in order to facilitate access 
of developing countries to foreign direct investment.185 With the recognition of 
the potentially positive role of the private sector in the global efforts towards sus-
tainable development,186 a new trend of promoting UN– business partnerships de-
veloped to become an ‘integral part’ of the work of the UN,187 and increasingly 
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relevant for the environmental sector.188 This is the result of a shift in discussions 
on multinationals from concerns over expropriation189 to concerns over globaliza-
tion.190 Due to the development aid crisis, the debt crisis, and the shortfall in in-
vestment towards developing countries, a re- evaluation of benefits of foreign direct 
investment took place, with greater competition among developing countries to 
attract multinationals.191 This was accompanied by increasing privatization, a 
growing number of bilateral investment agreements, and international action 
aiming at the establishment of new structures for investors’ protection through the 
World Bank and the World Trade Organization.192 The idea of partnerships is also 
responsive to a multi- stakeholder approach in the definition and implementation 
of international environmental standards for corporate accountability, as part of 
a changed system of international governance increasingly involving non- State 
actors, both the private sector and the NGO community, in the shaping and imple-
mentation of international law.193 Within this, attention was increasingly focusing 
on the whole private sector, and no longer multinationals alone.194
A study by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD)195 identified two main purposes of UN partnerships. On the one hand, 
they represented an attempt by the UN to regain political relevance by welcoming 
non- State actors in international deliberative fora and project implementation.196 
Partnerships provided the UN with a means of mobilizing resources, and tapping 
the technology, competencies, creativity, and global reach of the business commu-
nity for development purposes.197 This second aspect was specifically linked to the 
financial crisis that the UN underwent particularly in the 1990s.198 The UNRISD 
study also points to some of the weaknesses of this approach, namely the polit-
ical and material limitations of the UN in systematically screening companies with 
which they start partnerships. It highlighted how the different agendas of the dif-
ferent actors involved in the partnership may render it difficult to contribute sig-
nificantly to the goals of the UN. This would be the case of companies willing to 
enhance their competitiveness through a fairly minimalist agenda of corporate 
 188 The most notable, although controversial, outcome of WSSD was ‘Type II Partnerships’, namely 
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 190 Rubin (n. 124) 1277.
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accountability, by improving their reputation and image through their association 
with the UN.199 Some commentators have thus underscored that partnerships may 
permit the ‘smuggling’ of a business agenda into the UN.200 Other authors, con-
versely, consider partnerships as an indispensable step in the enhancement of inter-
national cooperation, which is much needed for the attainment of goals that are ‘too 
big a job for governments alone’.201 Against this background, the following sections 
focus on the most prominent partnership of the UN with the private sector— the 
UN Global Compact— because of its international standard- setting role.
3.1 The UN Global Compact
The highest- profile example of UN partnerships with the private sector is the Global 
Compact.202 It was launched by former UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan to respond 
to the lack of an international framework to assist companies in the development and 
promotion of global value- based management.203 In January 1999 Annan addressed 
the World Economic Forum,204 challenging ‘world business leaders to help build 
the social and environmental pillars required to sustain the new global economy, on 
the basis of shared values and principles’.205 The initiative was subsequently officially 
launched in July 2000, within ECOSOC.206 Almost 10,000 companies in over 160 
countries participate in the Global Compact.207 But reportedly ‘growth in member-
ship has been relatively moderate in recent years’ and the Compact lacks ‘a strategic 
vision for increased engagement of private companies’.208
The UN Global Compact has been widely publicized and criticized,209 due to 
its innovative approach according to which ‘confrontation’ with the business 
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community was replaced with ‘cooperation’.210 Its main aim is to build collaborative 
relations with the private sector, on the basis of internationally agreed principles 
of good corporate citizenship (human rights, labour standards, environmental 
sustainability, and anti- corruption).211 This section will discuss the innovative 
strategy of the UN Global Compact, and its legal significance as ‘the world’s largest 
corporate social responsibility initiative’.212
The scope of the UN Global Compact is to encourage the private sector to 
commit its support to the ten principles, expecting companies to integrate them 
into their core business operations, and pursuing activities that advance implemen-
tation of the principles, and other UN- related objectives, such as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) first213 and the Sustainable Development Goals after 
2015.214 Adhering companies are further expected to post on the Global Compact 
website, at least once a year, a report of the concrete steps taken, and lessons learnt 
on any of the principles. Under these conditions, business enterprises are free to 
publicize their participation in the UN Global Compact.215 This is supposed to 
provide the best incentives for companies to adhere. In addition, engagement by 
the private sector also includes the commitment to work in a transparent and ac-
countable manner, particularly to be prepared to respond to NGO observations 
and critiques on the Compact website.216 One of the Global Compact’s main fea-
tures is thus multi- stakeholder involvement, through the encouragement of the 
‘spotlight effect’ by voluntary monitoring undertaken by NGOs and the media.217
The Global Compact does not address or refer specifically to multinationals, 
but is open to all business entities, without distinction. Opinions on the Global 
Compact are quite divided. Environmental activists characterize the Global 
Compact as an ideal ‘greenwash’ instrument arguing that in the run- up to the 
WSSD,218 several corporations expressed their commitment to environmental 
principles to improve their public image, without undertaking any significant im-
plementation.219 Conversely, business considered that the Global Compact ren-
ders redundant the adoption of other international (possibly binding) documents 
H. Meyer and S. Boyka, ‘Human Rights, the UN Global Compact, and Global Governance’ (2001) 34 
Cornell International Law Journal 501; and E. Duruigbo, Multinational Corporations and International 
Law:  Accountability and Compliance Issues in the Petroleum Industry (Ardlee, NY:  Transnational 
Publishers, 2003) 150– 3.
 210 Bruno and Karliner (n. 200) 34.
 211 Ibid.
 212 Special Representative’s Interim Report (n. 50) para. 40.
 213 UNDP, Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 (New York: UN, 2015).
 214 https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/ sdgs.
 215 Shelton (n. 143) 216.
 216 United Nations Guide to the Global Compact, 9.
 217 Meyer and Boyka (n. 209) 504.
 218 Ch. 2.
 219 O. Hoedeman, ‘Rio + 10 and the Greenwash of Corporate Globalization’ (2002) 45 
Development 39– 40.
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on corporate accountability.220 The legal significance of the Global Compact itself, 
however, requires further reflection, as discussed below.
3.1.1  Legal significance
The UN qualifies the Global Compact as a ‘voluntary corporate citizenship initia-
tive based on a learning approach’.221 Companies are free to adhere to any of the 
ten principles through a letter of intent. The ‘opt- in’ approach222 of the UN Global 
Compact and its being a UN Secretariat- driven process could be understood as an 
institutional reaction within the UN system to the failure of the UN draft Code of 
Conduct inter- governmental negotiations.223 Particularly in consideration of the 
alleged lack of involvement of the private sector in the Code negotiations, the UN 
Global Compact sought to integrate multinationals as participants in the shaping 
and maintenance of an international framework on corporate accountability.224
Regret has been expressed with regard to the flexibility for companies to ‘pick 
and choose’ among the ten principles.225 No further formal requirements are in 
place,226 except for the posting on the website of the reports.227 The UN Global 
Compact makes it clear that it is not a substitute for effective action by govern-
ments nor does it supplant other voluntary initiatives. It is further specified that 
it does not endorse the companies participating in the initiative.228 The initiative 
is, rather, a platform designed to promote institutional learning, through trans-
parency, dialogue with stakeholders, and dissemination of best practices. In add-
ition, the lack of specificity of the principles has been considered as an impediment 
to effective implementation: while it aims to adapt the Compact to different busi-
ness cultures,229 it allows for varying degrees of stringency in its application.230 
The Global Compact should thus be assessed on the basis of its track record in 
providing a venue for ‘accumulated experience— through trial, error and social 
 220 Ibid. 41; Bruno and Karliner (n. 200)  34; Utting (n. 124)  8; Judith Richter’s contribution in 
UNRISD (n. 151)  77. The same argument has also been used by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) against a formal endorsement of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
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July 2003).
 221 United Nations Guide to the Global Compact, 4.
 222 As defined by Meyer and Boyka (n. 209) 502.
 223 As confirmed by D. Coleman, ‘The United Nations and Transnational Corporations: From an 
Inter- Nation to a “Beyond- State” Model of Engagement’ (2003) 17 Global Society 339, 350.
 224 Meyer and Boyka (n. 209) 510.
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 226 This is highlighted by Shelton (n. 143) 216.
 227 United Nations Guide to the Global Compact, 7.
 228 Ibid. 4.
 229 Calder and Culverwell (n. 170) 37.
 230 Shaughnessy (n. 209)  164; L. A. Mowery, ‘Earth Rights, Human Rights:  Can International 
Environmental Human Rights Affect Corporate Accountability?’ (2002) 13 Fordham Environmental 
Law Journal 343, 363; and M. Gjølberg and R. Audun, ‘The UN Global Compact— A Contribution to 
Sustainable Development?’ (University of Oslo Working Paper n.1/ 05, 2005).
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vetting— to gradually fill the blanks’.231 As discussed below, its relevance should 
also be assessed on the basis of its contribution to further international standard- 
setting on corporate environmental accountability and responsibility.232
The learning approach has been lauded for its potential to reach through dia-
logue to ‘broader, consensus- based definitions of what constitutes good prac-
tices . . . which will become a standard of reference source’ through transparency, 
advocacy, and competition.233 The approach also has the potential to ‘lead grad-
ually to a desire for greater codification benchmarking and moving from “good” 
to best “practice” ’, with ‘laggards [having] a harder time opposing actual achieve-
ments by their peers than a priori standard’.234
Two other aspects of the Global Compact are, however, relevant from a legal per-
spective: the origin of the standards and the existence of a follow- up mechanism. 
Like the UN draft Code, the ten principles are based on pre- existing, internation-
ally agreed UN documents, namely: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;235 
the International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work;236 the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development;237 and the UN Convention against Corruption.238 The relevance of 
the UN Global Compact for international environmental law therefore consists in 
the underlying assumption that international environmental law principles can 
be directly applied to multinationals, particularly the precautionary principle.239 
To that extent, it can be argued that the Global Compact is ‘built on a theoretical 
contradiction in terms of its true nature . . . in effect it tries to regulate, using the 
disguise of voluntary self- regulation’.240
As opposed to the UN draft Code of Conduct, the UN Global Compact is an 
autonomous initiative of the Secretary- General. In time, however, the Global 
Compact received an inter- governmental endorsement through General 
Assembly resolutions.241 So the question of the lack of its inter- governmentally 
agreed mandate was raised.242 Evidence of inter- governmental backing can 
 231 J Ruggie, ‘Theory and Practice of Learning Networks: Corporate Social Responsibility and the 
Global Compact’ (2002) 5 Journal of Corporate Citizenship 26, 32.
 232 Section 3.1.2.
 233 Ruggie (n. 231) 32.
 234 Ibid. 33.
 235 UNGA Res. 217A(III) (10 December 1948).
 236 86th Session of the General Conference of the International Labour Organization (Geneva, 19 
June 1998).
 237 ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ (13 June 1992) UN Doc. A/ CONF.151/ 6/ 
Rev.1 (Rio Declaration).
 238 UNGA Res. 58/ 4 (31 October 2003). United Nations Guide to the Global Compact, 7.
 239 Utting (n. 124) 1.
 240 Deva (n. 62) 97.
 241 UNGA Res. 62/ 211  ‘Towards Global Partnership’ (2007) para. 9 and 64/ 223  ‘Towards Global 
Partnership’ (2009) para. 13.
 242 See the Joint Inspection Unit, United Nations Corporate Partnerships: The role and functioning 
of the Global Compact, UN Doc. JIU/ REP/ 2010/ 9 (2010) paras 13– 18 and recommendation 1; and ‘A 
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now found in the periodic General Assembly Resolution ‘Towards Global 
Partnership’, which routinely refers to ‘strengthening the capacity of the United 
Nations to partner strategically with the private sector, . . . to advance United 
Nations values and responsible business practices within the United Nations 
system and among the global business community’.243 The UN General 
Assembly also regularly encourages and urges all companies to adopt prin-
ciples for responsible business, such as respecting the principles of the United 
Nations Global Compact, by translating them into operational corporate 
policies, codes of conduct and management, monitoring and reporting sys-
tems.244 More recently, the UN Joint Inspection Unit has recommended more 
inter- governmental involvement in the Compact’s governance structure, em-
phasizing how the mandate identified by the General Assembly still needs to 
be ‘framed, translated and positioned within the . . . wider context of the UN 
System’.245
Overall, the Global Compact can be considered as an advancement in the 
direct application of international norms to multinationals by shaping global 
discourse, global governance methodology, and cultural expectations.246 In 
time it has become ‘more sophisticated’ in the interpretation of its principles, 
the guidance it provides to companies, and the reporting requirements.247 
Its key weaknesses, however, remain the lack of a gatekeeping function to 
screen participants248 or review substantively their reporting and adherence 
to the principles: it relies on a global database to identify potential concerns 
and makes enquires with local Global Compact networks.249 Even if ‘Integrity 
Measures’ were introduced in 2005 to monitor companies’ compliance with 
the reporting requirements and allow the submission of complaints about ‘sys-
tematic or egregious abuses’ of the aims and principles of the Compact to the 
Global Compact Office,250 the procedure is not a compliance- based initiative, 
but essentially aims to safeguard the reputation and integrity of the Global 
Compact.251
 243 UNGA Res. 70/ 224 (2016) para. 24 preambular.
 244 Ibid. paras 7 and 12, preambular para. 7.
 245 UN Joint Inspection Unit (n. 242), Recommendation 8 and para. 174.
 246 Miles (n. 99) 249.
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3.1.2  Environmental content
From an environmental perspective, the Global Compact is significant for the 
emergence of international standards for corporate environmental accountability 
implying the relevance, if not direct applicability, of international environmental 
principles to private enterprises.252 The Global Compact has thus been referred 
to in the context of international advice on corporate environmental account-
ability through due diligence to respect human rights: this is the case of UN Special 
Rapporteur on Toxics, for instance.253
As opposed to its principles on human rights, the UN Global Compact makes 
reference only implicitly to the international framework for environmental pro-
tection of the environment. Its most prominent feature is the application of the 
precautionary approach to adhering companies.254 In this respect, the Guide to the 
UN Global Compact cautiously mentions that the principle is accepted in the EU 
and forms ‘part of international environmental law’.255 The Guide further empha-
sizes that the principle entails that businesses should take the most cost- effective, 
early action to prevent the occurrence of irreversible environmental damage. To 
this end, companies are expected to carry out assessments of their environmental 
impacts and environmental risks, invest in sustainable production methods and 
research, and develop environmentally- friendly products.256
In addition, the UN Global Compact encourages businesses to undertake initia-
tives to promote greater environmental responsibility.257 The Guide elaborates on 
environmentally sound business practices encompassing:  resource productivity, 
cleaner production, corporate governance, and multi- stakeholder dialogue.258 
Finally, the Global Compact expects adhering companies to encourage the devel-
opment and diffusion of environmentally- friendly technologies.259 These are de-
fined in the Guide to the UN Global Compact by express reference to Agenda 21, 
thus including technologies that allow for limited pollution, protection of the en-
vironment, sustainable use of natural resources, and reduction or reuse of waste.260
While, per se, the Global Compact environmental principles may be too vague 
to provide adequate guidance to companies,261 they have provided a basis upon 
which the Global Compact has developed more specific guidance over time, 
 252 Utting (n. 167) 1; contra, affirming that the Global Compact is ‘devoid of legal normativity’, see 
Karavias (n. 4) 103.
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sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and waste, Calin Georgescu (2012) UN Doc. 
A/ HRC/ 21/ 48, paras 50 and 70.
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 255 UN Guide to the Global Compact, 52.
 256 Ibid. 54.
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engaging in two types of activities. First, the Global Compact Office has partnered 
with the secretariat of multilateral environmental agreements to engage companies 
in reflection and action on specific environmental challenges. These activities ex-
emplify a thematic or sectoral approach (climate change, biodiversity, water), fo-
cused on targets and company policies, reporting, and stakeholder engagement, 
along the supply chain. Second, the Global Compact has produced guidance 
documents on international standards of particular relevance for the natural re-
source sector, such as on indigenous peoples’ rights,262 bringing together different 
international advice from the International Finance Corporation, Inter- American 
Court of Human Rights, and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
cases.263
4 The human rights- based approach
Almost at the same time as the development of the UN Global Compact, the former 
UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) started work on corporate account-
ability. Until 2006, the UNCHR was the UN body, composed of the representa-
tives of fifty- three member States, that was mandated to examine, monitor, and 
publicly report either on human rights situations in specific countries or on major 
phenomena of human rights violations worldwide. Its subsidiary body— the UN 
Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which was 
in turn composed of twenty- six independent human rights experts acting in their 
personal capacity as the Commission’s ‘think tank’,264 developed the Norms on 
the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with regard to Human Rights,265 which were rejected by member States in 2003, as 
discussed below.
Following this initiative, the UNCHR nominated a Special Representative of the 
Secretary- General to continue to investigate the issue of corporate responsibility 
and accountability from a human rights perspective,266 with a view to identifying 
and clarifying standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for multi-
nationals and other business, and elaborating on the role of States in effectively 
regulating and adjudicating on multinationals, including through international 
 262 Global Compact Office, The Business Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (United Nation Global Compact Office, 2013).
 263 Ch. 4.
 264 On the relationship between Sub- Commission and the Commission in relation to the Norms, 
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 265 UNCHR Sub- Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human 
Rights’ (26 August 2003) UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ Sub.2/ 2003/ 12/ Rev.2 (UN Norms).
 266 UNGA Res. 60/ 251 (3 April 2006) and HRC Res. 8/ 7 (18 June 2008).
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cooperation. While the self- declared regulatory approach of the Sub- Commission 
seems closer to that of the UN draft Code, the conclusions of the UN Special 
Representative have been framed much more cautiously on the state of inter-
national law and on the need for action by the UN— although, as will be discussed, 
the actual conceptual approach of the two initiatives is similar in many ways. This 
cautious approach, however, has allowed for the gathering of political support for 
the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights and its Guiding Principles, 
which represent the only inter- governmentally endorsed UN instruments on cor-
porate accountability and responsibility, and as such are now shaping the gamut 
of international human rights processes under the UN. It has been argued that the 
Guiding Principles have generated ‘a shift in the dynamic’ towards ‘greater under-
standing’ and a focus on implementation, as opposed to polarized debates on the 
relevance of human rights for business.267 This has led to an ‘unprecedented point 
of engagement’.268
The human rights- based approach may present some advantages in pushing the 
international agenda on corporate environmental accountability and responsibility 
forward. On the one hand, the notion of applying international law to non- State 
actors has been developed in the field of human rights, on the basis of an interpret-
ation of the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,269 referring 
to the responsibility of both governments and ‘other organs of society’ to respect 
the fundamental rights of individuals.270 Secondly, the human rights machinery 
brings in a ‘claims and responsibility’ approach, which typically empowers citi-
zens to complain directly for breaches of international law.271 Finally, this approach 
may prove beneficial in increasing the credibility of corporate accountability.272 
Denouncing corporate misconduct as a human rights matter may immediately 
convey the opprobrium of society and raise the prospects that the conduct will be 
of international concern,273 gathering political momentum, bringing in new allies 
from human rights advocates.274 From an environmental viewpoint, however, this 
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approach does not seem to lead to radically different substantive solutions. As will 
be discussed in more detail below, the corporate environmental accountability 
standards identified by this initiative tend to converge with those identified by 
other international organizations at different points in time. That said, the human 
rights- based approach has placed more emphasis on grievance mechanisms, and 
has some strategic advantages.
4.1 The Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard 
to Human Rights
The UNCHR Sub- Commission first required a report on the issue of human rights 
and multinationals in 1997.275 From 1998– 2004, the Sub- Commission estab-
lished a Working Group to examine the working methods and activities of multi-
nationals,276 with a view to examining the effects of multinationals on human rights 
and investment agreements’ compatibility with human rights.277 As early as 1999, 
when setting its agenda, the Working Group decided to prepare a draft code of con-
duct for companies. The final document, entitled ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human 
Rights’, was approved at the technical level by the Sub- Commission in August 
2003. The Sub- Commission and its working group, acting in their members’ in-
dividual capacity, undertook broad consultations with stakeholders on the matter, 
including public dissemination of previous drafts and collection of comments,278 
outside the constraints of inter- governmental negotiations.279 The Norms also 
took into consideration best practices in corporate accountability, with a particular 
view to business organizations’ and NGOs’ codes and guidelines on the matter.280
 275 UNCHR Sub- Commission Res. 1997/ 11 (22 August 1997).
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Unlike the UN draft Code of Conduct, the Norms not only addressed multi-
nationals, but also ‘other’ business enterprises. They were expected to be applied 
by all businesses. Unlike the UN Global Compact, however, which applies to all 
business companies regardless of their size, the Norms paid special attention to 
multinationals, and other business enterprises which, although not transnational 
in character, have relationships with multinationals, and have activities that pro-
duce delocalized impacts, or which involve violations of the right to security.281 
It was expressly acknowledged, however, that multinationals raise the greatest 
international concerns and are the least susceptible to national regulations,282 thus 
leading to a system of ‘relative application’ in the Norms. Accordingly, the degree of 
responsibility incumbent on a particular company was considered dependent on 
its sphere of activity and influence.
4.1.1  Legal significance
The Norms enjoyed a level of expert legitimacy based on the adoption by the 
Sub- Commission, but lacked political legitimization, which could have derived 
from the adoption by the Commission.283 When the Norms were submitted to 
the UN Commission for consideration and adoption, however, the Commission 
merely ‘took note’ of them and ‘expressed its appreciation’ for the work of the Sub- 
Commission.284 The Commission further underlined that the Norms had ‘not 
been requested by the Commission and, as a draft proposal, had no legal standing, 
and that the Sub- Commission should not perform any monitoring function in 
this regard’.285 The member States of the Commission therefore took great care 
to highlight that the Norms had been developed at the sole initiative of the Sub- 
Commission. They remain a document representing the opinion of experts but 
lacking the political endorsement of States.
Turning to their intention, the Norms286 were drafted as a comprehen-
sive ‘restatement of international legal principles applicable to business’,287 
covering: human rights, labour law, humanitarian law, environmental and con-
sumer protection, and anti- corruption law. They purported to reflect, interpret, 
 281 UN Norms, Section I ‘Definitions’, para. 21; Hillemanns (n. 278) 1069.
 282 Weissbrodt and Kruger (n. 277) 910.
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Ebert- Stiftung Occasional Geneva Papers n. 22, 2006), who claims that the Norms have a ‘systemizing 
function’ and are ‘a benchmark for negotiations on a future standard’.
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and elaborate primarily upon legally binding treaties and non- binding guidelines 
adopted by the vast majority of States and international organizations. A commen-
tator highlighted the ‘hybrid nature’ of the Norms, as they were considered at the 
same time recommendations and clarification of States’ obligations and identifi-
cation of the need to further develop direct corporate obligations.288 In addition, 
‘imposing the full range of duties on [multinationals] directly under international 
law by definition reduces the discretionary space of individual governments within 
the scope of those duties . . . [it] may further undermine domestic political incen-
tives to make governments more responsive and responsible to their own citi-
zenry . . . [and] the rights of vulnerable groups are not well served’ in the ‘endless 
strategic games and legal wrangling on the part of governments and companies 
alike’.289 It was further noted that the UN Norms included ‘substantive provisions 
[going] beyond a conventional human rights- based agenda and belong[ing] more 
to a general corporate social responsibility code’ such as fair business, marketing, 
and advertising practices.290
The Norms aimed to provide the first comprehensive set of international human 
rights standards directly applicable to multinationals,291 thereby seeking to mark 
an important step in applying international law directly to business enterprises as 
non- State actors.292 In addition, the Norms were envisaged as an evolving docu-
ment that did not endeavour to freeze standards by drawing on past drafting efforts 
and present practices, but rather encourage further evolution.293 Like the UN draft 
Code of Conduct, the value of the Norms rested on their universality, ie in their 
broad subject- matter, and in their general approach based on international prin-
ciples to be applied wherever companies operate.294 The intention of the drafters 
was thus for the Norms to constitute a ‘non- voluntary initiative’295 on corporate 
accountability, as evidenced by their ‘self- consciously normative’ tone,296 and the 
clear and measurable drafting.297 The drafters, therefore, intended to differentiate 
this initiative from the voluntary approach of the UN Global Compact,298 arguing 
that the Norms’ legal authority derived mainly from the sources of the principles, 
 288 N.  Rosemann, ‘The UN Norms on Corporate Human Rights Responsibilities:  An Innovating 
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particularly those embodied in treaty law or crystallized in customary inter-
national law.299 The text was accompanied by a Commentary, as a ‘useful interpret-
ation and elaboration tool’300 in order to provide detailed clarification for each of 
the principles.301
As opposed to the draft Code of Conduct, the Norms devoted considerable 
room to suggested means of implementation, distinguishing between the roles 
of different actors. Business entities were first expected to adopt, disseminate, 
and implement their own internal rules of operation in compliance with the 
Norms. They were further encouraged to apply them in their relationships with 
subcontractors. Secondly, they were expected to report annually on the in-
corporation of the Norms into all their business dealings. In doing so, private 
companies would make their responsibility known to the general public, thus 
further legitimizing and institutionalizing it.302 Thirdly, a provision suggested 
that business should provide ‘adequate, effective, and prompt reparation’ to all 
persons, entities, and communities that have been adversely affected by their 
failure to comply with the Norms.303 This provision was later regarded by the 
UN Special Representative on Transnational Corporations as ‘highly conten-
tious and largely symbolic’.304
With regard to action at the UN level, the Norms envisaged periodic monitoring 
of their implementation, in a transparent and inclusive way, by an existing or new 
UN body, that could also receive complaints from stakeholders about specific com-
panies’ violations of the Norms. In other words, the Norms sought to extend classic 
international human rights monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to non- State 
entities.305 However, the Commission’s 2004 decision made it crystal clear that the 
Sub- Commission should not perform any monitoring function.306 Furthermore, 
the Norms could have been used by the UN human rights treaty bodies for the cre-
ation of additional reporting requirements for States, as well as a benchmark for 
procurement requirements for the UN and its specialized agencies.307 The Norms 
were thus noteworthy in suggesting that other actors, in addition to States and cor-
porations, could contribute to their implementation, thereby supporting the UN 
and non- State actors in using them to assess business practice.308 They omitted to 
 299 Weissbrodt and Kruger (n. 286) 913.
 300 Ibid. 906.
 301 Ibid. 905.
 302 Ibid. 916.
 303 UN Norms, Section H, para. 18; Hillemanns (n. 287)  1078; Weissbrodt and Kruger (n. 
286) 913.
 304 Special Representative’s Interim Report (n. 56) para. 59. Nollkaemper (n. 14) 197, considers this 
part of the UN Norms ‘confusing’.
 305 Kinley and Chambers (n. 292) 452.
 306 UNCHR Decision 2004/ 116 (20 April 2004) para. C.
 307 Weissbrodt and Kruger (n. 286) 917.
 308 Muchlinski (n. 100) 679.
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refer to the possible role of the UN Global Compact in monitoring the Norms’ 
implementation.309
With regard to States, it was recommended to them to consider the Norms in 
adopting general comments and legislation on corporate accountability,310 al-
though no established process for incorporating the Norms into national legal sys-
tems was suggested.311
4.1.2  Environmental content
The Norms312 required ‘accordance with national laws, regulations, administrative 
practices and policies of the countries in which multinationals operate’ in relation to 
environmental protection, as well as ‘accordance with relevant international agree-
ments, principles, objectives, responsibilities and standards’ on the environment, 
human rights, public health, safety, bioethics, and the precautionary principle’. The 
preamble highlighted the obligation for multinationals and other business enter-
prises to respect ‘generally recognised responsibility and norms contained in UN 
treaties and other international instruments’, such as the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD)313 the Rio Declaration, the Plan of Implementation of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development,314 and the Millennium Declaration.315 In 
addition, multinationals’ activities were expected to be conducted ‘in a manner 
contributing to the wider goal of sustainable development’.316
The operational section on environmental protection of the Norms was framed 
in obligatory terms and required business to conduct its activities ‘in a manner 
contributing to the wider goal of sustainable development’.317 The preamble would 
arguably guide the interpretation of the reference to the relevant international in-
struments: at a minimum, companies would be expected to respect the standards 
and principles embodied, for example, in the Convention on Biodiversity and the 
Rio Declaration. It was noted how the insertion of the precautionary principle con-
stituted an unprecedented step in human rights law.318
The Commentary to the Norms called for: respect of the right to a clean and 
healthy environment, respect of the concerns for intergenerational equity, and 
 309 S. Deva, ‘UN’s Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?’ (2004) 10 ILSA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 493, 515.
 310 Hillemanns (n. 278) 1070.
 311 Calder and Culverwell (n. 170) 41.
 312 Section G, para. 14.
 313 Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993). 
See Ch. 4.
 314 WSSD, Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (4 July 2002) UN Doc. A/ CONF.199/ 20, Resolution 
2 (WSSD Plan of Implementation).
 315 UNGA Res. 55/ 2 (8 September 2000).
 316 Ibid. Section G, para.14.
 317 UN Norms, Section G, para.14.
 318 Walker (n. 264) 83.
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respect of ‘internationally recognized standards’ on air, and water pollution, land 
use, biodiversity, and hazardous waste.319 Secondly, the Commentary expressed 
the expectation that companies would be responsible for the environmental and 
human health impacts of all their activities. Thirdly, business enterprises are to as-
sess the environmental impacts of their activities on a periodic basis, in order to 
ensure that the burden of the negative environmental consequences does not fall 
on vulnerable racial, ethnic, and socio- economic groups. The reports of such as-
sessments are required to be circulated in a timely and accessible manner to the 
UN Environment Programme, ILO, and other international bodies, to the na-
tional governments of the host and home countries, and to other affected groups. 
In addition, the reports should be accessible to the general public.320 Fourthly, it 
expected companies to respect the prevention and precautionary principles, and 
to take appropriate steps to reduce the risk of accidents and damage to the envir-
onment, by adopting best management practices, and technologies.321 Finally, the 
Commentary indicated the expectation for business to ensure effective means of 
collecting the remains of products or services for recycling, reuse or other environ-
mentally responsible disposal.322
4.1.3   Legacy
The adoption of the Norms by the Sub- Commission elicited intense reactions. 
Among civil society, the International Chamber of Commerce immediately 
stressed the undesirability of the Norms,323 arguing that they would undermine 
the spirit of the UN’s new cooperation strategy with business underpinning the 
UN Global Compact.324 On the other hand, Amnesty International, among other 
NGOs, welcomed the Norms, which, in their view, provided guidance and leader-
ship for setting a stronger international framework for corporate accountability.325 
In particular, Amnesty International also advocated for the UN Global Compact to 
formally indicate that the Norms were an authoritative guide to its principles and 
for the OECD to indicate that the Norms were to be used as a reference for under-
standing the scope of the OECD Guidelines.326 None of this followed, but support 
for ‘hardening’ the Norms had come from the Special Rapporteur on Toxics and 
Human Rights.327
 319 UN Norms, Section G, Commentary, (a) (emphasis added).
 320 Ibid. (b) and (c).
 321 Ibid. (e) and (g).
 322 Ibid. (f).
 323 ICC and IOE (n. 220).
 324 Utting (n. 124).
 325 Amnesty International (n. 294) 13 and 15.
 326 Ibid. 14 and 16.
 327 UNCHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and 
Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous Products and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights’ (2003) UN 
Doc. E/ CN.4/ 2004/ 46/ Add. 2, para. 118.
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The majority of States did not favour the formal adoption of the Norms, be-
cause of their shift away from voluntary approaches, the duplication of existing 
initiatives, and the misstatement of international law embodied in the recognition 
of legal obligations on business.328 Such criticism, however, appears misplaced. 
It should be noted from the outset that the Norms asserted that the primary re-
sponsibility for human rights protection is that of national governments, and that 
companies are not requested to replace governments in such a task.329 Whereas 
the Norms did not intend to create new obligations for governments in relation to 
human rights,330 they aimed to provide for an allocation of responsibility between 
governments and business.331
Scholars were rather critical of the Norms’ effort to ‘enlist [multinations] as 
agents of international law implementation, even against States that have either 
refused to ratify certain international instruments or that have objected to the 
gloss advancement by international institutions’.332 In addition, it was pointed 
out that they did not recognize the limits of national company law, whereby con-
tracts incorporating the Norms ‘would be voided as exceeding the authority of the 
[multinations] board’.333 For this reason, Ruggie involved corporate lawyers in his 
consultations leading to the development of the Guiding Principles.334 Other com-
mentators have also criticized the Norms for implying that all human rights may 
be relevant to corporate conduct, including human rights that corporations cannot 
logically infringe and positive duties to promote and fulfil human rights which 
could only be envisaged in limited cases such as the privatization of certain State 
services.335 Ruggie considered the Norms’ ex ante identification of rights relevant 
for companies as an ‘inherently fruitless exercise’ compared with a determination 
on a case- by- case basis of relevant rights336 and without taking into account the 
complexities of global value chains.337 The Norms were further criticized for failing 
to delimit the relevance of human rights to persons under multinationals’ factual 
control.338
 328 All submissions on the Norms are available at <http:// www.ohchr.org/ english/ issues/ globaliza-
tion/ business/ reportbusiness.htm>; and UNCHR, ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
on Human Rights on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Related Business 
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’ (15 February 2005)  UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ 2005/ 91, para. 20 
(hereinafter, ‘High Commissioner’s report’). See also Karavias (n. 4) 77– 78.
 329 UN Norms, para. A, ‘General Obligations’; Weissbrodt and Kruger (n. 277)  911. Kinley and 
Chambers (n. 283) 481.
 330 Weissbrodt and Kruger (n. 277) 912.
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 332 L. Catá Backer, ‘Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on 
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in 
International Law’ (2005– 06) 37 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 287, 292.
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 336 Ruggie (n. 289) 825.
 337 Ibid. 823.
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Despite their political rejection, the Norms for a time provided a benchmark 
that clarified society’s expectations and put pressure on businesses.339 Certain 
NGOs engaged in road- testing the Norms.340 But after the inter- governmental 
support for the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights, the UN Norms 
have been rapidly set aside. Nevertheless, they provide certain conceptual insights 
that remain relevant today and were confirmed, implicitly, by the UN Framework 
on Business and Human Rights, as will be highlighted in the following sections.
4.2 The UN Framework and Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights
The end of the debate on the future of the Norms did not prevent the continu-
ation of discussions on corporate accountability. In 2005, the UN Commission on 
Human Rights considered a recommendation from the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights to act expeditiously to define and clarify the human rights re-
sponsibilities of business, and to discuss further the possibility of establishing a UN 
statement of universal human rights standards applicable to business.341 The deci-
sion was presented as a cross- regional initiative,342 with the objectives of achieving 
progress on the issue of human rights and business within the UN Commission, 
and gathering a broad- based consensus. This showed how most States were un-
willing to allow corporate accountability to slip off the UN agenda, although many 
were reluctant to politically endorse the UN Norms.343 Although the 2005 decision 
did not mention explicitly the UN Norms, it mandated the Special Representative 
also to clarify the implications of the concepts of ‘complicity’ and ‘sphere of influ-
ence’, which were controversial concepts in the text of the Norms.344
 339 Hillemanns (n. 278) 1080; see also Kinley and Chambers (n. 283) 461– 62.
 340 Walker (n. 264) 105, the ‘road mapping’ by the Business Leaders’ Initiative on Human Rights, a 
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 341 UNCHR Res. 2005/ 69 (20 April 2005). States in favour of the decision (forty- nine in total) 
were:  Argentina, Armenia, Bhutan, Brazil, Canada, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, 
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sors included: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
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In 2006, the first interim report by the Special Representative dealt a blow to 
the UN Norms, which were considered the origin of a stalemate on this issue.345 
Specifically, the Special Representative opposed the legal authority advanced by the 
Norms, largely disagreeing with the Norms’ premise on the existence of binding 
obligations on corporations under existing State- based human rights instruments, 
the proposed allocation of human rights responsibilities between States and com-
panies, and the concept of ‘sphere of influence’.346 Commentators, however, have 
considered it a false dichotomy to distinguish the UN Norms as an attempt to pre-
vent and redress corporate human rights violations from the encouragement of 
corporations’ positive contributions to development.347 Some scholars have there-
fore identified the UN Norms’ continued relevance lies in providing ‘a template on 
which to base any future initiatives’,348 and ‘a useful framework to guide corporate 
human rights impact assessments’.349 The following chapter will demonstrate to 
what extent the UN Norms find resonance in current work undertaken by UN 
Special Rapporteurs.
UN Special Representative John Ruggie, who had already been involved in the 
development of the UN Global Compact,350 focused on companies’ responsibility 
vis- à- vis human rights in terms of prevailing societal expectation around ‘no harm’ 
and ‘due diligence’.351 Interestingly, the latter concept had already been put forward 
in the UN Norms, but was presented in the UN Framework in a more politically 
acceptable context that explicitly distanced itself from the conceptual approach of 
the UN Norms. While ‘do no harm’ represents a substantive standard, the second 
pillar is mainly focused on procedural dimensions (due diligence), as a ‘bench-
mark against which other social actors judge the human rights impacts of com-
panies’352 — which is the concept of ‘accountability’ as defined in this study.353 As 
opposed to singling out specific thematic areas where concerns had already been 
expressed by the international community, however, the UN Framework indi-
cated that the scope of corporate responsibility to respect human rights is defined 
on a case- by- case basis by the actual and potential human rights impacts gener-
ated by business, in line with the International Bill of Rights.354 As such, the UN 
 345 Special Representative’s Interim Report (n. 50) para. 55.
 346 Ibid. paras 59– 69.
 347 D. Augenstein and D. Kinley, ‘Beyond the 100 Acre Wood: In which International Human Rights 
Law Finds New Ways to Tame Global Corporate Power’ (2015) 19 International Journal of Human 
Rights 828, 831.
 348 Miles (n. 99) 230.
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 350 Harvard Kennedy School, ‘John Ruggie’ < https:// www.google.co.uk/ webhp?sourceid=chrome- 
instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF- 8#q=john%20ruggie> accessed 27 February 2016.
 351 UN Framework for Business and Human Rights, paras 25 and 58.
 352 Ibid.
 353 Ch. 2.
 354 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, ‘Business and Human Rights: Towards 
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Framework avoids mentioning specifically environmental and human rights con-
cerns about business conduct in the natural resource sector. Rather, the proposed 
‘common conceptual and policy framework’ is expected to be further elaborated 
and taken up by relevant social actors.355
As a result of this more appeasing and less specific approach,356 the UN 
Framework elicited inter- governmental support in 2008,357 when the Human 
Rights Council recognized the need to operationalize the Framework.358 Although 
States remained divided as to the need for international legal instruments on cor-
porate responsibility and accountability,359 they agreed in 2008 to renew the Special 
Representative’s mandate with a view to further elaborating the scope and content 
of corporate responsibility. In particular, they highlighted the need for providing 
concrete guidance to business and other stakeholders in this regard, exploring op-
tions, and making recommendations for better access to effective remedies, and 
conducting multi- stakeholder consultations on ways and means to operation-
alize the Framework.360 The resulting Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights were adopted by the Human Rights Council in 2011,361 which, according to 
Ruggie, was ‘the first time the UN adopted a set of standards on the subject of busi-
ness and human rights . . . that governments did not negotiate themselves’, in the 
face of the stagnation of ‘traditional forms of international legalization and negoti-
ation through universal consensus- based institutions’.362
4.2.1  Conceptual and normative contributions
The main normative contribution of the UN Framework was to confirm that com-
panies are expected to go beyond the level of respect for the international obliga-
tions of host States as enshrined in their national laws.363 The Guiding Principles 
 355 Ibid. para. 107.
 356 S. Deva, ‘Treating Human Rights Lightly:  A Critique of the Normative Foundations of the 
SRSG’s Framework and Guiding Principles’ in S. Deva and D. Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations 
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2013) 86.
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 360 Human Rights Council Res. 8/ 7 (18 June 2008).
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Human Rights’ (2014) 20 Global Governance 5, 5– 6.
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ness associations:  International Organisation of Employers, International Chamber of Commerce, 
and Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD, Business and Human Rights:  The 
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further clarified that there is a ‘global standard of expected conduct for all business 
enterprises wherever they operate’, that exists independently of States’ abilities and 
willingness to fulfil their human rights obligations. Such global standard operates 
‘over and above compliance with national laws and regulations protecting human 
rights’, basically requiring business entities to take adequate measures to prevent, 
mitigate, and remediate adverse human rights impacts.364 Political acceptability 
was ensured by placing these considerations as the second of three pillars:  the 
duty of the State to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
business; the corporate ‘responsibility’ to respect human rights; and the need for 
greater access to effective remedies.365
Under the second pillar, due diligence aims to: avoid causing or contributing 
to adverse human rights impacts through companies’ own initiatives; and seek to 
prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their 
operations, products, or services by their business relationships, even if a business 
entity has not contributed to the impacts.366 This is the same effort to look beyond 
multinationals through supply chains and other business relations. Under the third 
pillar— access to remedies— the Special Representative recognized not only the 
role of States but also the role of grievance mechanisms to be developed by pri-
vate companies themselves,367 as long as they are geared towards redressing imbal-
ances in information and expertise, and enabling effective dialogue with affected 
stakeholders.368
The UN Guiding Principles further clarify that the human rights due dili-
gence process entails: (i) assessing actual and potential impacts with ‘meaningful 
consultations’ with potentially affected groups and other stakeholders at regular 
intervals; (ii) integrating the assessment findings in internal decision- making, 
budget allocation, and oversight processes; (iii) acting upon those findings; (iv) 
tracking responses (including by drawing on feedback from affected stakeholders); 
and (v) communicating how impacts are addressed to right- holders in a manner 
that is sufficient for stakeholders to evaluate the adequacy of the company’s re-
sponse.369 Companies are expected to prioritize the prevention and mitigation of 
most severe impacts or those that a delayed response would make irremediable.370 
 364 UN Special Representative on Human Rights and Business Enterprises, ‘Guiding Principles on 
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Following this overview, this section will discuss the key conceptual innovations of 
the Framework and its Guiding Principles, the importance of inter- governmental 
support, and the criticisms voiced in the human rights literature.
Writing in his academic capacity, Ruggie underscored that the main contri-
bution of the Framework and its Guiding Principles was ‘generating the begin-
nings of a new global regulator dynamic . . . [which] consciously reflected on and 
was informed by the reasons for past failures’.371 It has also been noted that the 
Framework takes a ‘complex, interactive and nuanced’ approach that goes beyond 
self- regulation due to the interaction of the three pillars, reflecting an ‘inextric-
ably intertwined and not mutually exclusive’ relationship between self- regulation 
and (domestic) mandatory regulation.372 In addition, the intuition of the UN 
Framework is that of focusing attention on expanding the scope of routine cor-
porate assessments of enterprise- wide risk, that tend to ‘aggregate, rather than 
atomize, risks across the corporate groups and functions’, thereby disregarding the 
question of separate legal personality for the purposes of enterprise risk manage-
ment.373 Furthermore, the reference to due diligence also benefitted from the no-
tion being ‘well- known to companies’.374 This has also had the effect of gathering 
interest and support from the legal profession and CSR consultants in their client 
advisory role.375 Ruggie concluded that he had successfully provided the ‘param-
eters and perimeters of business and human rights as an international policy do-
main’ where international legal instruments provide ‘carefully crafted precision 
tools’ for the evolution of the international agenda.376
While undoubtedly a political success, the UN Framework and its Guiding 
Principles have raised a host of criticisms from international human rights scholars 
and practitioners. In particular, it has been lamented that the emphasis on ‘im-
pacts’, rather than ‘violations’, of human rights in the UN Framework points to ‘a 
shift from a legal to a managerial conception of the responsibility of business’ that 
responds better to corporate lobbies’ interest than to the long- standing demands of 
victims.377 Other scholars have also pointed out that the UN Framework failed to 
show ‘sensitivity towards the way in which emerging [international] norms crys-
tallize over time into hard law’ 378 by misrepresenting the ‘dynamic relationship 
 371 J. Ruggie, ‘Hierarchy or Ecosystem? Regulating Human Rights Risks of Multinational Enterprises’ 
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 372 Muchlinski (n. 102) 150.
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Association http:// www.abanow.org/ 2012/ 01/ 2012mml09 and ISO26000 chapter on human rights 
modelled after the Guiding Principles.
 376 Ruggie (n. 362) 7– 8.
 377 Deva (n. 356) 78.
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The human rights-based approach 113
between international and domestic law’.379 Another reason for criticism was the 
exclusive focus on avoiding negative impacts on human rights, rather than also on 
the positive contribution of business to the realization of human rights.380 Another 
shortcoming of the UN Framework has been identified in the lack of guidance to 
companies on how to address ‘human rights dilemmas of conflicting requirements’ 
in which a decision to avoid the risk of violating one human rights may inevit-
ably lead to causing the violation of other human rights of apparently equal se-
verity or irremediable character.381 The Framework has been further criticized for 
falling short of proposing how to overcome legal barriers to hold corporations le-
gally accountable at the national level, such as the forum non conveniens doctrine 
and the corporate veil.382 The Guiding Principles are considered ‘under- inclusive’ 
of international human rights obligations, whereas the draft UN Norms had rea-
sonably incorporated existing international human rights obligations relevant to 
business activity.’383 It has been argued that corporations already have certain le-
gally binding human rights obligations and these obligations are not limited to the 
‘respect’ category, or to the International Bill of Human Rights.384
More fundamentally, it has been argued that the Framework and its Guiding 
Principles ‘ignore the critical elements of a human rights approach to social 
change . . . empowerment, participation and accountability’, by considering a pos-
sible new human rights treaty as an extreme and antiquated regulatory option and 
by preventing rightholders themselves to ‘shift dynamics in decision- making to-
wards human rights protection in locally responsive ways’. 385 Ultimately, to gain 
political legitimacy, the UN Framework has ‘steered clear of employing concepts 
cognate to international human rights law’386 in a concerted effort to avoid the 
impression that companies are assimilated to States in terms of human rights 
protection.
With regard to the first pillar, it has been argued that the Special Representative 
missed an opportunity to emphasize State extraterritorial obligations vis- à- vis 
the victims of corporate abuse, including States’ obligations to take reasonable 
and appropriate measures to secure the victim’s rights.387 So, for instance, the 
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 386 Karavias (n. 4) 83 (and more generally at 81– 83).
 387 D.  Augenstein and D.  Kinley, ‘When Human Rights ‘Responsibilities’ become ‘Duties’:  The 
Extra- Territorial Obligations of States that Bind Corporations. Human Rights Obligations of 
114 The Emergence of International Standards
Guiding Principles do not account for the role of States in preventing com-
panies from violating the right to water of individuals and communities in 
other countries by taking legal or political steps to influence companies.388 This 
can also be considered a way to fulfil States’ responsibilities to engage in inter-
national assistance and cooperation in the realization of relevant international 
human rights treaties,389 including at the intersection of human rights and en-
vironmental protection.390 Furthermore, the UN Guiding Principles have fallen 
short of critiquing the protection of multinationals in international investment 
law, ignoring the power imbalances not only in the negotiations of bilateral 
investment agreements but also in host States’ technical and financial sup-
port to home States/ developing countries on regulatory reform that supports 
multinationals.391
4.2.2  Legacy: the Working Group on Business and Human Rights
It is undeniable that the UN Framework has become the quintessential inter-
national reference with regard to corporate accountability:  it has influenced the 
most recent review of the OECD Guidelines and other international standards,392 
as well as the practice of international monitoring and complaints bodies.393 At 
the very least, the UN Framework and Guiding Principles have helped move from 
a polarized debate to a shared understanding that has allowed attention to be 
shifted to implementation.394 From an institutional perspective, for instance, the 
inter- governmental endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles has led to a light- 
touch follow- up development. This section will thus reflect on the legacy of the 
Framework in the context of the 2011 decision by the Human Rights Council to 
Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect?’ in Deva and Bilchitz (n. 356) 271, 285– 94; 
Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 2) 33.
 388 Augenstein and Kinley (n. 387) 289– 90, based on CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15: The Right 
to Water’ (20 January 2003) UN Doc. E/ C.12/ 2002/ 11, para. 33.
 389 Augenstein and Kinley (n. 347) 841, with regard to: CESCR, para. 3, and CRC, para. 41; and UN 
Charter Art. 56.
 390 Augenstein and Kinley (n. 347)  842; in reference to, eg, CERD, ‘Concluding Observations: 
Australia’, CERD/ C/ AUS/ CO/ 15- 17 (13 September 2010) para. 13. Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Issue of Human Rights and the Environment John Knox: Framework Principles on Human Rights 
and the Environment (2017) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 34/ 49, para. 70.
 391 P. Simons, ‘International Law’s Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate Accountability 
for Violations of Human Rights’ (2012) 3 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 5, 19. 
See Ch. 2.
 392 Update of the Guidelines on a Principle- based Approach to the Cooperation between the United 
Nations and the Business Sector, undertaken in order to ensure their full alignment with the Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights:  Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework (https:// business.un.org/ en/ documents/ 5292). See Ch. 4.
 393 Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’ (n. 1). See, eg, 
Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/ Rec(2016)3.
 394 Bickford (n. 267) 153.
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establish a Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corpor-
ations and other business enterprises.395
The mandate of the Working Group includes: to promote the effective and compre-
hensive dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles; and to identify, 
exchange, and promote good practices and lessons learned on their implementation. 
In addition, it is to make recommendations on the basis of information from gov-
ernments, transnational corporations and other business enterprises, national human 
rights institutions, civil society, and rights- holders; and cooperate with other relevant 
special procedures of the Human Rights Council, relevant UN and other international 
bodies, the treaty bodies and regional human rights organizations.396 Arguably, the 
Working Group was meant to exercise pressure from the bottom up on companies to 
continually improve the protection of human rights, but doubts were raised about its 
ability to do so in the absence of civil society as participants in norm creation, revision, 
monitoring, and enforcement.397
In most respects, the Working Group’s mandate is facilitative and supportive, 
seeking to promote capacity- building around the Guiding Principles. It also foresees 
that the Working Group, upon request, will provide advice and recommendations re-
garding the development of domestic legislation and policies relating to business and 
human rights. The same facilitative approach can also be detected in the task of devel-
oping a regular dialogue with governments and all relevant actors, including relevant 
United Nations bodies, as well as transnational corporations and other business enter-
prises, national human rights institutions, representatives of indigenous peoples, civil 
society organizations, and other regional and subregional international organizations. 
But the Working Group has arguably taken a narrow interpretation of its mandate, fo-
cusing on disseminating the Guiding Principles, as opposed to addressing more com-
plex questions such as the need for regulation and effective remedy.398 So it will be 
discussed here in the context of its contributions to international standard setting.399
The main contribution of the Working Group has been tracking and sup-
porting the development, including through the development of guidance 
for, national action plans on business and human rights.400 National Action 
Plans, which were requested in 2011 by the EU and in 2014 by the Human 
Rights Council, have been considered a ‘new governance’ tool, in the EU law 
 395 HRC resolutions 17/ 4 (2011) and 26/ 22 (2014).
 396 The mandate was renewed until 2020. HRC res. 35/ 7 (2017).
 397 Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 2) 23.
 398 C.  Rodríguez- Garavito, ‘Business and Human Rights:  Beyond the End of the Beginning’ in 
Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 2) 11, 20– 21.
 399 Its role in monitoring and compliance is briefly discussed in Ch. 5, in comparison with the role of 
UN Special Rapporteurs.
 400 HRC res. 26/ 22 (2014).
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sense,401 to promote convergence in State practice on a topic on which there 
is no consensus for legislative development.402 National Action Plans, how-
ever, have so far paid little attention to access to legal remedies for victims and 
they have not been fully transparent as a process.403 Nevertheless, they appear 
to have the potential to provide ‘raw data’ for the evaluation of different op-
tions for a new treaty on corporate responsibility, as well as lay the ground for 
cross- government coordination and dialogue as part of an iterative process of 
learning and improvement.404
In addition, the Working Group’s mandate refers specifically to the need to con-
tinue to make recommendations at the national, regional, and international levels 
for enhancing access to effective remedies,405 including in conflict areas, which is 
overlooked in other international corporate environmental accountability stand-
ards. Notwithstanding the status of a UN special procedure of the Human Rights 
Council, which has been ‘traditionally interpreted as privileging engagement with 
victims of human rights violations’, the Working Group did not prioritize the con-
cerns emerging from individual complaints or ensure participation of communi-
ties and local organizations.406 The Working Group, however, has responded to 
critiques, including more civil society in its meetings (albeit without privileging 
organizations that represent victims).407 It has also taken a more critical approach 
to National Action Plans, requiring that their baseline assessments not only list 
relevant existing policies and laws, but also assess their effectiveness on all the three 
pillars, on the basis of more detailed metrics to measure business impact on human 
rights.408
Overall, it is yet unclear if the Working Group will be able to live up to the 
expectations of civil society and scholars that it will ‘incorporate the highest 
human rights standards available in its work’, and make up for the lack of 
consultations on the Guiding Principles with people living in poverty and in 
rural areas.409 Concerns have also been raised about the need to ensure the 
 401 Eg G. de Burca and J. Scott, Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2006).
 402 European Commission, ‘A Renewed EU Strategy 2011– 14 for Corporate Social Responsibility’ 
COM(2011)681 final (25 October 2011) and HRC Res. 26/ 22 (2015). See discussion in C. Methven 
O’Brien, A. Mehra, S. Blackwell, and C. Poulsen- Hansen, ‘National Action Plans: Current Status and 
Future Prospects for a New Business and Human Rights Governance Tool’ (2015) 1 Business and 
Human Rights Journal 117, 117– 18.
 403 Methven O’Brien et al (ibid), 122 and 124.
 404 Ibid. 124  – 26. See also H. Cantú Rivera, ‘National Action Plans on Business and Human 
Rights: Progress or Mirage?’ (2019) 4 Business and Human Rights Journal 201.
 405 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises (2017) UN Doc. A/ 72/ 162.
 406 Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 398) 28.
 407 Ibid. 30.
 408 Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 398) 42.
 409 Meyersfeld (n. 268) 176– 80.
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impartiality and independence of the Working Group’s members,410 particu-
larly in light of the criticism that governments and business may represent the 
same interests.411
4.2.3  Environmental relevance?
As opposed to the Norms, the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights and 
its Guiding Principles do not identify specific environmental standards that are 
relevant for the private sector, leaving that to a case- by- case identification. They 
thus did not address the challenge for companies to identify relevant international 
standards.412 This appears even more surprising as all previous UN initiatives had 
an environmental component that was largely convergent. Even at times when 
the focus shifted from regulating multinationals to facilitating foreign direct in-
vestment, broad consensus emerged that it is appropriate and desirable to develop 
standards to guide or direct multinationals’ conduct when environmental risks 
were at stake.413
Instead, the Special Representative stressed the importance for the Framework 
of international policy coherence,414 particularly with specific regard to ‘pre-
vailing social norms  . . .  that have acquired near- universal recognition by all 
stakeholders’.415 He made no attempt, however, to seek or acknowledge synergies 
between the UN Framework and relevant widely ratified international environ-
mental agreements in the specific case of natural resource exploitation416— an 
area in which serious corporate abuses of human rights have been documented. 
Nonetheless, the Special Representative developed the procedural aspect of human 
rights due diligence process on concepts and approaches417 that have been de-
veloped and experimented in the environmental sphere, notably:  (i) impact 
 410 J. Kweitel, ‘Regulatory Environment on Business and Human Rights: Paths at the International 
Level and Ideas about the Roles of Civil Society Groups’ in Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 2) 160, 165– 66.
 411 Meyersfeld (n. 268) 176– 80.
 412 Deva (n. 62) 11.
 413 R. J. Fowler, ‘International Environmental Standards for Transnational Corporations’ (1995) 25 
Environmental Law Review 1, 3.
 414 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Further steps 
toward the operationalisation of the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework, (2010) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 
14/ 27, para. 52.
 415 Ibid. 13.
 416 The UN Representative indicated that the scope of corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights is defined by the actual and potential human rights impacts generated by business, which 
can be identified on the basis of an authoritative list of internationally recognized rights including 
the ‘International Bill of Rights’, Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and, 
depending on circumstances, also human rights instruments concerning specifically indigenous peo-
ples and other vulnerable groups: Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, ‘Business and 
human rights: Towards operationalising the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (2009) UN 
Doc. A/ HRC/ 11/ 13, 15.
 417 Ibid. 14.
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assessment; (ii) stakeholder involvement in decision- making; and (iii) life- cycle 
management.418 Equally, the UN Guiding Principles continue the self- referential 
trend of the UN Framework, with no specific reference to the relevance of multi-
lateral environmental agreements. No reference was made to specific rights of in-
digenous peoples either, which provide one of the most vivid connections between 
human rights to environmental protection discourses.419
Nevertheless, the Working Group on Business and Human Rights has occasion-
ally indicated the ‘need to better delineate roles, responsibilities and appropriate 
accountability systems’ for both States and business enterprises with regard to spe-
cific environmental issues. This has been the case of water and sanitation, agri-
cultural investment, climate justice,420 environmental crimes, and cross- border 
cooperation for access to remedies, 421 and the need to better integrate human 
rights in environmental impact assessments.422 In its guidance for National Action 
Plans on business and human rights, the Working Group made a passing refer-
ence to ‘protecting and respecting environmental and natural resource rights, in-
cluding land acquisition and tenure and property rights’.423 The Working Group 
also addressed to some extent matters of corporate environmental accountability 
in its thematic report on indigenous rights.424 Furthermore, some country reports 
made reference to environmental issues,425 and occasionally the Working Group 
has recommended directly to companies to ensure greater focus on safety and 
 418 E.  Morgera, Expert Report Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in the 
Environmental Sphere, European Commission- funded project ‘Study of The Legal Framework 
on Human Rights and the Environment Applicable to European Enterprises Operating outside 
the European Union’, May 2010, at 12:  http:// www.law.ed.ac.uk/ euenterpriseslf/ documents/ files/ 
CSREnvironment.pdf.
 419 E Morgera, ‘Environmental Accountability of Multinational Corporations:  Benefit- sharing 
as a Bridge between Human Rights and the Environment’ in B. Boer (ed.), Human Rights and the 
Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 37.
 420 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises (2015) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 29/ 28, para. 89.
 421 Best practices and how to improve on the effectiveness of cross- border cooperation between 
States with respect to law enforcement on the issue of business and human rights: Study of the Working 
Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises— 
Note by the Secretariat (2017) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 35/ 33, paras 42– 70. See Ch. 2.
 422 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises: ‘Addressing the human rights impacts of agro- industrial operations on indi-
genous and local communities: State duties and responsibilities of business enterprises’ (2016) UN Doc. 
A/ 71/ 291, para. 86.
 423 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises: National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights (2014) UN Doc. A/ 
69/ 263, para. 81. Note that the UN Global Compact also published a guidance document: ‘Guidance for 
Global Compact Local Networks on National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights’ (2015).
 424 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises (2016) UN Doc. A/ 71/ 291; see also Ch. 4.
 425 Eg Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises on its visit to the Republic of Korea— Note by the Secretariat (2017) UN 
Doc. A/ HRC/ 35/ 32/ Add.1, paras 20– 21, 44– 62; Report of the Working Group on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises on the Asia Forum on Business 
and Human Rights (2016) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 32/ 45/ Add.2, paras 47, 60– 63.
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contingency plans, particularly companies operating mines and infrastructure de-
velopment projects, with regard to ‘international guidance documents such as the 
United Nations Environment Programme Guidance for the Mining Industry in 
Raising Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level.’426
The mismatch between the work of the UN Special Representative on Business 
and Human Rights and international initiatives contributing to defining corporate 
environmental accountability standards was picked up by former UN Rapporteur 
on indigenous peoples’ rights, James Anaya,427 who fleshed out due diligence 
standards on the basis of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP)428 and the Convention on Biological Diversity.429 On that basis, the UN 
Framework on Business and Human Rights and its Guiding Principles were referred 
to in the 2018 UN Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment.430 
Other UN Special Rapporteurs have followed suit, contributing to a more sectoral 
development of due diligence at the intersection of human rights and the environ-
ment.431 This is the case of UN Special Rapporteur on Toxics432 and the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food.433 These considerations help further translate all 
human rights recognized in international law into standards for companies, which 
could feed into the ongoing negotiations of a legally binding instrument on business 
and human rights, as discussed below. They have also reported on sector- specific 
developments on corporate responsibility discussed in the next chapter.
The UN Framework and Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
also had an impact on pre- existing international initiatives on corporate environ-
mental accountability, such as the OECD Guidelines and Performance Standards 
of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which had been developed in par-
allel with the UN initiatives discussed so far.
 426 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises on its mission to Brazil (2016) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 32/ 45/ Add.1, paras 21– 
33 and 71(g). See also recommendation to companies to ‘take a more active role in addressing con-
cerns about social and environmental impacts of their operations’ in the Working Group’s statement 
at the end of visit to Peru by the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights (July 
2017): http:// www.ohchr.org/ EN/ NewsEvents/ Pages/ DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21888&LangID=E.
 427 Anaya started addressing corporate environmental accountability issues in 2009 (A/ HRC/ 12/ 34, 
Section E); and expanded upon this preliminary guidance by devoting the substantive section of his 
2010 annual report to corporate accountability (UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 15/ 37 (2010), Section III).
 428 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGA Res. 61/ 295 (13 September 2007).
 429 Morgera (n. 419) 37– 68. Discussed in Ch. 4, Section 3.1.
 430 UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 37/ 58 (2018), para. 22.
 431 Summary Report of Expert Roundtable on Elements of a Possible Binding International 
Instrument on Business and Human Rights: University of Notre Dame London Gateway, 16 May 2017 
(11 July 2017) 6.
 432 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally 
sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes, Başkut Tuncak (2015) UN Doc. 
A/ HRC/ 30/ 40, paras 80– 101. Discussed in Ch. 4.
 433 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, O. De Schutter, Final report: The trans-
formative potential of the right to food (2014) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 25/ 57. Discussed in Ch. 4.
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5 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
At the height of the discussion on a draft Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations within the UN,434 arguably in an effort to create a stalemate in that 
process,435 the OECD first approved its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises436 
in 1976. This section will discuss the key differences characterizing the OECD as 
an international forum on corporate accountability, the different approach taken 
at the OECD compared to the draft UN Code of Conduct, and the continued rele-
vance of the OECD Guidelines after the endorsement of the UN Framework on 
Business and Human Rights.
The OECD was created in 1961 with the understanding that ‘the economically 
more advanced nations should co- operate in assisting to the best of their ability 
the countries in process of economic development’ and in the recognition ‘that the 
further expansion of world trade is one of the most important factors favouring 
the economic development of countries and the improvement of international 
economic relations’.437 It aims to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth 
and employment and a rising standard of living in member countries, while 
maintaining financial stability, and thus contributing to the development of the 
world economy, through the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non- 
discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.438 It groups 
major capital- exporting States.
The early success of its activities on corporate accountability can be explained 
in light of two factors. The first was the significantly limited membership of like- 
minded countries, as opposed to the United Nations.439 Some viewed the birth 
of the OECD Guidelines as the developed countries’ strategy to create their own 
framework for multinationals’ activities, in order to reinforce their negotiating 
position at the multilateral level, in particular in the negotiations for the UN 
Code.440 Others went further to identify the desire on the part of OECD countries 
 434 J. Huner, ‘The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Review of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’ in Kamminga and Zia- Zarifi (n. 119) 197, 197– 98.
 435 J. Salzman ‘Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 189, 276.
 436 OECD, ‘Guidelines for Multinational Corporations’ (31 October 2001)  OECD Doc. DAFFE/ 
IME/ WPG(2000)15/ FINAL. For an initial appraisal, see A. Levi, ‘Il Codice OCSE Sulle Imprese 
Multinazionali’ (1982) Giurisprudenza Commerciale 326.
 437 Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development (Paris, 14 
December 1960, in force 30 September 1961), preamble.
 438 Ibid. Art. 1.
 439 Originally there were twenty member States and there are currently thirty- five: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States <http:// www.oecd.org/ document/ 1/ 0,2340,en_ 
2649_ 201185_ 1889402_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1,00.html>.
 440 Sauvant and Aranda (n. 87) 99.
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to pre- empt stricter regulation under the UN Code.441 Another significant differ-
ence with the draft UN Code was that the OECD opted for the traditional view 
that governments were more powerful than multinationals, thus assuming a pre- 
existing balance. Conversely, developing countries in the UN were voicing their 
concerns about the growing power of multinationals, which was considered in 
some instances to be overwhelming the host countries’ capacity for control.442 
The second was the extensive involvement of business and labour organizations, 
through the Advisory Committees of Business and of Labour Federations.443 Their 
participatory drafting process arguably contributed to ‘prevent misunderstandings 
and build an atmosphere of confidence and predictability between business, labour 
and governments’ within the OECD.444
5.1 Conceptual approach and legal significance
The OECD Guidelines were adopted as part of the Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises,445 which was designed to improve the 
international investment climate and to strengthen the basis for mutual confidence 
between enterprises and the society in which they operate. As opposed to the draft 
UN Code which focused both on the regulation of multinationals’ activities and 
their protection from the unlawful conduct of capital- importing countries, the 
OECD Guidelines were drafted solely as governmental recommendations formu-
lated to directly address multinationals operating in adhering countries.
Until States’ support for the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights, 
the OECD Guidelines were the only inter- governmentally endorsed corporate ac-
countability instrument featuring a comprehensive subject- matter and supported 
by an explicit commitment for States to ensure acceptable corporate conduct.446 
Forty- eight major home States, including non- OECD members, have adhered to 
the Guidelines.447 The more recent history of the OECD Guidelines is character-
ized by normative alignment with the UN Framework, but they have remained 
 441 The International Council on Human Rights Policy (n. 15) 101.
 442 A. A. Fatouros, ‘The OECD Guidelines in a Globalizing World’ (17 February 1999) OECD Doc. 
DAFFE/ IME/ RD(99)3, 7.
 443 Huner (n. 434) 201.
 444 J. Karl, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ in M. K. Addo (ed.), Human Rights 
Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1999) 259, 89– 90.
 445 OECD, ‘The OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises: Basic Texts’ (9 November 2000) OECD Doc. DAFFE/ IME (2000) 20 (most recent version).
 446 The OECD Guidelines were negotiated and approved by national delegations, as highlighted in 
UNCHR Decision 2004/ 116; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Global Compact 
Office, ‘Consultation on Business and Human Rights— Summary of Discussions’ (22 October 2004).
 447 See OECD, ‘National Contact Points’ < http:// www.oecd.org/ investment/ mne/ ncps.htm> ac-
cessed 1 August 2018.
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influential in their own right as they provide a more detailed international refer-
ence. The Guidelines further translated the concept of business due diligence of 
the UN Framework as the process through which enterprises can identify, prevent, 
mitigate, and account for how they address their actual and potential adverse im-
pacts as an integral part of business decision- making and risk management sys-
tems. The process aims to avoid causing or contributing to adverse impacts on 
matters covered by the Guidelines, through multinationals’ own activities, and ad-
dress such impacts when they occur. In other words, due diligence can be included 
within broader enterprise risk management systems, provided that it goes beyond 
simply identifying and managing material risks to the enterprise itself, to include 
the risks of adverse impacts related to matters covered by the Guidelines. Potential 
impacts are to be addressed through prevention or mitigation, while actual im-
pacts are to be addressed through remediation.448
The OECD Guidelines have been praised by some scholars for contributing to 
providing ‘a common frame of reference [in] assisting multinationals to ensure 
that their operations are compatible with expectations by host countries’449 and 
for legitimizing the social sanctions performed by non- State actors against irre-
sponsible companies, such as boycotts, and general advocacy campaigns.450 The 
Guidelines can also be seen as a tool for interpreting the meaning, and guiding the 
application, of other international instruments and domestic laws.451 Other com-
mentators, however, have expressed concern over the vagueness of the Guidelines, 
which fail to offer any immediate basis for a possible agreement to develop inter-
national obligations on the subject.452
With regard to their legal strength, it is significant to connect the evolution of 
the Guidelines with the collapse of the negotiations within the OECD of a binding 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).453 The MAI had been proposed as a 
comprehensive legally binding agreement covering all aspects of investment pro-
tection, together with an independent dispute settlement mechanism. As in the 
case of the draft UN Code of Conduct, States could not agree on the international 
standards for the protection of foreign direct investment,454 which contributed to 
 448 Para. 14. More practical information on business due diligence can also be found in the 2018 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible Business Conduct:  see comments by C. Shavin, 
‘Unlocking the Potential of the New OECD Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible Business Conduct’ 
(2019) 4 Business and Human Rights Journal 139.
 449 Karl (n. 455) 90.
 450 N. Tru, ‘Les codes de conduite: un bilan’ (1992) 96 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 
45, 54.
 451 The International Council for Human Rights Policy (n. 15) 68.
 452 Francioni (n. 128) 157.
 453 P. van der Gaag, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Corporate Accountability in a 
Liberalised Economy?’ (November 2004) <http:// www.oecdwatch.org/ docs/ paper%20NC%20IUCN.
pdf>.
 454 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004) 293.
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the collapse of negotiations in late 1998.455 As a result, instead of being included 
in the MAI, the Guidelines were significantly revised in 2000.456 They expressly 
stated their applicability to the operations of multinationals and all their entities,457 
in adhering countries and abroad.458 They also stressed that all business entities, 
not just multinationals, were subject to the same expectations of good corporate 
conduct.459
A posteriori, it has been argued that the OECD Guidelines represented a ‘kind 
of regulatory gesture’, which avoided legal sanctions against multinationals 
460 but ‘reflected firm expectations’.461 The Guidelines may thus have arguably 
achieved ‘hard- law effects by developing behavioral norms from within the cor-
porate culture’.462 Interestingly, in their most recent version, the Guidelines ac-
knowledge that on some matters they reflect binding international law and that 
multinationals should honour the Guidelines even if this does not lead to a vio-
lation of national law,463 anticipating the clarifications of the UN Framework 
on Business and Human Rights. In addition, the Guidelines underscore that ‘in 
countries where domestic laws and regulations conflict with the principles and 
standards of the Guidelines, enterprises should seek ways to honour such prin-
ciples and standards to the fullest extent which does not place them in violation 
of domestic law’.464
Their authoritativeness is also demonstrated by the successive development of sec-
toral guidance in the mining, textile, agriculture sectors,465 further translating treaties 
and international guidance into substantive standards of corporate environmental ac-
countability and responsibility.466
 455 Huner (n. 434) 203. J. Salzman, ‘The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Role in International Law’ (2011) 43 The George Washington International Law Review 255, 266– 72, 
argued that the OECD Secretariat focused on a straightforward technical harmonization exercise, and 
lacked of experience in managing highly politically contentious negotiations.
 456 S. Tully, ‘The 2000 Review of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2001) 50 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 394.
 457 OECD Guidelines, ch. II, paras 10, 11; OECD, ‘Roundtable on Corporate 
Responsibility: Encouraging the Positive Contribution of Business to Environment through the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (Background Report, June 2004) 7.
 458 OECD Guidelines, ch. I, para. 2.
 459 Ibid.
 460 G. Schuler, ‘Effective Governance through Decentralized Soft Implementation:  The OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1753, 1757.
 461 R. Geiger, ‘Coherence in Shaping the Rules for International Business: Actors, Instruments and 
Implementation’ (2011) 43 The George Washington International Law Review 295, 303.
 462 R. Valsan and D. Holloway, ‘MNE Guidelines’ in E. Morgera, G. Marín Durán, and A. Boyle 
(eds), Study on the Standard- setting Role and Legal Acquis of the OECD (2013, unpublished, on file with 
author).
 463 Preface, para. 1. See Deva (n. 62) 85.
 464 OECD Guidelines, I.2.
 465 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict- 
Affected and High- Risk Areas (Paris:  OECD, 2013); and OECD- FAO Guidance on Responsible 
Agricultural Supply Chains (Paris: OECD, 2015). Discussed in Ch. 4.
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Although the OECD Guidelines themselves are a voluntary initiative, they in-
clude an ‘implementation procedure’467 that is based on one formal obligation for 
adhering countries to set up national contact points (NCPs).468 In effect, the im-
plementation procedure is considered the ‘most visible sign of adhering govern-
ments’ commitment to the Guidelines’.469 As it is based on a legally binding act of 
the OECD (a Council Decision), it has been argued that this obligation may give 
rise to international responsibility for the State failing to create an NCP or to fur-
ther the effectiveness of the Guidelines and international cooperation, although it 
is difficult to imagine which international or national body would make such an 
attribution in a particular case.470 In addition, they have also made an impact at 
the national level: certain countries linked access to external trade assistance and 
export credit to the absence of findings against companies by the OECD National 
Contact Points.471
5.2 Environmental content
The Guidelines have been through various phases of evolution in their environ-
mental content. Following the Union Carbide industrial accident in Bhopal,472 
notwithstanding opposition by business representatives,473 a chapter on envir-
onmental protection was added to the Guidelines in 1991.474 Another significant 
historical turning point for the Guidelines was their 2000 review,475 which took 
place just after the collapse of the negotiations of the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, as international NGOs voiced concerns about the lack of provisions 
on labour and the environment in the proposed MAI.476 The Guidelines’ envir-
onmental provision was significantly strengthened, in order to reflect the Rio 
 467 OECD, ‘Implementation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Implementation 
Procedures’ (2000) <http:// www.oecd.org/ document/ 43/ 0,2340,en_ 2649_ 34889_ 2074731_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 
1,00.html>.
 468 Huner (n. 434) 200.
 469 OECD Secretary- General, May 2004.
 470 S. Robinson, ‘International Obligations State Responsibility and Judicial Review under the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Regime’ (2014) 30 Utrecht Journal of International and 
European Law 68.
 471 R. Cirlig, ‘Business and Human Rights: From Soft Law to Hard Law?’ (2016) 6 Juridical Tribune 
228, 243.
 472 V. Nanda and B. Bailey, ‘Challenges for International Environmental Law— Seveso, Bhopal, 
Chernobyl, the Rhine and Beyond’ (1988) 21 Law and Technology 1.
 473 Huner (n. 434) 201.
 474 However, in 1985 the OECD Committee on International Investment and Multilateral Enterprises 
(CIME) had issued a clarification on environmental matters (‘Clarification to the Reference to 
Environmental Policies in the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, reprinted in OECD’ in OECD, 
OECD and the Environment (Paris: OECD, 1986) 191).
 475 J. Murray, ‘A New Phase in the Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: The Role of the OECD’ 
(2001) 30 International Law Journal 255.
 476 Crane (n. 182) 429.
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Declaration on Environment and Development477 and Agenda 21478 and to re-
spond to the calls for the improvement of internal environmental management 
systems and for greater disclosure of environmental information. The objective of 
sustainable development, and general language on human rights, was also intro-
duced in the Guidelines at this time,479 along with a requirement for public dis-
closure of information on companies’ social, ethical, and environmental policies 
for multinationals as a whole.480
The 2000 Review and the discussions on corporate accountability at the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) revived environmental 
NGOs’ interest in the OECD Guidelines, particularly after the failure of the NGO 
proposal at WSSD to initiate negotiations on an international legally binding in-
strument on corporate liability.481 The text of the OECD Guidelines contains a 
specific and quite detailed chapter on the environment, but also includes several 
other sections directly relevant to the environmentally sound conduct of business. 
The Preface lists among the objectives: ‘to enhance the contribution to sustainable 
development made by multinational enterprises’,482 and stresses that the common 
aim of adhering governments is to encourage multinationals’ positive contribu-
tions to economic, environmental, and social progress while minimizing the dif-
ficulties to which their various operations may give rise.483 Under the General 
Principles, enterprises should fully take into account established policies in the 
countries in which they operate, consider the views of other stakeholders, and con-
tribute to economic, social, and environmental progress with a view to achieving 
sustainable development.484 Multinationals should also refrain from seeking or ac-
cepting exemptions not contemplated in the statutory or regulatory framework re-
lated to environmental incentives or other issues.485
The Environment Chapter of the Guidelines refers to general standards of en-
vironmental protection and to a list of specific tools for corporate environmental 
accountability, with a view to broadly reflecting the principles and objectives con-
tained in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, while also taking into account the 
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision- 
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.486 Besides stating the 
 477 ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ (13 June 1992) UN Doc. A/ CONF.151/ 6/ 
Rev.1. See Ch. 1.
 478 ‘Agenda 21’ (13 June 1992) UN Doc. A/ CONF.151/ 6/ Rev.1; Huner (n. 434) 204. See Ch. 1.
 479 OECD Guidelines, para. II.2. See comments by Deva (n. 62) 80– 81.
 480 OECD Guidelines, III.5.a.
 481 Friends of the Earth, ‘Towards Binding Corporate Accountability’ (Position paper for the WSSD, 
January 2002). See Ch. 1, Section 3.1.
 482 OECD Guidelines, Preface, paras 1, 6.
 483 Ibid. para. 10.
 484 Ibid. II.A.1.
 485 Ibid. II.A.5.
 486 Ibid. para. 60; Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision- Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) (Aarhus, 25 June 1998, in force 30 
October 2001).
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obvious fact that multinationals must respect the national laws of the host country, 
the chapeau significantly, albeit in soft language, recommends a general consider-
ation of international instruments and objectives. 487 In addition, the paragraph 
calls for ‘due account’ of environmental protection, public health and safety, and 
sustainable development objectives.488 Most of the chapeau, therefore, refers to 
supranational standards for the protection of the environment. With a pragmatic 
approach, the following, more detailed provisions list a series of tools for corporate 
environmental accountability: environmental management systems, communica-
tion and stakeholder involvement, life- cycle assessment and environmental impact 
assessments, education and training of employees, and contribution to public pol-
icies.489 Certain elements also serve to delineate substantive dimensions, such as 
risk prevention and mitigation, and continuous improvement of corporate envir-
onmental performance. The most recent version also contributes to corporate so-
cial responsibility with substantive standards on climate change, biodiversity, and 
resource efficiency.490
The most recent revision of the OECD Guidelines, in 2011, aimed, inter alia, 
to reflect the key normative innovations of the UN Framework on Business and 
Human Rights in terms of risk- based due diligence.491 While the Guidelines them-
selves make no explicit link between the new provisions on human rights and their 
chapter on the environment, these additions also have relevance for business due 
diligence to respect the interface of human rights and the environment, as high-
lighted by former UN Special Rapporteur John Knox.492
The OECD Guidelines also elaborated on the extent to which their addressees 
extend beyond multinational corporations. They expressed the expectation that 
companies would also seek to prevent or mitigate an adverse impact where they 
had not contributed to that impact, if the impact is nevertheless directly linked to 
their operations, products, or services by a business relationship. Consequently, 
multinationals are to encourage, where practicable, business partners, including 
suppliers and sub- contractors, to apply principles of responsible business conduct 
compatible with the Guidelines.493 Multinationals are also expected to seek ways to 
prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their 
business operations, products, or services by a business relationship, even if they 
do not contribute to those impacts.494
The new human rights chapter of the 2011 OECD Guidelines, therefore, signals 
that ‘corporate respect for human rights is no longer exclusively anchored in host 
 487 OECD Guidelines, Ch. VI.
 488 Ibid.
 489 Ibid. Ch. V, paras 1– 8.
 490 Discussed in Ch. 4.
 491 OECD Guidelines, II.10- 13. See Deva (n. 62) 86.
 492 See Ch. 2.
 493 OECD Guidelines, II.A.10- 14.
 494 Ibid. IV.1- 3 and 6.
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States’ international obligations, but in international recognized human rights, ir-
respective of the country or specific context of [multinationals’] operations’.495 It 
spells out that multinationals’ respect for internationally recognized human rights 
of those affected by their activities496 means they should avoid infringing on the 
human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with 
which they are involved. It also entails engaging with relevant stakeholders to pro-
vide meaningful opportunities for their views to be taken into account in relation 
to planning and decision making for projects or other activities that may signifi-
cantly impact local communities.497 It further entails providing for, or cooperating 
through legitimate processes in, the remediation of adverse human rights impacts 
where they identify that they have caused or contributed to these impacts.498
5.3  Legacy
Overall, the Guidelines’ continued influence builds on certain defining charac-
teristic of the OECD that make it a distinctive player in international law- making 
more generally. As already mentioned, the OECD benefits from international law- 
making forum shopping, as its members privilege a forum that is characterized by 
a commitment to economic liberalization and an ‘explicit economic perspective on 
policy issues’.499 As a result, the OECD Guidelines are ‘a useful mechanism to in-
fluence OECD member countries and their corporations through surveillance and 
peer pressure, as well as adverse publicity’.500 In addition, however, the OECD is a 
forum for transnational problem- solving that strategically combines a high- power 
research and networking organization for the collection of data, trend monitoring, 
economic forecasting, and development of policy options.501 The OECD thus en-
gages in ‘conditional agenda setting’ that is developed through regular meetings of 
global networks of state agencies and experts, that ‘exercise influence on policy de-
velopment challenges and strategic analysis of their resolution’, thereby framing is-
sues for future consideration, including in other fora with broader membership.502 
For these reasons, the OECD continues to serve as a proactive forum that has rele-
vance also beyond its membership as a result of widely acknowledged cutting- edge 
normative work.
 495 L. Liberti, ‘OECD 50th Anniversary:  The Updated OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and the New OECD Recommendation on Due Diligence Guidance for Conflict- Free 
Mineral Supply Chains’ (2012) 13 Business Law International 35, 45.
 496 OECD Guidelines, II.A.2.
 497 Ibid. II.A.10- 14.
 498 Ibid. IV.1- 3 and 6.
 499 Ibid. 274– 75.
 500 Salzman (n. 455) 265.
 501 Ibid. 256.
 502 Ibid. 272– 76.
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The 2011 version of the OECD Guidelines has been considered ‘the first ex-
ample of how the due diligence and supply chain provisions of the [UN Guiding 
Principles] . . . can be further translated into operational terms in a specific con-
text’ and has led to a ‘first example of [a] new demand- driven proactive agenda’.503 
In effect, on the basis of the 2011 Guidelines, the OECD has developed a series of 
sectoral guides that follow the same approach: a five- step due diligence framework; 
a model policy for companies based on a common set of inter- governmental ex-
pectations, suggested measures for risk mitigation and indicators for measuring 
improvement, and specific recommendations tailored to the challenges associ-
ated with specific supply chains.504 This is the case of the OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict- Affected 
and High- Risk Areas, which support the ‘progressive improvement of respon-
sible sourcing practices through constructive engagement with suppliers’.505 The 
OECD then partnered with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
in developing guidance to help enterprises observe standards of responsible busi-
ness conduct in the agricultural supply chain, following the structure of the Due 
Diligence Guidance for Minerals but also integrating FAO international stand-
ards, such as the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food 
Systems,506 and the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security.507 
In 2017, the OECD also developed a due diligence guidance for responsible supply 
chain management in the garment and footwear sector.508 All these examples of 
human rights- based, sector- specific guidance include detailed environmental 
standards (discussed in the next chapter). They have translated a broader range of 
inter- governmental standards into benchmarks for corporate conduct, using a co-
herent approach based on the UN understanding of the relevance of human rights 
for business and OECD’s understanding of corporate governance. They have been 
considered as a useful source of inspiration for national legislative initiatives,509 as 
well as a ‘standard of public interest which may affect national courts’ decisions’.510
The OECD has therefore taken on an explicit role in supporting the imple-
mentation of the UN Guiding Principles, and in cooperating with the UN Global 
 503 Ibid. 38 – 39.
 504 Ibid. 41.
 505 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict- 
Affected and High- Risk Areas (Paris: OECD, 2013).
 506 Committee on Food Security (CFS), Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and 
Food Systems (2014).
 507 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT), UN Doc. CL 
144/ 9 (C 2013/ 20) (2012), Appendix D.
 508 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear 
Sector (Paris: OECD, 2017) 156– 57.
 509 Liberti (n. 495) 43.
 510 Birnie et al. (n. 5) 328.
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Compact,511 while driving the agenda for sector- specific guidance to corporations. 
This has been understood as an attempt by the OECD to remain relevant in the face 
of more politically successful developments at the UN. It is also seen as a testament 
to the capacity of the OECD to evolve and adapt ‘to the growing needs of a global 
marketplace.’512
6 The Performance Standards of the International 
Finance Corporation
The International Finance Corporation (IFC)513 is the largest multilateral source 
of financing for private sector projects in the developing world.514 This section 
will briefly introduce the IFC and the relevance of its Performance Standards 
from an international environmental law perspective. It will then discuss how the 
Standards are aligned with the environmental content of the UN and OECD in-
struments discussed in this chapter, and how they have evolved in response to the 
UN Framework on Business and Human Rights. The section will conclude with a 
reflection about the broader trend- setting relevance of the IFC Standards.
6.1 The IFC
The IFC is the private- sector arm of the World Bank family.515 Established in 1956, 
its functions also include assisting private companies in the developing world to 
mobilize financing in international financial markets, and providing advice and 
technical assistance to business and governments. Its mission is to promote private- 
sector investment in developing countries, which will reduce poverty and improve 
people’s lives.516 In this light, the IFC can be described as an institution ‘at the 
 511 Catá Backer (n. 57) 266.
 512 A. Santner, ‘A Soft Law Mechanism for Corporate Responsibility:  How the Updated OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises Promote Business for the Future’ (2011) 43 The George 
Washington International Law Review 375, 376 and 380.
 513 Articles of Agreement of the IFC (20 July 1956, as amended by resolutions effective 21 September 
1961 and 1 September 1965); C. Mates, ‘Project Finance in Emerging Markets:  the Role of the 
International Finance Corporation’ (2004) 18 The Transnational Lawyer 165.
 514 IFC, IFC in Brief (undated) <http:// www.ifc.org/ ifcext/ about.nsf/ Content/ IFC_ in_ Brief> 3. Note 
that the IFC provides both direct and indirect investments: in the latter case, the Performance Standards 
apply to financial intermediaries rather than to private companies carrying out projects in developing 
countries. See B. Richardson, ‘Financing Sustainability: The New Transnational Governance of Socially 
Responsible Investment’ (2008) 17 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 73.
 515 A. Kiss and D. Shelton, International Environmental Law, 3rd edn (New  York:  Transnational 
Publishers, 2004) 157– 58.
 516 D. L. Khairallah, ‘International Finance Corporation’ in R. Blanpain (ed.), International 
Encyclopaedia of Laws (Intergovernmental Organizations— Suppl.  12) (The Hague:  Kluwer Law 
International, 2002).
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crossroads of the public and private sectors’, as it is a public- sector institution com-
mitted to working with the private sector, sharing private- sector risks in making 
loans and equity investments without government guarantee of repayment.517
Although the IFC coordinates its activities with other institutions in the World 
Bank Group, it generally operates independently as it has its own legal and finan-
cial autonomy with its own Articles of Agreement, share capital, management, and 
staff. Such separation is motivated by the fact that the IFC focuses on generating 
profits from its investment and does not offer grants like the World Bank does; 
and it does not work directly with governments.518 Nonetheless, there remain cer-
tain links between the Corporation and the Bank. First, the Bank safeguard pol-
icies,519 although drafted for public- sector projects, are deemed to apply by default 
to IFC- funded projects with the private sector when there are gaps in the IFC’s 
own policies and standards. Second, the Bank and IFC often cooperate when oper-
ating in the same country, thus in some instances the procedures of both organiza-
tions apply to a single project.520 Third, the president of the World Bank Group also 
serves as the IFC president.
Although the IFC was established in the late 1950s, it was only in 1990 that it 
first addressed the environment- related impacts of its projects, subjecting IFC 
projects to an environmental review process to ensure their consistency with ‘the 
spirit and the intent of the appropriate [World] Bank guidelines and policies’.521 
The vague formulation and the fact that the World Bank Guidelines were drafted 
with reference to financial support to governments rather than private companies 
left significant room for interpretation and led to limited impacts on enhancing 
the environmental performance of IFC- funded projects.522 In 1993, the IFC refor-
mulated this position, stating instead ‘IFC projects must comply with appropriate 
World Bank environmental policies and guidelines’.523 This formulation also failed 
to determine which World Bank policies were considered appropriate in the IFC 
sphere of action.524 Criticisms were also voiced because the IFC environmental 
 517 C. Lee, ‘International Finance Corporation: Financing Environmentally and Socially Sustainable 
Private Investment’ in S. Schlemmer- Schulte and K. Tung (eds), Liber Amicorum Ibrahim F.I. Shihata 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 469– 70.
 518 B. Saper, ‘The International Finance Corporation’s Compliance Advisor/ Ombudsman (CAO): An 
Examination of the Accountability and Effectiveness from a Global Administrative Law Perspective’ 
(2011) 44 NYU Journal of International Law and Policy 1280, 1283 and 1285.
 519 Boisson de Chazournes (n. 53) 297– 302.
 520 As in the case of the Chad/ Cameroon Pipeline and the Bujagali Hydropower Project in Uganda. 
Kiss and Shelton (n. 515) 156; and G. Hernández Uriz, ‘The Application of the World Bank Standards to 
the Oil Industry: Can the World Bank Group Promote Corporate Responsibility?’ (2002) 28 Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law 77.
 521 IFC, Procedure for Environmental Review of IFC Projects, Purpose of Review, para. 1, in effect from 
March 1990 to December 1992.
 522 Lee (n. 517) 477.
 523 IFC, ‘Environmental Analysis and Review of International Finance Corporation Projects, 
Procedure for Environmental Review of the International Finance Corporation’ (8 September 1993).
 524 This was the case of a Pangue hydroelectric project in Chile, for which the IFC asserted that the 
World Bank’s policy on Dams and Reservoirs did not apply. Lee (n. 517) 477.
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review process occurred at a late stage of project development, did not require 
consultations with local communities and affected groups, and did not make the 
environmental assessment available for review and comment.525
Following increasing public attention and disapproval of IFC- funded pro-
jects’ environmental performance in the late 1990s,526 the IFC undertook to pay 
greater attention to incorporating environmental requirements in its legal docu-
ments, differentiating its procedures and requirements, and strengthening public 
consultation and disclosure.527 Thus, in 1998 the Corporation adopted nine of the 
ten World Bank’s policies as its own Safeguard Policies, and released its Pollution 
Prevention and Abatement Handbook,528 which sought to apply to the private 
sector the principles of sustainable development, cleaner production processes, 
and pollution prevention.529 A 2003 review of its environmental policy and guide-
lines concluded that the system was weak, lacked specific objectives and an effective 
monitoring system, and was poorly integrated into the IFC’s core business,530 not 
being able to ensure in a comprehensive manner that IFC- funded projects were en-
vironmentally sound.531
The IFC Board approved renewed policy and standards for environmental sus-
tainability in February 2006. One of the novelties of the 2006 documents was a 
clear separation between the environment- related roles and responsibilities of the 
Corporation itself, on the one hand, and of its clients, ie private companies, on 
the other. The Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability532 illustrated the 
Corporation’s commitment, roles, and responsibilities, including that of reviewing 
projects proposed for direct financing against the Performance Standards,533 while 
the Performance Standards detailed the role and responsibilities of private enter-
prises that receive funding from the IFC. The IFC Performance Standards were 
revised in 2011 in parallel with the OECD Guidelines with a view to incorporating 
the main normative innovations of the UN Framework and its Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights.534
 525 Kiss and Shelton (n. 515) 245.
 526 Lee (n. 517) 475.
 527 Ibid. 479– 81.
 528 (1998) <http:// www.ifc.org/ ifcext/ enviro.nsf/ Content/ PPAH>. The Handbook provides pollu-
tion and abatement measures and emissions levels that are normally acceptable to the IFC, subject to 
project- specific analysis in the environmental assessment.
 529 Lee (n. 517) fn. 33.
 530 CAO, A Review of IFC’s Safeguard Policies (January 2003) 7.
 531 I. Bowles, A. Rosenfels, C. Kormos, C. Reining, J. Nations, and T. Ankersen, ‘The Environmental 
Impact of the International Finance Corporation Lending and Proposals for Reform: A Case Study of 
Conservation and Oil Development in the Guatemalan Petén’ (1999) 29 Environmental Law 103.
 532 IFC, Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability (30 April 2006)  <http:// www.ifc.org/ 
sustainability>.
 533 IFC, Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability, adopted by the IFC 
Board on 21 February 2006, with implementation starting on 30 April 2006 (hereinafter, IFC 2006 
Performance Standards).
 534 Note that the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights that elaborated the UN 
Framework participated in both reviews: Report of the Special Representative (n. 414) para. 13.
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6.2 The IFC environmental standards
The IFC environmental standards clearly identify the responsibility of the private 
sector on the basis of international environmental principles, multilateral envir-
onmental agreements and other international environmental law materials,535 as 
well as of formalized dialogue with business and NGO representatives.536 On the 
whole, the IFC Performance Standards mostly converge with other international 
initiatives on corporate accountability, such as the UN Norms, the UN Global 
Compact, and the OECD Guidelines in the choice of minimum standards based on 
international environmental principles, with the notable exception of precaution. 
They go beyond these initiatives by also spelling out international standards on the 
basis of multilateral environmental agreements.
The explicit reference to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,537 
the Convention on Biodiversity, the Basel Convention on Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Waste,538 the World Heritage Convention,539 the 
Convention on Long- range Transboundary Air Pollution,540 the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,541 and the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer542 may offer opportunities for fostering 
the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements directly through the 
responsible conduct of the private sector. In referring to these multilateral environ-
mental treaties, the IFC took care to specify that these references are ‘intended to 
acknowledge the international consensus and support on these instruments, but 
not to create client obligations to comply with these agreements, as these agree-
ments rest with signatory States and not with business’.543 The Corporation noted 
that the client’s responsibility is to meet the requirements of the IFC Performance 
Standards.544 Nonetheless, the alignment of the IFC Performance Standards with 
 535 As suggested in OECD, ‘Key Messages’ (OECD Workshop on Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements and the Private Sector, Helsinki, 16– 17 June 2005).
 536 D. Bradlow and A. Naudé Fourie, ‘The Operational Policies of the World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation: Creating Law- Making and Law- Governed Institutions?’ (2013) 10 
International Organizations Law Review 3, 24– 26.
 537 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 
March 1994).
 538 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal (Basel Convention) (Basel, 22 March 1989, in force 24 May 1992).
 539 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage 
Convention) (Paris, 16 November 1972, in force 17 December 1975).
 540 Convention on Long- range Transboundary Air Pollution (Geneva, 13 November 1979, in force 
16 March 1983).
 541 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm, 22 May 2002, in force 17 
May 2004).
 542 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal, 16 September 1987, in 
force 1 January 1989).
 543 IFC, ‘Policy and Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability and Policy 
on Disclosure of Information: IFC Responses to Stakeholder Comments and Rationale for Key Policy 
Changes’ (22 September 2006) 9.
 544 Ibid.
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other documents agreed at the international level can arguably contribute to the 
credibility and legitimacy of these initiatives in the eyes of international civil 
society.545
The IFC Standards further contribute to raise the profile (and, if incorporated 
in the loan agreements, the legal status) of soft- law instruments and promote com-
pliance with them,546 such as the FAO Code of Conduct on Pesticides.547 The latter 
had already attracted the attention of international lawyers interested in applic-
ability to private companies, as it ‘is divided roughly equally between commit-
ments for governments and commitments for industry’.548
There are several environmental dimensions to the IFC Performance Standards, 
as they comprise:  a general, cross- cutting requirement for environmental self- 
assessment and management system (Performance Standard 1); a series of more 
specific environmental standards (Performance Standard 3 on resource effi-
ciency and pollution prevention, and Performance Standard 4 on biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable management of living natural resources), and other 
thematic standards that may concern the environment, such as Performance 
Standard 7 on indigenous peoples and Performance Standard 8 on cultural heri-
tage.549 Furthermore, the IFC considers climate change and water, in addition to 
human rights and gender, as cross- cutting topics that are addressed across multiple 
Performance Standards.550
As opposed to the OECD Guidelines review, however, since 2011 the IFC has 
significantly strengthened its approach to community consultations, linking the 
need for companies to conduct ‘informed consultation’ with a specific and express 
(albeit qualified) requirement for prior informed consent. The 2011 review also ex-
panded on substantive standards of corporate environmental responsibility, with 
more extensive standards on climate change, resource efficiency, and biodiversity, 
including the introduction of resource efficiency for energy, water, and inputs; an 
increased emphasis on energy efficiency and greenhouse gas (GHG) measure-
ment; accountability for historical pollution; and a new duty of care for hazardous 
waste disposal. This is in line with the IFC Policy on Social and Environmental 
 545 The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) (A. Durbin, S. Herz, D. Hunter, and J. Peck), ‘Shaping 
the Future of Sustainable Finance: Moving from Paper Promises to Performance’ (January 2006) http:// 
www.wwf.org.uk/ researcher/ issues/ companiesandfinance/ index.asp 15. Furthermore, the IFC CAO 
also highlighted in its review of the 1998 environmental safeguard policies that explicit mention of 
international agreements, norms and standards may give ‘helpful context and reference points’ (CAO, 
n. 523, at 37.) See also comments by A. McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights 
(Abingdon, Routledge: 2010) 208.
 546 Boisson de Chazournes (n. 53) 297.
 547 FAO, The International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides (revised ver-
sion adopted by the 123rd Session of the FAO Council in November 2002).
 548 Ratner (n. 85) 815.
 549 The other Performance Standards focus on: labour and working conditions; community health, 
safety, and security; and land acquisition and involuntary resettlement (Performance Standards 2, 4 and 
5). Due to the focus of this study, these standards will not be analysed.
 550 Overview of IFC Performance Standards (2012) para. 4.
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Standards, which targets the IFC itself, acknowledged the need to support the pri-
vate sector’s contribution to climate change mitigation and adaptation, building 
the capacity of the private sector in relation to climate change, biodiversity, and 
resource efficiency, as well as to limit its impacts on ecosystem services,551 and to 
reflect a human rights due diligence approach across its sustainability principles.552
It has been concluded that ‘the IFC has not only chosen to integrate evolving 
standards developed in other intergovernmental forums, but decided to take 
the lead in developing environmental standards applicable to its private- sector 
clients’.553 In the Pulp Mills case, for instance, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) considered the fact that the IFC decision to fund a project after having as-
sessed compliance with multilateral environmental agreements referred in its 
Performance Standards, even those that are not applicable in Latin America.554
6.3 Operational distinctiveness and broader trend- setting value
The IFC Standards are intended to apply throughout the life of an investment.555 
They are meant to provide ‘guidance’ to clients on how to identify risks and im-
pacts, and are designed to ‘help avoid, mitigate and manage risks and impacts as a 
way of doing business in a sustainable way’.556
Because of the degree of international personality of international financial in-
stitutions, these are subject to duties under international law, thereby including 
international environmental law. Any failure to comply with international envir-
onmental obligations may entail their international responsibility as well as li-
ability for damages.557 The incorporation of such standards as conditions into loan 
agreements can make such international environmental standards for corporate 
 551 Which are defined at para. 2 of 2012 IFC Performance Standard 6, ‘Biodiversity Conservation 
and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources’, as the ‘benefits that people, including busi-
nesses, derive from ecosystem services’. The definition is clearly based on the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, a global scientific process that facilitated inter- governmental endorsement of the 
term ‘ecosystem services’:  The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well- 
Being: Synthesis (2005), <http:// www.maweb.org/ en/ index.aspx>. See Ch. 1.
 552 2012 IFC Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability, http:// www.ifc.org/ ifcext/ 
policyreview.nsf/ Content/ SustainabilityPolicy, paras 10– 11 and 15.
 553 M.  Langer, ‘Key Instruments of Private Environmental Finance:  Funds, Project Finance and 
Market Mechanisms’ in Dupuy and Viñuales (n. 1) 131, 159.
 554 Birnie et al. (n. 5) 81.
 555 Overview of IFC Performance Standards (2012) para. 2.
 556 Ibid. para 1.
 557 P. Sands and J. Peel, with A. Fabra and R. MacKenzie, Principles of International Environmental 
Law, 4th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 669. Indeed, major concerns for the se-
vere negative environmental impacts caused by projects funded by international financial institutions 
are continuously being raised by environmental NGOs: For instance, ‘IDB President Admits Serious 
Problems in Spill- Prone Amazon Pipeline’, press release by Amazon Watch and Environmental Defence 
(3 April 2006) <http:// www.amazonwatch.org/ newsroom/ view_ news.php?id=1134>. See generally A. 
Rigo Suerda, ‘The Law Applicable to the Activities of International Development Banks’ (2004) 308 
Recueil des Cours 1, 123– 27.
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accountability contractually binding on private companies. As opposed to the loan 
agreements between the World Bank and borrower governments that fall under 
the domain of the international law of treaties, the loan agreements of the IFC with 
private companies are usually concluded under the law of New York or English 
law,558 and thus may not be enforceable under international law.559 That said, in-
vestment contracts can avoid mentioning IFC standards or undermine them by 
placing restrictions preventing the host State from using domestic law to require 
investors to comply with their IFC standards on the basis of the agreement with the 
IFC or an Equator Bank.560
The relevance of the IFC Standards is broader than that. They have also set a 
trend for other international financial institutions, notably in the area of public 
participation561 and commercial banks.562 The Equator Principles are the best- 
known example,563 but together with other socially responsible initiatives they 
are arguably ‘a modest, niche sector of the financial economy only occasionally 
influencing the environmental practice of companies’564 In addition, all OECD 
export credit agencies claim that they apply the IFC standards through the non- 
binding Common Approaches agreement,565 thereby facilitating access to cap-
ital markets because the IFC due diligence procedure reduces credit and capital 
risks.566 The IFC has also started to control its financial intermediaries by imposing 
 558 Private correspondence with IFC staff, dated 17 October 2006 (on file with author).
 559 Boisson de Chazournes (n. 53) 290. The actual operationalization of these standards by the IFC 
will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 5.
 560 S. Leader, ‘Human Rights, Risks and New Strategies for Global Investment’ (2006) 9 Journal of 
International Economic Law 657, 671.
 561 D. Bradlow and M. Chapman, ‘Public Participation and the Private Sector: The Role of Multilateral 
Development Banks and the Evolving Legal Standards’ (2011) 4 Erasmus Law Review 91, 92 and 95.
 562 This is the notable case of the Equator Principles, which were last reviewed in 2013 following 
the latest review of the IFC Performance Standards: http:// www.equator- principles.com/ . C. Wright, 
‘The Equator Principles’ in T. Hale and D. Held (eds), Handbook of Transnational Governance 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011) 229. And this is clearly an intention of the IFC itself: R. Kyte, Director 
of the IFC Environmental and Social Development Department, ‘The New IFC Standards’ (2006) 12 
CSR Asia Weekly (15 March) 13; L. Ahearn, ‘Environmental Procedures and Standards in International 
Transactions:  Multilateral Models and Private Lending Practices’ (1999) 27 International Business 
Lawyer 419.
 563 B. Richardson, ‘Financial Markets and Socially Responsible Investing’ in B. Sjåfjell 
and B. Richardson (eds), Company Law and Sustainability:  Legal Barriers and Opportunities 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2015) 226, 263– 67. See also B.  Richardson, ‘Socially 
Responsible Investing through Voluntary Codes’ in Dupuy and Viñuales (n. 1) 383, 412– 41; Wright 
(n. 562)  230– 34; D. Ong, ‘From “International” to “Transnational” Environmental Law? A  Legal 
Assessment of the Contribution of the “Equator Principles” to International Environmental Law’ (2010) 
79 Nordic Journal of International Law 35; D. Ong, ‘Public Accountability for Private International 
Financing of Natural Resource Development Projects: The un Rule of Law Initiative and the Equator 
Principles’ (2016) 85 Nordic Journal of International Law 201.
 564 Richardson, ‘Financial Markets’ (n. 563) 273.
 565 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Common Approaches for Officially Supported 
Export Credits and Environmental and Social Due Diligence (TAD/ ECG/ (2015)5, 28 June 2012); 
Simons and Mackling (n. 247) 132.
 566 Langer (n. 553) 161.
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a review procedure on their activities, if the project they finance with the IFC sup-
port may have environmental and social impacts.567
Overall, the IFC has been ‘largely underestimated’ in its leading standard- setting 
role and in reaching out beyond its initial sphere of influence,568 including making 
an impact on the further development of international law.569
7 Preliminary conclusions and their relevance for a new treaty 
on business and human rights
The initiatives within the UN in the field of corporate environmental account-
ability and responsibility have been continuous and multifaceted. The UN draft 
Code of Conduct and the UN Norms faced significant opposition from capital- 
exporting States. And even in the case of the seemingly voluntary UN Global 
Compact, inter- governmental support has been an issue, notwithstanding the fact 
that this initiative drew on inter- governmentally approved sources such as the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, and provided a strong indication 
of companies’ acceptance of international environmental law principles.
The UN Framework and Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
are the only UN instrument that has received inter- governmental support, 
demonstrating that the UN can provide a forum for discussing corporate account-
ability and responsibility with the broadest possible involvement of States570 (ar-
guably equalizing bargaining powers among them571) thanks to its ‘obvious role’ in 
framing the debate in human rights terms.572 The imprimatur of the UN has had 
the expected legitimizing effect on the international search for corporate environ-
mental accountability and responsibility standards.573 Although conceptually the 
understanding of the relevance of international law for business is not so different 
under the UN Framework and its Guiding Principles and under the rejected UN 
Norms, the Framework’s political endorsement has immediately proved influential 
on the OECD Guidelines and IFC Performance Standards. And even though the 
UN Framework on Business and Human Rights and its Guiding Principles have 
not made specific reference to the environment, other international processes that 
have built upon them have made explicit how the human- rights based approach 
can be integrated into corporate environmental responsibility and accountability 
 567 Ibid. 163.
 568 Ibid. 165.
 569 Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (n. 536) 6– 7.
 570 Coonrod (n. 124) 303.
 571 Ibid. 305; B. Kjellén, ‘The Desertification Convention: Towards Creating a Multilateral Framework 
for Coping with Global Threats’ in M. Rolén, H. Sjöberg, and U. Svedin (eds), International Governance 
on Environmental Issues (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997) 77.
 572 King (n. 201) 481.
 573 Coonrod (n. 124) 305; Amnesty International (n. 294) 15; and Gleckman (n. 147) 100.
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standards, as well as contributing to their implementation. The development of 
sector- specific standards by the OECD and IFC, and the normative clarifications 
offered by UN Special Rapporteurs, as discussed in the next chapter, will further 
demonstrate this point.
Regardless of the varying political success and normative differences among all 
the international initiatives discussed in this chapter, international standards on 
corporate environmental accountability have emerged coherently on the basis of 
parallel work under the UN in the field of environmental protection.574 The UN 
draft Code, the UN Norms, the UN Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines, and 
the IFC Performance Standards have all been based on the international envir-
onmental principles enshrined in the Rio Declaration on the Environment and 
Development, and some of them have also made reference to the UN Convention 
on Biological Diversity and other multilateral environmental treaties. International 
environmental principles have clearly served as a basis for translating the inter-
national community’s expectation about acceptable business conduct with regard 
to the environment: information disclosure, impact assessments and consultation, 
prevention, and precaution.575 The 2011 parallel review of the OECD Guidelines 
and the IFC Standards, which was mainly motivated by the need to align with the 
UN Framework on Business and Human Rights, has led to further convergence in 
international standard- setting.576 The resulting normative coherence makes it dif-
ficult for governments or business to credibly make the argument that ‘there is no 
fundamentally clear set of minimal demands’ in this connection.577 Instead, inter-
national standards have been progressively linked to growing interest in supply- 
chain responsibility and external monitoring of corporate conduct.578
What remains to be seen is whether such normative coherence will provide a suf-
ficient basis for the negotiations of a new international treaty on business and human 
rights,579 or an excuse not to proceed with it. To what extent will a new treaty ef-
fectively tackle the often inextricable links between environmental degradation and 
human rights violations580 in the natural resource sector? These links have already 
 574 As already anticipated in UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1999: Foreign Direct Investment and 
the Challenge of Development (Geneva: UN, 1999) 367– 69 and Coonrod (n. 124) 303.
 575 Miles (n. 99) 227; J. Zerk, ‘Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuses: Towards a Fairer 
and More Effective System of Domestic Law Remedies’, report prepared for the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2012) 262– 77; J. Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment 
in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 67.
 576 Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’ (n. 1) 321.
 577 Bickford (n. 267) 153.
 578 Zerk (n. 575) 262– 77.
 579 Draft Report of the Open- ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With Respect to Human Rights (10 July 2015) available 
at <http:// www.ohchr.org/ EN/ HRBodies/ HRC/ WGTransCorp/ Session1/ Pages/ Draftreport.aspx> ac-
cessed 27 February 2016, paras 37 and 47.
 580 A. Sinden, ‘Power and Responsibility:  Why Human Rights Should Address Corporate 
Environmental Wrongs’ in D. McBarnet, A. Voiculescu, and T. Campbell (eds), The New Corporate 
Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 728; E. Morgera, ‘Human Rights Dimensions of Corporate Environmental Accountability’ in 
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been well documented and discussed in international environmental law processes, 
and in the preparation of the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights.581 
They have also emerged in the debate on a new treaty,582 notably in relation to the 
right to water583 and multilateral environmental agreements as potential sources 
of inspiration.584 But references to environmental dimensions of the treaty remain 
controversial.585 On the whole, it seems more likely that a new treaty will clarify 
States’ obligations to exercise control over business, through domestic legal liability 
deriving from business responsibility to respect human rights586 and through an 
extraterritorial duty to regulate corporations and facilitate access to justice.587 The 
treaty could also specify obligations and reinforce compliance mechanisms, and 
open existing international human rights remedy and participation mechanisms for 
civil society.588 The opportunity for the treaty to provide ‘institutional mechanisms to 
facilitate empowered participation by affected individuals and civil society’589 could 
change significantly the current international landscape of international corporate 
accountability and responsibility initiatives.590
P- M. Dupuy, E- U. Petersmann, and F. Francioni (eds), Human Rights, Investment Law and Investor- 
State Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 511.
 581 Morgera (n. 576); and D. Bilchitz and S. Deva, ‘The Human Rights Obligations of Business: A 
Critical Framework for the Future’ in Deva and Bilchitz (n. 356) 1.
 582 The issue has been raised in the first session of the working group on business and human 
rights: see the Draft Report of the Open- ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With Respect to Human Rights (n. 579), paras 21, 26– 
28, and 31. At the time of writing the most recent negotiating text is Open- ended intergovernmental 
working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human 
rights Chairmanship Revised Draft 16.7.2019 Legally Binding Instrument To Regulate, In International 
Human Rights Law, The Activities Of Transnational Corporations And Other Business Enterprises 
and Draft report on the fifth session of the open- ended intergovernmental working group on trans-
national corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights available at https:// 
www.ohchr.org/ EN/ HRBodies/ HRC/ WGTransCorp/ Pages/ IGWGOnTNC.aspx (5 November 2019). 
See P. Hood and J. Hughes- Jennet, ‘UN Working Group Publishes Revised Draft Business and Human 
Rights Treaty: Commentary on Scope, Prevention and Legal Liability’ (26 July 2019).
 583 Report on the second session of the open- ended intergovernmental working group on trans-
national corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights (2017) UN Doc. A/ 
HRC/ 34/ 47, paras 11, 36, 100.
 584 Ibid. paras 50, 97– 98.
 585 Draft report of the fifth session (n. 582) paras 35, 51, and 65.
 586 Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy for Business and Human Rights Abuses: A sub-
mission from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on 
the Revised Draft of the legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises (8 October 2019) 5– 6.
 587 Particularly through mutual legal assistance across borders:  O. De Schutter, ‘Towards a New 
Treaty on Business and Human Rights’ (2016) 1 Business and Human Rights Journal 41 53, 55. Report on 
the second session (n. 583) para. 9.
 588 Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 407) 33.
 589 Ibid. 40.
 590 It has been observed that although there are conflicting research findings on the importance of an 
international treaty for improved human rights conditions, there is convergence in the importance of 
civil society advocacy and demands for human rights implementation: C. Vargas, ‘A Treaty on Business 
and Human Rights? A Recurring Debate in a New Governance Landscape’ in Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 
2) 111, 115.
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As the possibility for the treaty to create international obligations directly 
binding on corporations, address their status in international law, and establish an 
international dispute settlement for corporate violations,591 appears remote at the 
time of writing, the treaty could still include ‘more expressive commitments’ to the 
existing international standards.592 And it could contribute to make them more re-
sponsive to local needs through an institutional process for engaging the full range 
of stakeholders, including those most affected by corporate conduct.593 This would 
contribute to filling a critical gap in international standard- setting initiatives so 
far, which is sustained engagement with victims594 and right- holders ‘before harm 
occurs, and in continual monitoring, agenda- setting, awareness raising and review 
processes’.595 It has been underscored that so far regional and local organizations 
that have direct experience of supporting victims of corporate human rights abuses 
linked to environmental degradation have not yet had sufficient voice596 in the 
process of learning from, assessing, or developing standards and their monitoring 
mechanisms discussed in the next chapters. This approach would contribute to 
make a new treaty ‘a component of a broader toolkit’ comprising also local political 
organization and litigation, sectoral multi- stakeholder standard- setting initiatives, 
further elaboration of UN treaty bodies’ recommendations on States’ extrater-
ritorial obligations and domestic regulation.597 In effect, even if a new treaty is 
adopted, the remaining instruments and approaches are largely expected to con-
tinue to be explored.
 591 Report on the second session (n. 583) paras 19– 20, 23.
 592 Expressiveness could serve to clearly and publicly manifest a commitment to principles that pro-
vide an ‘agreed operational modality’ that goes above and beyond existing obligations and resonate with 
lived the experience of right- holders, carefully avoiding shopping lists and over- specification: Melish 
(n. 385) 92– 93.
 593 Ibid.
 594 OHCHR (n. 586) 2– 3.
 595 Melish (n. 385) 84– 85 and 88 (emphasis in the original).
 596 Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 398) 37.
 597 Ibid. 38. This is also reflected in Draft report on the fifth session (n. 582) para. 2. See further S. 
Blackwell and N. Vander Meulen, ‘Two Roads Converged: The Mutual Complementarity of a Binding 
Business and Human Rights Treaty and National Action Plans on Business and Human Rights’ (2016) 6 
Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law 51.
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4
 Assessing the Convergence 
of International Standards on Corporate 
Environmental Accountability
This and the following chapter will carry out a critical analysis of the international 
standards on corporate environmental accountability and responsibility by relying 
on the normative advances made under the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD).1 The reason is three- fold. First, under this treaty 196 Parties have achieved 
consensus on a variety of standards addressed to the private sector in the achieve-
ment of global environmental objectives.2 Second, this consensus guidance has 
been recognized as relevant to interpret the human rights of indigenous peoples 
by different international human rights bodies, thereby contributing to show how 
international corporate accountability and responsiblity standards are increasingly 
emerging at the intersection of international environmental law and international 
human rights law. Third, these CBD standards have been relied upon to develop 
sector- specific standards3 under the more general international initiatives on cor-
porate environmental accountability and responsibility discussed in the previous 
chapter.
A brief explanation of the developments related to private- sector involvement 
under the CBD will precede the standard- by- standard discussion at the core of this 
chapter and the next. The degree of normative convergence will be assessed first 
 1 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 1993). 
The point was made initially in E. Morgera and E. Tsioumani, ‘Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Looking 
Afresh at the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2011) 21 Yearbook of International Environmental 
Law 3– 40, 24. Contra L. Siegele and H. Ward, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Step towards Stronger 
Involvement of Business in MEA Implementation?’ (2007) 16 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law 135.
 2 It should be recalled (as discussed in Ch. 3) that the preamble of the UN Norms (UNCHR Sub- 
Commission, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights’ (26 August 2003) UN Doc. E/ CN.4/ Sub.2/ 2003/ 12/ Rev.2) 
refers to:  the CBD; International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels, 
29 November 1969); Convention on Civil Liability for Damage resulting from Activities Dangerous 
to the Environment (Lugano, 21 June 1993, not in force); UNGA Res. 41/ 128  ‘Declaration on the 
Right to Development’ (4 December 1986); ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ 
(13 June 1992) UN Doc. A/ CONF.151/ 6/ Rev.1 (Rio Declaration); and WSSD, ‘Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation’ (4 July 2002) UN Doc. A/ CONF.199/ 20, Res. 2 (WSSD Plan of Implementation).
 3 D. Santillo and P. Johnston, ‘Ethical Standards and Principles of Sustainability’ in M. K. Addo (ed.), 
Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999) 351, stressed the need to better define sectoral standards.
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across the general standards discussed in the previous chapter, and contrasted with 
the advice elaborated by UN Special Rapporteurs relying on various international 
human rights materials and inter- governmentally approved guidance under the 
CBD. This analysis will show that, on the one hand, principles of international 
environmental law have been initially translated as corporate environmental ac-
countability standards, but over time have also been specified more substantively 
into corporate environmental responsibility standards.4 On the other hand, the 
more recent cross- fertilization of international biodiversity law and international 
human rights law has led to the emergence of self- standing substantial standards 
of corporate environmental responsibility, particularly in as far as the human 
rights of indigenous peoples to their territories, lands, natural resources, and trad-
itional knowledge are concerned. Other international standards of corporate en-
vironmental responsibility have also emerged with regard to protected areas and 
the sustainable use of natural resources. Corporate environmental responsibility 
standards will be discussed in the next chapter.
1 The Convention on Biodiversity and the private sector
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) aims at the conservation of the vari-
ability of living organisms5 and their interactions, and the sustainable use of living 
natural resources, encompassing genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge. It also concerns non- living resources that form part of ecosystems,6 
and the use of non- living natural resources that may affect biodiversity conser-
vation and sustainable use. Its subject- matter is thus remarkably wide, and its 
membership is virtually global (196 Parties, with the notable absence of the United 
States). At the crossroads of environmental protection and development,7 the CBD 
supports a balance between conservation and sustainable use rather than a blanket 
preference for conservation.8 For instance, the CBD has addressed biodiversity 
concerns arising from climate change mitigation and adaptation measures.9 More 
 4 See Ch. 1, Section 4.
 5 The definition of biodiversity is provided in CBD Art. 2 as ‘the variability among living organ-
isms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and 
of ecosystems’.
 6 See the definition of ecosystems under CBD Art. 2.
 7 L. Glowka et al., A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Gland, IUCN: 1994); C. Tinker, 
‘A New Breed of Treaty:  The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity’ (1995) 12 Pace 
Environmental Law Review 191.
 8 S. Johnston, ‘The Convention on Biological Diversity: The Next Phase’ (1997) 6 Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law 219.
 9 E. Morgera, ‘Against All Odds:  The Contribution of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
to International Human Rights Law’ in D. Alland et  al. (eds), Unity and Diversity of International 
Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Pierre- Marie Dupuy (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014) 983.
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generally, the CBD has provided an innovative and flexible framework for accom-
modating developed and developing countries’ concerns and capacities10 and for 
encouraging partnerships between national and local authorities, local and indi-
genous communities, and the private sector.11
The open- ended and heavily qualified rules contained in the CBD, however, 
have been criticized for their vagueness and for their soft- law nature,12 despite 
being contained in a formally legally binding instrument.13 It has also been con-
sidered an ineffective and fragmented process that has had little impact on State 
practice, making instead a continuous attempt to expand its subject- matter without 
fully achieving or systematically assessing progress on previously agreed commit-
ments.14 These weaknesses can also be considered the strength of the regime, how-
ever, if one considers that the consensus decisions of the CBD’s Conference of the 
Parties (COP)15 have provided subsequent agreement on the interpretation16 of 
relevant CBD rules17 in light of intervening legal, scientific, and technological de-
velopments in different sectors. As a result, CBD COP decisions have expanded 
upon the scope and content of the Convention, well beyond the expectations of its 
drafters, by way of interpretation or documentation of good practices. The CBD 
COP’s normative activity is thus testimony to an intense, evolving, and creative 
interpretation of the convention by the international community,18 including a 
certain degree of openness to inputs from indigenous peoples’ and local commu-
nities’ representatives.19 That said, such consensus has come at a price: CBD COP 
 10 D. McGraw, ‘The CBD: Key Characteristics and Implications for Development’ (2002) 11 Review 
of European Community and International Environmental Law 17.
 11 L. Kimball, ‘Institutional Linkages between the Convention on Biological Diversity and Other 
International Conventions’ (1997) 6 Review of European Community and International Environmental 
Law 239.
 12 M. Chandler, ‘The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to the International Lawyer’ 
(1993) 4 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law 141. Note that P. Birnie, A. Boyle, and 
C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
617, argue that it is necessary to ‘look more to the implementation process than the textual analysis of 
the Convention’s provisions in order to measure its contribution to the conservation of biodiversity’.
 13 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 
220– 22.
 14 McGraw (n. 10) 23.
 15 J. Brunnée, ‘COP- ing with Consent: Law- Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ 
(2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 1.
 16 Convention on the Law of the Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980), Art. 31(3)
(b): First and Second Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty 
Interpretation, UN Doc. A/ Cn.4/ 660 (2013) and UN Doc. A/ CN.4/ 671 (2014).
 17 Morgera and Tsioumani (n. 1) 3.
 18 For a discussion of the significant evolution of the interpretation of the CBD references to benefit 
sharing, see E. Morgera and E. Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit- Sharing: Linking Biodiversity and 
Community Livelihoods’ (2010) 15 Review of European Community and International Environmental 
Law 150.
 19 Under the CBD Working Group on Art. 8(j) (traditional knowledge), the fullest possible par-
ticipation of indigenous and local communities is ensured in all Working Group meetings, including 
in contact groups, by welcoming community representatives as Friends of the Co- Chairs, Friends of 
the Bureau and Co- Chairs of contact groups; without prejudice to the applicable rules of procedure of 
the Conference of the Parties establishing that representatives duly nominated by parties are to con-
duct the business of CBD meetings so that any text proposal by indigenous and local communities’ 
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decisions, similarly to the text of the Convention itself, also suffer from heavily 
qualified language,20 which has allowed for a very wide margin of discretion for 
States in their interpretation and implementation. In addition, guidance on certain 
concepts or issues is often dispersed in a myriad of CBD decisions, which have not 
been subject to any significant monitoring or compliance process.21
The relevance of the Convention on Biological Diversity from a human rights 
perspective was confirmed in the 2017 report of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights and the Environment.22 For the first time, CBD obligations have 
been authoritatively assessed as a matter of international human rights law, based 
on the unequivocal understanding that the full enjoyment of everyone’s human 
rights to life, health, food, and water depend on healthy ecosystems and their bene-
fits to people.23 On the one hand, the report served to underscore that procedural 
dimensions of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use24 are not just a matter 
of mere good governance,25 but a matter of international human rights law. This 
means that human rights obligations limit the discretion of CBD parties in their in-
terpretation and implementation of otherwise open- ended treaty language. In add-
ition, Special Rapporteur Knox clarified that there are substantive human rights 
law obligations that serve to clarify the limits of State discretion in pursuing the 
CBD objectives relating to biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.26 At the 
domestic level, in authorizing any activity, either conservation or use, CBD parties 
are to ensure that no unjustified, foreseeable infringements of human rights may 
arise from the decision.27 This is based both on potential public interventions that 
may infringe biodiversity- dependent human rights and on States’ obligation to pre-
vent business entities from violating these rights.28 In other words, implementing 
the CBD obligations in a mutually supportive way with international human rights 
law clarifies that States must develop laws and institutions that effectively ‘regu-
late harm to biodiversity from private actors as well as government entities’ in a 
representatives must be supported by at least one party. Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
on Biodiversity, Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open- Ended Working Group on Article 8(j) 
and Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity (2011) UN Doc. UNEP/ CBD/ COP/ 11/ 
7, para. 20.
 20 Morgera and Tsioumani (n. 1) 3.
 21 Ibid. 23– 25.
 22 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment: Biodiversity, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 
34/ 49 (19 January 2017). This paragraph builds on E. Morgera, ‘Dawn of a New Day? The Evolving 
Relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity and International Human Rights Law’ 
(2018) 54 Wake Forest Law Review 101.
 23 Knox (n. 22) para. 5.
 24 Ibid. para. 67.
 25 E. Brown Weiss and A. Sornarajah, ‘Good Governance’ in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
 26 Knox (n. 22) para. 34.
 27 Ibid.
 28 Ibid. paras 33– 34.
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way that is ‘non- retrogressive and non- discriminatory’.29 Furthermore, John Knox 
confirmed the relevance of certain CBD COP decisions for the second pillar of the 
UN Framework on Business and Human Rights— business respect of human rights 
in the context of extractives and conservation,30 as discussed below.
1.1 The extent to which the CBD has addressed corporate 
environmental accountability and responsibility
The text of the Convention on Biological Diversity explicitly addresses the pri-
vate sector with regard to the sustainable use of biodiversity components (Article 
10(e)): accordingly, the Convention commits State Parties to encouraging cooper-
ation between government authorities and the private sector in developing methods 
for the sustainable use of biological resources. Furthermore, the Convention refers 
to the private sector in relation to access to and transfer of technology31 and impli-
citly with regard to incentive measures.32 Against this background, in 2005, explicit 
discussions among State Parties began on various tools for facilitating the private 
sector engagement in biodiversity- related issues.33 In line with the practice of other 
international organizations, the CBD Secretariat proposed translating the goals 
and objectives of the Convention into a set of clear standards, as a critical step in 
facilitating the integration of biodiversity considerations into business policies and 
practices.34 Several consultations of the CBD Secretariat with the private sector35 
highlighted that at least certain sectors of the business community felt the need for 
further guidance on good practice, in particular on how industry should cooperate 
with indigenous peoples and local communities to apply the principle of prior 
informed consent.36 Participating companies further noted the need to compile 
 29 Ibid. para. 69.
 30 Ibid. paras 33 and 72.
 31 CBD Art. 16(4) reads:  ‘Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy 
measures, as appropriate, with the aim that the private sector facilitates access to, joint development and 
transfer of technology referred to in paragraph 1 above for the benefit of both governmental institutions 
and the private sector of developing countries and in this regard shall abide by the obligations included 
in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above.’
 32 CBD Art. 11.
 33 This was initially discussed in September 2005 at the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Open- Ended 
Working Group on Review of Implementation (Montreal, Canada, 5– 9 September 2005). Executive 
Secretary of the CBD, ‘Private Sector Engagement in the Implementation of the Convention’ (2005) UN 
Doc. UNEP/ CBD/ WG- RI/ 1/ 8, para. 3
 34 Executive Secretary of the CBD, ‘Private Sector Engagement in the Implementation of the 
Convention’ (2005) UN Doc. UNEP/ CBD/ WG- RI/ 1/ 8. Also in other fora, academics and practi-
tioners agreed on the importance of developing standards for facilitating private- sector engagement in 
biodiversity- related issues. OECD, ‘Key Messages’ (OECD Workshop on Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements and the Private Sector, Helsinki, 16– 17 June 2005).
 35 CBD, ‘Report of the Business and the 2010 Biodiversity Challenge Meeting’ (2005) UN Doc. 
UNEP/ CBD/ WG- RI/ 1/ INF/ 5; CBD, ‘Report of the Second Business and the 2010 Biodiversity 
Challenge Meeting’ (2005) UN Doc. UNEP/ CBD/ COP/ 8/ INF/ 11.
 36 CBD, ‘Report of the Second Business and the 2010 Biodiversity Challenge Meeting’ (n. 35) 6.
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biodiversity standards and criteria (both general and sector- specific) and align 
them with the CBD goals and objectives, to be integrated in good practice guid-
ance and measures,37 with a view to setting priorities for biodiversity conservation 
and management for business.38 Participating companies further called for guid-
ance on incorporating biodiversity into environmental impact assessments.39 In 
response to these calls, the COP adopted in 2006 its first decision on private sector 
engagement,40 emphasizing that stakeholder involvement in the implementation 
of the Convention and achievement of the 2010 target is in addition to the ‘pri-
mary’ responsibility of States.41 It also highlighted the need to enhance both vol-
untary and regulatory means for the private sector to support the implementation 
of the Convention objectives.42 It thus identified ‘internationally agreed standards 
on activities that impact biodiversity’ as one of the mechanisms to facilitate the 
private sector’s contribution to the Convention implementation and achievement 
of the 2010 target.43 Successive decisions on the private sector have not, however, 
in and of themselves, advanced standard- setting on corporate accountability. But 
they have eventually led to the establishment of a Global Partnership for Business 
and Biodiversity,44 which is a network to enhance the understanding of the role of 
business in the realization of the CBD objectives. In addition, more recent deci-
sions on biodiversity mainstreaming have continued consideration of the need for 
international standards for the business sector, making reference to the UN Global 
Compact and addressing specific sectors, such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
tourism, infrastructure, energy, mining, manufacturing, and processing sectors.45 
The biodiversity mainstreaming agenda has led to the establishment of an Informal 
 37 Ibid. 11 and 17– 18.
 38 Ibid. 7.
 39 On the basis of the CBD, Voluntary Guidelines on Biodiversity- inclusive Environmental Impact 
Assessment’ (2006) CBD Dec VIII/ 28 (Annex), that are targeted to governments.
 40 CBD, COP Decision VIII/ 11 ‘Private Sector Engagement’ (2006). Many decisions adopted at the 
8th meeting of the Conference of the Parties, in addition to Decision VIII/ 17, also explicitly referred 
to business. In Decisions 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 20, 25, and 27 adopted at the 8th meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties, reference is made to ‘business’, ‘business/ private sector groups’, ‘business 
sector’, ‘developers’, ‘economic activities’, ‘industry’, ‘key economic sectors’, ‘operators’, ‘private decisions’, 
‘private entities’, ‘private sector’, ‘private sector agencies’. A number of economic sectors are also referred 
to, including agriculture (Decisions VIII/ 1, VIII/ 6, VIII/ 8, VIII/ 9), animal breeding industry (VIII/ 
27), energy (VIII/ 9), fisheries (VIII/ 1, VIII/ 6, VIII/ 8, VIII/ 9), forestry (VIII/ 1, VIII/ 6, VIII/ 8, VIII/ 
9), financial institutions (VIII/ 1, VIII/ 5, VIII/ 8, VIII/ 9), infrastructure development (VIII/ 1), mining 
(VIII/ 1, VIII/ 8, VIII/ 9), shipment organizations (VIII/ 27), and tourism (VIII/ 1, VIII/ 8, VIII/ 9). The 
decisions cover, inter alia, business engagement and partnerships; the development and promotion of 
best practices; resource mobilization; incentives, market creation, and certification; awareness raising; 
and business participation in Convention processes (as reported in CBD, ‘Note on Cooperation with 
the other Conventions, International Organizations and Initiatives and Engagement of Stakeholders, 
Addendum: Engagement of Business’ (2008) UN Doc. UNEP/ CBD/ COP/ 9/ 21/ Add.1).
 41 CBD, COP Decision VIII/ 11, preambular para. 2.
 42 Ibid., preambular para. 3. For a discussion on standards and international environmental law, see 
Ch. 3, Section 1.
 43 CBD, COP Decision VIII/ 11, preambular para. 9(d) (emphasis added).
 44 CBD COP Decision XII/ 10 (2014).
 45 CBD, COP Decision XIII/ 3 (2016) and CBD Art. 6(b).
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Advisory Group on Mainstreaming of Biodiversity to support the development of 
a long- term approach to this area of work,46 but it is too early to say whether this 
new body will engage in standard- setting.
Up to now, therefore, the development of standards under the explicit label of en-
gagement with the private sector under the CBD has been limited. But, as opposed 
to elaborating standards that are solely addressed to private companies, the most 
promising approach under the Convention has instead been developing guide-
lines that are addressed to a variety of actors (governments, but also private devel-
opers, development funders, etc), which have the potential to act as international 
standards for corporate environmental accountability and responsibility.47 While 
these guidelines shy away from clearly drawing a line between State obligations 
and business responsibility, they have provided more detailed approaches upon 
which private companies can draw, than those discussed in the previous chapter. 
These guidelines have received the endorsement of the CBD’s virtually universal 
membership.
This chapter will argue that there are several other CBD COP decisions and 
guidelines that are relevant to better understand international standards on cor-
porate environmental accountability and responsibility, beyond those already 
identified by international human rights bodies, such as:  the CBD Akwé: Kon 
Guidelines on socio- cultural and environmental impact assessments for devel-
opments in sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occupied or used 
by indigenous peoples and local communities;48 the Addis Ababa Principles 
and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity;49 the International 
Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism Development;50 the Tkarihwaié:ri Code 
of Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual Heritage 
of Indigenous and Local Communities;51 and the Mo’ otz kuxta Voluntary 
Guidelines on consent and benefit- sharing from the use of traditional knowledge 
of indigenous peoples and local communities.52
 46 CBD, COP Decision XIV/ 3 (2018), para. 18.
 47 CBD, ‘Report of the Business and the 2010 Biodiversity Challenge Meeting’ (n. 29).
 48 CBD Decision VII/ 16F, ‘Akwé:  Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place on, or 
which are Likely to Impact on, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by 
Indigenous and Local Communities, in Article 8(j) and related provisions’ (2004).
 49 CBD Decision VII/ 12 (2004), Annex II.
 50 CBD Decision V/ 25 (2000).
 51 CBD, Tkarihwaié:ri Code of Ethical Conduct to Ensure Respect for the Cultural and Intellectual 
Heritage of Indigenous and Local Communities, CBD Decision X/ 42 (2010).
 52 The Mo’ otz Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines for the development of mechanisms, legislation or other 
appropriate initiatives to ensure the ‘prior and informed consent’, ‘free, prior and informed consent’, 
or ‘approval and involvement’, depending on national circumstances, of indigenous peoples and local 
communities for accessing their knowledge, innovations, and practices, for fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits arising from the use of their knowledge, innovations, and practices relevant for the conser-
vation and sustainable use of biological diversity, and for reporting and preventing unlawful appropri-
ation of traditional knowledge, CBD Dec. XIII/ 18 (2016).
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2 International standards on corporate 
environmental accountability
The following sections will provide an in- depth assessment of the degree of nor-
mative convergence of international standards on corporate accountability at the 
intersection of international environmental law and human rights, relying on CBD 
decisions. Standards based on international environmental law principles will be 
examined: their translation into procedural standards of corporate environmental 
accountability will be discussed, drawing the necessary distinctions between what 
is requested internationally from States and what are the emerging normative 
benchmarks for private companies. The extent to which these international stand-
ards on corporate accountability have also been developed into substantive stand-
ards of corporate environmental responsibility will be interrogated.
2.1 Environmental integration
The principle of environmental integration is one of the building blocks of the 
international efforts for the protection of the environment and is considered an 
essential element of sustainable development.53 It implies that countries and inter-
national organizations commit to integrate environmental considerations into 
economic development or sectoral policies. The principle of environmental inte-
gration, although initially conceived with regard to national development plan-
ning,54 has served as a strong basis for the concept of corporate environmental 
accountability. It has been translated into the general expectation that business 
enterprises take into account environmental concerns within their corporate 
decision- making process. As such, it provides a precondition for other corporate 
environmental accountability standards, such as prevention and precaution, and 
is contingent upon the standards related to environmental information, consult-
ation, and grievance mechanisms.
This standard implies the explicit consideration of environmental impacts of 
corporate activities at the boardroom level, so that any negative impact would be 
identified, rectified, and prevented from occurring.55 While private companies are 
bound by national environmental laws to this effect in the case of major devel-
opments, in light of this international standard they are also reasonably expected 
 53 P. Sands and J. Peel, with A. Fabra and R. MacKenzie, Principles of International Environmental 
Law, 4th edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 215– 17; and V. Barral, ‘The Principle 
of Sustainable Development’ in L. Krämer and E. Orlando (eds), Principles of Environmental Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018) 103, 108 and 111.
 54 Rio Declaration, Principle 4.
 55 D. Ong, ‘The Impact of Environmental Law on Corporate Governance:  International and 
Comparative Perspectives’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 685, 695.
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to go beyond the specific implementation and enforcement capacity in a State 
to integrate environmental concerns in all their operations on an ongoing basis. 
Assessing in practice whether a company has fully or properly taken into account 
environmental considerations in its operations may be difficult, although egre-
gious disregard of serious environmental consequences could be more easily iden-
tified on a case- by- case basis. The two main standards that translate environmental 
integration for companies are impact assessment and environmental management 
systems.
The IFC Performance Standard explains at the outset how assessment of envir-
onmental impacts, and the adoption of an environmental management system 
provide ‘the umbrella policy’ for managing all other performance standards— in 
other words, the central planning tool that acts as the backbone for the implemen-
tation of more specific standards.56 This is based on earlier experience in IFC- 
funded projects where a weak environmental impact assessment (either compiled 
after the beginning of the project, or not broad enough in scope, or carried out 
by a client lacking sufficient capacity) had undermined the effectiveness and im-
pact of all performance standards.57 In effect, the 2006 version of the Performance 
Standard already stressed the relevance of impact assessments and environmental 
management systems also for the purposes of community engagement, disclosure 
of information, and prevention (discussed below). This supports the idea that com-
panies should take a proactive approach in continuously searching for opportun-
ities to add environmental value to their investment.58 The following sub- sections 
will discuss environmental impact assessments and environmental management 
in turn.
2.1.1  (Self- )assessment of environmental impacts
Environmental impact assessments (EIAs), which were already in use in the 1970s, 
are now a well- established international and domestic legal technique for States to 
integrate environmental concerns into socio- economic development and decision- 
making.59 Internationally, EIAs are considered to include, at a minimum: scien-
tific evidence, effective consideration of possible impacts on the environment, and 
communication to authorities of the findings.60 So they entail the identification, 
assessment and evaluation of potential adverse impacts in a ‘scientifically rigorous, 
transparent and participatory’ manner, 61 with the last requirement entailing ‘a 
 56 The Compliance Advisor/ Ombudsman (CAO) of the IFC, A Review of IFC’s Safeguard Policies 
(January 2003) 7 and 9.
 57 Ibid. 30.
 58 M. Warner, The New International Benchmark Standards for Environmental and Social Performance 
of the Private Sector in Developing Countries:  Will it Raise or Lower the Bar? (London:  Overseas 
Development Institute, 2006) 2.
 59 Sands et al (n. 53) 601– 22; and A. Kiss and D. Shelton, International Environmental Law, 3rd edn 
(New York: Transnational Publishers, 2004) 236– 44.
 60 P- M. Dupuy, Droit International Public (Paris: Dalloz, 2004) 109.
 61 N. Craik, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment’ in Krämer and Orlando (n 53) 195.
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dialogue or, at a minimum, . . . a response that demonstrates some account of the 
views expressed’.62 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered EIAs of po-
tential transboundary impacts a customary rule of international law, and left the 
determination of its precise requirements to the State’s discretion.63 It has been ar-
gued that at least two additional components of impact assessments are required 
by general international law— cumulative impact assessments and post- project 
monitoring.64 Furthermore, international human rights processes have been quite 
consistent in establishing that prior, comprehensive environmental and socio- 
cultural impact assessments be carried out as a safeguard for indigenous and tribal 
peoples’ rights over their natural resources (discussed below).65
Most national laws around the world require EIAs, although they are usually 
confined to major developments that are likely to have significant negative im-
pacts on the environment. Thus national legislation typically sets thresholds below 
which an EIA is not required, as international law requires States to put in place 
a ‘reasoned process for the determination of the significance [of potential harm] 
that accounts for the contextual nature of the determination’.66 That said, signifi-
cance vis- à- vis biodiversity and climate change is difficult to determine because 
of the cumulative and highly diffuse nature of the sources of impacts.67 While the 
precise contents of EIAs are determined in national legislation, not all exemptions 
and exclusions in national law would serve to relieve the State of its international 
obligations.68
In most national laws, the responsibility to carry out the EIA is placed on private 
developers.69 In contrast to national laws, the international standard of corporate 
environmental accountability on impact assessment is not triggered by a particular 
threshold of risk, so companies are expected as a matter of practice to assess en-
vironmental impacts in all their activities on an ongoing basis. The standard can 
therefore refer to additional impact assessments than those required by national 
legislation (self- assessments), but it can also emphasize higher expectations on 
how business entities carry out assessments required by national legislation. The 
 62 Ibid. 205.
 63 ICJ, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), Judgment (20 April 2010) para. 205.
 64 N. Craik, ‘Principle 17: Environmental Impact Assessment’ in J. Viñuales (ed.), The Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 451.
 65 See Ch. 5, Section 1.1.
 66 Craik (n. 61) 199– 200, on the basis of ICJ, Construction of a Road Case (Nicaragua v Costa Rica) 
(merit) Judgment (16 December 2015) para. 154.
 67 Craik (n. 61) 205. Notably CBD State Parties adopted specific guidelines to ensure systematic in-
tegration of biodiversity concerns in EIAs, including in consideration of the specific challenges raised 
by marine biodiversity:  CBD COP Decision VIII/ 28 (2008) Voluntary Guidelines on Biodiversity- 
inclusive Impact Assessments and Decision XI/ 18 B (2012), Voluntary Guidelines for the Consideration 
of Biodiversity in Environmental Impact Assessments and Strategic Environmental Assessments in 
Marine and Coastal Areas (contained in (2012) UN Doc. UNEP/ CBD/ COP/ 11/ 23).
 68 Craik (n. 61) 202, based on ICJ, Construction of a Road Case (n. 66) para. 157 and Separate Reasons 
of Judge Donoghue, para. 15.
 69 UNEP, Assessing Environmental Impacts— A Global Review of Legislation (Nairobi: UN, 2018).
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standard entails that the private sector assesses, on a periodic basis, the possible im-
pacts on the environment of all its activities, on the basis of scientific evidence and 
communication with likely affected communities. It further requires companies to 
take such an assessment into account in deciding whether to carry out, or continue 
to carry out, such activities or not, and if so with which cautions. A self- assessment 
of environmental impacts, leading to the adoption of an environmental manage-
ment system is called for by the UN Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational 
Corporations, the OECD Guidelines, and the IFC Performance Standards.70 The 
UN Global Compact refers to such an assessment of environmental risks and im-
pacts in the context of the precautionary principle. The assessment of impacts 
was also a key tool singled out by the UN Special Representative on Business and 
Human Rights, which is broadly in line with the human rights- based approach 
found in the UN Norms.71 Accordingly, business enterprises are to assess the en-
vironmental impacts of their activities on a periodic basis, in order to ensure that 
the burden of the negative environmental consequences does not fall on vulnerable 
racial, ethnic, and socio- economic groups.72
The OECD Guidelines define a ‘life- cycle assessment’ as a tool for systematic 
evaluation of the environmental aspects of a product or service through all stages 
of its life- cycle— that is, when the raw material is extracted, manufactured, trans-
ported, used, recycled, and disposed of.73 This is reinforced in the OECD- FAO 
Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains,74 which contain an EIA re-
quirement for continuously assessing and addressing in decision- making the ac-
tual and potential impacts of companies’ operations, processes, goods and services 
over their full life- cycle with a view to avoiding or, when unavoidable, mitigating 
any adverse impacts. Life- cycle approaches are considered to reflect an emerging 
international principle on sustainable production and consumption, which pro-
vides ‘a normative orientation for the strategy decisions of private companies and 
their business models’.75 It is considered one of the ways to implement sustainable 
use (discussed below) by identifying and balancing conflicting targets at the oper-
ational level.76 It calls for the assessment of environmental impacts ‘from raw ma-
terials over the production process until final disposal’, with particular emphasis 
 70 Ch, 3, Sections 2.1, 5.2, and 6.2.
 71 Ch. 3, Section 4.2.3.
 72 D. Weissbrodt and M. Kruger, ‘Human Rights Responsibilities of Business as Non- State Actors’ in 
P. Alston (ed.), Non- State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 315, 343.
 73 OECD, Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (2011), VI.3.
 74 OECD- FAO, Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains (Paris: OECD, 2015). For a 
commentary, M. Brunori, ‘Recomposing the mosaic of responsible business conduct along the agricul-
tural supply chain: the FAO- OECD Guidance’ BENELEX Blog post (March 2016), https:// benelexblog.
wordpress.com/ 2016/ 03/ 16/ recomposing- the- mosaic- of- responsible- business- conduct- along- the- 
agricultural- supply- chain- the- fao- oecd- guidance/ , last visited 19 November 2019.
 75 M. Führ and J. Schenten, ‘Sustainable Production and Consumption’ in Krämer and Orlando (n. 
53) 125, 126.
 76 Ibid. 128.
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on hazardous and toxic materials and waste management at the consumer’s end.77 
Life- cycle approaches are considered conducive to learning systems, with per-
manent feedback and evaluation loops to draw on the ‘full potential for (disrup-
tive) innovation’.78
The IFC 2012 Performance Standards, in turn, call for a case- by- case deter-
mination of the scope of the risks and impacts that is consistent with ‘good inter-
national industry practice’, calling for ‘full- scale’ assessments, ‘limited or focused’ 
assessments or ‘straightforward application of environmental siting, pollution 
standards, design criteria, or construction standards’.79 Previously the IFC had re-
quired the consideration of multilateral environmental treaties in project environ-
mental analyses ‘where relevant and feasible, with a view to minimizing possible 
adverse impacts on global environmental quality’.80 The 2012 version instead re-
fers more restrictively to ‘laws implementing host country obligations under inter-
national law’ and ‘under some circumstances, clients may also subscribe to other 
international recognized standards’ as part of the development of an overarching 
policy defining the environmental and social objectives and principles guiding 
the project.81 What this language implies is that the IFC’s more explicit reliance 
on multilateral environmental treaties has come at the cost of excluding the rele-
vance of environmental treaties that are not joined only by the home country, or 
that address other standards that have not been specifically translated into the IFC 
Standards themselves.
2.1.1.1  Cumulative impacts
As mentioned above, a key element of international EIA obligations is the assess-
ment of cumulative impacts, which encompass ‘the incremental impact of an ac-
tivity in the light of past, present and reasonably foreseeable future actions’.82 This 
is not systematically reflected in the international standards on corporate envir-
onmental accountability. For instance, the OECD Guidelines have been criticized 
for not including a specific requirement to consider cumulative environmental im-
pacts.83 This had also been the case for the IFC in its 1998 EIA Safeguard Policy,84 
 77 Ibid. 131.
 78 Ibid. 135 and 131.
 79 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 7.
 80 IFC, ‘Guidance Note: Checklist of Potential Issues for an Environmental Assessment’ (December 
1998) 42.
 81 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 6.
 82 Craik (n. 61) 202.
 83 OECDWatch statement on the update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: Improved content and scope, but procedural shortcomings remain (25 May 2011); and 
Amnesty International, ‘The 2010– 11 Update of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
has come to an end: the OECD must now turn into effective implementation’ (23 May 2011).
 84 IFC, Environmental Impact Assessment Safeguard Policy (OP 4.01) (October 1998) <http:// www.
ifc.org/ ifcext/ enviro.nsf/ Content/ Safeguardpolicies>.
 
152 Assessing International Standards on CEA
which lacked reference to assessing cumulative effects85 and integration with social 
impacts.86 As a response, already in 2006, the IFC had indicated the EIA standard 
extends to cumulative impacts and possible global impacts through consideration 
of applicable multilateral environmental agreements, in particular the CBD.87 To 
that end, the 2006 Standards had introduced the concept of the project’s ‘area of 
influence’.88 This encompassed not only the primary project site, related facilities 
controlled or developed by the client, and associated facilities, but also areas poten-
tially impacted by cumulative impacts from further planned development related 
to the project, or even areas potentially affected by impacts from unplanned but 
predictable developments caused by the project that may occur later or in a dif-
ferent location.89 The client was also expected to address risks and impacts deriving 
from third parties, in a manner proportionate to the client’s control and influence 
over the third party.90 This at least partially answered the WWF’s proposal to re-
quire clients to exercise leadership in their sphere of influence, to require environ-
mental management from their suppliers, and to exercise due diligence to ensure 
that inputs purchased or received from third parties do not violate their own en-
vironmental policies.91 This requirement was clarified in 2012, with specific refer-
ence to the purchase of primary production of food, fibre, and other commodities 
from regions where there is a known risk of significant conversion of natural and/ 
or critical habitats.92 In these instances, the company is expected to adopt a system 
of evaluation of suppliers and ongoing verification practices, including ‘where pos-
sible, require[ing] actions to shift the client’s primary supply chain over time to 
suppliers that can demonstrate that they are not significantly adversely impacting 
these areas’.93 In addition, under the 2012 Performance Standard the project’s area 
of influence also includes indirect impacts on biodiversity or ecosystem services 
upon which affected communities’ livelihoods are dependent,94 which is linked to 
the expansion of the community consultation requirements discussed below.95 The 
 85 Whose importance is underlined by Principle 5 of the CBD Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines 
(n. 49).
 86 CAO (n. 56) 30. This is also supported by the CBD Voluntary Guidelines on Biodiversity- Inclusive 
Environmental Impact Assessment, CBD COP Decision VIII/ 28 (2008) 10.
 87 IFC, ‘Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability’ (30 April 2006) <http:// 
www.ifc.org/ sustainability> (IFC Performance Standards):  Performance Standard 1, para. 5; and 
Performance Standard 6, para. 4.
 88 IFC, ‘Policy and Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability and Policy 
on Disclosure of Information: IFC Responses to Stakeholder Comments and Rationale for Key Policy 
Changes’ (22 September 2006) 10.
 89 2006 Performance Standard 1, para. 5; 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 9.
 90 2006 Performance Standard 1, para. 6; 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 8.
 91 WWF (A. Durbin, S. Herz, D. Hunter, and J. Peck), Shaping the Future of Sustainable 
Finance: Moving from Paper Promises to Performance (January 2006) 68.
 92 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 10 and Performance Standard 6, para. 30.
 93 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 6, para. 30.
 94 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 8.
 95 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 8, fn. 16, which refers to ‘cumulative impacts generally 
recognised as important on the basis of scientific concerns and/ or concerns of affected communities’.
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2012 version further refers to ‘cumulative, regional, sectoral or strategic environ-
mental assessments where relevant’,96 which could be related to concerns raised 
under the CBD, such as target species and ecosystems,97 areas that are adjacent to 
touristic spots or ecosystems of importance for tourism,98 or to indigenous peo-
ples’ land claims, or long- term implications of resource development on commu-
nity interests.99
2.1.1.2   Outcomes
The principal outcome of the (self- )assessment of environmental impacts is the 
production of information that will be used by the company itself for its envir-
onmental management purposes (as discussed below). According to scholars, an 
international requirement for (self- )assessment of environmental impacts can 
compel private companies’ management to pay greater attention to environmental 
performance and contribute to the transfer of valuable information on environ-
mental control technology and costs.100 There is, however, also the expectation that 
the information should be shared outside the company. Very early concerns were 
voiced at the UN, and encapsulated in the draft UN Code of Conduct that trans-
national companies cooperate not only with national governments, but also with 
international organizations, for the protection of the environment.101 According 
to the UN Norms, the reports of (self- )assessments are expected to be circu-
lated in a timely and accessible manner to the UN Environment Programme, the 
International Labour Organization, and other international bodies, to the national 
governments of the host and home countries, and to other affected groups. In add-
ition, the Norms suggested that these reports be accessible to the general public.102
Besides the procedural dimension related to the production and sharing of en-
vironmental information (further discussed below as a self- standing standard of 
corporate environmental accountability), the most complex question regarding 
the (self- )assessment of environmental impacts is whether a specific substantive 
approach should arise from this exercise, and whether a profound re- thinking 
of proposed activities should be also engendered. In inter- State relations, an 
identification of alternative can be considered ‘desirable, but not a necessary re-
quired element’, although alternatives ‘play a critical role in providing a basis by 
 96 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 11.
 97 CBD Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines (n 49), Principle 5, Operational Guidelines. See Ch. 
5, Section 3.
 98 CBD Biodiversity and Tourism Guidelines (n 50), para. 44.
 99 E. Morgera, ‘Under the Radar:  Fair and Equitable Benefit- sharing and the Human Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities connected to Natural Resources’ (2019) 23 International 
Journal of Human Rights 1098, 1112. See Ch. 5, Section 1.
 100 C. Pearson, ‘Environmental Standards, Industrial Relocation and Pollution Havens’ in C. Pearson 
(ed.), Multinational Corporations, Environment, and the Third World (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1987) 113, 128. On the standard on information disclosure, see Section 2.4 below.
 101 UN Code of Conduct, para. 43.
 102 Commentary to the UN Norms, (b) and (c).
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which to assess proposed activities’.103 The IFC, however, does not require that 
among possible alternatives a no- project scenario is taken into account.104 The 
CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines, on the other hand, specifically call on development 
proponents to include in their impact assessments options for no- action alter-
natives.105 The analysis of alternatives in environmental assessments has been 
considered essential to demonstrate good faith at the interim stages, not just at 
the stage of the final decision, as well as the meaningful character of consult-
ations in the absence of clear quantitative standards to assess the acceptability of 
impacts.106 This is particularly the case when indigenous peoples’ human rights 
may be at stake and the developer may not be able to show that mitigation meas-
ures correspond to the preferred alternatives put forward by indigenous peoples 
or local communities.107
2.1.1.3  Links with consultation
Business and human rights scholars have raised concerns about limiting human 
rights impact assessments only to high- risk circumstances and the lack of guid-
ance on how to integrate human rights into impact assessments.108 The OECD Due 
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict- 
Affected and High- Risk Areas109 suggest involving on- the- ground personnel and 
stakeholders in conducting transparent social, environmental, and human rights 
impact assessments,110 with preliminary field research related to the environment 
through interviews with relevant individuals working for the enterprise or with 
other enterprises operating in the region.111 Document- based understanding of 
context includes environmental baselines/ impact assessments, which can provide 
information on air and water quality, water availability and sources, soil conditions, 
climate, rainfall, and status of flora and fauna.112 The IFC Standard further specifies 
that the assessment should take into account the differing values of biodiversity for 
affected communities, and consider threats ranging from ‘habitat loss, degradation 
 103 Craik (n. 61) 201.
 104 IFC Responses to Stakeholders (n. 88) 11, where the IFC argues that in the case of private sector 
projects, ‘it would be more productive for the assessment to consider how the project should be imple-
mented to avoid or minimize impacts, rather than whether the project should happen at all . . . [whereas] 
it is for IFC to decide whether to finance a project or not, based on the client’s assessment of risks and 
impacts.’
 105 CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 48), para. 21.
 106 N. Craik, H. Gardner, and D. McCarthy, ‘Indigenous— Corporate Private Governance and 
Legitimacy: Lessons Learned from Impact and Benefit Agreements’ (2017) 52 Resources Policy 379.
 107 Ibid. See Ch. 5, Section 1.1.
 108 P. Simons and A. Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human Rights and the 
Home State Advantage (Abingdon, Routledge: 2014) 133– 34.
 109  OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict- 
Affected and High- Risk Areas (Paris: OECD, 2013).
 110 Ibid. 30.
 111 Ibid. 36.
 112 Ibid. 37, table 1.
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and fragmentation, invasive alien species, overexploitation, hydrological change, 
nutrient loading and pollution’.113
The CBD Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism Development provide an-
other useful reference linking (self- )assessment of environmental impacts with 
consultation processes. They call on those promoting tourism developments to 
undertake the following steps:  identify the various stakeholders (which should 
be read as ‘right- holders’ in light of the UN Framework on Business and Human 
Rights) involved in or potentially affected by the proposed project,114 assess the 
potential impacts of the proposals, provide information on these potential impacts 
through a notification process,115 undertaking and funding necessary studies,116 
and involve indigenous peoples and local communities in the assessment.117
As these standards reflect the fact that participation of potentially affected stake-
holders is a widely accepted and essential element of environmental assessment,118 
they face similar challenges in their implementation. Notably, the general effect-
iveness of environmental assessments ‘as procedural measures generating envir-
onmentally sound and just outcomes in socio- ecological systems characterized 
by uncertainty and normative disagreement’ remains ‘an open question, notwith-
standing over forty years of practice across the globe’.119
2.1.2  Environmental management system
(Self- )assessment of environmental impacts are a precondition for companies to 
elaborate an environmental management system. These serve to ensure that the 
outcome of (self- )assessments is followed by the identification of practical implica-
tions for corporate management. Environmental management systems may serve 
to control both direct and indirect environmental impacts of enterprise activities 
over the long term, and address pollution control and resource management.120
The OECD Guidelines elaborate on environmental management systems and 
contingency plans as the internal framework necessary to control a company’s 
environmental impacts and integrate environmental considerations into busi-
ness operations.121 In addition to contributing to the realization of corporate 
 113 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 6, paras 6– 7, in response to IFC CAO (n 56) 31 and WWF (n. 
91) 41. See Ch. 5, Section 3.
 114 CBD, Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism (n 50), para. 20(a)ii.
 115 Ibid. para. 36.
 116 Ibid. para. 38.
 117 Ibid. para. 39.
 118 Rio Declaration, Principles 10 and 22; International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Prevention 
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities’ (2001) UN Doc. A/ 56/ 10, art. 13; Independent 
Expert on Environment and Human Rights, John Knox, Mapping Report on the Issue of Human Rights 
Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, (2013) 
UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 25/ 53, para. 78; generally Craik (n. 52) and J. Holder, Environmental Assessment: The 
Regulation of Decision- Making (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) ch. 6.
 119 Craik (n. 64) 443.
 120 OECD Guidelines, Commentary, 30.
 121 Ibid. 29.
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environmental accountability standards based on prevention and precaution (dis-
cussed below), environmental management systems allow companies to engage 
in a process of continual improvement of their environmental performance,122 
essentially though the collection and evaluation of information and monitoring 
of measurable environmental objectives and targets, without setting absolute per-
formance standards.123 This aims at allowing companies to tackle ‘both a business 
responsibility and a business opportunity’ through a systematic approach to con-
tinual improvement.124
The IFC also considers environmental management systems as the basis for 
both mitigation and proactive performance enhancement by companies, by de-
fining measurable outcomes and estimating resources, allocating responsibility 
for implementation and being responsive to changes in project circumstances.125 
These systems also provide a practical way for companies to assess whether they 
are employing the ‘best practical means’ or ‘best available technology’ with regard 
to their environmental performance. A standard for private companies’ best prac-
tices can be considered part and parcel of the broader idea of environmental man-
agement systems.126
Another important feature of environmental management systems is its support 
for disclosure of information and community engagement.127 The IFC has detailed 
these through the requirement for private companies to establish, as part of the 
environmental management system, mechanisms for external reporting on im-
plementation,128 ongoing consultation with potentially affected communities,129 
and a grievance mechanism.130 These requirements were meant to respond to civil 
society’s calls for enhancing transparency, compliance, and accountability in envir-
onmental management systems.131
2.1.2.1  Substantive dimensions
Environmental management system have been further detailed in specific sec-
tors, blurring the lines between procedural and substantive standards. This has 
 122 OECD, ‘Roundtable on Corporate Responsibility: Encouraging the positive contribution of busi-
ness to environment through the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Summary of the 
Roundtable Discussion’ (16 June 2004)  <http:// www.oecd.org/ document/ 1/ 0,2340,en_ 2649_ 34889_ 
31711425_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1,00.html> 4.
 123 UNCTAD, Environment (Geneva: UN, 2001) 56.
 124 OECD Guidelines, para. 61.
 125 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 1, paras 13– 15; 2012 Performance Standard 1, paras 13– 16.
 126 Ong (n. 55) 693– 98; J. Ebbesson, ‘Transboundary Corporate Responsibility in Environmental 
Matters:  Fragments and Foundations for a Future Framework’ in G. Winter (ed.), Multilevel 
Governance of Global Environmental Change:  Perspectives from Science, Sociology and the Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 200, 219; and Commentary to UN Norms, Section (g).
 127 Discussed at Sections 2.4– 2.5.
 128 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 1, para. 16.
 129 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 1, para. 19.
 130 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 1, paras 16 and 23.
 131 WWF (n. 91) 7.
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been particularly the case with regard to freshwater and climate change, under the 
Global Compact and the IFC Performance Standards.
With regard to water management, the Global Compact ‘CEO Water 
Mandate’132 calls upon companies to collect data on internal water performance 
and the condition of the basins in which the company operates. Data generated is 
used to identify water- related business risks and opportunities and negative im-
pacts; and define and refine corporate water policy, strategies, and performance 
targets that drive performance improvements and address risks and negative im-
pacts; implement water strategies and policies throughout the company and across 
the company’s value chain. The policies and targets are in turn used to monitor 
progress and changes in performance and basin conditions; communicate pro-
gress and strategies externally; and engage with stakeholders in the company’s con-
tinuous improvement by means of corporate water disclosure. While these specific 
steps are procedural, the Global Compact has also provided substantive guidance 
to integrate water sustainable use concerns in light of relevant international human 
rights law.133
Similarly, the Global Compact ‘Caring for Climate’ initiative contains a 
commitment for companies to improve continuously energy efficiency and 
reduce their carbon footprint of products, services, and processes; set volun-
tary targets for doing so; and report publicly and annually on the achievement 
of those targets. This is accompanied by building significant capacity within 
their organizations to understand fully the implications of climate change for 
business and to develop a coherent business strategy for minimizing risks and 
identifying opportunities.134 In addition, the initiative refers to responsible en-
gagement in the development of policies and measures for a low- carbon and 
climate- resilient economy. The initiative also foresees that companies will 
work with other enterprises and along value chains to set standards to reduce 
climate risks and assist with adaptation to climate change,135 thereby pointing 
at opportunities for self- regulation and contributions to State regulation. As 
part of the general requirement for environmental management systems, IFC 
Performance Standard 3 also focuses on climate change, expressing the expect-
ation that companies will consider alternatives to reduce their greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions during project design and operation, including renewables 
or low- carbon energy sources, sustainable land use practices, and reduction of 
gas flaring.136
 132 http:// ceowatermandate.org/ 
 133 The Human Right to Water: Emerging Corporate Practice and Stakeholder Expectations (United 
Nation Global Compact Office, 2010).
 134 2013 The Guide for Responsible Corporate Engagement in Climate Policy.
 135 https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/ docs/ news_ events/ 8.1/ caring_ for_ climate.pdf; https:// www.
unglobalcompact.org/ take- action/ action/ climate
 136 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 3, para. 7.
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2.2  Prevention
The prevention principle calls for States’ due diligence to avoid conduct that is 
harmful to the environment,137 by reducing, limiting, or controlling activities that 
may cause or constitute a risk of environmental damage.138 According to the Rio 
Declaration, this implies States’ obligation to prevent damage to the environment 
within their own jurisdiction, by means of appropriate regulatory, administrative, 
and other measures.139 It can also mean that action should be taken at an early 
stage and before the damage has occurred, by prohibiting activities that cause or 
may cause damage to the environment in violation of standards established under 
international law.140 Prevention encompasses both proactive and anticipatory ap-
proaches, including the positive obligation of risk anticipation to protect the en-
vironment as a whole and harm mitigation, although the latter should not be used 
as an ‘excuse to deliberately act on environmental harm in a belated manner’.141 
Among States, relevant obligations are triggered by foreseen harm of a certain 
magnitude and of an imminent or urgent nature: generally ‘significant harm’ that 
does not equate necessarily to ‘serious’ or ‘substantial’ and that needs to be deter-
mined on a case- by- case basis through an integrated evaluation of risks in light of 
the ecosystem approach.142 Prevention thus calls for a ‘degree of care [that] should 
be appropriate and proportional to the level of risk that the harm represents’, which 
may increase over time as science and technology advance143 (with the ecosystem 
approach providing for an integrated and adaptive process to that end).144 With 
regard to its territorial scope, States are called upon to prevent environmental 
damage of a transboundary nature, in areas beyond national jurisdiction, as well 
as in the domestic context if international human rights law may be violated as a 
result of the environmental harm.145
As one of the raisons d’être of international environmental law, prevention is 
also a fundamental component of international standards on corporate environ-
mental accountability. It chimes with the idea of ‘no harm’ under the IFC and the 
second pillar of the UN Framework on Business and Human Rights.146 Applied 
 137 Dupuy (n. 60) 105; and Kiss and Shelton (n. 59).
 138 Sands et al (n 53) 200– 03.
 139 Rio Declaration, Principle 11.
 140 Sands et  al (n 53)  200– 03. ‘Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment’ (16 June 1972) UN Doc. A/ CONF.48/ 14/ Rev.1 (Stockholm Declaration), Principles 6, 7, 
15, 18, and 24.
 141 L. A. Duvic- Paoli, ‘Principle of Prevention’ in Krämer and Orlando (n. 53) 161, 161 and 167.
 142 Ibid. 165– 66.
 143 Ibid. 167– 68.
 144 E. Morgera, ‘The Ecosystem Approach and the Precautionary Principle’ in E. Morgera and 
J. Razzaque (eds), Encyclopedia of Environmental Law:  Biodiversity and Nature Protection Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017) 70.
 145 Duvic- Paoli (n. 141) 169– 70.
 146 Ch. 3, Sections 4.2.1 and 6.2.
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to the private sector, a standard based on prevention complements the need for 
private companies to take into account the possible environmental impacts of the 
companies’ activities on the environment. It expects private companies to take ac-
tive steps, including the suspension of certain activities, when this is necessary to 
prevent otherwise certain or likely damage to internationally protected environ-
mental resources.147 Wherever avoidance of environmental damage is not pos-
sible, damage control and minimization should be undertaken by the company to 
limit adverse impacts on the environment.
The practical translation of the prevention principle into a corporate account-
ability standard operated by the OECD Guidelines implies that companies should 
put in place contingency plans for preventing, mitigating, and controlling serious 
environmental and health damage from their operations, including accidents and 
emergencies, as well as mechanisms for immediate reporting to competent au-
thorities.148 Again, the idea behind this provision is that of a cycle for emergency 
management, in which multinationals should evaluate the likelihood that an ac-
cident will occur, be prepared through emergency planning, land- use planning, 
and risk communication, and limit the adverse consequences to human health, the 
environment, and private property in the event of an accident.149 In this respect, 
the OECD has further elaborated on this tool by adopting the Guiding Principles 
for Chemical Accident, Prevention, Preparedness and Response,150 which assign 
primary responsibility for the safety of installations handling chemicals and haz-
ardous substances to owners and operators.151
The IFC 2012 Standard, in turn, refers to a mitigation hierarchy, whereby com-
panies are to anticipate and avoid, or, where this is not possible, minimize and 
compensate or offset residual impacts to the environment, as well as workers and 
affected communities.152 This is also seen as necessary for businesses to avoid 
infringing human rights and to address adverse human rights impacts that they 
may cause or contribute to.153 The 2012 version includes the idea of the mitiga-
tion hierarchy in environmental management systems, as far as ‘technically and 
financially feasible’ so as to take into account commercial availability and other 
commercial considerations such as incremental and maintenance costs.154 The IFC 
Standards thus set certain limits to this general approach, by qualifying it with ref-
erence to technical and financial feasibility and cost- effectiveness in the context of 
 147 Ong (n. 55) 105.
 148 OECD Guidelines, Ch. V, para. 5.
 149 OECD, Roundtable on Corporate Responsibility:  Encouraging the Positive Contribution of 
Business to Environment through the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Background 
Report (June 2004), 69.
 150 OECD, ‘Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness and Response’ 
(2003) <http:// www2.oecd.org/ guidingprinciples/ >.
 151 OECD, 2004 Roundtable Background Report (n. 149) 76.
 152 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, objectives.
 153 Ibid. para. 3.
 154 Ibid. para. 14 and fn. 20.
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a project that relies on commercially available skills and resources, with a view to 
integrating ‘cleaner production’ into product design and production processes.155 
Technical feasibility is understood on the basis of commercially available skills, 
equipment, and materials, taking into account prevailing local factors.156 Cost- 
effectiveness refers to the capital and operational costs and financial benefits of the 
measure considered over the life of the measure.157 ‘Good international industry 
practice’ is defined as the exercise of professional skill, diligence, prudence, and 
foresight that would reasonably be expected from skilled and experienced profes-
sionals engaged in the same type of undertaking under the same or similar cir-
cumstances globally or regionally.158 Private companies are expected to refer to 
an ‘internationally recognized source’ when evaluating and selecting resource 
efficiency and pollution prevention and control techniques, including the IFC 
Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines,159 unless host country regulations 
are more stringent.160
The IFC Standard also spells out provisions for environmental and social action 
plans, as well as emergency preparedness and response, and monitoring and re-
view to be established in cooperation with affected communities.161 It calls upon 
companies to involve external experts only when there are potentially significant 
adverse impacts or technically complex issues involved in the assessment.162 This 
should be read in light of guidance provided by international human rights bodies, 
which stress the need for independent expertise when the rights of indigenous peo-
ples and local communities are at stake.163 The UN Special Rapporteur on Toxics, 
for instance, recommended routinely monitoring for associated toxic substances at 
mine sites, as well as in nearby sources of drinking water or aquatic habitat, when 
hazardous substances that can contaminate water are used, such as cyanide and 
hydro- fracking solutions.164
In addition, the objectives of the IFC Standard encompass: promoting ‘more 
sustainable’ use of resources, including water and energy; and reducing project- 
level GHG emissions.165 More specifically, the Performance Standard requires 
companies to apply, during the whole project life- cycle, technologies and practices 
that are ‘best suited to avoid, or where not feasible, to minimize or reduce adverse 
 155 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 3, para. 1; 2012 Performance Standard 3, paras 4 and 6.
 156 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 3, fn. 3.
 157 Ibid. fn. 5.
 158 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, fn. 10.
 159 These are technical reference documents that address IFC’s expectations regarding the industrial 
pollution management performance of its projects, and are currently under review (<http:// www.ifc.
org/ ifcext/ policyreview.nsf/ Content/ EHSGuidelinesUpdate#How>).
 160 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 3, para. 5.
 161 Ibid. paras 16 and 20– 24.
 162 Ibid. para. 19.
 163 See Ch. 5, Section 1.1.
 164 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights obligations related to environmentally 
sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and waste, Calin Georgescu (2012) UN Doc. 
A/ HRC/ 21/ 48, paras 50 and 70.
 165 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 3, objectives.
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impacts on human health and the environment’, and that are tailored to the project, 
in light of the risk and impact assessment, and consistent with ‘good international 
industry practice’.166 Translation of the prevention principle into a standard based 
on best practices and technologies is echoed in the UN Global Compact167 and the 
UN Norms,168 as a complement to the standard on environmental management 
systems169 that can underpin substantive standards on sustainable use.170
2.2.1  Substantive dimensions
More recently, prevention has also inspired the development of substantive stand-
ards of corporate environmental responsibility in specific thematic areas, such as 
freshwater, chemicals, waste, and climate change.
The 2012 version of IFC Standards, for instance, contains a substantive standard 
on water consumption, which appears in line with similar developments under 
the UN Global Compact. It focuses on projects that are ‘potentially significant 
consumer[s] of water’, and calls for adopting measures to avoid or reduce water 
usage to avoid adverse impacts on others, including the use of alternative water 
supplies, water consumption offsets to reduce the total demand for water resources 
to within the available supply, and the evaluation of alternative project locations.171 
Concerns have been raised about the fact that this Standard does not explicitly 
refer to its significance vis- à- vis the human rights to health and water,172 without 
safeguards or exceptions developed in the human rights field.173 The OECD Due 
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in the Garment and Footwear 
Sector, in turn, draws from the OECD Principles on Water Governance and the 
Global Compact’s CEO Water Mandate,174 to emphasize the need to employ 
best available technologies to promote water efficiency and/ or reduce depend-
ence on freshwater, including through investment in water- saving equipment 
and water reuse and reduction in water usage.175 The guidance also notes that 
 166 Ibid.
 167 Principle 10 of the UN Global Compact expects adhering companies to encourage the develop-
ment and diffusion of environmentally- friendly technologies, which are defined in the Guide to the 
UN Global Compact as including technologies that allow for limited pollution, protection of the en-
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 168 Commentary to the UN Norms, (e) and (g).
 169 See Section 2.1.2.
 170 See Ch. 5, Section 3.
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 172 P. Simons and A. Macklin, The Governance Gap:  Extractive Industries, Human Rights and the 
Home State Advantage (Abingdon, Routledge: 2014) 135.
 173 A. McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010) 218.
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when considering expansions, enterprises should consider ways to address net 
increase in water demand and, generally, direct sourcing to regions that are not 
water- stressed.176
The translation of the prevention principle into standards of waste minimiza-
tion featured in the UN Norms:177 they expressed the expectation that private 
companies ensure effective means of collecting the remains of products or serv-
ices for recycling, reuse, or other environmentally responsible disposal.178 The IFC 
Performance Standard on pollution prevention refers to the Basel Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes,179 and the London 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes or Other 
Matters,180 to develop project- level requirements on wastes and other hazardous 
materials.181 As a result, IFC Performance Standard 3 requires: avoiding, or where 
that is not feasible, minimizing, waste generation; recovering and reusing waste; or 
treating, destroying, and disposing of it in an environmentally sound manner.182 
The OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, in turn, 
encapsulates the specific expectation that companies avoid or reduce the gener-
ation of hazardous and non- hazardous waste, substituting or reducing the use of 
toxic substances, and enhancing the productive use or ensuring a safe disposal of 
waste.183 Reducing, minimizing, and preventing pollution and waste is also under-
scored in the CBD Guidelines on Tourism.184 This can be seen as a reflection of 
an emerging principle of extended producer responsibility, where the producer is 
responsible for the post- consumer phase in the life- cycle, by establishing a link be-
tween product design and waste phase.185 Prevention is thus translated as placing 
the responsibility to address waste management on the ‘actors that have the most 
influence on the system’.186
The IFC, furthermore, contains a detailed Performance Standard on pollu-
tion prevention, which translates into a project- level approach a series of inter-
national standards related to pollution, climate change, resource efficiency with 
particular emphasis on water use, and safe use of chemicals.187 The Convention 
 176 Ibid.
 177 CBD Sustainable Use Principles, Principle 12.
 178 Commentary to the UN Norms, (f).
 179 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
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WWF with regard to the 2006 version: WWF (n. 91) 57.
 181 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 3, para. 12 and fn. 15.
 182 Ibid. para. 12.
 183 OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, 29.
 184 CBD Biodiversity and Tourism Guidelines (n 50), para. 44.
 185 C. Dalhammar, ‘Extended Producer Responsibility’ in Krämer and Orlando (n. 53) 208.
 186 Ibid. 215.
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on Long- range Transboundary Air Pollution188 is a reference in avoiding or min-
imizing the release of pollutants in different media (air, water, and land), and con-
trolling the intensity or load of their release, in routine, non- routine, or accidental 
circumstances with the potential for local, regional, and transboundary impacts.189 
Companies are further subject to the prohibition to purchase, store, manufacture, 
use, or trade in products classified as extremely hazardous or highly hazardous by 
the World Health Organization (WHO).190 Furthermore, Performance Standard 3 
requires companies’ environmentally responsible conduct in relation to integrated 
pest management in accordance with the FAO International Code of Conduct on 
the Distribution and Use of Pesticides.191 Although stakeholders requested the IFC 
to refer to pollution transfer and release registers, which are referred to in OECD 
Guidelines,192 these instruments have not been considered by the IFC as an ap-
propriate requirement for the private sector, because they necessitate collaboration 
with multiple parties which is beyond the control of a private company, and also 
because they may be detrimental to clients’ competitiveness.193
In addition, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains 
in the Garment and Footwear Sector194 also contains a section on hazardous chem-
icals, with a combination of procedural and substantive standards. The Guidance 
calls on companies to identify which harmful, hazardous, or restricted chemicals 
are in use in the sub- sector, identify higher- risk stages in its own operation, higher- 
risk countries due to inadequate regulation or enforcement, and develop an inven-
tory of chemicals.195 As part of the corrective action plan, a company is expected to 
stop using banned chemicals, implement best available techniques, and develop a 
chemical management plan for safe storage, labelling, and protection.196
While these specifications provide a significant level of additional detail to 
international standards of prevention, they do not take into account particular 
concerns for sectors of society that are most vulnerable to the negative impacts 
of substandard chemicals management. The UN Special Rapporteur on Toxics 
thus developed in 2012 a series of specific recommendations on business respon-
sibility with regard to the need to respect the human rights of the child. He in-
dicated that companies should identify, prevent, and mitigate children’s exposure 
to toxics through the companies’ own activities, products, or business relation-
ships, including global supply chains and other international relationships; and use 
 188 Geneva, 13 November 1979, in force 16 March 1983.
 189 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 3, para. 4; 2012 Performance Standard 3, para. 10 and fn 10.
 190 2012 IFC Performance Standard 3, paras 9, 12, and 17.
 191 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 3, paras 12– 15; and 2012 Performance Standard 3, para. 16.
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 195 Ibid. 158– 59.
 196 Ibid. 160.
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available safer alternatives to mitigate human rights impacts or actively invest in 
the development and adoption of safer alternatives and mitigation measures.197
A variety of substantive dimensions have emerged with regard to climate 
change. The 2012 IFC Standards foresee that ‘the commercial feasibility of the 
project is to be less of a consideration than the prevention of negative impacts of 
a project’.198 IFC Performance Standard 3 sets a threshold of emissions (25.000 
tonnes Co2 equivalent per year) above which clients are expected to quantify and 
monitor direct and indirect emissions annually, in accordance with internation-
ally recognized methodologies, such as those provided by the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).199 This builds on an innovation of the 2006 
revision,200 that responded to suggestions made by the IFC’s own Compliance, 
Advisor/ Ombudsman201 and international environmental non- governmental 
organizations (NGOs).202 In comparison, the OECD Guidelines mainly refer to 
climate change in more general terms, with regard to continually seeking to im-
prove corporate environmental performance, at the level of the enterprise and, 
where appropriate, of its supply chain, focusing on sustainable consumption 
rather than sustainable production. In effect, the OECD Guidelines encourage 
consumers’ reduction of GHG emissions, by expecting companies to provide ac-
curate information on their products.203 The OECD Guidelines further refer to 
climate change in encouraging disclosure or communication practices in ‘areas 
where reporting standards are still evolving’ such as GHG emissions.204 An 
approach based on best available technologies and precaution, in turn, can be 
found in the OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains 
with regard to GHG reduction,205 along with energy efficiency measures, en-
ergy conservation measures, and reduction in the size of packaging, or reusable 
or recyclable packaging, and the design of durable products.206 The section on 
climate change is also notable for building upon the sustainable consumption- 
related provisions in the OECD Guidelines chapter on the environment, by 
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recommending that companies increase customer awareness on behaviour that 
reduces emissions.207
2.3  Precaution
According to the Rio Declaration formulation, precaution implies that States 
should not use the lack of scientific certainty as a reason for postponing cost- 
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation, where there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage.208 While ‘there is no single formulation’ of 
the precautionary principle in international law with regard to the risk triggers 
and how early and how stringent measures should be taken, precaution is often 
understood as calling for a cost- benefit analysis and a provisional approach that 
is re- evaluated over time with a view to support learning.209 The importance of 
precaution for States’ due diligence with respect to the human- rights- and- the- 
environment nexus has also been underscored by the Inter- American Court of 
Human Rights.210 Several inter- governmental organizations and environmental 
NGOs211 have relied on the precautionary principle/ approach to define the con-
cept of corporate environmental accountability. Some of its implications for States, 
however, cannot be applied to the business sector. One case in point is the need for 
activities and substances that may be harmful to the environment to be regulated 
and possibly prohibited, even if no conclusive or overwhelming evidence is avail-
able as to the harm or likely harm to the environment.212 This has, nonetheless, had 
the ‘most profound effect’ on companies: arguably precaution has significantly al-
tered the processes by which new products and technologies are developed and ex-
ploited, and increasingly limited the admissibility of activities recognized as being 
potentially hazardous, as opposed to waiting until actual harm has occurred or is 
proved to be imminent.213
As opposed to applicable national legal requirements, a precautionary standard 
of corporate environmental accountability may require companies to act carefully 
and with foresight when taking decisions concerning activities that may have ad-
verse impacts on the environment.214 More specifically, it may prevent companies 
 207 Ibid. 171.
 208 Rio Declaration, Principle 15; Kiss and Shelton (n. 59) 206.
 209 J. Wiener, ‘Precautionary Principle’ in Krämer and Orlando (n. 53) 174, 177– 79 and 182.
 210 Inter- American Court of Human Rights, Medio Ambiente y Derechos Humanos, Oc- 23/ 17, 
Opinión Consultiva (15 November 2017) paras 180– 81.
 211 A. Khokhryakova, ‘Beanal v.  Freeport- Mcmoran, Inc.:  Liability of a Private Actor for an 
International Environmental Tort under the Alien Tort Claims Act’ (1998) 9 Colorado Journal of 
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from using a certain level of scientific certainty as an excuse for carrying out ac-
tivities potentially dangerous for the environment. In addition, this standard may 
imply a shift of the burden of proof, thus requiring that a company wishing to carry 
out an activity will have to prove that such activity will not cause harm to the en-
vironment.215 In all these instances, it will depend on a case- by- case determination 
of the cost- effective measures that a company can take, and the level of scientific 
uncertainty and of environmental threat or likely harm at stake.
A corporate environmental accountability standard based on precaution can 
be found in almost all recent international initiatives discussed in the previous 
chapter. The UN Global Compact’s216 Guide cautiously mentions that the precau-
tionary principle is accepted in the EU and forms ‘part of international environ-
mental law’.217 The inclusion of precaution in the UN Norms218 was considered 
an unprecedented step in human rights law.219 While precaution is also included 
in the OECD Guidelines, it is, however, conspicuously missing from the IFC 
Performance Standards, which is surprising considering the reliance by the IFC 
on the Convention of Biological Diversity and its extensive standards on sustain-
able use. In comparison, the CBD Addis Ababa Principles on Sustainable Use are 
based on precaution, aiming to avoid or minimize adverse impacts on ecosystem 
services, structures, and functions, as well as other components of ecosystems.220 
Nonetheless, ecosystem services are addressed in the IFC Performance Standards.
The Guide to the UN Global Compact translates the precautionary principle 
for businesses as the expectation that companies will take the most cost- effective, 
early action to prevent the occurrence of irreversible environmental damage, on 
the basis of the (self- )assessment of environmental impacts. The application of this 
standard is expected to result in companies investing in sustainable production 
methods and research, and developing environmentally- friendly products.221 In 
a different formulation, the OECD Guidelines intend to use the precautionary ap-
proach to prevent multinationals from delaying action to prevent or minimize ser-
ious environmental damage (also taking into account human health and safety) in 
the absence of full scientific certainty, as long as such action entails cost- effective 
measures and is consistent with the scientific and technical understanding of 
risks.222 Both refer to cost- effective measures, but the UN Global Compact links 
the standard to irreversible environmental damage, while the OECD Guidelines set 
 215 Ibid.
 216 The UN Global Compact, Principle 7.
 217 UN Guide to the Global Compact, 52.
 218 Ibid. Section G, para. 14.
 219 Simon Walker’s contribution in United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD), ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Development: Towards a New Agenda: Summaries of 
Presentations’ (Geneva, 17– 18 November 2003) 83.
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 221 UN Guide to the Global Compact, 54.
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International Standards on CEA 167
a lower threshold by referring to serious harm. Whereas the UN Global Compact 
emphasizes the role of private companies in taking action, the OECD Guidelines 
express in negative terms that companies should not delay precautionary action. 
Along similar lines, the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines provide that, where there is 
a threat of significant reduction or loss of biodiversity and particularly with re-
spect to mitigation measures associated with development, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or min-
imize such a threat.223
An important part of the Commentary to the OECD Guidelines is devoted 
to precaution, stressing that although several instruments already adopted by 
adhering countries enunciate a precautionary approach, including Rio Principle 
15, none of these instruments is explicitly addressed to enterprises but ‘business 
involvement is implicit in all of them’.224 Accordingly, the Guidelines do not in-
tend ‘to reinterpret any existing instruments or to create new commitments or pre-
cedents on the part of governments— they are intended only to recommend how 
the precautionary approach should be implemented at the level of enterprises’.225 
Companies should act affirmatively as soon as possible to avoid serious or irrevers-
ible environmental damage resulting from their activities. Recognizing the need 
for flexibility in its application, based on the specific context in which the approach 
is carried out, the Commentary also stresses that governments ‘determine the basic 
framework in this field, and have the responsibility to periodically consult with 
stakeholders on the most appropriate ways forward’.226
The OECD Guidelines have provided a forum for businesses and others to re-
flect on the challenges posed by precaution as a matter of corporate environmental 
accountability. In that context, companies underscored the challenge to apply a 
truly precautionary approach, when traditionally it is the role of regulators to apply 
precaution and interpret what constitutes acceptable risk, subject to a consultative 
process with the public.227 Because of the absence of a single, internationally ac-
cepted interpretation of the precautionary approach,228 participants considered it 
‘essential’ that countries institute and enforce appropriate laws that specify scien-
tific approaches and citizens’ risk tolerance, in order to guide multinationals’ op-
erations.229 This lack of clarity currently appears in many sector- specific standards 
for risk management in relation to chemicals, hazardous waste, air pollution, ozone 
depletion, climate change, and biodiversity.230 The OECD suggested that risk ana-
lysis relating to food safety and consumer protection, which has been operationally 
 223 Ibid. para. 61.
 224 Ibid. para. 37.
 225 Ibid. paras 37 and 39.
 226 Ibid.
 227 OECD, 2004 Roundtable Summary of Discussions (n 122) 9.
 228 Ibid.
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defined in international standards by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, is also 
relevant for environmental risk analysis.231 The 2011 version of the Guidelines’ 
Commentary thus goes to great lengths in confirming that ‘no existing instrument 
is completely adequate for expressing this recommendation’.232
Perhaps for the same reasons, the IFC Performance Standards fall short in 
aligning themselves with other international corporate environmental account-
ability standards as they do not mention explicitly, nor even imply, in any of its 
new standards, the precautionary approach. This is largely evident with reference 
to hazardous substances and chemicals management, invasive alien species,233 
and fishing activities, where international instruments consider this approach a 
cornerstone. While the 2006 version indicated that the assessment should be based 
on ‘current information’ and ‘appropriate baseline data’,234 the 2012 version makes 
reference to ‘recent environmental and social baseline data at an appropriate level 
of detail’, adding specific reference also to GHG emissions, risks associated with a 
changing climate and adaptation opportunities, and potential transboundary ef-
fects.235 Neither, however, mentioned the consequences of lack of scientific cer-
tainty about possible risks or impacts on the private company’s assessment of 
environmental risks and their management. Such a shortcoming was already high-
lighted by WWF, according to which IFC projects that have the potential for dis-
proportionate and irreversible impacts should not be funded, at least until more 
certainty about such impacts can be achieved,236 instead of privileging an approach 
based on mitigation.237
2.4 Disclosure of environmental information
Disclosure of environmental information is considered the basis of the private- 
sector cooperation with local and other authorities, particularly for compli-
ance with the prevention standard.238 As early as 1989, UN reports prioritized 
corporate environmental information disclosure as an ‘essential element for the 
 231 Ibid. 59.
 232 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, para. 69. This chimes with Sands et  al (n 
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implementation of sustainable development’.239 At the same time, commentators 
drew attention to the growing body of policy recommendations on transnational 
disclosure of information on hazardous products and processes.240 Several cases 
of environmental damage led to aggravated consequences because of the lack of 
timely disclosure of information to public authorities and affected communities.241 
For instance, in the case of the Bhopal disaster, the company did not send out an 
immediate alarm when the gas escaped, did not take any steps to communicate 
to public authorities or the local communities the consequences of exposure to 
leaked gas produced by the reaction, nor did they give information on the medical 
steps to be taken in the aftermath of the disaster.242 Also the consequences of the 
Seveso dioxin release were significantly worsened by the late disclosure of informa-
tion by the company.243
Against this background, activists and scholars have advocated that information 
held by private companies should be disclosed when a key public interest such as 
the environment is at risk.244 This is justified by practical reasons, namely it is ar-
gued that companies are well capable of providing timely response information, 
are likely to possess the most updated information on specific technologies, and 
are best placed to transmit such information between countries.245 It should also 
be noted that this standard is extremely dependent for its normative definition 
upon case- by- case application, requiring specification as to who should receive the 
information, the time of information disclosure, the kind of information expected, 
and the limitations to such standard.246
The fundamental character of the standard on disclosure of information for the 
concept of corporate environmental accountability was already evident in the 1990 
UN draft Code of Conduct.247 The UN Global Compact considers disclosure of 
information a necessary component of companies’ multi- stakeholder dialogue.248 
The UN Norms, the OECD Guidelines, and the IFC Performance Standards link 
 239 UNCTC, ‘Ongoing and Future Research: Transnational Corporations and Issues Relating to the 
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the environmental integration standard with disclosure of information.249 Beyond 
an overarching shared understanding of the importance of ensuring access to in-
formation, however, international standards vary in determining what kind of in-
formation should be provided to whom and in what ways.
2.4.1  Recipients of information
With regard to addressees, the UN Norms indicated that information should be 
provided not only to the government of the State in which activities are taking 
place, but also to the State of incorporation, to relevant international organiza-
tions, and to the public at large.250 According to the CBD Guidelines on Tourism 
Development, both the developer and the operator are required to notify desig-
nated government authorities of any failures to comply with conditions attached to 
an approval.251 In case of risk of transboundary environmental pollution or other 
catastrophic environmental harm, cooperation may extend to regional and inter-
national bodies.252 The OECD Guidelines, in contrast, only provide for limited co-
operation with national authorities in charge of environmental protection through 
the provisions of environmental information.253 These omissions may reflect the 
OECD’s view that the main driver for corporate environmental accountability is 
national legislation, usually motivated by major accidents,254 and that the existence 
of criminal or financial responsibility for non- compliance with environmental 
norms creates a disincentive for companies to find and report environmental prob-
lems on a voluntary and proactive basis.255
The IFC Standards underscore the private sector’s primary responsibility for 
disclosing information to the public.256 According to the CBD Guidelines on 
Tourism Development, both the developer and the operator are required to report 
periodically to designated authorities and to the public on compliance.257 In add-
ition, both the OECD Guidelines and the OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible 
Agricultural Supply Chains point to business responsibility to share information 
with ‘potentially affected communities’.258 The UN Special Rapporteur on Toxics 
indicated that companies are expected to communicate to the public relevant 
 249 Commentary to the UN Norms, (b) and (c); and IFC Performance Standard 1.
 250 UN Norms, Section G, Commentary, (b) and (c).
 251 CBD Biodiversity and Tourism Guidelines (n 50), para. 60.
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information about hazardous substances in their supply chains and products in 
a user- friendly format; and publish information in the languages of linguistic mi-
norities and indigenous peoples, paying special attention to providing information 
to those most at risk.259
The OECD Guidelines also provide insights into the links between providing 
information to consumers and the role for companies in sustainable consumption. 
The Guidelines call upon companies to promote higher levels of awareness among 
customers of the environmental implications of using the products and services 
of the enterprise, including by providing accurate information on their products 
(eg on GHG emissions, biodiversity, resource efficiency, or other environmental 
issues). This should be read in conjunction with the chapter on consumer protec-
tion, which calls for providing accurate, verifiable, and clear information that is 
sufficient to enable consumers to make informed decisions, including information 
on the prices and, where appropriate, content, safe use, environmental attributes, 
maintenance, storage, and disposal of goods and services. Where feasible this in-
formation should be provided in a manner that facilitates consumers’ ability to 
compare products.260 The Guidelines further call upon companies to support ef-
forts to promote consumer education in areas that relate to their business activities, 
with the aim of, inter alia, improving consumers’ ability to better understand the 
environmental impact of their decisions,261 for example on the basis of informa-
tion on the energy efficiency and the degree of recyclability of products and, in the 
case of food products, information on agricultural practices.262
2.4.2  Types of information
With regard to the kind of information to be shared, the draft UN Code of Conduct 
emphasized the need for multinational companies to supply host countries’ com-
petent authorities with all relevant information concerning products, processes, 
and services, including:  their characteristics, other activities including experi-
mental uses and related aspects which may harm the environment, the measures 
and costs necessary to avoid or at least to mitigate their harmful effects; as well 
as prohibitions, restrictions, warnings, and other public regulatory measures im-
posed in other countries on grounds of protection of the environment on these 
products, processes, and services.263 The detailed list of required information was 
 259 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally 
sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes, Başkut Tuncak (2015) UN Doc. 
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 260 OECD Guidelines, VIII.2.
 261 Ibid. VIII.5.
 262 Ibid. para. 85. International standards specifically related to the agri- business sector are discussed 
in more detail at Section 3.6 in Ch 5.
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considered to be one of the main contributions of the draft Code to the definition 
of corporate environmental accountability.264
The OECD Guidelines include a generic expectation for multinationals’ dis-
closure policies to include foreseeable risk factors,265 which arguably include en-
vironmental risks. In addition, companies are expected to disclose ‘policies and 
other codes of conduct to which they subscribe, as well as their performance in 
relation to these statements and codes’,266 which implies environmental commit-
ments. According to the Commentary, this should be seen as ‘a second set of dis-
closure or communication practices in areas where reporting standards are still 
evolving’, as opposed to more standard corporate governance transparency stand-
ards. The evolving standards that relate to the environment include ‘greenhouse 
gas emissions, as the scope of their monitoring is expanding to cover direct and 
indirect, current and future, corporate and product emissions’ or biodiversity.267 In 
addition, enterprises are explicitly encouraged to apply high- quality standards for 
non- financial information, including environmental reporting where such stand-
ards exist.268 An annual audit should be conducted by an independent, compe-
tent, and qualified auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance 
to the board and shareholders that the financial statements fairly represent the fi-
nancial position and performance of the enterprise in all material respects.269 The 
Commentary to the Guidelines further notes that non- financial information ‘may 
pertain to entities that extend beyond those covered in the enterprise’s financial ac-
counts’, such as subcontractors, suppliers, or joint venture partners, which may be 
particularly appropriate to monitor the transfer of environmentally harmful activ-
ities to partners.270 The OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply 
Chains specifically refers to timely and accurate information related to foreseeable 
risk factors and response to particular environmental, social, and human rights 
impacts to potentially affected communities, at all stages of the investment cycle, as 
well as the provision of accurate, verifiable, and clear information that is sufficient 
to enable consumers to make informed decisions.271
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The IFC had received a plethora of critiques about vague information disclosure 
requirements, which were depending on the extent of the potential environmental 
and social impacts, at an ‘appropriate’ stage. As a result, disclosure practices varied 
widely among projects, resulting in difficult access to project information, in-
sufficient details in available environmental information, and the inappropriate 
extension of business confidentiality concerns to the social and environmental di-
mensions of the project.272 In response, the 2006 Standard marked a step forward 
in requiring: disclosure of key information at the beginning of the project; inclu-
sion of the action plan among the documents to be made accessible to the public; 
and ensuring that such disclosure continues beyond the planning stage, in order to 
address the whole implementation of the action plan and issues raised by affected 
communities during the whole project life- cycle. Strengthening the links with con-
sultation, the 2012 version added to the list of information to be disclosed risks and 
potential impacts on communities and relevant elements of the management pro-
gramme, and the envisaged stakeholder engagement process.273 The IFC does not 
go as far as setting indicative timelines for disclosure of information.274
CBD decisions and international human rights guidance have provided de-
tailed guidance in some areas. According to the CBD Guidelines on Tourism 
Development, for instance, periodic reports should be provided on compliance 
with conditions set out in approvals, and on the conditions of biodiversity and the 
environment in relation to tourism facilities and activities for which they are re-
sponsible, such as ensuring respect for endangered species, prevention of intro-
duction of alien species, and access to genetic resources.275 With particular regard 
to risks concerning the human rights of the child, the Special Rapporteur on Toxics 
called upon companies to generate and disclose information related to the risks of 
exposure and on the intrinsic hazards of industrial substances, pesticides, and food 
additives that they manufacture and sell. Businesses are thus expected to commu-
nicate publicly and objectively measures taken to mitigate potential childhood ex-
posures; and ensure that health and safety information about the potential hazards 
of industrial chemicals and pesticides to children is made accessible to regulators 
and businesses down the supply or value chain.276
2.4.3  Degree of disclosure
Most international standards do not address in detail the question of the degree 
of disclosure of information. In the specific sector of toxic substances, however, 
where ‘virtually every industry and business sector is linked to the production, 
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use, release or disposal of hazardous substances and wastes up and down the value 
chain’,277 the UN Special Rapporteur on Toxics recommended that businesses be 
guided by the principle of full disclosure. He thus considered companies to be al-
lowed secrecy only when the necessity and legitimacy of confidentiality are proved, 
upon exhaustively listing information or types of information that is not publicly 
accessible but provided to governments, including the reason for non- disclosure. 
In addition, the Special Rapporteur called on companies to recognize the right of 
access to information and avoid using the privilege of confidential business infor-
mation to shield health and safety information on the hazardous substances used 
and produced, and to which humans and wildlife may be exposed, such as chem-
icals dispersants and hydro- fracking solutions.278
With regard to business responsibility to respect indigenous peoples’ human 
rights,279 the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights indicated that 
due diligence implies that companies facilitate indigenous peoples’ full access to 
information about potential financial benefits, including when this information 
is considered proprietary (in which case, it should be shared on a confidential 
basis).280
2.5 Consultation with potentially affected communities
Both in relation to the (self- )assessments of environmental impacts and environ-
mental management systems, all the international standards discussed in the pre-
vious chapter refer to the need for the private sector to facilitate participation of 
potentially affected communities in companies’ decision- making processes. This is 
a specification, with a narrower scope, of the general principle of public participa-
tion in decision- making that can be found in the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development.281 Expectations around communities’ involvement by the pri-
vate sector have become clearer as the inter- linkages between environment and 
human rights have emphasized cases where expected or likely environmental 
impacts may also negatively affect the enjoyment of local communities’ and in-
digenous peoples’ rights to their traditional lifestyle, cultural practices, lands, and 
natural resources.282 The question of effective and genuine participation, where 
communities can have some influence on the outcome, is tightly linked to prior 
access to sufficient and comprehensible information discussed above and access 
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to grievance mechanisms discussed in Section 2.6. Benefits arising to companies 
from community involvement are generally identified as enhanced quality of prior 
assessments, higher- quality information feeding into better decision- making, and 
solutions to mitigation and contingency planning that are more appropriate to 
local circumstances.
The UN Global Compact invites companies more generally to hold multi- 
stakeholder dialogues, without providing further specifications.283 The Global 
Compact’s framework on biodiversity and ecosystem services, however, introduces 
the concept of ecosystem linkages at the landscape level, to support integrated plan-
ning along the value chain. This serves to emphasize the need for companies to re-
spect land and land- use rights of local stakeholders, safeguard livelihoods of local 
communities that are natural resource- dependent, and involve them in decision- 
making, in order to advance common goals and ensure that environmental as well 
as social needs are met.284
Carefully avoiding human rights language, the 2011 review of the OECD 
Guidelines stressed stakeholder engagement as an interactive and two- way 
process based on good faith for the planning and decision- making concerning 
projects or activities ‘that may significantly impact local communities’, such 
as those involving the intensive use of land and water, as well as disclosure 
of climate change and biodiversity- specific information.285 These recent revi-
sions, however, have been criticized by civil society for their lack of explicit 
reference to free prior informed consent in the consultations with indigenous 
peoples.286 The OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply 
Chains, in contrast, referred not only to good faith, but also effective and 
meaningful, consultations with communities through their own representative 
institutions before initiating any operations, as well as during and at the end of 
operations.287
With regard to the International Finance Corporation, a significant evolu-
tion has taken place along the various reviews of the standards in this connec-
tion. The 1998 safeguard policies mentioned exclusively indigenous peoples. 
The successive version referred to affected communities,288 thereby including 
local communities that are not recognized or do not self- identify as indigenous, 
 283 Guide to the UN Global Compact, 58. See Ch. 5.
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but exclusively with respect to potential risks that could severely affect their 
health.289 The 2012 version, instead, calls upon clients to identify individuals 
and groups that may be ‘directly and differently or disproportionately affected 
by their project because of their disadvantaged or vulnerable status’, including 
because of their ‘dependence on unique natural resources’.290 It substituted 
the term ‘stakeholder engagement’ with ‘community engagement’ with a view 
to broadening the constituencies to be engaged, although the language on the 
scope and purpose of the engagement is similar and it ‘remains unclear who is 
meant to determine the scope of engagement that is initially required’.291 There 
is in effect no mention of human rights holders.292 In addition, the most re-
cent version of the IFC Performance Standards indicates that companies are to 
‘consider’ involving representatives of affected communities in monitoring the 
effectiveness of their environmental management programs only ‘where appro-
priate’,293 thus leaving a considerable margin of discretion to individual busi-
ness entities. This is coupled with the creation of an ‘external communications 
system’ that will allow IFC clients to screen, assess, and reply to communica-
tions from stakeholders with a view to continually improving their management 
system. The system is in turn subject to the requirement for a ‘stakeholder en-
gagement framework’ where the exact location of the project is unknown but 
the project is nonetheless reasonably expected to have significant impacts on 
local communities. More detailed indications regarding dissemination of in-
formation are provided when communities may be affected by risks of adverse 
impacts of the project, with the significant specification that when stakeholder 
consultations are the responsibility of the host government, the company is ex-
pected to conduct a complementary process if the government- led engagement 
does not meet the IFC Performance Standards.294 While the general standards 
on consultation remain quite different in their detail, more coherent, higher 
standards of due diligence apply to indigenous peoples, as will be discussed in 
the next chapter.295
 289 In a case of water contamination with gold mine waste. See S. Langdon, Peru’s Yanacocha Gold 
Mine: The IFC’s Midas Touch? (September 2000) <http:// www.ciel.org/ Ifi/ ifccaseperu.html>.
 290 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 12 and fn. 18.
 291 D. Bradlow and M. Chapman, ‘Public Participation and the Private Sector: The Role of Multilateral 
Development Banks and the Evolving Legal Standards’ (2011) 4 Erasmus Law Review 91, 98.
 292 Including with regard to non- indigenous local/ traditional communities: Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights and the Environment John Knox: Framework Principles on 
Human Rights and the Environment (2018) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 37/ 59, paras 9 and 47– 48; and E. Morgera, 
‘A reflection on benefit- sharing as a Framework Principle on Human Rights and the Environment pro-
posed by UN Special Rapporteur John Knox (Part II: Right- holders and duty- bearers)’ BENELEX Blog 
post (April 2018), https:// benelexblog.wordpress.com/ .
 293 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, ‘Assessment and Management of Social and Environmental 
Risks and Impacts’, para. 21.
 294 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, paras 26, 30– 31, and 38.
 295 Ch. 5, Section 1.
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2.6  Grievance
As discussed in the previous chapter, the UN Framework on Business and Human 
Rights addresses private companies in its third pillar on access to remedies, noting 
the need for companies to set up a grievance mechanism. More specifically, ac-
cording to the UN Guiding Principles, enterprises ‘should establish or participate 
in . . .  legitimate, transparent, predictable, equitable, and right- compatible griev-
ance mechanisms’ that are directly accessible to individuals and communities 
that may directly be affected by their business operations, with a view to both sup-
porting the identification of adverse impacts and systematic problems, and rem-
edying adverse impacts.296
A project- level grievance mechanism can support both risk mitigation 
as part of the (self)- assessment of environmental impacts, and as a system to 
monitor implementation and effectiveness on the basis of information dis-
closure and stakeholder consultation, thereby also supporting the continuous 
improvement efforts of the company.297 A grievance mechanism can provide 
the company with access to additional information about the project’s external 
environment that can serve to identify and address shortcomings in its environ-
mental management systems.298 Company grievance systems also benefit from 
the results of impact self- assessment, as the outcomes can help to determine the 
likely complexity of future grievances and consequently the nature and amount 
of resources needed for implementation, including a variety of third parties, 
given the complexity of environmental impacts.299 Company- level grievance 
mechanisms can also serve to identify complexities around the State respon-
sibility to respect human rights and protect the environment, and business 
responsibility.300
The OECD Guidelines inserted reference to grievance mechanisms as part 
of their new section on human rights due diligence in 2011. Instead of right- 
compatible grievance, they refer, however, to ‘compatibility with the Guidelines’.301 
They stress that company- level grievance mechanisms ‘are based on dialogue and 
engagement with a view to seeking agreed solutions’, could be administered by an 
enterprise in collaboration with other stakeholders, and can support continuous 
learning. They add that not only should these mechanisms not preclude access to 
 296 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, paras 29 and 31.
 297 IFC, Addressing Grievances from Project- Affected Communities: Good Practice Note (2009), 
also on the Global Compact website at: https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/ library/ 38.
 298 Ibid. 6.
 299 Ibid. 7.
 300 Ibid. 21.
 301 2011 OECD Guidelines, Commentary, para. 46.
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judicial or non- judicial grievance mechanisms, but they also should not preclude 
access to the National Contact Points.302
The IFC Standards have undergone a significant evolution along the various re-
views of the standards in this connection. The 1998 safeguard policies only pro-
vided that the private company should engage affected people in dialogue and 
take their concerns into account during the project preparation and implemen-
tation,303 which, according to commentators, led to environmentally catastrophic 
projects.304 The 2006 version, instead, contained the expectation that companies 
would respond to communities’ concerns, and establish a grievance mechanism to 
receive and facilitate resolution of communities’ complaints on its environmental 
performance. With quite some detail, the standard required that the mechanism be 
understandable, transparent, culturally appropriate, readily accessible, and free of 
charge. The 2012 version also added that it should ‘not impede access to judicial or 
administrative remedies’.305
While none of the international standards discussed in the previous chapter 
make an explicit connection between grievance mechanisms, human rights, and 
the environment, this can be considered implicit.306 Even when environmental 
grievances do not specifically mention human rights, they may nonetheless raise 
human rights implications, such as negative impacts on the human right to health 
or food.307 Accordingly, information and independent expertise in human rights 
and the environment should be ensured in the context of grievance mechanisms, 
including from academic institutions (or professional associations) and inter-
national/ regional organizations with a local presence.308 Finally, it should be noted 
that CBD sources tend not to address this issue. The exception is the Akwé: Kon 
Guidelines on socio- cultural and environmental impact assessments, which call 
upon development proponents to establish a review and appeal process, in which 
parties should ensure the full participation of affected indigenous peoples and 
local communities.309
 302 Ibid.
 303 C. Lee, ‘International Finance Corporation: Financing Environmentally and Socially Sustainable 
Private Investment’ in S. Schlemmer- Schulte and K. Tung (eds), Liber Amicorum Ibrahim F.I. Shihata 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 469, 473.
 304 I. Bowles, A. Rosenfels, C. Kormos, C. Reining, J. Nations, and T. Ankersen, ‘The 
Environmental Impact of the International Finance Corporation Lending and Proposals for 
Reform: A Case Study of Conservation and Oil Development in the Guatemalan Petén’ (1999) 29 
Environmental Law 103.
 305 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 1, para. 23; IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 35.
 306 UN Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment (n. 292) paras 22 and 35.
 307 Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Rights- 
compatible Grievance Mechanisms: A Guidance Tool for Companies and their Stakeholders, 2008, on 
the UN Global Compact website: https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/ library/ 57, 7.
 308 Ibid. 17.
 309 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n 48), para. 22.
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3 Preliminary conclusions
International standard- setting initiatives on corporate environmental account-
ability have been increasingly characterized by a significant degree of normative 
convergence.310 This is a trend that has accelerated and became more explicit since 
the early 2010s, and that can be ascribed to the increasingly clear interface between 
international biodiversity law and international human rights.
Environmental integration for companies is consistently translated as impact 
assessment and environmental management systems. In contrast to national laws, 
the former is not triggered by a particular threshold of risk, so companies are ex-
pected as a matter of practice to assess environmental impacts in all their activities 
on an ongoing basis, including when those are not required by national legisla-
tion (self- assessments). This also serves to emphasize higher expectations on how 
business entities carry out assessments required by national legislation. That said, 
divergences remains with regard to the need to address cumulative impacts (al-
though some progress can be noted in that connection with regard to the attention 
paid to supply chains and areas of influence). In addition, the identification of alter-
natives for proposed projects, including a no- project alternative, remains unclear 
in international standards of corporate environmental accountability. Standards 
based on prevention are also common, but the difference lies in the details, with 
the OECD focusing on contingency planning for emergency management and the 
IFC taking a broader approach to mitigation hierarchy, which also includes off- 
setting. Corporate environmental accountability standards based on precaution 
are present in all instruments discussed in the previous chapter, with the excep-
tion of the IFC. Both the UN Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines refer to 
cost- effective measures, but the Global Compact links the standard to irreversible 
environmental damage, while the OECD Guidelines set a lower threshold by refer-
ring to serious harm. Along similar lines, corporate environmental accountability 
standards based on access to information are widespread, but they vary in deter-
mining what kind of information should be provided to whom and in what ways. 
Useful clarifications have been provided by the UN Special Rapporteur on Toxics, 
who has also emphasized the need for business due diligence to integrate specific 
concerns for vulnerable groups, notably children. Corporate environmental ac-
countability standards focused on consultation and grievance mechanisms are also 
common, and tend to avoid explicit reference to human rights, even if they have 
been introduced or reinforced on the basis of the UN Framework and Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights.
 310 E Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’ in P.- M. Dupuy 
and J. Viñuales (eds), Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection: Incentives 
and Safeguards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 321.
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On the whole, while there is a significant degree of convergence among all stand-
ards of corporate environmental accountability, remaining divergence points to 
particularly controversial concepts in international law, such as precaution or the 
justiciability of environmental human rights. In addition, substantive dimensions 
of these international standards have started to emerge for some international cor-
porate environmental accountability standards and have quickly reached a signifi-
cant level of detail.311 In the context of environmental management systems, for 
instance, more substantive standards have emerged with regard to freshwater and 
climate change targets. The international standard on prevention has particularly 
lent itself to developing substantive dimensions in relation to freshwater, chem-
icals, waste, and climate change. This confirms the recommendation by former UN 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, John Knox, that more 
work is necessary to clarify the responsibilities of businesses in relation to human 
rights and the environment, including how the nexus between human rights and 
the environment relates to gender and other types of discrimination.312 In ef-
fect, as also exemplified by the normative work of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Toxics, international standards on business due diligence need to further develop 
in order to take into account specific groups of right- holders, such as children. As 
will be discussed in the next chapter, progress has been made specifically with re-
gard to indigenous peoples in this connection. In addition, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 6, means of monitoring and implementation of international standards on 
corporate environmental accountability and responsibility have served to ensure 
coherence among these standards and fill gaps in specific cases.
 311 Contra S. Deva, ‘UN’s Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?’ (2004) 10 ILSA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 493, 509, where the author argues that international standards are ‘generally so vague 
and general that it is quite easy to comply with their words without adhering to their spirit’.
 312 UN Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment (n. 292) para. 18.
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Environmental Responsibility
Substantive human rights law obligations serve to clarify the limits of State discre-
tion in pursuing the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).1 
At the domestic level, in authorizing any activity, either biodiversity conservation 
or use, CBD Parties are to ensure that no unjustified, foreseeable infringements of 
human rights may arise from the decision.2 This also implies States’ obligation to 
prevent business entities from violating these rights.3 In other words, implementing 
the CBD obligations in a mutually supportive way with international human rights 
law entails that States must develop laws and institutions that effectively ‘regu-
late harm to biodiversity from private actors’ in a way that is ‘non- retrogressive 
and non- discriminatory’.4 These clarifications of the relationship between inter-
national biodiversity law and international human rights law are quite recent5 and 
provide a basis to better understand the emergence of substantive international 
standards of corporate environmental responsibility in relation to indigenous peo-
ples’ rights to territories, land, and natural resources. They also serve to understand 
the emergence of substantive standards on protected areas and the sustainable use 
of natural resources.
1 Indigenous peoples and local communities
Through successive decisions, CBD Parties have made significant conceptual and 
normative contributions to clarify the content of business due diligence to respect 
 1 E. Morgera, ‘Under the Radar:  Fair and Equitable Benefit- sharing and the Human Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities connected to Natural Resources’ (2019) 23 International 
Journal of Human Rights 1098. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, 
in force 29 December 1993).
 2 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment: Biodiversity, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 34/ 
49 (19 January 2017) para. 34.
 3 Ibid. paras 33– 34.
 4 Ibid. para. 69.
 5 E. Morgera, ‘Dawn of a New Day? The Evolving Relationship between the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and International Human Rights Law’ (2018) 54 Wake Forest Law Review 101.
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the human rights6 of indigenous peoples’ rights to natural resources but also for 
other local communities in the context of the ecosystem approach.7 These contri-
butions have been recognized by some of the international standard- setting initia-
tives on corporate accountability discussed in Chapter 3, notably the UN Norms, 
the IFC Performance Standards, and the activity of UN Special Rapporteurs. 
These developments, however, may be surprising as the Convention is not seen 
as a forward- looking treaty from a human rights standpoint. Its text does not in-
clude the word ‘right’.8 Both the Convention and decisions of the CBD Conference 
of Parties (COP) until 2014 have referred to ‘indigenous and local communities’, 
because State Parties could not find consensus on utilizing the more human rights- 
cognizant expression ‘indigenous peoples’.9 It was only in 2014 that the CBD COP 
decided to change the terminology, with Parties going to great lengths to indicate 
that the reference to ‘indigenous peoples and local communities’ in future CBD 
COP decisions had no implication from the perspective of treaty interpretation 
(either as subsequent agreement or subsequent practice),10 with a view to pre- 
empting limitations to States’ discretion in developing national legislation.11
There is indeed some scope for concern about the position of certain CBD 
Parties vis- à- vis human rights:12 the CBD has provided a forum in which States’ 
 6 This was also expanded upon in E. Morgera, ‘Benefit- Sharing as a Bridge between Human Rights 
and the Environment and Human Rights Accountability of Multinational Corporations’ in B. Boer 
(ed.), Environmental Law Dimensions of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 37; E. 
Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’ in P.- M. Dupuy and 
J. Viñuales (eds), Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection: Incentives and 
Safeguards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 321.
 7 Principles of the Ecosystem approach, in Ecosystem approach (CBD Decision V/ 6, 22 June 
2000), Annex B and Refinement and Elaboration of the Ecosystem Approach, Based on Assessment 
of Experience of Parties in Implementation, in Ecosystem approach (CBD Decision VII/ 11, 13 April 
2004) Annex I.
 8 P. Birnie, A. Boyle, and C. Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 3rd edn 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 627.
 9 Notwithstanding repeated recommendations to do so from the UN Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues: see, eg, Report of the Tenth Session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
(UNPFII), (2011) UN Doc. E/ 2011/ 43- E/ C.19/ 2011/ 14, paras 26– 27.
 10 COP CBD Dec. XII/ 12 (2014), F, para. 2(c) (with reference to Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties (Vienna, 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980)  (VCLT) Art. 31(3)(a) and (b)  or special 
meaning as provided for in VCLT Art. 31(4)). This is without prejudice to the interpretation or applica-
tion of the Convention in accordance with VCLT Art. 31(3)(c).
 11 This has been clarified in a footnote (fn. 2)  to a successive CBD decision, namely The Mo’ otz 
Kuxtal Voluntary Guidelines for the development of mechanisms, legislation, or other appropriate ini-
tiatives to ensure the ‘prior and informed consent’, ‘free, prior and informed consent’, or ‘approval and 
involvement’, depending on national circumstances, of indigenous peoples and local communities for 
accessing their knowledge, innovations, and practices, for fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising 
from the use of their knowledge, innovations, and practices relevant for the conservation and sustain-
able use of biological diversity, and for reporting and preventing unlawful appropriation of traditional 
knowledge: CBD Dec. XIII/ 18 (2016).
 12 For instance, the more significant CBD provision from a human rights perspective (Art. 8(j) on 
traditional knowledge) is heavily qualified, notably by a clause ‘subjecting’ it to ‘national law’. Subjecting 
compliance with international law as expressed in the CBD to national law was considered unusual at 
the time of the Convention’s adoption but the terminology has shifted over time in the development of 
soft law under the CBD. This type of reference to national law seems to point to the negotiators’ inten-
tion to preserve the legal relationship between a State and the indigenous peoples within its territory 
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reticence on certain human rights questions has emerged.13 Negotiations under 
the CBD, for instance, highlighted continued opposition to the right to ‘prior 
informed consent’ of indigenous peoples14 and tepid language merely ‘noting’15 
the relevance of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,16 not-
withstanding its intervening universal endorsement.17 And yet, even in the face 
of continued reluctance by some CBD Parties to use explicit human rights lan-
guage,18 international human rights bodies have recognized that the CBD COP 
normative activity has contributed to clarify the application of indigenous peo-
ples’ human rights in the context of the technicalities of environmental decision- 
making and management processes, including for the purposes of business due 
diligence.19
The most notable case is represented by the CBD Akwé:  Kon Guidelines on 
socio- cultural and environmental impact assessments (EIAs) for developments in 
sacred sites and on lands and waters traditionally occupied or used by indigenous 
peoples and local communities.20 These guidelines have been used more and more 
often in different contexts to assess whether private companies’ conduct is accept-
able in light of international human rights standards. CBD Parties themselves have 
encouraged business entities to monitor and assess impacts on biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, to develop and apply processes and production methods that 
based on pre- existing, but possibly also future, national law. L. Glowka et al., A Guide to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (Gland: IUCN, 1994) 48– 49.
 13 Indigenous peoples’ representatives and the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights, lamented that negotiations of a new legally binding protocol under the CBD did not suffi-
ciently respect indigenous peoples’ rights: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples to the General Assembly, (2012) UN Doc. A/ 67/ 301, para. 58.
 14 Resulting in the adoption of the ambiguous expression ‘prior informed consent or approval and 
involvement’ in Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya, 29 October 
2010, in force 12 October 2014) Art. 7. Note that the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues noted 
that the term ‘consultation’ cannot replace or undermine the right of indigenous peoples to prior in-
formed consent: UNPFII (n. 9) para. 36
 15 Nagoya Protocol, preambular recital 26.
 16 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN General Assembly Resolution 61/ 295, 
13 September 2007).
 17 The adoption of the Declaration by the General Assembly was initially opposed by Australia, 
Canada, the US, and New Zealand. All these countries reversed their position by 2010 (See UN Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, press release ‘Indigenous rights declaration endorsed by 
States’ (23 December 2010) at http:// www.ohchr.org/ EN/ NewsEvents/ Pages/ Indigenousrightsdeclarati
onendorsed.aspx.
 18 E. Morgera, ‘Against All Odds:  The Contribution of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
to International Human Rights Law’ in D. Alland et  al. (eds), Unity and Diversity of International 
Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Pierre- Marie Dupuy (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014) 
983, 983.
 19 See generally Morgera (n. 1).
 20 CBD Decision VII/ 16F, ‘Akwé:  Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place on, or 
which are Likely to Impact on, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by 
Indigenous and Local Communities, in Article 8(j) and related provisions’ (2004).
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minimize or avoid negative impacts on biodiversity, and ‘take into account, as ap-
propriate, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines’.21
The work of the former UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 
James Anaya, on extractive industries is particularly illuminating in this respect:22 
Anaya emphasized that social and environmental impact studies should be con-
ducted according to the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines.23 Anaya also devoted signifi-
cant attention to fair and equitable benefit- sharing— an international legal concept 
that has been subject to significant development under the CBD.24 Similarly, the 
UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in 2010, stressed the 
link between prior informed consent, benefit- sharing, and mitigation measures in 
the context of large- scale natural resource extraction on indigenous peoples’ ter-
ritories or the creation of national parks, and forest and game reserves,25 referring 
to the CBD work programme on protected areas as a helpful reference for the pur-
poses of business due diligence.26 In turn, the International Finance Corporation’s 
2012 Performance Sustainability Standards relied on the CBD and the legal concept 
of benefit- sharing, as a key link between free prior informed consent and due dili-
gence.27 The normative work under the CBD has further been drawn upon by the 
implementation procedure of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
including to complement and operationalize the UN Framework on Business and 
Human Rights.28
As a result, international legal materials consistently pointed to the applic-
ability of environmental impact (self- )assessment, free prior informed consent 
(FPIC), and fair and equitable benefit- sharing to business enterprises in the nat-
ural resource sector,29 albeit to different extents.30 These specialized standards 
are intertwined with the substantive human rights of indigenous peoples.31 Prior 
to applying these standards, Anaya recommended that companies identify, fully 
 21 CBD Decision X/ 21, ‘Business Engagement’ (2010) para. 2(b)– (c).
 22 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
Indigenous People, James Anaya (2009) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 12/ 34, Section E.
 23 Ibid. paras 73– 74.
 24 E. Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit- Sharing’ 
(2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 353.
 25 UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Follow- up Report on Indigenous 
Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision- making with a Focus on Extractive Industries (2012) 
UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 21/ 52, para. 37.
 26 The CBD work programme on protected areas (CBD Decision VII/ 28 (2004), Annex) was referred 
to by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Progress Report on the Study on 
Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision- making (2010) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 15/ 35, 
para. 37.
 27 Ch. 3, Section 6.2.
 28 Ch. 6, Section 2.3. OECD, Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises (Paris:  OECD Publishing, 
2011), introduced in Ch. 3, Section 5 of this book.
 29 Morgera (n. 1) 1120– 23.
 30 S. Seck, ‘Indigenous Rights, Environmental Rights, or Stakeholder Engagement? Comparing IFC 
and OECD Approaches to the Implementation of the Business Responsibility to Respect Human Rights’ 
(2016) 12 McGill Journal of International Sustainable Development Law and Practice 57.
 31 Eg IFC 2012 Performance Standard 7: Guidance Note, 9.24; Morgera (n. 1) fn. 201.
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incorporate, and make operative the norms concerning the rights of indigenous 
peoples within every aspect of the work carried out within or in close proximity 
to indigenous lands. In this connection, assessments are also expected to take into 
account indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ rights over lands and waters 
traditionally occupied or used by them and associated biodiversity.32 As part of 
their due diligence, companies should avoid endorsing or contributing to any act 
or omission on the part of the State amounting to a failure to adequately consult 
with the affected indigenous community before proceeding with a project.33 For 
their part, States still have to comply with their international human rights obli-
gations when delegating to companies the execution of impact assessments and 
FPIC processes, considering the power imbalances and indigenous peoples’ lack of 
access to technical information about proposed projects.34
Different international standards, however, have not all referred to all the trig-
gers for applying specialized standards to business due diligence. Former UN 
Special Rapporteur Knox identified as triggers, first, the use of indigenous peo-
ples’ and traditional communities’ traditional knowledge; and second, the extrac-
tion or other activities (including conservation) in relation to territories, lands, or 
resources (including genetic resources) that are traditionally owned, occupied, 
or used by indigenous peoples and traditional communities. The latter includes 
lands to which they have had access for their subsistence and traditional activ-
ities, and may not have formal recognition of property rights or delimitation and 
demarcation of boundaries.35 Along similar lines, the OECD- FAO Guidance for 
Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains refers to operations involving indigenous 
peoples’ lands, resources, and knowledge.36 The IFC 2012 Standards identify as 
triggers: potential relocation of indigenous peoples, impacts on lands and natural 
resources subject to traditional ownership or under customary use, and projects 
proposing to use cultural resources for commercial purposes.37 These are only 
partly overlapping with those identified by Knox, because the reference to trad-
itional knowledge is limited to commercial use.38 And while the IFC Standards 
make explicit reference to relocation in line with the UN Declaration on the Rights 
 32 CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), para. 57.
 33 Report of the Special Rapporteur Anaya A/ HRC/ 12/ 34 (n. 22) Section E.
 34 Seck (n. 30) 392.
 35 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights and the Environment John 
Knox: Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment (2018) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 37/ 59, 
paras 53 and 48. See comments in E. Morgera, ‘A reflection on benefit- sharing as a Framework Principle 
on Human Rights and the Environment proposed by UN Special Rapporteur John Knox (Part I)’ 
BENELEX Blog post (April 2018), https:// benelexblog.wordpress.com/ .
 36 OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains (Paris: OECD, 2016) para. 53 
and fnn. 19– 21 referring to CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), para. 46 and IFC Performance Standard 
7, paras 18– 20.
 37 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 35.
 38 Nagoya Protocol, Art. 8(a); E. Morgera, E. Tsioumani, and M. Buck, Unraveling the Nagoya 
Protocol: Commentary on the Protocol on Access and Benefit- Sharing to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2014) 179– 84.
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of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),39 they have not included projects adjacent to 
indigenous peoples’ lands and when waste or hazardous materials are stored in 
their lands, which UNDRIP also singles out.40 The IFC Standards further empha-
size that FPIC and benefit- sharing are envisaged where the business entity ‘intends 
to utilise natural resources that are central to the identity and livelihoods of indi-
genous peoples and their use exacerbates livelihood risk’.41 This should be under-
stood in line with the concept of physical and cultural survival discussed by the 
Inter- American Court of Human Rights:42 either proposed development projects 
or conservation initiatives concern natural resources that are traditionally used by 
indigenous and tribal peoples; or the extraction of natural resources (notably min-
erals) that are not traditionally used by indigenous peoples is likely to affect other 
natural resources that are.43 This is in line with ILO monitoring bodies’ view that 
not only projects implemented in traditional lands, but also those having an im-
pact on communities’ life require a heightened level of protection.44 The African 
Commission, in turn, underscored the need to protect natural resources found on 
or under indigenous land, rather than only those resources the extraction of which 
may have a negative impact on the group indirectly.45 As coherent international 
guidance from a human rights perspective would be helpful to feed into the devel-
opment of corporate responsibility standards, it has been underlined with concern 
that the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights did not mention any 
cases in which international law required FPIC.46
It should also be preliminarily noted that while most attention in the following 
section will be concentrated on indigenous peoples, these triggers can apply also to 
a category of less clear status in international human rights law— local/ traditional 
communities.47 This term could apply to a variety of groups benefiting from the 
 39 UNGA Res. 61/ 295 (13 September 2007).
 40 P. Simons and A. Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human Rights and the Home 
State Advantage (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) 135 based on Amnesty International, ‘Public Statement 
a Missed Opportunity to Better Protect the Rights of those Affected by Business related Human Rights 
Abuses’ (2011).
 41 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 18.
 42 Inter- American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Saramaka People v.  Suriname, Judgment 
(Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), 12 August 
2008, paras 122– 23; P. Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights 352 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2002) 282.
 43 Saramaka (Merits) paras 155– 58.
 44 S. Errico, ‘The Controversial Issue of Natural Resources:  Balancing States’ Sovereignty with 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights’ in S. Allen and A. Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 348.
 45 G. Pentassuglia, ‘Indigenous Groups and the Developing Jurisprudence of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Some Reflections’ (2010) 3 UCL Human Rights Review 150, 160.
 46 C. Rodríguez- Garavito, ‘Business and Human Rights:  Beyond the End of the Beginning’ 
in C. Rodríguez- Garavito (ed.), Business and Human Rights:  Beyond the End of the Beginning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 11, 20.
 47 Eg Special Rapporteur De Schutter, Interim Report (2012) UN Doc. A/ 67/ 268, para. 39; ECOWAS, 
Directive on the Harmonization of Guiding Principles and Policies in the mining Sector (2009); UN- 
REDD Programme, ‘Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ (2013) 11– 12; and Roundtable 
on Sustainable Biofuels, Principles and Criteria (2012): see Morgera, Tsioumani, and Buck (n. 38) 40; 
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protection of human rights of general application (such as those related to property, 
subsistence, and culture),48 which may be negatively affected by interferences with 
these communities’ customary relations with land and natural resources,49 such 
as traditional farmers50 and small- scale fishing communities.51 Under the CBD, 
these groups are singled out because of their ecosystem stewardship,52 which hinges 
on the intrinsic connection between these communities’ knowledge and their nat-
ural resources— in other words, the development and transmission of traditional 
knowledge through the management of traditionally used natural resources.53 Such 
knowledge is thus embodied in traditional lifestyles54 that are inextricably linked 
to natural resources, shared cultural identity and customary rules.55 This resonates 
with the understanding, under international human rights law, of the traditional 
use of natural resources as ‘part of a way of life’.56 Former UN Special Rapporteur 
Knox underscored local communities’ comparable vulnerability to those of indi-
genous peoples due to their similarly close relationship with territories, and the 
fact that local communities equally ‘depend directly on nature for their material 
needs and cultural life’ without self- identifying as indigenous peoples.57 In other 
and L. Cotula and K. Tienhaara, ‘Reconfiguring Investment Contracts to Promote Sustainable 
Development’ (2013) 2011– 12 Yearbook of International Law on Investment and Policy 281, 301 and 303.
 48 A.  Bessa, ‘Traditional Local Communities in International Law’ (PhD dissertation, European 
University Institute, 2013).
 49 O. De Schutter, ‘The Emerging Human Right to Land’ (2010) 12 International Community Law 
Review 303, 324– 25, 319.
 50 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Rome, 3 November 
2001, in force 29 June 2004) Art. 9.2; Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Voluntary Guidelines 
on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National 
Food Security (VGGT) (2012) UN Doc. CL 144/ 9 (C 2013/ 20), Appendix D (VGGT) Art. 8.6; and 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, UN General 
Assembly Resolution 73/ 165 (2019). For a discussion, see E. Tsioumani, ‘Beyond Access and Benefit- 
sharing: Lessons from the Law and Governance of Agricultural Biodiversity’ (2018) Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 1.
 51 FAO, Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small- scale Fisheries in the Context of Food 
Security and Poverty Eradication (2013) para. 5.1.
 52 Principles of the Ecosystem Approach, Decision V/ 6 (2000) para. 9, and CBD Decision VII/ 11 
(2004), Annex I, annotations to rationale to Principle 4. This appears to be reflected in the General 
Assembly, Strategic Framework for the period 2012– 13 (UN Doc. A/ 65/ 6/ Rev.1) para. 11(24)(b) and 
for 2014– 15 (UN Doc. A/ 67/ 6 (prog. 11)) para. 11(16). See discussion in E. Morgera, ‘Ecosystem 
and Precautionary Approach’ in E. Morgera and J. Razzaque (eds), Encyclopedia of Environmental 
Law: Biodiversity and Nature Protection Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017) 70.
 53 In the light of the placement of CBD Art. 8(j) in the context of in situ conservation (CBD Art. 8). 
J. Gibson, ‘Community Rights to Culture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in 
Allen and Xanthaki (n. 44) 434, 434– 35.
 54 On the basis of the wording of CBD Art. 8(j): see definition of traditional knowledge in Akwé: Kon 
Guidelines (n. 20).
 55 See generally B. Tobin, Indigenous Peoples, Customary Law and Human Rights: Why Living Law 
Matters (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
 56 Thornberry (n. 42) 334 and 353.
 57 UN Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, paras 48 and 9. See E. Morgera, 
‘A reflection on benefit- sharing as a Framework Principle on Human Rights and the Environment pro-
posed by UN Special Rapporteur John Knox (Part II: Right- holders and duty- bearers)’ BENELEX Blog 
post (April 2018), https:// benelexblog.wordpress.com/ .
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words, the emerging ‘rights of ecologically concerned non- indigenous local com-
munities’58 are increasingly being expected to be integrated in business due dili-
gence through impact assessments, FPIC, and benefit- sharing.
1.1 Environmental and socio- cultural impact (self- )assessment
The Global Compact developed specific guidance on business responsibility 
to respect indigenous peoples’ rights,59 which translates into an expectation 
for business to ‘first recognize that indigenous peoples’ relationship to land 
and natural resources may not align with non- indigenous concepts of prop-
erty’.60 This chimes with former UN Special Rapporteur Anaya’s proposal 
that companies identify prior to commencing their activities all matters re-
lated to the basic human rights of indigenous peoples with a view to taking 
them into account when their activities are carried out.61 This underscores a 
risk in relying on host States’ domestic frameworks as their spiritual connec-
tion to land that is not technically, under the law of the relevant country, con-
sidered to be a form of ownership. The Guidance, therefore, indicated that 
indigenous peoples themselves should identify what activities may or may 
not impact this right, and their views in this regard should be sought and 
incorporated by companies into impact assessments and project planning.62 
In that connection, reference is made to the CBD’s Akwé: Kon Guidelines, 
as well as the UN Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food 
Security.63
The UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights has taken a more 
limited approach, without reference to benefit- sharing or the integration of indi-
genous methodologies. It recommended that business enterprises should ensure 
 58 S. Seck, ‘Transnational Corporations and Extractive Industries’ in S. Alam, S. Atapattu, C. Gonzalez, 
and J. Razzaque (eds), International Environmental Law and the Global South (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 380, 392. See also Pentassuglia (n. 45) 157, and generally and C. Doyle and J. 
Gilbert, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Globalization: From “Development Aggression” to “Self- Determined 
Development” ’ (2008/ 9) 7 European Yearbook of Minority Issues 219.
 59 Global Compact Office, The Business Reference Guide to the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (United Nations Global Compact Office, 2013).
 60 Ibid. 66.
 61 Special Rapporteur Anaya, Report on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous people (2010) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 15/ 37, para. 46. This has been confirmed in IACtHR, 
Kichwa, para. 300; IACtHR, Kaliña and Lokono, para. 214; and Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), Concluding observations on the combined thirteenth to fifteenth periodic re-
ports of Suriname (2015) UN Doc. CERD/ C/ SUR/ CO/ 13- 15, para. 26.
 62 Global Compact Office (n. 59) 66.
 63 Ibid.
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that impact assessment processes provide for an evidence- based and gender- 
disaggregated review of socio- anthropological issues pertaining to any adverse 
impacts on indigenous peoples living in areas affected by a project, differentiating 
impacts on possibly vulnerable groups and paying particular attention to any oper-
ations in the territories and lands of indigenous peoples.64
International human rights processes have indicated that prior impact assess-
ments provide information necessary for indigenous peoples to decide whether 
to provide FPIC or not. The Inter- American Court has consistently indicated that 
these assessments should aim at ensuring that permitted levels of impact do not 
negate the physical or cultural survival of the members of indigenous peoples, and 
that indigenous peoples are aware of possible risks, including environmental and 
health ones, so that they can weigh up whether to accept proposed developments 
voluntarily and with full knowledge.65 The Akwé: Kon Guidelines clarify that nega-
tive impacts could include potential damage to ways of life, livelihoods, well- being, 
and traditional knowledge.66 The breadth of the assessment, as a result, ranges 
from cultural elements such as belief systems, languages, and customs,67 to systems 
of natural resource use, the maintenance of genetic diversity through indigenous 
customary management, the exercise of customary laws regarding land tenure and 
distribution of resources and benefits,68 food, and health.69 It also includes com-
munity well- being, vitality and viability (employment levels and opportunities, 
welfare, education, and availability and standards of housing, infrastructure, serv-
ices).70 It further extends to transgenerational aspects, such as opportunities for 
elders to pass on their knowledge to youth.71
Respect for indigenous traditions and cultures72 in impact assessments further 
implies integrating indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ expertise, meth-
odologies, and procedures.73 This, in turn, may contribute to realizing indigenous 
peoples’ right to participate in public affairs,74 which points to the public dimension 
 64 Report of the Working Group on Business and Human Rights on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises (2016) UN Doc. A/ 71/ 291.
 65 IACtHR, Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs:  28 November 2007)  para. 133; IACtHR, Kichwa Indigenous Communitiy of 
Sarayaku v Ecuador, Judgment (Merits and Reparations: 27 June 2012) para. 205; IACtHR, Case of 
Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v Suriname, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs:  25 November 
2015) para. 214.
 66 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), para. 36.
 67 Ibid. para. 6(f).
 68 Ibid. paras 24 and 27– 28, 34.
 69 Ibid. para. 42.
 70 Ibid. para. 6(d).
 71 Ibid. para. 49.
 72 IACtHR, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgment (Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs:  12 August 2008)  para. 41; IACtHR, Kichwa, para. 206; 
IACtHR, Kaliña and Lokono, para. 215; also citing Rio Declaration, Principle 10.
 73 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), para. 64.
 74 IACtHR, Kaliña and Lokono, paras 197 and 202– 03.
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of these exercises even if they are fully run by private actors. Another inter- linked 
dimension of this international standard is that these assessments should not be 
limited to identifying negative impacts on indigenous peoples and local commu-
nities, but also potential positive impacts upon them: the Akwé: Kon Guidelines 
call for addressing fair and equitable benefit- sharing75 during prior impact assess-
ments.76 It can therefore be argued that while impact assessments are generally 
understood as geared towards damage prevention or damage control,77 they should 
also identify, in an integrated fashion environmental, economic, and socio- cultural 
benefits.78 The CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines require that consideration of benefit- 
sharing starts significantly early on in the process— as early as the screening and 
scoping phases of assessments.79 This is to be achieved through collaborative pro-
cedures and methodologies aimed at ensuring the full involvement of indigenous 
peoples and local communities.80 As a result, following the Akwé: Kon Guidelines 
arguably implies moving away from a technical damage- control approach, shifting 
to collaboratively identifying and understanding also opportunities for positive 
impacts according to indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ worldviews.81 
These worldviews would then determine the scope of the assessment.82
International human rights processes have also underscored that prior impact 
assessments should be prepared by an independent, technically qualified entity 
with ‘active participation of indigenous communities concerned’.83 The Akwé: Kon 
Guidelines further recommend establishing processes for recording indigenous 
communities’ views also when they are unable to attend public meetings because 
of remoteness or poor health, and not just in written form.84 Governments are 
expected to provide adequate human, financial, technical, and legal resources to 
support indigenous expertise, proportionally to the scale of the proposed develop-
ment.85 In addition, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines recommend involving indigenous 
communities in the financial auditing processes of the development to ensure that 
the resources invested are used effectively.86 Furthermore, companies are expected 
 75 Discussed as a self- standing standard at Section 3.1.2.
 76 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), para. 40.
 77 N. Craik, ‘Biodiversity- inclusive Impact Assessment’ in Morgera and Razzaque (n. 52), 431, argues 
that consideration of biodiversity concerns more generally expands the range of issues and values to be 
included in environmental assessments. See also C. Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights 
and Resources: The Transformative Role of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2015) 94.
 78 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), para. 23; Morgera (n. 1) 1110.
 79 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), Forward, and paras 3, and 13– 14.
 80 Ibid. paras 64 and 15– 16.
 81 Ibid. para. 37.
 82 N. Craik, ‘Process and Reconciliation:  Integrating the Duty to Consult with Environmental 
Assessment’ (2016) 52 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1, 28– 29; Morgera (n. 1) 1121.
 83 IACtHR, Kichwa, para. 300; IACtHR, Kaliña and Lokono, para. 214; CERD (n. 61), para. 26.
 84 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), para. 17.
 85 Ibid. paras 18, 64– 66, 70.
 86 Ibid. para. 46.
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to negotiate an agreement with indigenous peoples or a local community that 
traditionally occupies certain sites, to cover the procedural aspects of assessment, 
including options for no- action alternatives; setting out rights, duties, and respon-
sibilities of all parties; and addressing measures to prevent or mitigate any negative 
impacts of the proposed development.87
To ensure the full and effective participation and involvement of indigenous 
peoples and local communities in screening, scoping, and development planning 
exercises,88 the Akwé:  Kon Guidelines further suggest appointing community 
representatives on bodies advising on the screening and scoping phases, and en-
suring that communities are consulted on the assessment process, and involved 
in the establishment of the terms of reference for conducting the assessment.89 
Furthermore, participatory models of community engagement should be used 
for conducting assessments, including in decision- making, while the proponent 
is expected to provide ‘regular feedback to affected communities throughout the 
impact assessment and development processes’.90 To support such involvement, 
developers are further expected to engage local experts ‘at the earliest oppor-
tunity’.91 The usefulness of these clarifications in the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines 
was recognized by the OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply 
Chains92 and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of 
Minerals from Conflict- Affected and High- Risk Areas.93
That said, the actual suitability of EIAs in different countries to effectively 
and respectfully integrate traditional knowledge with ‘scientific knowledge’,94 
remains to be explored. In addition, evidence confirms that EIAs may not pro-
vide a culturally appropriate and open space for understanding the worldviews 
of indigenous peoples, due to embedded tendencies to privilege mainstream 
views of development.95 This is demonstrated by indigenous peoples’ preference 
for indigenous assessments that are fully based on indigenous laws and legal 
traditions.96
 87 Ibid. para. 21. See Sections 1.2.4 and 1.3.3 later in this chapter.
 88 Ibid. para. 3(a).
 89 Ibid. para. 14.
 90 Ibid. para. 15.
 91 Ibid. para. 16.
 92 OECD- FAO Guidance on Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, para. 25 and fn. 21. See discus-
sion at Section 3.1.
 93 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict- 
Affected and High- Risk Areas (Paris: OECD, 2013) 35, fn. 2.
 94 S. Vermeylen, G. Martin, and R. Clift, ‘Intellectual Property, Rights Systems and the Assemblage of 
Local Knowledge Systems’ (2008) 15 International Journal of. Cultural Property Rights 201.
 95 C.  Laude, A Tale of Two Reconciliations in Environmental Planning:  The Right to Say No to 
Development and the Enticement of a ‘Politics of Recognition’, presentation at Decolonizing the Academy 
conference, University of Edinburgh (26 February 2016).
 96 N. Schabus, ‘Traditional Knowledge’ in Morgera and Razzaque (n. 52) 264.
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1.2 Free prior informed consent
Although it is commonly considered a relatively recent international legal con-
cept,97 free prior informed consent has been claimed as a key concept originating 
in indigenous peoples’ own legal traditions and relations with other peoples.98 The 
exact content of this requirement for States remains a matter of contention. It is 
explicitly mentioned in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP)99 and the ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries,100 and considered implicit in other international 
human rights treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination.101 It is also included in more limited terms in the text of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity102 and decisions adopted under it.
FPIC encounters varied degrees of recognition among States,103 which is also 
apparent under the CBD.104 Notably, although some CBD instruments such as the 
Akwé:  Kon Guidelines refer to ‘prior informed consent’,105 more recent instru-
ments106 refer to ‘prior informed consent or approval and involvement’ reflecting 
the reluctance by some CBD Parties to fully endorse the standards enshrined in 
UNDRIP. According to proponent countries, the expression ‘approval and in-
volvement’ was introduced in order to allow for a greater degree of flexibility in 
implementation at the national level,107 in the light of different domestic legal 
arrangements concerning the relations between governments and indigenous 
 97 Eg UN Expert Mechanism, Final report of the study on indigenous peoples and the right to partici-
pate in decision- making (2011) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 18/ 42, para. 63, criticized by Doyle (n. 77) 15 and 5.
 98 See generally Doyle (n. 77) 15.
 99 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 61/ 295 (13 September 2007).
 100 International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Convention no.  169 Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (27 June 1989, in force 5 September 1991).
 101 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (New York, 7 
March 1966, in force 4 January 1969).
 102 CBD Art. 8(j).
 103 J. Gilbert and C. Doyle, ‘A New Dawn over the Land: Shedding Light on Collective Ownership and 
Consent’ in Allen and Xanthaki (n. 44) 325.
 104 Morgera, Tsioumani, and Buck (n. 38) 145– 56.
 105 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), paras 29, 52– 53, and 60, refer consistently only to ‘prior informed 
consent’.
 106 Nagoya Protocol Art. 6(2), with ‘approval and involvement’ being found in the wording of CBD 
Art. 8(j); CBD, Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
the Benefits Arising out of Their Utilization, CBD Decision VI/ 24 (2002) Annex, para. 31; and CBD 
Decision V/ 16, para. 5. For an indication of continued diverge of views on utilizing UNDRIP language 
in the context of the CBD, see C. Benson et al., ‘Summary of the Seventh Meeting of the Working Group 
on Article 8(j)’ (2011) 9:557 ENB 5– 6; and B. Antonich et al., ‘Summary of the Eighth Meeting of the 
Working Group on Article 8(j) and 17th Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and 
Technological Advice of the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2013) 9:611 ENB 4, 6– 7, and 20.
 107 G. Burton, ‘Implementation of the Nagoya Protocol in JUSCANZ Countries: The Unlikely Lot’ in 
E. Morgera, M. Buck, and E. Tsioumani (eds), The 2010 Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit- Sharing 
in Perspective: Implications for International Law and National Implementation (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2013) 295, 318– 19.
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peoples within their territories.108 It can be hypothesized that these differences 
mainly concern the ways and degree to which the FPIC process is determined and 
controlled by indigenous communities.109 Several commentators have suggested 
that CBD Parties can consider the two expressions as having essentially the same 
meaning in practice,110 that is, an effective guarantee to protect human rights con-
nected to natural resources by empowering communities to genuinely influence 
decisions that affect their interests,111 not merely a right to be involved in such pro-
cesses.112 CBD Parties have indicated that it would be ‘not practical to propose a 
“one- size- fits- all” approach’ instead of ‘taking into account national and local 
circumstances of the indigenous peoples and local communities concerned’.113 
Another explanation could be that those governments that made a declaration on 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples wish to protect room for 
manoeuvre at the national level in regulating their relationships with indigenous 
peoples.114
The dividing line between the general principle of international law on effective 
consultation and FPIC obligations is, in effect, not clear- cut. The Inter- American 
Court has emphasized the need for ‘special and differentiated’ consultation pro-
cesses when the interests of indigenous and tribal peoples are about to be af-
fected,115 with the public interest test set at a higher threshold because the physical 
and cultural survival of indigenous and tribal peoples is at stake.116 In other words, 
FPIC goes beyond a more general right to consultation with the public, as a matter 
of intensity of the duty that is intertwined with substantive aspects.117 It has been 
 108 ‘Joint submission Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee)’ 133– 36, and comments by 
A. Savaresi, ‘The International Human Rights Implications of the Nagoya Protocol’ in Morgera, Buck, 
and Tsioumani (n. 107) 53, 69.
 109 UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Anaya, Study on Extractive Industries and 
Indigenous Peoples (2013) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 24/ 41, paras 26– 36.
 110 Eg Singh Nijar, The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing: An Analysis (2011); Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights James Anaya (2012) UN Doc. A/ 67/ 301, paras 92 
and 61, where the Special Rapporteur specifically expresses the ‘hopeful expectation’ that the provisions 
of the Nagoya Protocol will be implemented ‘in harmony with’ UNDRIP.
 111 Doyle (n. 77) 154; Thornberry (n. 42) 349.
 112 Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Advice No. 2, Indigenous peoples and the 
right to participate in decision- making (2011) para. 1, emphasis added. See also M. Århén, Indigenous 
Peoples in the International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 141.
 113 CBD Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines (n. 11), para. 9.
 114 Morgera (n. 1) 1106.
 115 IACtHR, Kichwa, paras 165– 66.
 116 Ibid.; see also African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Afr. Comm.), Centre for 
Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois 
Welfare Council v Kenya (4 February 2010) Case 276/ 2003, para. 212. Compare with K. Gover, ‘Settler- 
State Political Theory, “CANZUS” and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2015) 
26 European Journal of International Law 345.
 117 See contra, the argument that the right to consultation is procedural, whereas FPIC as a core 
element of the internal aspect of the right to self- determination is substantive (the right to effectively 
determine the material outcome of decision- making process): see Århén (n. 112) 135– 38. The present 
author is rather persuaded that procedural and substantive dimensions are intertwined in consultation 
as well as in FPIC, impact assessment, and benefit- sharing: Morgera (n. 1) 1106– 07.
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argued that FPIC should guarantee a ‘distinguishable voice’ for indigenous and 
tribal peoples within a pluralistic and democratic society in light of their right to 
decide their own development priorities.118
These divergences of interpretation among States are reflected in inter-
national standards of corporate environmental responsibility. The IFC 2006 
version failed to align itself with international standards on indigenous peo-
ples’ rights. It required private companies undertaking projects with significant 
adverse impacts on local communities to put in place ‘free, prior and informed 
consultations and facilitate their informed participation’.119 The IFC at the time 
referred to its Board of Directors’ decision not to mention the international 
standard expression ‘prior informed consent’ without providing further de-
tails.120 The 2012 Standard marks a departure for the IFC and provides for the 
need for companies to conduct ‘informed consultation’ with a specific and ex-
press (albeit qualified) requirement for prior informed consent. The latter has 
been hailed as ‘a watershed moment in international development history’, con-
sidering significant pressure applied by civil society to achieve this change.121 
In comparison, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights has 
been criticized for not distinguishing consultation from consent.122 FPIC is not 
specifically mentioned in the OECD Guidelines, but could be considered im-
plied in an oblique reference to UNDRIP in the Guidelines Commentary.123 
The OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains makes 
reference to the IFC Performance Standards: accordingly, consent should be 
‘consistent with achieving the ends of [UNDRIP] and with due regard for par-
ticular positions and understanding of individual states’.124 Against this back-
drop, the following elements of FPIC have been translated for the private sector 
under the CBD and international human rights processes: the meaning of con-
sent and the need for appropriate representation, iterative and culturally ap-
propriate modalities, and documentation .
 118 In light of ILO Convention 169, Art. 7(1): A. Fuentes, ‘Judicial Interpretation and Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights to Lands, Participation and Consultation. The Inter- American Court of Human Rights’ 
Approach’ (2015) 23 International Journal of Minority and Group Rights 39, 74– 76 and 79.
 119 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 1, para. 22 (emphasis added).
 120 IFC, ‘Policy and Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability and Policy 
on Disclosure of Information: IFC Responses to Stakeholder Comments and Rationale for Key Policy 
Changes’ (22 September 2006) 5, where it reads ‘we note that this proposal was already considered and 
rejected during the discussions on the World Bank group’s management response’; and at 29 where 
it reads ‘the World Bank group concluded that the process of free, prior and informed consultations 
leading to broad community support would be more appropriate for the bank group’.
 121 S. Baker, ‘Why the IFC’s Free, Prior and Informed Consent Policy Does Not Matter (Yet) to 
Indigenous Communities Affected by Development Projects’ (2012– 13) 30 Wisconsin International 
Law Journal 668, 669 and 679.
 122 Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 46) 20.
 123 OECD Guidelines, para. 40.
 124 OECD– FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, 98.
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1.2.1  Meaning of consent
The IFC translated the concept of prior informed consent for private companies as 
a good- faith negotiation with culturally appropriate institutions representing indi-
genous peoples’ communities, with a view to reaching an agreement that is seen as 
legitimate by the majority within the community.125 This is more specific and less 
top- down than the recommendation of the UN Working Group on Business and 
Human Rights, that companies consult indigenous peoples and focus on dialogue 
as a means to address and resolve grievances; and engage regularly and directly 
with men and women in the communities in order to inform them as to the way 
their lifestyles, livelihoods, and human rights may be affected.126
The IFC further indicated that ‘consent does not necessarily require unanimity 
and may be achieved even when individuals and sub- groups explicitly disagree’.127 
This is in line with the understanding of FPIC proposed by the Human Rights 
Council128 and commended by the UN independent expert on the promotion of 
a democratic and equitable international order, who, however, cautioned against 
overlooking minority viewpoints.129
In addition, former UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples’ rights James 
Anaya clarified that FPIC does not provide indigenous peoples with a veto power 
when the State acts legitimately and faithfully in the public interest. But rather it 
‘establishes the need to frame consultation procedures in order to make every ef-
fort to build consensus on the part of all concerned’ that is seen as legitimate by the 
community130 and is in line with customary legal traditions.131 Thus, consensus- 
driven consultation processes should not only address measures to mitigate or 
compensate for adverse impacts of projects, but also explore and arrive at means of 
equitable benefit- sharing in a spirit of true partnership.132
While it is difficult to anticipate in the abstract when indigenous communities 
may say yes to a proposed development, particular difficulties may arise in situ-
ations where ownership over natural resources is not clarified in domestic frame-
works, or when consultations with communities in this regard are inconclusive. 
The Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines clarify that the understanding of ‘consent’ includes 
the right not to grant consent, and only allows the temporary use of traditional 
 125 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 7, para. 15.
 126 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises: Business- related impacts on the rights of indigenous peoples (2013) UN 
Doc. A/ 68/ 279, paras 31 and 56.
 127 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 7, para. 12.
 128 Human Rights Council Res. 17/ 4, para. 11 (2011).
 129 Report of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international 
order (2017) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 36/ 40, paras 62– 63.
 130 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/ HRC/ 12/ 34 (n. 22) para. 53.
 131 Which are considered premised on principles of good faith, justice, friendship, and solidarity, 
as a notion that affirms and protects the rights of both parties and clarify their duties towards one an-
other: Doyle (n. 77) 41.
 132 Special Rapporteur Anaya’s report, UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 12/ 34 (n. 22) paras 48 and 53.
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knowledge for the purpose for which it was granted, unless otherwise and mutu-
ally agreed.133 As has been argued elsewhere, the link between self- assessment of 
impacts and fair and equitable benefit- sharing may also serve to clarify when indi-
genous peoples may be entitled to say no to a private company.134 If the proposed 
activity is likely to affect traditionally owned or used resources, or has the potential 
to negatively impact on traditionally used resources threatening the community’s 
cultural and physical survival, the lack of early, genuine, and culturally appropriate 
identification and discussion of benefits according to their worldviews justifies the 
withholding of consent in and of itself. Withholding consent can also be justified 
if the dialogue on benefits has not had any impact on the final outcome, in the ab-
sence of sufficient reasons to justify such an outcome.135
1.2.2  Appropriate representation
Another complexity concerns the need to ensure that consent is given by the legit-
imate representatives of the peoples or communities concerned.136 International 
human rights materials emphasize the need to take into account indigenous peo-
ples’ and local communities’ ‘self- chosen and autonomously managed’137 decision- 
making mechanisms.138 Accordingly, States are responsible to ensure the genuine 
involvement of legitimate representatives of indigenous peoples and the true na-
ture of consent in the context of customary institutions, taking into account that 
consent may be withdrawn at a later stage.139 But, as underscored by the Guidance 
to the UN Global Compact, ‘the practical role of governments in ensuring com-
pliance with FPIC varies by country, and many governments are still in the early 
stages of working out how to best comply with international FPIC standards.’140 
This creates added risks for companies to ensure respect for indigenous peoples’ 
rights as part of their due diligence.
The IFC CAO issued guidance, based on its practical experience, including 
principles and strategies to support companies in tackling issues around represen-
tation. The principles stressed self- identification of group representatives, the need 
for each party to feel reasonably assured that the representatives of the other party 
are credible and legitimate, consideration of gender equity in representation struc-
tures, and, where possible, consideration of other factors such age, culture, geog-
raphy, level of impact, positions and opinions, political views, education, language, 
 133 CBD Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines (n. 11), para. 7(b).
 134 Morgera (n. 1) 1114– 15.
 135 Ibid. See also ILA, Report on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2010).
 136 UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues:  see, eg, Report of the Tenth Session of the UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (2011) UN Doc. E/ 2011/ 43- E/ C.19/ 2011/ 14.
 137 Doyle (n. 77) 16.
 138 Ibid. 154; Thornberry (n. 42) 349.
 139 Ibid.
 140 Global Compact Office (n. 59) 25. See also Global Compact’s Good Practice Note on Free Prior 
Informed Consent (UN, 2014).
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or religion; and the need to understand, agree upon, and clearly define and docu-
ment consent.141 They also mentioned the responsibility of representatives to keep 
their constituents informed throughout the dispute resolution process, including 
how their inputs are weighed and acted upon; and the need to adapt to changes 
in representation over time.142 One of the key challenges, which is relevant to all 
standards discussed in this section, is addressing limitations in a representative’s 
capacity (in resources, organization and coordination, information, and technical 
knowledge) and related power imbalances.143 The IFC suggests in this connection 
that companies take into account communities’ capacities, provide them oppor-
tunities to assess risks and impacts, and enable them to access legal advice.144
1.2.3  Iterative and culturally appropriate modalities
The 2012 version of the IFC Performance Standards emphasize the ongoing nature 
of the consultation process, which is in line with guidance in international human 
rights law and international biodiversity law.145 It underscores the need for direct 
exchanges of views with communities on matters that affect them, as well as with 
regard to benefit- sharing measures,146 with particular attention to gender equality 
issues.147 In addition, the IFC Performance Standards clarify that all consultations 
should be free from external manipulation, interference, coercion, or intimida-
tion; enabling meaningful participation, ‘where applicable’,148 which appears to 
be below international standards.149 In addition, the IFC Standard recommends 
documenting consent, using the language of preference of affected communi-
ties.150 This is followed up through ongoing reporting to affected communities on 
issues identified through consultation or grievances, including updates on mitiga-
tion measures and actions.151
Although the IFC Standards are aligned with international guidance on the need 
for culturally appropriate approaches to FPIC processes,152 mismatches between 
assumptions and decision- making modalities between the developer and commu-
nities with regard to contracts are significant and may prove ‘insurmountable’.153 
Scholars have expressed concern that the IFC may still appear to suggest that 
 141 CAO, ‘Reflections from the Practice of Dispute Resolution No 2:  Representation’ (CAO, 
undated) 4.
 142 Ibid. 5.
 143 Ibid. 6.
 144 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 7: Guidance Note 7, at 8; see Baker (n. 121) 690.
 145 This mainly relates to consultations with indigenous peoples: Ch. 5, Section 1.
 146 See Ch. 5, Section 1.3.
 147 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 31.
 148 Ibid, para. 30.
 149 See discussion of triggers for this standard in Section 1 of this chapter.
 150 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 1, para. 30.
 151 Ibid. para. 36.
 152 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 7: Guidance Note 7, at 8.
 153 Baker (n. 121) 702.
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‘project approval may be obtained prior to obtaining FPIC’.154 In effect, whether 
the IFC’s understanding of FPIC will make a difference depends on effective op-
portunities for communities to ‘affect in any meaningful way the social and en-
vironmental risks’ of large projects. At the stage of engagement with the company, 
considerable investment has already occurred and meaningful and broad discur-
sive space needs to be found between the developers’ interest in risk management 
and communities’ aspirations for self- determination, which can then lead to the 
conclusion of legally enforceable contract155 to ensure respect of the human rights 
of communities.
One of the increasingly common features across international instruments on 
corporate environmental responsibility in this connection is the understanding 
of FPIC as a continuous process, rather than a one- off exercise,156 which ‘should 
underpin and be an integral part of developing a relationship’.157 Bringing together 
the IFC Standards and the findings of the Inter- American Court of Human Rights 
and African Commission, the Guidance to the UN Global Compact indicated that 
FPIC ‘is an on- going process that should be maintained throughout the life cycle of 
planning, researching, developing, implementing, and executing a project through 
regular engagement with affected indigenous peoples’.158 Along similar lines, the 
FAO- OECD Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains refers to the 
process of seeking PIC as an ‘iterative rather than one- off discussion’ based on 
‘continuous dialogue’,159 with a view to mitigating impacts in a manner that reflects 
communities’ aspirations and priorities.160 This appears aligned with international 
human rights sources underscoring the need to seek FPIC at all stages of devel-
opment projects or conservation initiatives, whenever there is a possible impact 
on communities’ traditional life161 from the inception to the final authorization 
and implementation of proposed activities.162 The CBD Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines, 
which were inter- governmentally adopted after incorporating considerable inputs 
from indigenous representatives,163 indicated that FPIC should be understood as 
a continual process building mutually beneficial, ongoing arrangements to ‘build 
trust, good relations, mutual understanding, intercultural spaces, knowledge ex-
changes, create new knowledge and reconciliation’.164
 154 Ibid. 694.
 155 Ibid. 671– 72 and 686– 88.
 156 Morgera (n. 1) 1105.
 157 CBD Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines (n. 11), para. 8.
 158 Global Compact Office (n. 59) 26.
 159 OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, 80.
 160 Ibid. 94.
 161 IACtHR, Kaliña and Lokono, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Sierra Porto and Ferrer Mac- 
Gregor Poisot, para. 14; UNPFII (n. 26), particularly para. 34.
 162 IACtHR, Kaliña and Lokono, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Sierra Porto and Ferrer Mac- 
Gregor Poisot, para. 14.
 163 Morgera (n. 5) 114.
 164 CBD Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines (n. 11), para. 8.
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Another increasingly common feature across international guidance is the 
linkage between cultural appropriateness and the timing of the FPIC process. In 
the context of international human rights processes, FPIC has been interpreted as 
entailing that consent should be given freely, without coercion, intimidation, or 
manipulation, including by allowing sufficient time for internal discussion within 
the community.165 The IFC indicated that FPIC should also allow for sufficient 
time for consensus- building and for communities to develop responses to project 
issues that impact upon their lives and livelihoods, as well as for sufficient time for 
the developer to address communities’ concerns and suggestions on project design 
and implementation.166 The CBD 2014 Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines underscore the 
need for FPIC to be free from ‘expectations or timelines that are externally im-
posed’,167 and rather take into account communities’ time requirements.168
The degree and modalities of information- sharing during the FPIC process also 
have a bearing on cultural appropriateness. International human rights bodies have 
also clarified that FPIC should be based on an understanding of the full range of is-
sues and implications entailed by the activity or decision in question, with a view to 
providing indigenous peoples with ‘full and objective information about all aspects 
of the project that will affect them, including the impact of the project on their lives 
and environment’.169 The UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights recom-
mended paying due attention to the various methods of informing and consulting 
indigenous peoples that may be required owing to their distinct cultures and lan-
guages.170 The CBD Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines have provided more detail on the need 
for adequate and balanced information from a variety of sources that is made available 
in indigenous or local languages using terms understood by indigenous peoples and 
local communities, and including safeguards to ensure that all parties to an agreement 
have the same understanding of the information and terms provided.171
 1.2.4  Documentation and community protocols
The requirement to document the FPIC process can have significant substantive 
dimensions, including in terms of defining ‘what would constitute consent’ from 
the viewpoint of communities.172 While most examples are soft in nature (such as 
 165 IACtHR, Kichwa, para. 18.
 166 IFC Performance Standard 7: Guidance Note 7, at 8.
 167 CBD Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines (n. 11), para. 14.
 168 Ibid. para. 7(b).
 169 IACtHR, Saramaka (Merits) para. 134; and A. Fodella, ‘Indigenous Peoples, the Environment, and 
International Jurisprudence’ in N. Boschiero, T. Scovazzi, C. Pitea, and C. Ragni (eds), International 
Courts and the Development of International Law: Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves (The Hague: TMC 
Asser Press, 2013) 356 and 360.
 170 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises: Business- related impacts on the rights of indigenous peoples (2013) UN 
Doc. A/ 68/ 279, paras 31 and 56.
 171 CBD Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines (n. 11), para. 17(c)(iii).
 172 Baker (n. 121) 695– 99; IFC Guidance Note 7, at 9.
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memoranda of understanding, letter of intent, and joint statement of principles), 
using a legally binding contract or at least tying violations of communities’ require-
ments to a default under the primary loan agreement can provide firmer evidence 
of good- faith engagement on the part of the company.173
While the OECD Guidelines do not necessarily prescribe an agreement in 
written form, they call for agreement with indigenous peoples on what constitutes 
appropriate consent and a consultation process, on the basis of communities’ cus-
tomary laws and practices, with their own freely chosen representatives.174 The 
OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains refers to the 
need to document and implement agreements resulting from consultations, in-
cluding by establishing a process by which community views and concerns can be 
properly recorded. While written statements may be preferred, community mem-
bers’ views could also be recorded on video or audio tape, or any other appropriate 
way, subject to the consent of communities.175
Other written materials can support the process of seeking FPIC from the outset, 
rather than towards the end of the process. To facilitate the understanding of cus-
tomary laws, as well as community values and beliefs, as the first step in seeking 
FPIC, recent CBD Guidelines devoted significant attention to ‘community proto-
cols’. Supporting a bottom- up approach, community protocols are a written docu-
ment developed through a community consultation to outline its core ecological, 
cultural, and spiritual values and customary laws, based on which the community 
provides clear terms and conditions to regulate access to their knowledge and re-
sources.176 These protocols may allow a community to prepare in advance for any 
negotiations with private developers, rather than entering into such negotiations in 
an ad hoc manner, potentially also preventing internal conflicts. Compliance with 
community protocols remains voluntary, unless it is secured through national le-
gislation or contractual means.177
Community protocols have become a recurring feature under the CBD, as they 
are expected to ‘cover a broad array of expressions, articulations, rules and practices 
generated by communities to set out how they expect other stakeholders to engage 
with them. They may reference customary as well as national or international laws 
to affirm indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ rights to be approached ac-
cording to a certain set of standards.’178 The 2014 Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines clarify 
the role of community protocols as being to:
 173 Baker (n. 121) 699.
 174 Ibid. 97.
 175 OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, 51.
 176 E. Morgera and E. Tsioumani, ‘The Evolution of Benefit- Sharing:  Linking Biodiversity and 
Community Livelihoods’ (2010) 15 Review of European Community and International Environmental 
Law 150, 157– 58.
 177 Morgera and Tsioumani (n. 176) 157– 58.
 178 CBD Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines (n. 11), para. 19.
Indigenous peoples and local communities 201
provide communities an opportunity to focus on their development aspirations 
vis- a- vis their rights and to articulate for themselves and for users their under-
standing of their bio- cultural heritage and therefore on what basis they will en-
gage with a variety of stakeholders. By considering the interconnections of their 
land rights, current socio- economic situation, environmental concerns, cus-
tomary laws and traditional knowledge, communities are better placed to deter-
mine for themselves how to negotiate with a variety of actors.179
In other words, these documents not only better prepare communities to interact 
with private developers, but they also better prepare private developers to engage 
respectfully and appropriately with communities. Community protocols can thus 
help to shape interactions around FPIC and benefit- sharing in line with commu-
nities’ worldviews, including by clarifying what communities are not willing to 
compromise on, how they expect outsiders to respect their decision- making pro-
cesses, and what kind of benefits communities themselves would consider.180 An 
empirical study on community protocols, however, has identified common chal-
lenges with regard to community protocols across four different regions (Europe, 
Africa, Latin America, and Asia) and five different sectors (traditional medicine, 
protected area management, extractives, traditional pastoralism, and traditional 
agriculture). First, this study underscored that communities’ needs and practices 
change over time, which may not necessarily be accurately reflected in existing 
community protocols. Therefore, community protocols need to be considered a 
basis for opening a dialogue, as opposed to a fixed basis for negotiation, as com-
munities may not always have the capacity and resources to update protocols over 
time. Second, the development and update of community protocols require time, 
resources and often external support181 (including legal assistance to better under-
stand relevant international and national legal regimes)182 that may not necessarily 
be available to communities, or may bring about the risk that external actors may 
influence or impose certain expectations on communities.183 Private companies, 
therefore, need to exercise caution in expecting communities to have protocols in 
place that can support the FPIC process, and should not rely on community proto-
cols that have been developed for other specific purposes. With these cautions in 
mind, becoming familiar with existing community protocols should be considered 
part of business due diligence to respect the human rights of specific indigenous 
peoples.
 179 Ibid.
 180 L. Parks, ‘Challenging Power from the Bottom Up? Community Protocols, Benefit- sharing and 
the Challenge of Dominant Discourses’ (2018) 88 Geoforum 87.
 181 Ibid.
 182 Morgera and Tsioumani (n. 176) 157– 58.
 183 L. Parks and E. Morgera, ‘The Need for an Interdisciplinary Approach to Norm Diffusion: The 
Case of Fair and Equitable Benefit- sharing’ (2015) 24 Review of European, Comparative and 
International Environmental Law 353, 361.
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1.3 Fair and equitable benefit- sharing
Fair and equitable benefit- sharing is considered a subset of the general principle of 
international law of equity.184 It is also seen as a component of sustainable devel-
opment, as a corollary of inter- and intra- generational equity.185 Similarly to States’ 
benefit- sharing obligations, former UN Special Rapporteur Anaya emphasized 
that companies should consider benefit- sharing as independent of compensa-
tion measures,186 as a tool to create genuinely equal partnerships with indigenous 
peoples with a view to strengthening their capacity to establish and pursue their 
own development priorities and enhancing their own decision- making mechan-
isms and institutions.187 Anaya argued that business due diligence would imply 
that companies set up specific benefit- sharing mechanisms, based on international 
standards.188 This implies moving away from an exclusive focus on damage preven-
tion to a proactive and collaborative identification of benefit- sharing opportunities 
according to indigenous peoples’ worldviews.189 To that end, Anaya envisaged that, 
if indigenous peoples themselves do not wish or are unable to initiate resource ex-
traction, they are entitled to participate in project decision- making and share in 
their profits through an agreement with outside companies (for instance, through 
a minority ownership interest in the extractive operations).190 This points to the 
usefulness of benefit- sharing arrangements that at the same time provide en-
hanced participation opportunities and income generation for indigenous peo-
ples, illustrating the interconnectedness of procedural and substantive standards.
In accordance with the 2012 version of the IFC Standards, private companies 
are called upon to put in place benefit- sharing by taking into account indigenous 
peoples’ laws, institutions, and customs.191 Benefit- sharing does not feature in the 
OECD Guidelines or in the UN Global Compact, but sectoral guidance produced 
 184 Francioni, ‘Equity’ in R.  Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, online edition, 2010)  para. 21; and E. Morgera, ‘Fair and 
Equitable Benefit- Sharing’ in L. Krämer and E. Orlando (eds), Principles of Environmental Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018) 323, 330– 31.
 185 V. Barral, ‘The Principle of Sustainable Development’ in Krämer and Orlando (n. 184) 103, 108.
 186 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/ HRC/ 15/ 37 (n. 61), paras 89– 91.
 187 Special Rapporteur Anaya, Report on the rights of indigenous peoples (2011) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 
66/ 288, para. 102 ; and UN Special Rapporteur Anaya, Progress report on extractive industries (2012) 
UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 21/ 47, paras 52 and 62.
 188 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/ HRC/ 15/ 37 (n. 61), paras 76– 80.
 189 UN Expert Mechanism, Advice no. 4: Follow- up report on indigenous peoples and the right to 
participate in decision- making, with a focus on extractive industries (2012) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 21/ 55, 
para. 39(h) and implicitly UK National Contact Point, Final Statement on the Complaint from Survival 
International against Vedanta Resources plc, at http:// www.oecd.org/ investment/ mne/ 43884129.pdf, 
para. 73 (2009).
 190 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/ HRC/ 24/ 41 (n. 109) para. 75. These points have been reiterated by 
the African Commission’s Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights 
Violations in Africa, Final Communiqué on the National Dialogue on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
and Extractive Industries, from 7– 8 October 2019, Nairobi, Kenya.
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under these two general instruments has included it. The Global Compact guid-
ance on business responsibility to respect indigenous peoples’ rights refers to 
transparent benefit- sharing and cautions against providing financial or other 
benefits in exchange for investment rights without first acquiring FPIC. It further 
calls for sharing benefits based on regular, annual reviews of the activity and prof-
itability.192 In turn, the OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply 
Chains makes benefit- sharing part of a broader commitment to ensure that oper-
ations are in line with the development priorities and social objectives of the host 
government.193 One challenge for companies, however, is when government prior-
ities are at odds with indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ development pri-
orities, creating a very complex setting for companies to respect this international 
standard.
The CBD Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines emphasize that, in line with the under-
standing of FPIC discussed above,194 benefit- sharing is equally about partnership 
building through establishing mutually agreed terms, rather than a top- down and/ 
or unilateral flow of benefits. In addition, they indicate that ‘benefits should, as 
far as possible, be shared in understandable and culturally appropriate formats, 
with a view to building enduring relationships, promoting intercultural exchanges, 
knowledge and technology transfer, synergies, complementarity and respect’.195 
Furthermore, the Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines draw attention to the role of benefit- 
sharing in supporting cultural reproduction, by stating that ‘benefit- sharing could 
include a way of recognizing and strengthening the contribution of indigenous 
peoples and local communities to the conservation and sustainable use of bio-
logical diversity, including by supporting the intergenerational transmission of 
traditional knowledge’.196
The following sections will discuss to what extent international standards 
have clarified the kind of benefits to be shared, necessary cautions (based on pre-
vious negative experiences in the private sector), and the challenges of relying on 
business- community benefit- sharing agreements.
1.3.1  Kinds of benefits
Former UN Special Rapporteur Anaya indicated that business enterprises should 
regard benefit- sharing ‘as a means of complying with a right, and not as a char-
itable award or favour granted by the company in order to secure social support 
for the project or minimize potential conflicts’.197 He underscored the need to go 
beyond the usual model of natural resource extraction, whereby the initial plans 
 192 Global Compact Office (n. 59) 70.
 193 OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, 26.
 194 Section 1.2.3.
 195 CBD Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines (n. 11), para. 23.
 196 Ibid. para. 13.
 197 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/ HRC/ 15/ 37 (n. 61) para. 79
 
204 Assessing International Standards on CER
for exploration and extraction of natural resources are developed by a corpor-
ation, with some involvement by the State, but little or no involvement of the af-
fected indigenous community, with the result that indigenous peoples are ‘at best 
being offered benefits in the form of jobs or community development projects 
that typically pale in economic value in comparison to the profits gained by the 
corporation’.198
Similar to guidance emerging in international human rights law, the CBD Mo’ otz 
Kuxtal Guidelines underscore that benefit- sharing ‘may vary depending upon the 
type of benefits, the specific conditions and national legislation . . . , the content of the 
mutually agreed terms and the stakeholders involved’ and benefit- sharing mechan-
isms ‘should be flexible’ and determined on a case- by- case basis.199 A wider choice 
of benefits could allow for taking into account communities’ needs, values, and pri-
orities on a case- by- case basis, as required under international human rights law, on 
the basis of a finer- grained understanding of opportunities within natural resource 
governance. Equally, however, the menu of benefits reveals the limitation of inter-
national biodiversity law: in the absence of specific procedural guarantees and indi-
cations of the minimum level of protection, benefit- sharing could be used to impose 
certain views of development upon indigenous peoples and local communities that 
could endanger their cultural or physical survival. In effect, business- community 
benefit- sharing models can be far from clearly beneficial towards indigenous peo-
ples, as they may involve unfair pricing and indebtedness.200
The OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains refers 
to promoting fair and equitable sharing of monetary and non- monetary benefits 
with affected communities on mutually agreed terms, in accordance with inter-
national treaties, where applicable for parties to such treaties, for example, when 
using genetic resources for food and agriculture.201 This is an implicit reference 
to the CBD Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit- sharing 
and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. 
The OECD- FAO Guidance makes no reference, however, to the need to respond 
to indigenous peoples’ views and preferences in this connection. It calls upon 
companies to strive to identify opportunities for development benefits, such as 
through:  the creation of local forward and backward linkages and of local jobs 
with safe working environments; the diversification of income- generating oppor-
tunities; capacity development; local procurement; technology transfer; improve-
ments in local infrastructure; better access to credit and markets, particularly for 
small and medium- sized businesses; payments for environmental services; alloca-
tion of revenue; or the creation of trust funds.202 These are largely based on CBD 
 198 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/ HRC/ 21/ 47 (n. 187) paras 68, 74, and 76.
 199 Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines (n. 11), para. 24.
 200 Cotula and Tienhaara (n. 47) 293.
 201 OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, 26.
 202 Ibid. 53.
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sources on monetary benefit- sharing, including not only profit- sharing through 
trust funds, but also licences with preferential terms, job creation for communities 
(which find resonance in the Endorois decision of the African Commission203), and 
payments for ecosystem services.204 In addition, CBD Parties have identified bene-
fits that support indigenous peoples’ own economic activities, such as: fostering 
local enterprises, participating in others’ enterprises and projects, offering direct 
investment opportunities, facilitating access to markets, and supporting the diver-
sification of income- generating (economic) opportunities for small and medium- 
sized businesses.205
According to the IFC Standards, benefits may include culturally appropriate im-
provement of communities’ standard of living and livelihoods and the long- term 
sustainability of the natural resources on which they depend.206 The IFC further 
clarified that benefits associated with the natural resource use that ‘may be col-
lective in nature rather than directly oriented towards individuals and households’, 
taking into account the ecological context.207 With specific regard to involuntary 
resettlement, IFC clients are expected to implement measures to ensure, for com-
munities with natural resource- based livelihoods, the continued access to affected 
resources or alternative resources with equivalent livelihood- earning potential and 
accessibility. With regard to continued access, according to the CBD Akwé: Kon 
Guidelines, proponents of development and associated personnel should respect 
the cultural sensitivities and needs of indigenous peoples and local communities 
for privacy, especially with regard to important ritual ceremonies, and also en-
sure that their activities do not interfere with daily routines and other activities 
of such communities.208 With regard to alternative resources, it should be noted 
that international human rights sources have not made reference to this but only 
referred to the need for continued access, because equivalent livelihood- earning 
potential may not provide for cultural appropriateness and may threaten the cul-
tural survival of certain communities. This points to the need to distinguish more 
clearly under the IFC Performance Standards between the international standards 
of benefit- sharing and requirements of compensation, which is discussed later in 
this chapter.209
Further types of benefits have been identified under the CBD to improve and con-
solidate the conditions under which indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ 
 203 African Commission, Endorois, para. 297.
 204 Akwé:  Kon Guidelines (n. 20)  para. 46. See M. Menton and A. Bennett, ‘PES:  Payments for 
Ecosystem Services and Poverty Alleviation?’ and I. Porras and N. Asquith, ‘Scaling- up Conditional 
Transfers for Environmental Protection and Poverty Alleviation’ in K. Schreckenberg et  al. (eds), 
Ecosystem Services and Poverty Alleviation: Trade- offs and Governance (London: Routledge, 2018) 189 
and 204 respectively.
 205 CBD, Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism, Decision V/ 25 (2000) paras 22– 23, 43.
 206 Ibid. paras 12– 13.
 207 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement, para. 26.
 208 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), para. 33.
 209 See Section 1.3.2 below.
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ecosystem stewards and traditional knowledge holders develop and maintain their 
practices. These benefits include information sharing, capacity building, scientific 
cooperation, or assistance in diversifying management capacities,210 as well as the 
incorporation of traditional knowledge in environmental and socio- cultural im-
pact assessments211 and in natural resource management planning.212 The last two 
options could be explored in the context of the substantive dimensions related of 
the standards on impact (self- )assessments213 and environmental management 
systems,214 having to do with the integration of indigenous peoples in project man-
agement itself, rather than as outside beneficiaries.
1.3.2   Cautions
Benefit- sharing arrangements, however, can be used in disruptive and damaging 
ways. The Inter- American Court, for instance, has noted that discussions on 
benefit- sharing can take the form of ‘attempts to undermine social cohesion of af-
fected communities by bribing community leaders or establishing parallel leaders, 
or by negotiating with individual members of the community. It thus considered 
these practices contrary to international standards,’215 in responding to evidence 
that benefit- sharing may be offered in exchange for obtaining consent.216 The 
Inter- American Court further noted that the mere offer of money and different 
economic benefits to obtain consent, without the State monitoring the dialogue 
between outsiders and indigenous peoples, encourages a climate of disrespect.217
There are also concerns about potential inequities when benefits are shared 
within communities. The Mo’ otz Kuxtal Guidelines note that ‘benefit- sharing 
should be fair and equitable within and among relevant groups, taking into account 
relevant community- level procedures, and as appropriate gender and age/ intergen-
erational considerations’. The Akwé: Kon Guidelines also provide significant words 
of caution on the risks of elite capture218 associated with benefit- sharing: they draw 
 210 Principles of the Ecosystem Approach (n. 7), para. 9; CBD expanded work programme on forest 
biodiversity, Decision VI/ 22 (2002) at goal 5, objective 1, activities; CBD work programme on moun-
tain biodiversity, CBD decision VII/ 27 (2004), Annex, para. 1.3.7; Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), paras 
40 and 46; Addis Ababa Guidelines, CBD Decision VII/ 12 (2004), Annex II, rationale to Principle 4; 
CBD, Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit- Sharing (n. 106), para. 50.
 211 Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), para. 56.
 212 Addis Ababa Guidelines (n. 210), operational guidelines to Principle 4; and CBD work pro-
gramme on forest biodiversity, para. 34. See also Agenda 21 (1992) UN Doc. A/ CONF.151/ 26/ Rev.1 vol. 
1, Annex II, para. 15(4)(g) and Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (2002) UN Doc. A/ CONF.199/ 
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 216 Ibid. para. 194.
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in Development’ Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 14- 18 (2013), at http:// ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2353493.
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attention to the ‘affected community and its people as a whole’ so as to ensure that 
‘particular individuals or groups are not unjustly advantaged or disadvantaged to 
the detriment of the community as a result of the development’.219
In addition, business enterprises themselves have noted the challenge that 
national regulatory frameworks on benefit- sharing are insufficient.220 In ef-
fect, there is more developed national legislation on EIAs and on FPIC than on 
benefit- sharing.221 National legal frameworks could, for instance, require that 
companies share benefits with all community members, rather than only those dir-
ectly participating in joint ventures, through different stages of the project cycle.222 
Furthermore, national legal frameworks could determine the extent to which de-
velopers will be held responsible for monitoring project impacts, disseminating 
information, and using it to inform periodic reviews of benefit- sharing agreements 
in light of international standards of best practice.223
Finally, the distinction between benefit- sharing and compensation can be diffi-
cult to draw in practice and can be abused. Such distinction is not clear, in effect, 
in existing standards, which is notably the case of the IFC Standards.224 The Global 
Compact guidance on business responsibility to respect indigenous peoples’ rights 
focuses on compensation, indicating that businesses are expected to ensure that 
population increases caused by business activity do not strain natural resources, 
and do not otherwise disrupt the way of life for indigenous peoples, including their 
access to food, water, medicinal plants, animals, and other resources.225 In add-
ition, business are further expected to provide compensation and restitution for 
damages inflicted upon the territory, land, and resources of indigenous peoples 
and the rehabilitation of degraded environments caused by any existing or historic 
activities that did not obtain FPIC. Businesses are also to ensure that the allocated 
budget from activities covers all costs associated with closure and restoration and 
include sufficient funds to provide for potential future liabilities. The OECD- FAO 
Guidance on Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, on the other hand, clarifies 
that benefit- sharing is separate (and may be additional) to compensation for un-
avoidable adverse impacts.226
 219 CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), para. 51.
 220 Special Rapporteur Anaya, Extractive industries operating within or near indigenous territories 
(2011) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 18/ 35, para. 49.
 221 P. Marchegiani, E. Morgera, and L. Parks, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Natural Resources in 
Argentina: The Challenges of Impact Assessment, Consent and Fair and Equitable Benefit- sharing in 
Cases of Lithium Mining (2019) 24 International Journal of Human Rights 224.
 222 C. Filer, ‘The Development Forum in Papua New Guinea:  Evaluating Outcomes for 
Local Communities’ in M. Langton and J. Longbottom (eds), Community Futures, Legal 
Architecture:  Foundations for Indigenous Peoples in the Global Mining Boom (Abingdon:  Routledge, 
2012) 145, 158.
 223 Ibid.
 224 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 5, para. 9; as discussed earlier, in Section 1.3.
 225 Ibid.
 226 OECD- FAO Guidance, 52.
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To clarify the distinction, former UN Special Rapporteur Anaya suggested 
that benefit- sharing may make up for broader, historical inequities that have de-
termined the situation in which the specific material and immaterial damage has 
arisen.227 These observations may support an argument whereby benefit- sharing 
is understood as a proactive tool for the full realization of human rights connected 
to natural resources in light of communities’ worldviews. Benefit- sharing can thus 
arguably be distinguished from compensation that is expected to make up for lost 
control over resources and income- generation opportunities.228 Benefit- sharing 
combines instead new opportunities of income generation and continued, or pos-
sibly enhanced, control over the use of the lands and resources affected by the de-
velopment.229 At the very least, the distinction rests on the fact that compensation 
derives from and is commensurate to a violation of the right to natural resources, 
whereas benefit- sharing is independent of any violation of their rights.230
1.3.3  Business- community agreements
The use of contractual tools for incorporating benefit- sharing agreements be-
tween companies and indigenous peoples, which is generally expected in the form 
for ‘mutually agreed’ benefits, as referred by both human rights bodies and CBD 
Parties,231 is also fraught with complexities. These agreements may also contain 
the written documentation of FPIC discussed earlier.232 Contractual negotiations 
may in principle function as a dialogic partnership- building process between pri-
vate companies and communities for a contextual application of benefit- sharing. 
But there have been well- documented, unequal negotiating powers, as well as in-
formation and capacity asymmetries.233 These concerns are compounded by ob-
jective difficulties in reconciling communities’ customary law within dominant 
legal systems,234 including in connection with dispute resolution. In principle, 
benefit- sharing contracts may provide an opportunity to ‘co- author’ the terms of 
 227 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/ HRC/ 24/ 41 (n. 109) para. 76.
 228 F. Lenzerini, ‘Reparations for Indigenous Peoples in International and Comparative Law:  An 
Introduction’ in F. Lenzerini (ed.), Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative 
Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 3, 13– 14. See also D. Shelton, ‘Reparations for 
Indigenous Peoples: The Present Value of Past Wrongs’ in Lenzerini (ibid.) 47, 60– 61 and 66– 69.
 229 E. Morgera, ‘The Need for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit- Sharing’ 
(2016) 27 European Journal of International Law 353, on the basis of Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/ 
HRC/ 21/ 47 (n. 187) paras 68, 74, and 76 and A/ HRC/ 24/ 41 (n. 109) para. 75.
 230 Morgera (n. 1) 1115– 17.
 231 IACtHR, Kaliña and Lokono, paras 227– 29 and 159. For a discussion, A. Lucas, ‘Participatory 
Rights and Strategic Litigation:  Benefits Forcing and Endowment Protection in Canadian Natural 
Resource Development’ in L. Barrera- Hernandez, B. Barton, L. Godden, A. Lucas, and A. Rønne 
(eds), Sharing the Costs and Benefits of Energy and Resource Activity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016) 339.
 232 Section 1.2.3 above.
 233 Morgera (n. 1) 1105.
 234 For a reflection on the challenges of legal pluralism in the context of benefit- sharing from bio-
prospecting, S. Vermeylen, ‘The Nagoya Protocol and Customary Law: The Paradox of Narratives in the 
Law’ (2013) 9 Law Environment & Development Journal 185.
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cooperation between companies and indigenous peoples.235 Contracts may in-
corporate community worldviews as principles of interpretation, and/ or as elem-
ents determining the fairness and equity in benefit- sharing.236 They may also 
incorporate reference to international human rights standards237 to substantiate 
contractual obligations to respect community worldviews. The incorporation of 
different worldviews in contractual arrangements faces several practical chal-
lenges deriving from the limited opportunities for full and effective community 
engagement in contractual negotiations and likely clashing with the developer’s 
commercial demands for expediency and cost- effectiveness.238 A  further layer 
of complexity arises from confidentiality clauses in benefit- sharing agreements, 
which limits cross- community communication of lessons learnt in negotiating 
benefit- sharing.239 These fundamental challenges add to significant technical dif-
ficulties in accounting, calculating benefits, and ensuring environmental sustain-
ability, that require significant administrative capacity.
A recent analysis in the Canadian context has underscored that despite their 
private law nature, business- community benefit- sharing contracts are meant to 
secure public benefits, as an indirect means for the governments to comply with 
international and constitutional obligations towards indigenous peoples.240 This 
justifies a role for the State in the negotiations of business- community agreement. 
From the government perspective, these contracts incorporate the findings of im-
pact assessments, as well as providing for follow- up and monitoring obligations 
mandated by national law.241 Special Rapporteur Anaya underlined that ‘the State 
remains ultimately responsible for any inadequacy in the consultation or negoti-
ation procedures and therefore should employ measures to oversee and evaluate 
the procedures and their outcomes, and especially to mitigate against power im-
balances between the companies and the indigenous peoples with which they ne-
gotiate’.242 To this end, domestic legislation is needed to ensure that benefit- sharing 
serves as a ‘limit to contractual autonomy’, on the basis of international human 
rights law.243 In addition, consultations carried out directly by private companies 
with indigenous peoples should be supervised by the State.244 States are also to 
 235 N. Craik, H. Gardner, and D. McCarthy, ‘Indigenous— Corporate Private Governance and 
Legitimacy: Lessons Learned from Impact and Benefit Agreements’ (2017) 52 Resources Policy 379, 386.
 236 K. Carpenter and A. Riley, ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights’ 
(2014) 102 California Law Review 173.
 237 Cotula and Tienhaara (n. 47) 302.
 238 Craik et al. (n. 235) 384.
 239 K. Caine and N. Krogman, ‘Powerful or Just Plain Power- Full? A Power Analysis of Impact and 
Benefit Agreements in Canada’s North’ (2010) 23 Organization & Environment 76. See also M. Langton, 
‘The Resource Curse Compared:  Australian Aboriginal Participation in the Resource Extraction 
Industry and Distribution of Impacts’ in Langton and Longbottom (n. 222) 23, 29 and 38.
 240 See generally Craik et al. (n. 235).
 241 Ibid. 383.
 242 Special Rapporteur Anaya, A/ HRC/ 24/ 41 (n. 109) para. 62.
 243 Francioni (n. 184) 3, paras 23– 24 and 27.
 244 Ibid.
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verify that benefit- sharing agreements with extractive industries are crafted on 
the basis of full respect for indigenous peoples’ rights.245 On the ground, some 
evidence points to substantive positive impacts of government’s participation in 
negotiations between communities and companies.246 But it may be particularly 
complex for companies to respect international and national standards, if com-
munities themselves do not wish to involve the government out of concern that 
the contract may become a source of external control (including on the distribu-
tion of benefits within the community).247 More generally, communities could 
find themselves in an adversarial relationship with the government, as different 
State entities may have a vested interest in the negotiations. One approach to ad-
dress these concerns would be relying on national human rights ombudsmen as 
semi- independent government entities that can mediate and facilitate negotiations 
between private companies and communities, including by signalling when pro-
posals may be undermining existing human rights.248
Even more complexity surrounds community negotiations with private op-
erators that are foreign investors. These negotiations may be constrained by the 
terms of an investor- State contract, which may limit the types of benefits to be 
made available, such as local employment and local business opportunities.249 
States could include in their agreement with investors an obligation for the latter to 
conclude a benefit- sharing agreement with communities, determining goals and 
minimum parameters below which the investor- community agreement cannot 
go.250 This would allow the government to monitor and enforce possible violations 
of the investor- community benefit- sharing contract, including by sanctioning the 
violation of key terms of benefit- sharing contracts with the termination of State- 
investor agreements.251
Overall, the use of private and/ or public instruments for encapsulating mutually 
agreed benefit- sharing remains a matter for further study in international environ-
mental, human rights, and investment law. Much remains to be understood about 
the actual room for communities’ worldviews to be expressed, understood, and 
realized within contractual, investment, and corporate legal tools and structures.252 
More research is also required on the necessary oversight of benefit- sharing agree-
ments, including with regard to integrating in such scrutiny also indigenous pro-
cedural and substantive standards.253
 245 Ibid. paras 88 and 92.
 246 Langton (n. 239) 32.
 247 Craik et al. (n. 235) 385.
 248 See generally Marchegiani et al. (n. 221).
 249 Cotula and Tienhaara (n. 47) 292.
 250 Albeit to the extent allowed by the State’s bilateral investment treaties: ibid. 303 and 294.
 251 Ibid. 303 and 293.
 252 Ibid. 293.
 253 C. Kamphuis, ‘Contesting Indigenous- Industry Agreements in Latin America’ in D. 
Newman and I. Odumosu- Ayanu (eds), The Law and Politics of Indigenous- Industry Agreements 
(London: Routledge, 2019).
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2 Protected areas
The establishment of protected areas or other areas for the conservation of habitats, 
ecosystems, or certain species both on land and at sea is one of the most basic tech-
niques for environmental protection.254 Such techniques have been widely used at 
the international level, with the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance255 and the World Heritage Convention256 being the pioneers in this 
respect. A substantive standard of corporate environmental responsibility is based 
upon the international identification and protection of particular sites, for their 
environmental and cultural characteristics. It entails that business respects at least 
areas where the international community has recognized a global value and the 
need for international cooperation, avoiding undermining the purpose for which 
protected areas have been created.257
This is not a common standard across the corporate accountability initiatives 
discussed in the previous chapter, however:  the IFC Performance Standards 
are the exception in this connection. Two Performance Standards are relevant 
here: Performance Standard 8 on cultural heritage and Performance Standard 6 on 
biodiversity.
2.1 Natural and cultural heritage
IFC Performance Standard 8 is purportedly based on the World Heritage 
Convention, and aims to guide clients on how to protect irreplaceable cul-
tural heritage in the course of their operations.258 Under the World Heritage 
Convention, listed World Heritage ‘natural’ sites include areas that constitute 
the habitat of threatened species of animals of outstanding universal value from 
the point of view of science or conservation.259 Cases of corporate environmen-
tally irresponsible conduct addressed by the World Heritage Committee have 
demonstrated how cultural and natural heritage are often interlinked and how 
 254 See, eg, A. Gillispie, Protected Areas and International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007); and 
A. Cliquet and H. Schoukens, ‘Terrestrial Areas Protection’ in Morgera and Razzaque (n. 52) 110.
 255 A. Kiss and D. Shelton, International Environmental Law, 3rd edn (New  York:  Transnational 
Publishers, 2004) 377– 80.
 256 Ibid. 380– 87.
 257 Earthwatch Institute, IUCN, and World Business Council for Sustainable Development, ‘Business 
and Biodiversity:  The Handbook for Corporate Action’ (2002) <http:// www.wbcsd.ch/ DocRoot/ 
ob3ZstqTvcmXQVtEtMxh/ 20020819_ biodiversity.pdf> 25.
 258 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 8, para. 1.
 259 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage 
Convention) (Paris, 16 November 1972, in force 17 December 1975)  Art. 2.  See, eg, M. Bowman, 
P. Davies and C. Redgwell, Lyster’s International Wildlife Law, 2nd edn (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2010) 451– 82; and F. Francioni (ed.), The World Heritage Convention: A Commentary 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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important the protection of one is to the protection of the other.260 The Standard 
is relevant from an environmental and human rights perspective for two 
reasons: it targets unique natural features, such as sacred groves, rocks, lakes, 
and watercourses; and it is also concerned with traditional knowledge.261 It is 
therefore closely linked with the international standards specific to indigenous 
peoples and local communities.262
Specifically, the IFC standard objectives include not only the protection of 
cultural heritage from adverse impacts of project activities, but also supporting 
its preservation and the equitable sharing of benefits from the use of cultural 
heritage in business activities.263 Thus, this is another instance in which the IFC 
expects companies to make a positive contribution rather than limiting them-
selves to ‘do no harm’ . In addition, the standard applies to all kinds of cultural 
heritage, regardless of whether it has been legally protected or previously dis-
turbed.264 This should be read in conjunction with the biodiversity standards 
related to protected areas, and could be interpreted as an additional standard 
that applies when cultural heritage is not included in a World Heritage Site, for 
example.
Performance Standard 8 expects companies to identify and protect cultural 
heritage by ‘undertaking internationally recognized practices for protection, 
field- based study and documentation’.265 There is no specific reference, however, 
to which international law sources could serve this purpose directly, but rather 
to the national law implementing the host country’s obligations under the World 
Heritage Convention.266 The CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines provide further detail, 
indicating that, in the event that sites or objects of potential heritage significance 
are uncovered during earthworks associated with a development, all activities in 
and around the area of discovery should cease until a proper archaeological or 
heritage assessment has been completed.267 Businesses are expected to site and de-
sign projects in order to avoid significant damage to cultural heritage, and not to 
diminish the chances of discovering cultural heritage products until an assessment 
by a competent specialist indicates what type of action to take.268 Furthermore, the 
company is expected to consult with affected communities who use or have used 
within living memory cultural heritage for long- standing cultural purposes.269 
 260 Eg Report of the Mission to the Kakadu National Park, Australia, 26 October– 1 November 1998 
(1998) UN Doc. WHC- 98/ CONF.203/ INF.18.
 261 2012 Performance Standard 8, para. 3.
 262 Section 1 above.
 263 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 8, Objectives; 2012 Performance Standard 8, Objectives. This is 
discussed in Section 3.1.1.
 264 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 8, para. 3; 2012 Performance Standard 8, para. 5.
 265 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 8, para. 6; 2012 Performance Standard 8, para. 8.
 266 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 8, para. 6.
 267 CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines (n. 20), para. 26.
 268 Ibid. para. 5.
 269 See Section 3.1.
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This has a two- fold purpose: first, to identify cultural heritage of importance, which 
calls for additional responsibility for the company; and second to incorporate into 
the client’s decision- making process communities’ views.270 Neither the 2006 or 
2012 version requested that companies obtain the prior informed consent of these 
communities, which is instead a requirement under international biodiversity law 
and international human rights law.271 In the case of conservation measures, FPIC, 
benefit- sharing, and indigenous peoples’ effective participation in management 
and monitoring of traditional territories, including continued access and use that 
are compatible with environmental protection, are required under international 
human rights law.272
The IFC Standard is more stringent when it relates to critical cultural heritage, 
as in the case of critical habitats for biodiversity protection in light of consultations 
with communities. Critical heritage also includes heritage situated in legally pro-
tected areas and internationally recognized ones.273 In these circumstances, the 
company is required not to significantly alter, damage, or remove the cultural heri-
tage. In exceptional circumstances, when the project may significantly damage 
critical cultural heritage and its loss may endanger the cultural or economic sur-
vival of communities that use such heritage for longstanding cultural purposes, 
the company will also conduct good faith negotiations and ensure the informed 
participation of affected communities, and mitigate other impacts on critical heri-
tage appropriately, also with the informed participation of communities.274 The 
2012 version also expects companies to allow continued access to the cultural site 
or provide an alternative access route, subject to overriding health, safety, and se-
curity considerations,275 which is an important consideration emerging from re-
gional human rights case law.276
The CBD Guidelines on Biodiversity and Tourism Development, in turn, sug-
gest277 controlling impacts of major tourist flows, reducing impacts of activities 
outside tourism areas on adjacent and other ecosystems of importance for tourism, 
contributing to the conservation of biodiversity, and conserving landscapes and 
heritage.278
 270 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 8, paras. 9 and 6; 2012 Performance Standard 8, para. 9.
 271 Morgera (n. 1) 1102. See Section 1 above.
 272 See African Commission, Endorois, paras 81, 156, 173, 249 and Recommendation 1(b); and 
IACtHR, Kaliña and Lokono paras 98, 138– 39, 159, and 197; and Special Rapporteur Anaya, Cases 
examined by the Special Rapporteur (June 2009– July 2010), (2010) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 15/ 37/ Add.1, 
paras 257– 67; and Report of the Special Rapporteur Anaya to the General Assembly (2016) UN Doc. A/ 
71/ 229, paras 74 and 80.
 273 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 8, para. 13.
 274 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 8, para. 9; 2012 Performance Standard 8, para. 14.
 275 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 8, para. 10.
 276 See sources at n. 272.
 277 CBD Biodiversity and Tourism Guidelines (n. 208), para. 44.
 278 Ibid. para. 49.
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2.2 Natural areas
IFC Performance Standard 6 focuses on legally protected areas and internationally 
recognized areas, and refers exclusively to proposed projects located within such 
sites, but does not provide for cases in which the project is located in an adjacent area. 
Cases of IFC- funded projects conducted in the vicinity of protected areas with se-
vere environmental adverse effects spilling into the protected sites have already been 
documented.279 This shortcoming may be compensated by other IFC Standards on 
sustainable use: the IFC 2012 version clarifies that biodiversity standards apply, on the 
basis of the impact (self- )assessment, to projects located in certain habitats, projects 
that may potentially impact on or are dependent on ecosystem services over which the 
company has management control or significant influence; or projects that include 
the production of living natural resources.280 The most recent version also introduced 
more specific requirements for biodiversity offsets, plantations and natural forests, 
management of renewable natural resources, and supply chains.281
The 2012 version refers to two international treaties, the World Heritage 
Convention and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, 
as well as the UNESCO Man and Biosphere Reserves,282 which is a global net-
work of national parks rather than a treaty.283 Ramsar sites are listed under the 
Convention on the basis of their international significance in terms of ‘ecology, 
botany, zoology, limnology or hydrology’.284 State Parties must promote the pro-
tection of the fundamental ecological functions of wetlands as regulators of 
water regimes and as habitats supporting a characteristic flora and fauna, espe-
cially migratory birds.285 It requires IFC clients to act only with legal permission, 
in a manner consistent with government- recognized protected- area management 
plans. Businesses also have to consult with sponsors, managers, and local commu-
nities, and implement additional programmes to promote and enhance conserva-
tion aims and effective management of the area.286
Even if the CBD programme on protected areas is explicitly addressed to State 
Parties, it contains guidance that has been considered relevant also for business, on 
how to respect indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ rights in the context 
 279 F. Wing Solis, Panama’s Corredor Sur: Turning the Bay of Panama into a ‘Faecal Swamp’ (September 
2000) < https:// www.ciel.org/ Publications/ IFCCSPanama.pdf >.
 280 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 6, paras 4– 5.
 281 Section 3.3 below.
 282 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 6, fn. 17.
 283 On biosphere reserves, see Gillispie (n. 254) 12– 13.
 284 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention) (Ramsar, 
2 February 1971, in force 21 December 1975) Art. 2(2). See, eg, Bowman, Davies, and Redgwell (n. 
259) 403– 50.
 285 Ramsar Convention, preamble and Arts 3– 4.
 286 Ibid. 6, para. 20.
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of protected areas, which has become an issue of increasing concern internation-
ally.287 The CBD programme on protected areas points to the role of business in 
assessing the economic and socio- cultural costs, benefits, and impacts arising from 
the establishment and maintenance of protected areas, particularly for indigenous 
peoples and local communities, to avoid and mitigate negative impacts, and, where 
appropriate, to compensate costs and equitably share benefits in accordance with 
national legislation. In addition, businesses can be expected to use social and eco-
nomic benefits generated by protected areas for poverty reduction, consistent with 
protected- area management objectives. Furthermore, companies operating in pro-
tected areas should engage indigenous peoples and local communities and relevant 
stakeholders in participatory planning, management, governance, and monitoring 
of protected areas, in line with the ecosystem approach288 and these communities’ 
rights under national legislation and applicable international obligations. In add-
ition, businesses are to identify barriers preventing adequate participation, pro-
vide resources for the involvement of indigenous peoples and local communities, 
and support the development of their capacities to establish and manage protected 
areas. In 2018 CBD Parties adopted further guidance on equitable management of 
protected areas, such as ensuring gender equality and legitimate representation of 
indigenous peoples and local communities, including in the establishment, gov-
ernance, planning, monitoring, and reporting of protected and conserved areas on 
their traditional territories (lands and waters);289 setting up appropriate proced-
ures and mechanisms for the effective participation of and/ or coordination with 
other stakeholders; transparency and accountability; procedures and mechanisms 
for fair dispute or conflict resolution; and a monitoring system that covers gov-
ernance issues, including impacts on the well- being of indigenous peoples and 
local communities,290 which is mainly procedural. The inter- governmental con-
sensus achieved under the CBD on indigenous and community conserved areas 
is particularly instructive in this connection,291 starting from the need to recog-
nize, respect, and support community- based approaches to conservation and the 
 287 Eg Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples— Conservation measures 
and their impact on indigenous peoples’ rights (2016) UN Doc. A/ 71/ 229.
 288 CBD COP Decision VII/ 28 (2006) paras 2.1, 2.1.4, and 2.15.
 289 Ibid. where the Conference of the Parties ‘notes that the establishment, management and moni-
toring of protected areas should take place with the full and effective participation of, and full respect 
for the rights of, indigenous and local communities consistent with national law and applicable inter-
national obligations’.
 290 CBD COP Decision XIV/ 8 (2018) Annex II Voluntary Guidance on Effective Governance Models 
for Management of Protected Areas, Including Equity, Taking into Account Work Being Undertaken 
under Article 8(j) and Related Provisions: B. Voluntary guidance on effective and equitable governance 
models.
 291 See generally H. Jonas, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ and Community Conserved Territories and Areas 
(ICCAs): Evolution in International Biodiversity Law’ in Morgera and Razzaque (n. 52) 145.
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integration of communities in governance and management arrangements,292 
which can provide more substantive guidance to business entities.
3 Sustainable use of natural resources
The concept of sustainable development is one of the foundations of the inter-
national agenda on corporate environmental accountability and responsibility. The 
CBD defines sustainable use as ‘the use of components of biological diversity in a 
way and at a rate that does not lead to the long- term decline of biological diver-
sity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present 
and future generations’.293 Interestingly, the Convention expressly calls for private- 
sector involvement in ensuring the sustainable use of biodiversity components.294 
In the relations among States, however, sustainable use is ‘highly contextualized 
and has no single fixed meaning’, but it can be considered a customary international 
rule in as far as living natural resources are concerned.295 It is also widely under-
stood as incorporating the idea that use is in principle not precluded but needs to 
take into account sustainability over time so the ‘rate or extent of utilization per-
mitted will vary depending on the status of the resource and the demands upon it 
at a particular time’, including in light of the precautionary principle/ approach.296
Both the UN Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises expect private companies 
to operate in a manner contributing to the objective of sustainable development. 
Only few standards, however, clarify what the private sector should be expected 
to do substantively to preserve natural resources for the benefit of future gen-
erations297 or at least to use natural resources at levels that are sustainable, thus 
allowing for the recovery of species currently depleted, and internationally pro-
tected, for example, or for the natural reproduction cycle of others. The CBD Addis 
Ababa Principles for Sustainable Use can provide some detailed guidance, as they 
set a framework for advising as to how the private sector should avoid leading to 
the long- term decline of biodiversity.298 Under the principle of adaptive manage-
ment, standards potentially applicable to the private sector include: ensuring that 
for particular uses adaptive management schemes are in place; responding quickly 
 292 CBD Decisions X/ 31/ B (2010) para. 31, XII/ 19 (2014) para. 4(f) and X/ 33 (2010) para. 8(i) in rela-
tion to climate change (which are addressed to ‘other/ relevant organizations’); and XII/ 5 (2014) para. 11 
(which is addressed to ‘relevant stakeholders’).
 293 CBD Art. 2.
 294 CBD Art. 10(e) reads as follows: ‘Encourage cooperation between its governmental authorities 
and its private sector in developing methods for sustainable use of biological resources.’
 295 C. Redgwell, ‘Sustainable Use of Natural Resources’ in Krämer and Orlando (n. 184) 115.
 296 Ibid. 121. On precaution as a standard of corporate environmental accountability, see Ch. 4, 
Section 2.3.
 297 Barral (n. 185) 103.
 298 CBD Sustainable Use Principles, Principle 1.
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to unsustainable practices; and designing monitoring systems on a temporal scale 
sufficient to ensure that information about the status of the resource and ecosys-
tems is available to inform management decisions for the conservation of the re-
source. Other principles potentially applicable to business entities in the Addis 
Ababa Principles include ensuring the compatibility of spatial and temporal scale 
of management with ecological and socio- economic scales of use and its impacts, 
enabling full public participation in preparation of management plans to better 
ensure ecological and socioeconomic sustainability;299 optimizing benefits from 
users,300 and involving local stakeholders to equitably share monetary and non- 
monetary benefits with them for their efforts.301
The following sub- sections will explore the extent to which international 
standards have clarified the expected conduct of private companies with regard 
to: threatened or endangered species, sustainable production, ecosystem services, 
invasive alien species, habitats, and sustainable agri- business.
3.1 Threatened or endangered species
Threatened or endangered species have been identified, listed, and periodically re-
viewed by the international community through certain international agreements, 
such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)302 
and the Convention on Migratory Species.303 Although private companies can 
quite easily identify species that are globally relevant according to the decisions 
and recommendations under these international treaties, as well as through com-
munication with national authorities, the actual standard of conduct may, how-
ever, be very difficult to strictly define in practice.304
The IFC addresses business responsibility vis- à- vis critically endangered or en-
demic species in relation to critical habitats, which are considered of high biodiver-
sity value also because of globally significant concentrations of migratory species 
and highly threatened or unique ecosystems.305 Accordingly, companies are not 
 299 Ibid. Principle 7.
 300 Ibid. Principle 11.
 301 Ibid. Principle 12.
 302 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (Washington, 
3 March 1973, in force 1 July 1975). See generally, Bowman, David, and Redgwell (n. 259) 483– 534; and 
E. Techera, ‘Species- based Conservation’ in Morgera and Razzaque (n. 52) 97.
 303 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn, 23 June 1979, in 
force 1 November 1983). See generally, Bowman, David, and Redgwell (n. 259) 535– 84; and Techera 
(n. 302).
 304 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Montego Bay, 10 December 
1992, in force 16 November 1994) Arts 61(3), 62(1), 119(1)(a), and 150(b), eg, refers to several stand-
ards:  maximum sustainable yield, optimum utilization, and rational management. See, eg, D.  Diz, 
‘Marine Biodiversity: Unravelling the Intricacies of Global Frameworks and Applicable Concepts’ in 
Morgera and Razzaque (n. 52) 123.
 305 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 8, para. 16.
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supposed to implement any project activity only if three conditions are met. First, 
there are no measurable adverse impacts on biodiversity values and ecological pro-
cesses. Second, the project does not lead to a net reduction in global or national 
population of endangered species over a reasonable period of time. Third, there is a 
robust, appropriate long- term biodiversity monitoring and evaluation programme 
in the environmental management systems.306 Similar to the 2006 version, this 
seems to presume that only in critical habitats, but not in natural ones, is there a 
risk for irreversible damage or irreplaceable biodiversity loss, and the definition of 
critical habitats relies on international standards, although not on relevant inter-
national environmental agreements. Reference is made instead to the endangered 
species listed in the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red 
List of Threatened Species.307 It remains unclear why the Performance Standard 
does not make reference to international treaties that list endangered species, in 
addition to the IUCN Red List. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), for in-
stance, had suggested excluding from financing projects that could lead to trading 
species listed as endangered under CITES Appendix I.308
3.2 Sustainable production
The 2011 review of the OECD Guidelines considered ‘exploring and assessing ways 
to improve environmental performance’ with reference to emission reduction, ef-
ficient resource use, the management of toxic substances, and the conservation of 
biodiversity.309 Regrettably, this addition was not addressed in the commentary to 
the Guidelines. Nevertheless, the environment chapter of the OECD Guidelines 
refers to sustainable production as the development and provision of products or 
services that: have no undue environmental impacts; are safe in their intended use; 
are efficient in their consumption of energy and natural resources; and can be re-
used, recycled, or disposed of safely.310 The same standard also incorporates a re-
quirement related to climate change, in that products should ‘reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions’.311 These add to procedural standards for companies to explore and 
 306 2012 Performance Standard 6, para. 17.
 307 The main purpose of the IUCN Red List is to catalogue and highlight those taxa that are facing a 
higher risk of global extinction (ie those listed as Critically Endangered, Endangered and Vulnerable). 
Since 1997, the Red List has been prepared jointly by IUCN and UN Environment Programme- World 
Conservation Monitoring Centre.
 308 WWF (A. Durbin, S. Herz, D. Hunter, and J. Peck), Shaping the Future of Sustainable 
Finance: Moving from Paper Promises to Performance (January 2006) 42.
 309 OECD Council, ‘OECD Guidelines Update 2011— Note by the Secretary- General’, Appendix II, 
para. II.A.10; and OECD Guidelines, ch. VI, para. 6.d.
 310 See Ch. 4, Section 2.2.
 311 OECD Guidelines, ch. VI, para. 4(c).
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assess ways of improving the environmental performance of the enterprise over 
the longer term, for instance by developing strategies for emission reduction, ef-
ficient resource utilization and recycling, substitution or reduction of use of toxic 
substances, or strategies on biodiversity.312 These could contribute to address some 
of the causes of biodiversity loss.
The IFC has also included standards on sustainable use, which have been subject 
to evolution. In accordance with the objectives of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity,313 the 2006 version made reference also to sustainable natural resources 
management, based on the principle of sustainable development (defined as sup-
porting the adoption of practices that integrate conservation needs and develop-
ment priorities).314 The IFC translated the concept of sustainable development as 
‘the use, development and protection of resources in a way or at a rate that en-
ables people and communities to provide for their present social, economic, and 
cultural well- being while also sustaining the potential of those resources to meet 
the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations and safeguarding the life- 
supporting capacity of the air, water, and soil ecosystems’.315
The IFC Performance Standard then targets companies engaged in primary 
production of living natural resources (including forestry, agriculture, animal 
husbandry, fisheries, and aquaculture), particularly in the absence of appropriate 
and applicable global, regional, or national standards.316 Additional requirements 
include: committing to applying international industry operating principles and 
good management practices and available technology; actively engaging and 
supporting the development of national standards, for the definition and dem-
onstration of sustainable practices; and (as was the case in the previous version 
of the Standards) committing to achieving certification.317 In the case of multi- 
stakeholders’ schemes based on international environmental law principles, this 
may well be a practical solution to adapt the standards to different industry sectors. 
Certification, however, has been the object of sustained criticism for their weak im-
plementation and monitoring.318 Reliance on private certification schemes along a 
complex supply chain has also been considered ‘a cause for concern’ because of the 
potential for rent- seeking behaviour by certification scheme operators.319 Finally, 
 312 Ibid. para. 4(d).
 313 2006 Performance Standard 6, para. 1; 2012 Performance Standard 6, para. 1.
 314 2006 Performance Standard 6, para. 1 and Objectives.
 315 IFC Performance Standard 6, fn. 7.
 316 2012 Performance Standard 6, para. 26.
 317 Ibid. paras 26 and 29– 30.
 318 K. Bourdreaux and S. Schang, ‘Threats of, and Responses to, Agribusiness Land Acquisitions’ 
(2019) 4 Business and Human Rights Journal 365, 369.
 319 J. Lin, ‘Governing Biofuels:  A Principal- Agent Analysis of the European Union Biofuels 
Certification Regime and the Clean Development Mechanism’ (2012) 24 Journal of Environmental 
Law 43.
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private companies are also expected to prefer suppliers that can demonstrate they 
are not significantly impacting on natural or critical habitats.320
3.3 Ecosystem services
The 2012 version of the IFC Performance Standards also added an objective on the main-
tenance of ecosystem services.321 These are also included in the Performance Standard 
on community health,322 calling upon business enterprises to determine likely adverse 
impacts on ecosystem services, and systematically identify priority ecosystem services 
(either those having adverse impacts on affected communities or those on which the 
project will be directly dependent for its operations) in a participatory process. These are 
aimed at avoiding negative impacts, or minimizing them and implementing measures 
to increase the operations’ resource efficiency,323 including in connection with commu-
nity health, relocation, indigenous peoples, and cultural heritage.324
As a substantive dimension of the international standards on environmental 
management systems,325 the Global Compact, in 2012, produced a framework for 
developing, implementing, and disclosing policies and practices on biodiversity 
and ecosystem services that are integrated into corporate sustainability strategies, 
responding to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment.326 Accordingly, the frame-
work identified first relevant procedural standards, such as identifying and valuing 
the company’s dependencies, as well as its direct and indirect impacts on biodiversity 
and ecosystem services. In addition, it expects companies to adopt an integrated re-
porting approach that shows impacts and dependency as an integral part of company 
operational and financial performance at different levels. The framework also calls 
for monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on biodiversity impacts using relevant bio-
diversity and ecosystem service impact indicators, and establish a review mechanism 
to build these results into company strategy and overall corporate sustainability. On a 
more substantive note, the framework further supports companies in extending the 
strategy along the supply chain by integrating requirements to safeguard biodiversity 
and ecosystem services in sourcing schemes and provide support to suppliers, espe-
cially micro, small, and medium- sized operators.327
 320 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 6. para. 31.
 321 2012 Performance Standard 6, Objectives and paras 2– 3. On the concept of ecosystem services, 
see Ch. 1, Section 1.
 322 2012 Performance Standard 4, para. 8.
 323 Ibid. paras 24– 25.
 324 Ibid. para. 25, with reference to Performance Standards 4– 5 and 7– 8.
 325 Ch. 4, Section 2.1.2.
 326 See Ch. 1.
 327 UN Global Compact and IUCN, A Framework for Corporate Action on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (2012) https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/ library/ 139
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3.4 Invasive alien species
In the sphere of biodiversity protection, prevention standards of a substantive na-
ture imply the avoidance of the risk of irreversible biodiversity loss. More developed 
prevention standards have emerged with regard to invasive alien species, which 
is addressed by the CBD Tourism Guidelines328 and is also expected from private 
companies receiving funding from the IFC. The IFC requires that companies ‘seek 
to avoid’, ‘as a matter of priority’, impacts on biodiversity and ecosystem services, by 
adopting adaptive management practices so that the implementation of mitigation 
and management measures are responsive to changing conditions and the results of 
monitoring throughout the project’s life- cycle,329 which is arguably a translation of 
the CBD ecosystem approach.330 Accordingly, IFC clients should not intentionally 
introduce new alien species, unless in accordance with existing regulatory frame-
works and subject to risk assessment to determine the potential for invasive behav-
iour.331 The 2012 version clarifies that companies must also implement measures to 
avoid potential accidental or unintended introductions, and exercise due diligence 
in not spreading invasive alien species to areas in which they have not been estab-
lished. In addition, clients are expected to take measures ‘as practicable’ to eradicate 
these species from natural habitats over which they have management control.332 The 
CBD Guiding Principles for the Prevention, Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts 
of Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species also call for taking into 
account risks for unintentional introduction of alien species in environmental im-
pact assessments.333 The OECD– FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply 
Chains, more laconically, calls upon agri- business to minimize the spread of invasive 
alien species.334
3.5  Habitats
With reference to the private sector’s impacts on habitats, IFC Performance 
Standard 6 differentiates between modified habitats, natural habitats, and critical 
habitats. In the first instance— modified habitats, including agricultural land and 
 328 Ibid., para. 67.
 329 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 6, para. 7.
 330 See generally Morgera (n. 52). On international standards on cultural heritage, see Section 
3.2 above.
 331 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 6, paras 12– 13; 2012 Performance Standard 6, para. 22.
 332 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 6, para. 23.
 333 CBD Guiding Principles for the Prevention, Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of Alien 
Species that Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species, Decision VI/ 23 (2002), Guiding Principle 11. 
See generally S. Burgiel, ‘Invasive Alien Species’ in Morgera and Razzaque (n. 52) 283. On EIAs, see Ch. 
4, Section 2.1.1.
 334 OECD– FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, 66.
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forest plantations, that still have significant biodiversity value335— under the 2006 
version, companies were expected to ‘exercise care’ to minimize any conversion 
or degradation of modified habitats, but also to identify opportunities to enhance 
habitats and preserve biodiversity as part of their operations, albeit depending on 
the nature and scale of the project.336 This was a case in which the IFC Performance 
Standards not only aimed at environmental damage avoidance or control, but also 
encouraged the private sector to make an active contribution to environmental 
protection. The 2012 version, instead, has strengthened the requirement for min-
imizing impacts, but only added the implementation of mitigation measures.337
In the second case— natural habitats— the Standard allows for significant con-
version or degradation to occur. In effect, the CAO had raised concerns that the 
2006 Standards did not include the principle that projects should be sited on land 
that has already been converted, or the requirement to minimize unavoidable im-
pacts or degradation of natural habitats rather than merely mitigate them.338 As a 
result, the 2012 Standard sets the following conditions: there are no viable alter-
natives within the region, consultation has established stakeholders’ and affected 
communities’ view on the extent of conversion and degradation, and mitigation is 
designed to achieve no net biodiversity loss such as set- asides, biological corridors, 
ecosystem restoration, or biodiversity offsets.339 Set- aside areas are excluded from 
development and targeted for conservation enhancement measures, and should be 
identified by their ‘high conservation value’ based on internationally recognized 
guidelines.340
The 2012 version also included a set of safeguards around biodiversity offsets, 
as part of the mitigation hierarchy:341 they are to be designed and implemented 
to achieve ‘measurable conservation outcomes’, be reasonably expected to result 
in ‘no net loss’ and preferably in a ‘net gain of biodiversity’ (which is required for 
critical habitats), and adhere in their design to the ‘like- for- like or better’ principle, 
as well as being carried out by external experts on the basis of best available infor-
mation and current practices.342 The Global Compact’s framework for developing, 
implementing, and disclosing policies and practices on biodiversity and ecosystem 
services that are integrated into corporate sustainability strategies, identifies the 
following steps: companies are to avoid, minimize, and rehabilitate negative im-
pacts and then offset any unavoidable residual biodiversity losses, prioritizing im-
plementation on sites of high biodiversity value; and encourage the adoption of 
this approach throughout the supply chain, with a view to achieving a net positive 
 335 Ibid. paras 11– 12.
 336 IFC 2006 Performance Standard 6, para. 6.
 337 Ibid., para. 12.
 338 CAO (n. 141) para. 49. No reply in IFC response (n. 120) 5.
 339 IFC 2012 Standard 6, paras 14– 15.
 340 Ibid. para. 14 and fn. 10.
 341 This was discussed in relation to the standard of prevention in Ch. 4, Section 2.2.
 342 IFC 2012 Performance Standard 6, para. 10.
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impact or at the minimum no net loss of biodiversity.343 Although offsets remain 
controversial under the CBD,344 former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
and the Environment Knox cautioned against ‘reject[ing] the concept [of offsets] 
entirely’ as properly employed, offsets ‘can help to fulfil the duties and responsi-
bilities of States and corporations to protect and respect the human rights of those 
most directly affected by the commercial exploitation of natural resources’.345
3.6 Sustainable agri- business
The more specific international guidance on the role of agri- business provides a 
good example of a sectoral approach to sustainable use that brings together, con-
textualizes, and further details standards of corporate environmental accountability 
and responsibility. At the same time, it illustrates unsettled views on certain substan-
tive benchmarks. The OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply 
Chains, for instance, provides a more specific translation of the prevention stand-
ards,346 calling upon agri- business to reduce food loss and waste, promote recyc-
ling, control and minimize the spread of invasive alien species,347 and enhance the 
productive use of waste and/ or by- products. It also calls for implementing technic-
ally and financially feasible and cost- effective measures for improving efficiency in 
energy consumption; and taking measures, as appropriate, to reduce and/ or remove 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.348 In addition, it spells out sustainable use stand-
ards in terms of ‘good agricultural practices’, such as: maintaining or improving soil 
fertility and avoiding soil erosion; increasing the resilience of agriculture and food 
systems, the supporting habitats, and related livelihoods to the effects of climate 
change through adaptation measures;349 and selecting the most appropriate pro-
duction system to enhance resource use efficiency while preserving the future avail-
ability of current resources, such as water and agricultural inputs and outputs.350
As agri- business has surpassed extractives as the sector ‘most often implicated 
in killings of land and environmental defenders’ due to land tenure- related con-
flicts,351 and also because of environmental and human rights impacts arising from 
 343 UN Global Compact and IUCN, A Framework for Corporate Action on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (2012), < https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/ library/ 139> Last visited 22 December 2019.
 344 Eg World Bank and Profor, Biodiversity Offsets: A User Guide (2016) < https:// www.cbd.int/ finan-
cial/ doc/ wb- offsetguide2016.pdf> last visited on 22 December 2019.
 345 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoy-
ment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, on his visit to Madagascar, (2017) UN Doc. 
A/ HRC/ 34/ 49/ Add.1, paras 43– 45.
 346 See Ch. 4, Section 2.2.
 347 See Section 3.4 above.
 348 OECD- FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, 66 and fnn 84– 89.
 349 Ibid.
 350 Ibid.
 351 Bourdreaux and Schang (n. 318) 366.
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the use of pesticides,352 further guidance has emerged from international human 
rights processes. Former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Olivier 
De Schutter has pointed out the need to prevent negative impacts on small- scale 
farmers353 and to support agro- ecological forms of production (ie sustainable, 
knowledge- intensive modes of production that rely on on- farm fertility gener-
ation and pest management rather than on external inputs).354 He opposed highly 
input- intensive modes of production that rely on external inputs such as improved 
varieties of seeds and chemical fertilizers that increase dependency and under-
mine sustainable practices such as biological control, composting, poly- cropping, 
or agroforestry.355 These recommendations go well beyond the reference to good 
agricultural practices in the OECD- FAO Guidance.
4 Preliminary conclusions
Substantive international standards of corporate environmental responsibility 
have started to emerge and have quickly reached a significant level of detail,356 
particularly in the context of sectoral approaches. With regard to substantive 
standards to ensure business respect of indigenous peoples’ human rights, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity has provided a global good- practice reference 
with its Akwé: Kon Guidelines on socio- cultural and environmental impact assess-
ments, which have been extensively used to fill gaps across international standards 
of corporate environmental accountability and responsibility. Nevertheless, more 
clarity is still needed on the interface of prior (self- )assessments, FPIC, and fair and 
equitable benefit- sharing as iterative and culturally appropriate processes. And this 
is in addition to practical challenges in ensuring that companies’ (self- )assessment 
practices do not preclude communities from expressing their views in ways that 
effectively influence the decision- making process.
While FPIC is increasingly required, divergences of interpretation among States 
are reflected in international standards of corporate environmental responsibility 
 352 D. Strouss, ‘Bringing Pesticide Injury Cases to US Courts:  The Challenges of Transnational 
Litigation’ (2019) 4 Business and Human Rights Journal 337; and UN Special Rapporeur on the Right 
to Food Hilal Elver (in collaboration with UN Special Rapportuer on Toxics), Report on the Effects of 
pesticides on the right to food (2017) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 34/ 48.
 353 UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, Final Report:  The 
Transformative Potential of the Right to Food (2014) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 25/ 57, 27.
 354 UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, Report on agroecology and the 
right to food (2011) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 16/ 49.
 355 UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, Report to the General 
Assembly: Human Rights Criteria for Making Contract Farming and Other Business Models Inclusive 
of Small- scale Farmers (2011) UN Doc. A/ 66/ 262, paras 54, 25, and 31.
 356 Contra S. Deva, ‘UN’s Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?’ (2004) 10 ILSA Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 493, 509, where the author argues that international standards are ‘generally so vague 
and general that it is quite easy to comply with their words without adhering to their spirit’.
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with regard to the nature of consent, the need for appropriate representation for 
indigenous peoples and other communities, and the need to provide documen-
tation of consent. Standards converge on the need for culturally appropriate pro-
cesses. But divergences can be detected with regard to the degree and modalities 
of information- sharing, the timing of the FPIC process, and the implications of 
its iterative nature. An international standard on benefit- sharing has also increas-
ingly emerged, but much remains to be clarified about the kind of benefits to be 
shared and the safeguards to be put in place to avoid top- down and bad- faith 
practices that have resulted in disruptive and damaging impacts on communities. 
Finally, a great challenge surrounds the roles of companies in taking into account 
the limited capacities of indigenous peoples and local communities to engage in 
negotiations and put in place concrete measures to enhance communities’ capaci-
ties, with a view to making EIAs, FPIC, and benefit- sharing a genuine process of 
partnership- building.
A substantive standard of corporate environmental responsibility based upon 
the international identification and protection of particular sites, for their en-
vironmental and cultural characteristics, is still not common despite the ease of 
identifying relevant benchmarks in international environmental treaties. The IFC 
Performance Standards remain the exception in this context. With regard to the 
sustainable use of natural resources, few standards have clarified what the private 
sector should be expected to do substantively to use natural resources at levels that 
allow for the recovery of species currently depleted, and internationally protected, 
for example, or for the natural reproduction cycle of others. Nevertheless, more 
international guidance is becoming available to address specifically threatened 
or endangered species, sustainable production, ecosystem services, invasive alien 
species, habitats, and sustainable agri- business.
While there is a significant degree of convergence among all these stand-
ards, continuing divergence points to particularly controversial concepts in 
international law remain, such as free prior informed consent, biodiversity off-
sets, or agro- ecology, to name a few examples. These are also several thematic 
areas where substantive standards of corporate environmental responsibility 
could be much more detailed, such as in the case of climate change,357 the use 
 357 UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment David Boyd, Report ‘Safe 
Climate’ (2019) UN Doc. A/ 74/ 161, para. 72, identified as the ‘five main responsibilities of business 
related to climate change . . . to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from their own activities and their 
subsidiaries; reduce greenhouse gas emissions from their products and services; minimize greenhouse 
gas emissions from their suppliers; publicly disclose their emissions, climate vulnerability and the risk 
of stranded assets; and ensure that people affected by business- related human rights violations have 
access to effective remedies’ (citing Expert Group on Climate Obligations of Enterprises, Principles on 
Climate Obligations of Enterprises: Legal Perspectives for Global Challenges (Expert Group on Climate 
Obligations of Enterprises, 2018). Note that contrary to his 2007 report on biodiversity, which con-
tained specific references to business responsibility to respect human rights and biodiversity, there was 
no reference to business responsibility in in the 2006 report on climate change of former UN Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment John Knox (2006) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 31/ 52.
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of traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples, farmers, and local commu-
nities,358 and the transfer of technologies.359 Furthermore, standards have 
been mainly conceived in relation to land, so ocean- related conservation and 
sustainable use remain so far unaddressed explicitly by existing international 
guidance.
 358 See generally E. Morgera, ‘Fair and Equitable Benefit- sharing at the Crossroads of the Human 
Right to Science and International Biodiversity Law’ (2015) 4 Laws 803, 819– 26 and Report of the UN 
Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights: the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and 
its applications (2012) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 20/ 26.
 359 Global Compact, Principle 9; OECD Guidelines, ch. IX; and OECD- FAO Guidance for 
Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains, 29. See also, generally, Morgera (n. 358) 817– 19 and Special 
Rapporteur on cultural rights (n. 358).
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 International Oversight
International initiatives on corporate environmental accountability and responsi-
bility have not limited themselves to standard- setting, but have also put in place 
mechanisms to monitor corporate conduct, exercise some degree of oversight on 
the implementation of international standards, and/ or consider complaints from 
members of the public. Even the UN Global Compact, which was ‘not designed, 
nor does it have the mandate or resources, to monitor or measure participants’ per-
formance’,1 has developed a procedure to handle ‘credible allegations of system-
atic or egregious abuse of [its] overall aims and principles’.2 The UN Framework 
on Business and Human Rights and its Guiding Principles are in turn subject 
to a follow- up mechanism under the Working Group on Business and Human 
Rights.3 By far the most well- established procedure can be found under the OECD 
Guidelines,4 which is based on the creation of national contact points (NCPs) in 
adhering countries, handling inquiries (‘specific instances’) at the national level.5 
Under the International Finance Corporation (IFC), inclusion of environmental 
conditions in loan agreements by the IFC allows the use of contractual enforcement 
approaches, while an independent Ombudsman is available to receive complaints 
from affected communities and individuals. In addition, UN Special Rapporteurs 
on human rights increasingly address specific instances of corporate disregard for 
international standards in their country visits.
This chapter will assess the evolving mandate and practices of the international 
initiatives on corporate environmental accountability and responsibility discussed 
in the previous chapters, with a view to drawing comparative observations about 
the functions they perform. The chapter will first place international oversight ap-
proaches in the context of the academic debate on compliance. It will focus on ana-
lysing the practice of the best- developed initiatives (the OECD implementation 
procedure and the IFC Ombudsman) and then contrast them with more incipient 
 1 UN Global Compact, ‘Note on Integrity Measures’ (12 April 2010)  available at <https:// www.
unglobalcompact.org/ docs/ about_ the_ gc/ Integrity_ measures/ Integrity_ Measures_ Note_ EN.pdf> ac-
cessed 27 February 2016, 1.
 2 Ibid. On the origins of the procedure, see K. Norwrot, ‘The New Governance Structure of the Global 
Compact: Transforming a “Learning Network” into a Federalized and Parlamentarized Transnational 
Regulatory Regime’ (2005) 47 Essays in Transnational Economic Law 24– 30.
 3 HRC Res. 17/ 4 (2011) para. 6.
 4 The Implementation Procedure of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises is included 
in Part II of the OECD Guidelines, Section 1.
 5 OECD Guidelines, Section 2.
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initiatives, such as the country visits by UN Special Rapporteurs and the integrity 
measures under the UN Global Compact. The aim of the analysis is to understand 
the contribution of these processes not only to the implementation of international 
standards in a particular context, but also to further international standard- setting 
itself.
1 Tools for compliance?
International oversight initiatives may serve to bring to light instances of sub-
standard corporate conduct in the natural resource sector and potentially to 
proactively manage possible conflicts among different stakeholders through an 
independent mechanism for assessing facts and facilitating the identification of 
constructive solutions. These mechanisms may provide a readily available, in-
expensive, and impartial avenue for individuals, communities, and civil society 
groups to have their complaints against private companies heard, going beyond 
the hurdles and bias that may be experienced in accessing justice at the national 
level.6 From a practical perspective, oversight may be also helpful in documenting 
the instances in which private companies respect international standards of cor-
porate environmental accountability and responsibility. On the one hand, the 
evidence gathered by these international mechanisms can support the claims of af-
fected communities and civil society, lending them more weight in processes with 
public authorities and private companies. On the other hand, these mechanisms 
may respond to requests from private companies to have allegations against them 
assessed and managed by an independent entity through fact- finding and good 
offices, thereby helping to prevent conflicts from escalating. And although these 
monitoring activities result only in non- binding recommendations to companies 
or even only to the State in which they operate, a systematic assessment of the en-
vironmental conduct of enterprises, based on internationally recognized stand-
ards, may arguably put sufficient pressure on individual companies to stop harmful 
conduct or offer compensation to victims.
From an international law- making perspective, these mechanisms may offer 
concrete opportunities to test the suitability of corporate environmental account-
ability and responsibility standards, further clarifying the conditions for their 
applicability to private companies in different contexts. These initiatives can also 
contribute to ensure their coherent application of international standards notwith-
standing their different origin. In addition, these initiatives may assess the suit-
ability and completeness of international standards in the context of specific cases, 
identifying gaps and potentially filling them. In that context, these international 
 6 Discussed in Ch. 2, Section 1.2.1.
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initiatives can also contribute to ensuring normative coherence among different 
sets of international standards, including to further the cross- fertilization between 
international human rights law and international biodiversity law on business 
responsibility to respect the human rights of indigenous peoples.7 Consolidated 
quasi- jurisprudence from these monitoring efforts may facilitate the progressive 
development of public international law, and influence successive proceedings 
at the international and national level, to clarify an evolving system of shared re-
sponsibilities between States and non- State actors.8 Furthermore, international 
oversight mechanisms may be valuable in gathering evidence to back up ongoing 
inter- governmental negotiations on the strengthening of the legal status of min-
imum standards of corporate environmental accountability and responsibility.9 
Establishing facts may facilitate a shift in public opinion towards demanding 
greater accountability of multinationals and other business enterprises through 
international law.10
The existence of implementation mechanisms established at the international 
level is a factor upon which the effectiveness of legal tools, whether binding or not, 
depends,11 given that their normative core is clarified through case- by- case ap-
plication. Returning to Hart’s legal theory and his concept of secondary rules as 
rules that confer powers, be they public or private, to determine in various ways 
the incidence of primary rules or to control their operations, it seems that the con-
cept of rules of adjudication12 may be useful in explaining the implementation of 
legal standards for corporate environmental accountability and responsibility. In a 
broad sense, rules of adjudication can encompass, particularly in international law, 
all means to enforce or but also facilitate the effective implementation of primary 
rules. According to Hart, rules of adjudication specify ways in which to determine 
conclusively the violation of primary rules.13 They are intended as a ‘remedy to 
the inefficiency of diffused social pressure’, and thus empower individuals to make 
authoritative determinations as to whether on a particular occasion a primary 
rule has been breached.14 In the words of Abi- Saab, ‘norms of adjudication con-
cern the practical application of primary rules to concrete situations’.15 Rules of 
 7 See Ch. 5, Section 1.
 8 N. Rosemann, ‘The UN Norms on Corporate Human Rights Responsibilities:  An Innovating 
Instrument to Strengthen Business’ Human Rights Performance’ (Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung, Occasional 
Geneva Papers no. 20, 2005) 32.
 9 Discussed in Ch. 3, Section 7.
 10 C. Wells and J. Elias, ‘Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on the International 
Stage’ in P. Alston (ed.), Non- State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 
141, 173.
 11 As highlighted by C. Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve 
of a New Century’ (1999) 281 Recueil des cours 9, 353.
 12 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 81.
 13 Ibid. 94.
 14 Ibid. 97.
 15 G. Abi- Saab, ‘Cours général de droit international public’ (1987) 207 Recueil des cours 9, 115.
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adjudication can also be described as a ‘technique to secure routine compliance 
with norms of behaviour’, with a view to securing values.16 Taking into account the 
specificities of standards as primary rules, means beyond traditional enforcement 
mechanisms could rely on international standards for corporate environmental ac-
countability as the benchmark for determining the legitimacy of the conduct of 
multinational corporations and other business enterprises, and facilitate in a prac-
tical way the effective implementation of international environmental law prin-
ciples and of the objectives of multilateral environmental agreements by the private 
sector.17 The operationalization of international standards of corporate environ-
mental accountability and responsibility thus depends on process- oriented ap-
proaches with multiple components: information, communication, consultation, 
technical assistance, and stakeholder empowerment.18
Before turning to the analysis of the practice of existing oversight processes, it 
seems necessary to make a preliminary distinction between several concepts re-
lated to the means to ensure the effectiveness of multilateral environmental agree-
ments and norms. Shihata proposed to differentiate ‘implementation’ stricto sensu, 
which describes all the actions required to carry out States’ commitments resulting 
from the agreements, from ‘enforcement’, which refers to measures jointly or uni-
laterally adopted by competent authorities to ensure the respect for such inter-
national commitments, if they are not honoured in practice. He then pointed to 
other ‘less structured’ or ‘indirect’ forms of enforcement such as international net-
works for the diffusion of information, verification, and monitoring that ensure 
‘compliance’, understood as the actual respect of substantive requirements of the 
agreements in the actual behaviour of those concerned.19 The last category can 
be usefully applied to private companies, and not only to States. Tools for compli-
ance will thus be assessed, bearing in mind the lack of adequate remedies before an 
international forum for claims by individuals against multinational corporations.20 
Better understanding, from a doctrinal and empirical perspective, of the role of 
international monitoring and complaints mechanisms in testing international 
standards of corporate environmental accountability and responsibility providing 
constructive approaches, if not remedies, for corporate substandard conduct may 
provide important insights for the ongoing negotiations of a new international 
 16 R. Higgins, Problems and Processes. International Law and How We Use it (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994) 1.
 17 I. Shihata, ‘Implementation, Enforcement and Compliance with International Environmental 
Agreements— Practical Suggestions in light of the World Bank’s Experience’ (1996– 97) 9 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 37.
 18 Ibid. 45.
 19 Ibid. 37: these definitions have been elaborated by Shihata with specific reference to States.
 20 J. Ebbesson, ‘Transboundary Corporate Responsibility in Environmental Matters: Fragments and 
Foundations for a Future Framework’ in G. Winter (ed.), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental 
Change: Perspectives from Science, Sociology and the Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) 200, 215. See discussion in Ch. 2.
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treaty on business and human rights, which is mainly expected to enhance access 
to justice for victims.21
2 The implementation procedure of the OECD Guidelines
The OECD Guidelines’ ‘implementation procedure’22 is based on one formal ob-
ligation for adhering countries to set up national contact points (NCPs).23 State 
discretion is quite broad in fulfilling this obligation as long as the NCP structure 
allows it to operate in accordance with ‘core criteria of visibility, accessibility, trans-
parency and accountability’, according to the Guidelines’ Procedural Guidance.24 
NCPs are charged with promoting the Guidelines at the national level, encour-
aging their observance in the national context, ensuring that they are well known 
and understood by the national business community, and gathering information 
on national experience. Most importantly, NCPs handle inquiries (‘specific in-
stances’),25 which are basically a means for any ‘interested party’ to draw the NCP’s 
attention to a company’s alleged non- observance of the Guidelines.26 NCPs make 
an initial assessment of the issue and then offer their services as mediators. If the 
conflict is not resolved, it can be referred to the OECD Committee on International 
Investment and Multilateral Enterprises (Investment Committee),27 where non- 
binding decisions are taken by consensus. In the vast majority of cases, however, 
the onus of attempting to resolve specific instances and ensuring the effectiveness 
of the Guidelines rests largely upon NCPs.28
The Investment Committee comprises all OECD members and obser-
vers. Although it is ultimately responsible for their interpretation of the OECD 
Guidelines,29 its involvement in the implementation procedure remains rather 
 21 Draft Report of the Open- ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With Respect to Human Rights (10 July 2015) available 
at <http:// www.ohchr.org/ EN/ HRBodies/ HRC/ WGTransCorp/ Session1/ Pages/ Draftreport.aspx> ac-
cessed 27 February 2016, paras 4 and 19. See discussed in Ch. 3, Section 7.
 22 OECD, ‘Implementation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Implementation 
Procedures’ (2000) <http:// www.oecd.org/ document/ 43/ 0,2340,en_ 2649_ 34889_ 2074731_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 
1,00.html>.
 23 J. Huner, ‘The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Review of the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises’ in M. T. Kamminga and S. Zia- Zarifi (eds), Liability of Multinational 
Corporations under International Law’ (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 197, 200.
 24 OECD, Council Decision of the Council on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(2000) OECD doc. C(2000)96/ FINAL, 4.
 25 Ibid.
 26 P. van der Gaag, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Corporate Accountability in a 
Liberalised Economy?’ (November 2004) <http:// www.oecdwatch.org/ docs/ paper%20NC%20IUCN.
pdf>, 3.
 27 Ibid.
 28 J. Karl, ‘The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ in M. Addo (ed.), Human Rights 
Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1999) 89, 92– 95.
 29 Ibid.
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exceptional and guarded.30 NCPs report annually to the Investment Committee, 
which also responds to requests from adhering countries on specific or general 
aspects of the Guidelines, organizes exchange of views on related matters, and is-
sues clarifications (providing additional information about whether and how the 
Guidelines apply to a particular business situation, without assessing the appro-
priateness of that enterprise’s conduct). Furthermore the Investment Committee 
reviews the Guidelines and related procedural decisions to ensure their relevance 
and effectiveness, and reports to the OECD Council.31
The OECD implementation procedure is considered the result of ‘multi- level 
cooperation and  . . .  centralized soft mediation- based implementation’ that pro-
vides assurances of ‘impartial problem- solving capacity’ on politically sensitive is-
sues and exchange of views and expertise with other organizations.32 It has further 
been noted that the OECD implementation procedure has been used for some time 
in regions where there is resistance to engage in litigation against corporations.33 
It has also been observed that NCPs can play a ‘quasi- judicial role’ applying both 
soft and hard law, with considerable leeway in determining burdens of proof, 
particularly when multinationals operate in countries with weak or absent gov-
ernments and are therefore expected to assume public- law expectations.34 Non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs) argue that NCPs’ statements could become a 
source of useful precedents on acceptable business behaviour.35 In addition, NGOs 
file complaints before an NCP as a means of gaining direct access to companies and 
to publicize the results of complaint procedures as part of a broader strategy for 
putting pressure on, or creative incentives for, multinationals.36
The following sub- sections will discuss, in turn: the evolution of the procedure, 
including as a result of influence from other international corporate environmental 
accountability processes; the various outcomes of this procedure, including fur-
ther normative convergence among different sets of international standards; and 
institutional cooperation, notably with the UN Security Council.
 30 G. Schuler, ‘Effective Governance through Decentralized Soft Implementation:  The OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1753, 1773.
 31 P. Acconci, ‘The Promotion of Responsible Business Conduct and the New Text of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2001) 2 Journal of World Investment 123, 140– 41.
 32 Schuler (n. 30) 1755– 56 and 1758.
 33 J. Wouters and C. Ryngaert, ‘Litigation for Overseas Corporate Human Rights Abuses in the 
European Union: The Challenge of Jurisdiction’ (2008– 09) 40 George Washington International Law 
Review 939— although this paper pre- dates the developments discussed in Ch. 2, Section 1.2.1.
 34 L. Catá Backer, ‘Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID) v Das Air and Global Witness 
v Afrimex:  Small Steps towards an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the Regulation of 
Multinational Corporations’ (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 258, 287, 291, and 303.
 35 The International Council on Human Rights Policy, Beyond Voluntarism: Human Rights and the 
Developing International Legal Obligations for Companies (Versoix: International Council on Human 
Rights Policy, 2002) 101.
 36 F. Calder and M. Culverwell, Following up the WSSD Commitments on Corporate Responsibility & 
Accountability (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2004) 28.
Implementation Procedure of OECD Guidelines 233
2.1 Evolution of the procedure
Criticisms about the implementation mechanism of the Guidelines,37 including by 
the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights,38 have to some ex-
tent been addressed through successive reviews of the implementation procedure. 
This section will first discuss more detailed criticism of the implementation pro-
cedure, and then assess to what extent this has been taken into account in the 2011 
review of the Guidelines.
During the 2000 review of the OECD Guidelines, NGOs expressed their dis-
appointment with the weak implementation mechanism and the variability in 
NCPs’ willingness and capacities to play a proactive and preventive role.39 Other 
critiques concerned: the lack of independent verification of whether companies 
follow the Guidelines, the confidentiality rule applied in the ‘best interests’ of the 
implementation of the Guidelines, and the failure by NCPs to issue statements and 
make recommendations when no agreement can be achieved between the parties 
concerned.40 Other observers stressed that the implementation mechanism relied 
too heavily on private companies’ cooperation, did not provide effective remedies, 
and often did not identify publicly concerned companies.41 Difficulty in gathering 
official information on specific instances regarding the environmentally sound 
conduct of multinationals in or from OECD adhering countries arose from the 
practice of not using companies’ names in official OECD documents and the un-
even practice by NCPs of publishing their statements on their websites makes it 
complicated to match information on the same cases as reported by NGOs.
High variation in procedures, timelines, and final outcomes of the NCPs were 
underscored with concern over time. Some NCPs were proactive in gathering add-
itional information, facilitating a constructive dialogue between companies and 
NGOs, and ensuring the Guidelines had an impact on the ground, whereas others 
have been said to use the lack of ‘investment nexus’ (discussed below)42 as an easy 
 37 Friends of the Earth, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (undated) <http:// 
www.foe.org/ oecdguidelines/ > accessed 27 February 2016, 6; OECD, ‘Roundtable on Corporate 
Responsibility: Encouraging the Positive Contribution of Business to Environment through the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Background Report’ (June 2004) <http:// www.oecd.org/ docu-
ment/ 1/ 0,2340,en_ 2649_ 34889_ 31711425_ 1_ 1_ 1_ 1,00.html> accessed 27 February 2016, 12 (herein-
after, OECD 2004 Roundtable Background Report); UNCTAD, ‘Disclosure of the Impact of Corporations 
on Society: Current Trends and Issues’ (2003) UN Doc. TD/ B/ COM.2/ ISAR/ 20, 6; V. Nilsson, ‘The OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Corporations in Practice’ (Paper Presented at the OECD Global Forum 
on International Investment— Investment for Development: Forging New Partnerships, 19– 21 October 
2004) <http:// www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/ 6/ 61/ 33807212.pdf> accessed 27 February 2016.
 38 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary- General on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie: Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights (2008) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 8/ 5, para. 98.
 39 Friends of the Earth (n. 37) 6; OECD 2004 Roundtable Background Report (n. 37) 12.
 40 Ibid.; UNCTAD, ‘Disclosure of the Impact of Corporations on Society: Current Trends and Issues’ 
(15 August 2003) UN Doc. TD/ B/ COM.2/ ISAR/ 20, 6; and Nilsson (n. 37).
 41 The International Council on Human Rights Policy (n. 35) 117.
 42 Section 2.5 in this chapter.
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excuse not to start investigations on certain specific instances.43 The UN Special 
Representative on Business and Human Rights had recommended that NCPs have 
clear timeframes for the commencement and completion of the process, and public 
reports of outcomes.44 The UN Special Representative further questioned the 
avoidance of conflict of interests when NCPs are hosted by national government 
structures, the adequacy of their resources to undertake investigations, missed op-
portunities for peer learning across NCPs, and the adequacy of assurances pro-
vided to aggrieved parties.45 Nevertheless, Ruggie, in his personal capacity, argued 
that human rights complaints fare better in the NCP process than in other types of 
complaints.46
In response, the 2011 review resulted in spelling out principles for NCP ‘func-
tional equivalence’ (accessibility, transparency, predictability, impartiality, ac-
countability, efficiency, and timeliness), while leaving adhering governments 
flexibility in their set- up, as long as NCPs are enabled to operate in an impartial 
manner while maintaining an adequate level of accountability to the adhering 
government.47 The 2011 review also called for the systematic publication of the 
outcomes of the NCP procedure and detailed their minimum content: NCP state-
ments should describe the issue raised and the reasons for the NCP decision, and 
state recommendations on the implementation of the Guidelines ‘as appropriate’.48 
As a result, NCPs are now required to publish a statement in situations where they 
decide not to consider an issue further, a report when parties reach an agreement, 
and a statement when parties fail to reach an agreement. But there is still no re-
quirement to publicize a complaint when it has been filed or the name of the par-
ties, or to keep parties informed about the case or publish an initial assessment, 
except when the NCP decides that the issue raised does not merit further consid-
eration.49 The new version also includes suggested timelines: three months for the 
initial assessment of instances and three months for issuing a statement of report 
following the conclusion of the procedure, with a view to concluding the whole 
 43 Van der Gaag (n. 26) 5.
 44 UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework (n. 38) para. 98.
 45 J. Ruggie, ‘Keynote Presentation by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary- General on 
Business and Human Rights to the Annual Meeting of National Contact Points of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development’ (Paris, 24 June 2008) <http:// www.reports- and- materials.
org/ Ruggie- presentation- OECD- Natl- Contact- Points- 24- Jun- 2008.doc>.
 46 J. Ruggie and T. Nelson, ‘Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises:  Normative Innovations and Implementation Challenges’ (2015) The Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 22; J. Ruggie ‘Hierarchy or Ecosystem? Regulating Human Rights Risks of Multinational 
Enterprises in C. Rodríguez- Garavito (ed.), Business and Human Rights: Beyond the End of the Beginning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 46, 49.
 47 OECD Guidelines Update 2011— Note by the Secretary- General, Appendix III, section 1 A and 
C. The ‘Procedural Guidance’ and its Commentary are included in Part II of the OECD Guidelines; 
OECD Guidelines Update 2011— Commentaries, para. 9.
 48 OECD Guidelines Note by the Secretary- General, Appendix III, section I.C, para. 3.
 49 P. Simons and A. Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human Rights and the Home 
State Advantage (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) 108; OECD Procedural Guidance, 70.
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procedure in twelve months.50 But it allows discretion to extend these timelines if 
circumstances warrant it. One such circumstance can be the case of an activity in 
non- adhering countries, which would occur in the majority of cases.51
The 2011 review was thus seen to have ‘missed the opportunity to make the 
compliance mechanism more accessible, more independent, and more effective 
in pressuring corporate actors to respect human rights in their transnational 
operations’.52 The 2011 review was criticized for not requiring NCPs to identify 
breaches of the Guidelines and set out consequences for companies’ failure to en-
gage in the implementation procedure, as well as to monitor and follow up on their 
recommendations.53 The lack of requirement for NCPs to come to a decision on 
breaches of the OECD Guidelines in cases where the parties fail to reach an agree-
ment is considered a barrier to NCPs playing a quasi- judicial role.54 And even 
when instances are concluded with the identification of a breach of the Guidelines, 
according to the NGO, OECDWatch, ‘the vast majority of OECD Guidelines 
cases have unfortunately not led to any significant improvement in the respective 
company’s behaviour or the situation that led to the complaint’.55
2.2 Variation in outcomes
Instances to date have concerned different parts of the environmental recom-
mendations of the Guidelines, often focusing on prior (self- )assessment of envir-
onmental and human rights impacts of projects and their communication to the 
affected communities.56 In this section, the varied outcomes of the NCP process 
will be discussed with a view to assessing how the international standards dis-
cussed in the previous chapters can be applied in specific contexts. The outcomes 
generally range from mediation leading to a joint statement between the parties 
to findings of a breach of the Guidelines with specific recommendations on infor-
mation and consultation, possibly leading to the institutionalization of local plat-
forms for dialogue. Even in cases where NCPs find that there is no violation of the 
Guidelines, some instances can result in recommendations to seek higher stand-
ards of stakeholder engagement.
Following mediation by the UK NCP, an agreement was reached between 
the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and an extractive company about the 
 50 OECD Guidelines Update 2011— Commentaries, para. 40.
 51 Ibid. 109, and Commentary on Procedural Guidance, 83.
 52 Simons and Macklin (n. 49) 113.
 53 Ibid.
 54 Ibid. 111.
 55 Ibid. 109 and OECDWatch, ‘10 Years On: Assessing the Contribution of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises to Responsible Business Conduct’ (2010) https:// www.oecdwatch.org/ wp- 
content/ uploads/ sites/ 8/ 2010/ 06/ OECD- Watch- 10- Years- On.pdf.
 56 Discussed in Ch. 4, Sections 2.1.1 and 2.4– 2.5.
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suspension of activities in an internationally protected area,57 the Virunga National 
Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The outcome included specific 
commitments to both procedural and substantive standards. The company com-
mitted not to undertake or commission any exploratory or other drilling within the 
park unless the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
and the DRC government agreed that such activities were not incompatible with its 
World Heritage status. The company’s statement also went beyond the specific case 
at hand, by including a commitment not to conduct any operations in any other 
World Heritage site, and seek to ensure that any current or future operations in 
buffer zones adjacent to World Heritage sites, as defined by national governments 
and UNESCO, do not jeopardize the outstanding universal value for which these 
sites are listed. The company further confirmed that when undertaking environ-
mental impact assessments (EIAs) and human rights due diligence, the processes 
will be in full compliance with international standards and industry best practice, 
including appropriate levels of community consultation and engagement on the 
basis of publicly available documents.58
Another successful mediation was achieved by the Norwegian NCP, leading 
to a joint statement from the parties in which a fish farming company acknow-
ledged it had not taken a precautionary approach in meeting social and environ-
mental challenges and accepted responsibility for its subsidiaries’ activities . In 
the statement, the company committed to strive for excellence on environmental 
initiatives in its industry, including by contributing to the development and use 
of environmentally friendly technology, taking a more structured approach to 
the exchange of knowledge and best practice between companies in the group 
regardless of business location, and further developing its efforts to minimize 
the risk of inflicting serious environmental damage on their surroundings. In 
addition, the company committed to seek to enter into mutually beneficial agree-
ments with indigenous peoples in all areas where their rights were affected by 
fish farming operations.59 In the joint statement, all the parties also recognized 
the benefits that arose from the company’s research into fish disease and the new 
insights of relevance for the whole sector to better prevent fish diseases.60 These 
commitments, therefore, provide a contextual application of the substantive 
standard related to sustainable use.61
On occasion, the finding of a breach of the OECD Guidelines leads the NCP 
to support the creation of a local institution to facilitate dialogue among parties. 
 57 See discussion of relevant standards in Ch. 5, Section 2.
 58 UK NCP, Final statement following agreement reached in a complaint from WWF International 
against SOCO International plc, 2014.
 59 Joint Statement by Cermaq ASA, Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature/ Friends of the 
Earth Norway and Forum for Environment and Development (2011).
 60 Ibid.
 61 See discussion of relevant standards in Ch. 5, Section 3.
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The 2001 case on Canadian and Swiss copper mining in Zambia62 was submitted 
to the Canadian NCP by Oxfam Canada alleging a violation of the Guidelines on, 
inter alia, communication and consultation with communities on environmental, 
health, and safety policies linked to the impending removal of local farmers from 
the company- owned land.63 The Canadian NCP facilitated communications be-
tween the company’s headquarters in Canada, the Canadian office of Oxfam, and 
operations in Zambia. The parties reached a resolution ‘after the company met with 
groups from the affected communities and worked out an approach whereby the 
farmers could continue to use the land, at least for the short term’.64 The Canadian 
NCP65 encouraged the company to maintain an open line of communication with 
Oxfam and other groups concerned about the welfare of the people affected by 
the operations of the Zambian mining company.66 This resulted in the establish-
ment of a land task force committee by the company, the local government, and 
local NGOs, with the mandate to, inter alia, protect the environment, provide in-
formation to the public on land and environmental issues, and resolve any land 
disputes at the local level.67 This provided a co- developed permanent structure for 
implementing procedural standards of corporate environmental accountability.68
In other instances, even where no breach was found, the NCP still included re-
commendations to improve the implementation of procedural standards related 
to stakeholder engagement. An example is a case submitted in 2004 concerning 
a dam project by Electricité de France (EDF)69 based on a concession agreement 
with the Laos government.70 A coalition of NGOs71 alleged, inter alia, that EDF 
had failed to identify, respond to, and consider the environmental impacts of the 
project, due to lack of baseline data necessary to address the environmental, health, 
and social impacts, and to anticipate changes before the project commenced.72 The 
complaint also highlighted uncertainty regarding the project’s impact on endemic 
and nationally threatened species, and regarding the increased pressure on timber 
resources due to clear- cuts already carried out in the reservoir area.73 In addition, 
 62 J. Smith, ‘Public Summary of the Report of an International NGO Training and Strategy Seminar 
on the OECD Guidelines for Multinationals:  A Tool to Combat Violations of Environmental and 
Workers’ Rights?’ (2003) <http:// www.milieudefensie.nl/ foenl/ publications/ oesdtraining_ eng.pdf>.
 63 OECDWatch (n. 55) 12.
 64 Government of Canada, ‘Annual Report 2002:  Canada’s National Contact Point for the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2002) http:// www.ncp- pcn.gc.ca/ annual_ 
2002- en.asp#implementation.
 65 Ibid.
 66 Ibid.
 67 Friends of the Earth (n. 37) 17.
 68 See discussion of relevant standards in Ch. 4, Section 2.
 69 The EDF Group is an integrated energy company made up of a network of different companies. Its 
head office is in Paris, France.
 70 ‘Complaint from Proyecto Gato, Amis de la Terre, CRBM, World Rainforest Movement, Finnish 
Asiatic Society, and International Rivers Network’ (10 February 2005)  http:// www.reports- and- 
materials.org/ Proyecto- Gato- and- Amis- de- la- Terre- press- release- EDF- 10- Feb- 2005.doc.
 71 Ibid.
 72 Ibid. 2.
 73 Ibid. 3. See Section 3.1 in Ch 5.
238 International Oversight
the complaint stressed that EDF only provided limited information about the pro-
ject and its impact to communities, and did not allow community members to par-
ticipate in the decision- making process.74 The NCP concluded in 200575 that no 
breach of the Guidelines could be attributed to EDF.76 The conclusion seemed to be 
based on two considerations. First, the company had signed an agreement on social 
responsibility going above what was requested by the OECD Guidelines. Second, 
the NCP considered that the host State had a weak legal and regulatory system. On 
that basis, it recommended that companies do their utmost to implement the inter-
nationally acknowledged best practices that they follow in their own country on 
the construction site and for the people affected by their activity.77 Thus, the NCP 
recommended that EDF remain involved in implementing compensatory meas-
ures to affected communities, together with the Laotian national authorities.78
Recommendations on procedural standards were also formulated by the UK 
NCP in a case where no breach of the Guidelines was found. In a case concerning 
an aluminium smelter in Mozambique, the NCP considered the company’s envir-
onmental management approach appropriate ‘after having analysed each allega-
tion in detail’.79 Nevertheless, it encouraged the companies
‘to build upon their existing procedures for engagement with local communi-
ties and be forthcoming in disclosing to interested parties (particularly the affected 
communities and their representatives) information on projects that may have an 
impact on the environment and the health and safety of the communities affected 
by the smelter’.80
In yet another case, the Norway NCP did not find any grounds for concluding 
that a company had failed to comply with the Guidelines, but still encouraged it 
to work in a manner that more clearly promoted indigenous peoples’ rights and 
the implementation of the Guidelines. It noted for instance that the actual imple-
mentation of the consultations process could have been better facilitated, to foster 
mutual trust with a view to obtaining the Saami village’s consent. The NCPs also 
noted that the company went above and beyond the Guidelines by covering parts 
of the Saami village’s outlays and travel expenses in connection with participa-
tion in consultation, underscoring that this may be necessary in order to achieve 
 74 Ibid. 4– 5. See Sections 2.4– 2.5 in Ch 4.
 75 French NCP, ‘Recommendations intended for EDF and its Partners with Regard to the 
Implementation of the “Nam Theun 2” Project in Laos’ (1 April 2005)  http:// www.reports- and- 
materials.org/ French- NCP- Nam- Theun- 2- recommendations- 1- April- 2005.doc.
 76 Ibid.
 77 Ibid.
 78 Ibid.
 79 B. Maheandiran, ‘Calling for Clarity: How Uncertainty Undermines the Legitimacy of the Dispute 
Resolution System under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2015) 20 Harvard 
Negotiation Law Review 205, 224.
 80 UK NCP, Final statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises: Complaint from Justiça Ambiental et al. against BHP Billiton PLC (on Mozal 
SARL) in Mozambique, 13 September 2012.
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genuine consultations during which indigenous groups are given an opportunity 
to promote and safeguard their rights.81 Furthermore, the NCPs considered that 
consultations are a continuing process that must be upheld and adapted so that 
new circumstances are also addressed, for example, when it subsequently emerged 
that the impacts of the wind power development were greater than originally ex-
pected. All these specifications are in line with the international human rights 
law and international biodiversity law guidance on free prior informed consent 
(FPIC) as an ongoing process.82 The NCP also remarked that the company, being 
aware of indigenous groups’ vulnerability to more adverse impacts than assumed 
in the licence application, ‘could have shown even more willingness to implement 
mitigating measures and adapt the scope of the project to a level where agreement 
could be reached, prior to the legal process and without waiting for decisions to be 
made by the court system’.83 While the NCP did not explicitly refer to the standard 
of fair and equitable benefit- sharing (as opposed to compensation),84 it arguably 
made an implicit reference to the usefulness of community protocols in the situ-
ation:85 it remarked that ‘it would have benefited the process if the Saami village 
had prepared a well thought- through plan for its use of the area. It would also have 
been beneficial if a coordinated process had been developed between indigenous 
groups in the regions for how to deal with development project’.86 The NCP recom-
mended hiring an independent third party to assist in the consultation process and 
joint mapping of the impact of the project and/ or monitoring of existing agree-
ments, noting international expectations captured in ‘A Good Practice Note’, which 
has received support from the UN Global Compact’s Human Rights and Labour 
Working Group.87
Follow- up reports to NCP statements provide insights into the effectiveness of 
the NCP’s role in the actual relations between companies, governments, and af-
fected communities. They also shed further light on the practical conditions for 
the applicability of international standards on corporate environmental account-
ability and responsibility. In an instance involving negative impacts from mining 
operations on communities’ access to water, the UK NCP found no indication of a 
systematic methodology to engage with the wider community on an ongoing basis, 
and no evidence of a documented strategy or process for raising and addressing 
grievances. It also found lack of detail on what information was shared with the 
communities on the company’s environmental and social impacts and what expect-
ations communities could have from staff. Besides underscoring non- compliance 
 81 See discussion of relevant standards in Ch. 5, Section 1.
 82 See discussion of relevant standards in Ch. 5, Section 1.2.
 83 Norway NCP, Jijnjevaerie Saami Village vs. Statkraft AS: Final Statement (2016).
 84 See discussion in Ch. 5, Section 1.3.
 85 See discussion in Ch. 5, Section 1.2.2.
 86 Norway NCP (n. 83).
 87 Ibid.
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with procedural standards, the NCP also delved into the substantive aspects of 
communities’ access to water from a human rights perspective. It documented that 
even if both parties to the complaint recognized that clean water was supplied to 
the community free of charge, the original NCP recommendation had emphasized 
the need for continued and unrestricted access in recognition of the human right 
to water. The NCP therefore indicated that the issue of a permanent water supply 
was only partially resolved and remained an outstanding obligation. The NCP fur-
ther noted that notwithstanding recognition of the importance of communities’ 
input in the development process, the company did not address the community’s 
lack of the experience in fulfilling this role or the support it required to successfully 
engage with other parties in an overall resolution process, such as the maintenance 
of the already established water facilities. The NCP also noted lack of progress in 
the development of a joint monitoring approach.88
Overall, the role of the OECD implementation procedure ranges from 
documenting cases of companies’ non- compliance with the OECD Guidelines 
and proactively managing their relations with affected communities, to clarifying 
how international standards apply in specific circumstances and filling gaps in the 
OECD Guidelines by relying on other sources of international standards of cor-
porate environmental accountability and responsibility.
2.3 Promoting normative coherence
Although NCPs have made uneven references to international standards for cor-
porate accountability other than the OECD Guidelines, the UK NCP set a prece-
dent in 2009, pointing to another significant function of the OECD compliance 
procedure— contributing to normative coherence among international stand-
ards on corporate environmental accountability and responsibility. The UK NCP 
addressed a complaint brought to its attention by Survival International, a UK- 
based NGO, against Vedanta, a UK- registered mining company operating dir-
ectly or through subsidiaries in India. The instance concerned the company’s use 
of forest land for bauxite mining near Lanjigarh and its failure to consult with an 
indigenous group affected by its operations, the Dongria Kondh. The NCP found, 
mostly on the basis of evidence from the complainant (as Vedanta did not engage 
fully in the procedure and its own investigations), that Vedanta had failed to put 
in place an adequate and timely consultation mechanism to engage fully with the 
Dongria Kondh. Accordingly, the NCP declared non- compliance with the OECD 
Guidelines sections on engaging in adequate and timely communication and con-
sultation with the communities directly affected by the environmental policies 
 88 UK NCP, Follow up statement after recommendations in complaint from RAID against ENRC 
(2018).
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of the enterprise and by their implementation. It further found that Vedanta did 
not respect the rights and freedoms of the Dongria Kondh in a manner consistent 
with India’s commitments under various international instruments, including the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)89 and the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).90
Specifically, the NCP used the CBD Akwé: Kon Guidelines on environmental 
and socio- cultural impact assessments91 to interpret the OECD Guidelines’ provi-
sions on consultations on environmental impacts,92 to determine that Vedanta did 
not employ the local language or means of communication other than written form 
for consultations with communities with very high rate of illiteracy. It also found 
that the environmental impact assessment that had been carried out, although in-
cluding an analysis of the ‘socio- economic environment’ of the study area, did not 
address the impact of the mine on the community.93 The NCP concluded that the 
company did not carry out adequate or timely consultations about the potential 
environmental impact of the construction of the mine on them.94
The NCP thus recommended that Vedanta engage in consultations with the 
indigenous group on access to the project- affected area, ways to secure com-
munities’ traditional livelihoods, and alternative arrangements (other than re- 
settlement) for the affected families according to the process outlined in the CBD 
Akwé: Kon Guidelines. At a minimum, the NCP expected Vedanta to advertise 
the consultation in a language and form that could be easily understood by the 
Dongria Kondh, thereby ensuring the participation of the maximum number of 
their representatives in the consultation.95 Interestingly, the NCP also underlined 
that in carrying out a human rights impact assessment, as suggested by the UN 
Framework on Business and Human Rights, the Akwé: Kon Guidelines could be 
used as a point of reference, particularly for carrying out indigenous groups’ im-
pact assessments.96
The follow- up statement by the NCP, however, provided a mixed picture, 
with the NGO claiming that no change in the company’s conduct could be de-
tected. In turn, Vedanta reported on specific action being undertaken following 
 89 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December 
1993).
 90 UN General Assembly Res. 61/ 295 (13 September 2007).
 91 CBD Decision VII/ 16F, ‘Akwé:  Kon Voluntary Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment regarding Developments Proposed to Take Place on, or 
which are Likely to Impact on, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters Traditionally Occupied or Used by 
Indigenous and Local Communities, in Article 8(j) and related provisions’ (2004).
 92 UK NCP, Final Statement on the Complaint from Survival International against Vedanta 
Resources plc, 25 September 2009, paras 44– 46, at http:// www.berr.gov.uk/ files/ file53117.doc.
 93 Ibid. para. 57.
 94 Ibid. paras 65 and 67.
 95 Ibid. paras 73– 74.
 96 Ibid. para. 79.
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consultations with affected communities, and no comment provided by the NCP.97 
Nevertheless, the case shows how the OECD Guidelines implementation pro-
cedure can significantly point to companies’ shortcomings vis- à- vis international 
environmental standards, as well as leading to coherent interpretation and appli-
cation of different international sources of corporate environmental accountability 
standards. To the latter end, the NCP proposed filling a gap in the UN Framework 
on Business and Human Rights through CBD guidelines.98
2.4 Inter- institutional cooperation
Another interesting function of the OECD implementation procedure is that it can 
lead to inter- institutional cooperation, including with the UN System. The most 
notable case concerns the UN Security Council addressing private companies op-
erating in situations of conflict99 in relation to the illegal exploitation of natural re-
sources in the Democratic Republic of Congo.100 The UN Security Council directly 
addressed the conduct of multinationals at the international level, and through an 
international process, namely the establishment of an international, independent 
fact- finding body (‘experts group’) to conduct field visits, and investigate directly 
the irresponsible conduct of, among others, private companies.
An annex to the experts’ report listed individuals, States, and companies whose 
international violations had been documented by the expert group.101 Listed com-
panies had either been involved in natural resources exploitation in a way directly 
linked to the funding of the conflict (Annex I), or were responsible for failing to en-
sure that their commercial links did not contribute to funding and perpetuating the 
conflict (Annex III). The experts used the OECD Guidelines as a benchmark in as-
sessing the conduct of companies so that these were included in Annex III of their 
report because of an apparent breach of the OECD Guidelines.102 Although the 
report of the experts group did not primarily address the environmental provisions 
of the OECD Guidelines, it highlighted other specific environmental misconduct, 
 97 Follow up to Final Statement by the UK National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises: Complaint from Survival International against Vedanta Resources plc (12 
March 2010).
 98 E. Morgera, ‘From Corporate Social Responsibility to Accountability Mechanisms’ in P.- M. Dupuy 
and J. Viñuales (eds), Harnessing Foreign Investment to Promote Environmental Protection: Incentives 
and Safeguards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 321.
 99 The International Council on Human Rights Policy (n. 35) 145– 47.
 100 UN Security Council, ‘Presidential Statement on the situation concerning the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’ (19 December 2001) UN Doc. S/ PRST/ 2001/ 139; UN Security Council Res. 
1457/ 2003 (24 January 2003) and UN Security Council Res. 1499/ 2003 (13 August 2003).
 101 UN Security Council, ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (16 October 2002) UN 
Doc. S/ 2002/ 1146, Annex (2002 Experts’ Report).
 102 UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 23 October 2003 from the Secretary- General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council’, para. 12.
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namely how the exploitation of natural resources in DRC entailed illegal logging 
and trade in endangered species illegally taken from protected areas.103 During 
the investigations, the experts communicated with the OECD Committee on 
International Investment and Multilateral Enterprises, thus developing a modus 
operandi according to which the experts would hand over to OECD NCPs’ infor-
mation on companies for further follow- up in their jurisdiction.
The publication of the report in October 2002 raised much media attention and 
several companies acknowledged their own responsibility, in particular with refer-
ence to supply chains for raw materials. Besides its impact in terms of international 
public pressure, the initiative also comprised a follow- up procedure. For a com-
pany to be delisted, it needed to ‘achieve a resolution of the issue’ through dialogue 
with the experts group, on the assumption that higher standards of corporate be-
haviour by foreign companies could play a major role in improving the situation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.104 Where it was not possible to reach a reso-
lution, the experts referred the relevant governments for follow- up under their 
jurisdiction, in the form of monitoring of compliance with resolutions or further/ 
updating investigation.
In September 2003, the OECD Committee requested the Security Council, ex-
pressing access to the information justifying the experts group’s conclusions on 
OECD- based enterprises’ roles in DRC to support adhering governments’ cooper-
ation on the Guidelines implementation.105 However, at its December 2003 ses-
sion, the OECD Committee noted the need for improving cooperation with the 
UN Security Council,106 as no exchange of information had taken place. Some 
NCPs reported that they had been in contact with enterprises named in Annex III 
of the 2002 Experts’ Report, while others mentioned that they had approached the 
experts group by various means, asking for information. The experts group was 
invited to the next Committee meeting in April 2004, to meet with NCPs in the 
countries involved.107 Eventually, NGOs noted that only a few NCPs initiated any 
inquiries in response to the UN Security Council Report.108 Several instances were 
 103 2002 Experts’ Report (n. 101)  33. An NGO report also indicated severe air and water pollu-
tion due to radioactive materials originating from illegal uranium mining sites: RAID, ‘Unanswered 
Questions:  Companies, Conflict and the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (May 2004)  <http:// www.
unites.uqam.ca/ grama/ pdf/ RAID- DRC_ Ex- Summary.pdf> 63.
 104 UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 2002/ 10/ 15 from the Secretary- General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council: addendum’ (20 June 2003) UN Doc. S/ 2002/ 1146/ Add.1; and UN 
Security Council, ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (2003) UN Doc. S/ 2003/ 1027 (2003 
Experts’ Report).
 105 ‘Letter from Marinus W. Sikkel, Chair of CIME, to Mahmoud Kassem, Chairman of the UN Panel 
of Experts on DRC’ (26 September 2003), reprinted in OECD 2004 Report by the Chair, 46 (Annex 4).
 106 ‘Letter from Donald Johnston, OECD Secretary- General, to Kofi Annan, UN Secretary- General’ 
(9 January 2004), reprinted in OECD 2004 Report by the Chair, 48 (Annex 4).
 107 Smith (n. 62) 10.
 108 OECD, ‘2004 Annual meeting of the National Contact Points. Report by the Chair’ (2004) <http:// 
www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/ 5/ 36/ 33734844.pdf> 4– 5.
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concluded because the NCP indicated that the UN Panel report did not specify suf-
ficiently the grounds on which a company had been listed.109 One exception was 
the Israel NCP, which reported that, following an enquiry, the company stopped 
illegitimate sourcing from DRC.110
In another follow- up instance, information was supplied to an NCP on the con-
dition that it was to remain confidential and could only be disclosed to the com-
panies involved or as part of a criminal prosecution. This prevented the NCP from 
assessing a related, independent NGO complaint in conjunction with the UN 
Panel allegations. Although the UN Panel reached a resolution with the company, 
the NCP stressed to the private company concerned the need to contribute to eco-
nomic, social, and environmental progress with a view to achieving sustainable 
development in the countries in which it operates. The NCP, however, did not suc-
ceed in facilitating a constructive dialogue between the NGO and the company, or 
in mediating an agreed settlement between the parties.111
Overall, although this example shows that the NCP drew on UN work ‘well be-
fore the UN Guiding Principles’, setting the stage for the 2011 review,112 the high- 
profile opportunity for cooperation between the UN and the OECD remained a 
largely unrealized potential.
2.5 Continued challenges
Confidentiality and a sufficient nexus to the OECD Guidelines have been recurrent 
challenges in the OECD implementation procedure. The degree of confidentiality 
proposed by the Canadian NCP, for instance, led an NGO to pull out of a facili-
tated dialogue on mining operations in Ecuador by a Canadian company that had 
allegedly failed in communicating to the public and its employees environmental, 
health, and safety impacts and in consulting with the communities on environ-
mental, health, and safety policies.113 Commentators have concluded that NCPs can 
only play a meaningful role when they do not assign undue emphasis to confidenti-
ality, effectively preventing complainants from fully engaging in the process.114
 109 Belgium NCP, ‘Press release on Speciality Metals Company’ (undated) <http:// economie.fgov.
be/ organization_ market/ oecd_ guidelines/ pdf/ SMC_ fr.pdf>; France NCP, ‘DRC/ SDV Transami, as re-
ported in OECD, ‘2007 Annual meeting of the National Contact Points: Report by the Chair’ (2007) 
<http:// www.oecd.org/ dataoecd/ 5/ 36/ 33734844.pdf>; UK National Contact Point Statement on allega-
tions against De Beers’ (undated) <http:// www.csr.gov.uk/ oecddoc/ file23459.pdf>.
 110 As reported in OECD (n. 105).
 111 UK NCP, ‘Statement on allegations against Oryx Natural Resources’ (June 2005) <http:// www.csr.
gov.uk/ oecddoc/ file23454.pdf>.
 112 Ruggie and Nelson (n. 46) 5.
 113 Canadian NCP, ‘Statement Concerning Ascendant Copper Corporation in Ecuador’ (un-
dated) <http:// www.ncp- pcn.gc.ca/ ncpanual- en.asp>. See discussion of relevant standards in Ch. 4, 
Section 2.4.
 114 Maheandiran (n. 79) 236.
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Until the 2011 review, several cases were also hindered by the need to establish 
an investment nexus. In a 2003 case,115 two NGOs asked the Swedish NCP to as-
sess two mining companies’ operations in Ghana in relation to the human rights 
and environmental provisions of the OECD Guidelines. The NCP concluded that, 
although environmental and social problems existed, the roles played by the two 
companies were limited, and they did not fail to comply with the Guidelines.116 
At the same time, the NCP found that the companies’ on- site personnel did not 
have adequate knowledge of their responsibilities under the Guidelines,117 and 
encouraged the multinational to take into account its actual ability of influencing 
a business partner in the host country.118 Other cases had not been accepted by 
NCPs due to the question of business relations,119 but this barrier was removed by 
the 2011 review of the OECD Guidelines, so trade and finance activities of multi-
nationals also fall under the scope of NCPs’ activities.120
On the basis of the 2011 review extending coverage to the supply chain, the 
number of instances before NCPs involving manufacturing, in addition to 
extractives, has increased.121 The Norwegian NCP in 2013 indicated, drawing 
on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and a letter from 
the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, that the OECD 
Guidelines apply to minority shareholders.122 To provide another example, in 
2011, the French NCP provided its good offices in a specific instance concerning 
foreign investors associated with a palm oil producer that allegedly diminished the 
availability of natural resources, did not adequately treat water and prevent air pol-
lution, and failed to prevent other negative environmental impacts. The NCP con-
sidered that the investors were not exercising all possible influence on their trading 
partners, even if they had taken positive steps towards improving the producer’s 
 115 OECD (n. 104), at 43.
 116 RAID and SOMO, ‘OECDWatch Review of National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines 
for the period June 2003– June 2004 and Update of NCP cases filed by NGOs’ (August 2004) <www.
corporate- accountability.org/ docs/ OW_ 2004_ Review.pdf>, 11 (statement from the Swedish National 
Contact Point for OECD Guidelines with reference to specific instances received concerning Atlas 
Copco and Sandvik).
 117 Ibid.
 118 OECD, ‘Guidelines for Multinational Corporations’ (31 October 2001)  DAFFE/ IME/ 
WPG(2000)15/ FINAL (OECD Guidelines), Ch II, para. 10, which states that enterprises should 
‘[e] ncourage, where practicable, business partners, including suppliers and sub- contractors, to apply 
principles of corporate conduct compatible with the Guidelines’.
 119 The instances are against: TotalFinaElf (Germany), submitted in 2002 by Greenpeace Germany 
on alleged pollution in Russia; West LB (Germany), submitted in 2003 by Greenpeace Germany on 
the financing of a pipeline to be built in Ecuador; Chemie Pharmacie Holland, submitted in 2003 by 
FOE Netherlands on human rights violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo; and Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group (Australia), submitted in 2006 on forestry activities in Papua New 
Guinea (Australian NCP Statement (28 May 2008) <http:// www.ausncp.gov.au/ content/ docs/ 366_ 415_ 
ANZ%20Statement.pdf>).
 120 R. Geiger, ‘Coherence in Shaping the Rules of International Business: Actors, Instruments and 
Implementation’ (2011) 43 George Washington International Law Review 295, at 305.
 121 Ruggie and Nelson (n. 46) 115 and 118.
 122 Ibid. 119, fn. 55.
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environmental performance, including by supporting the producer in proceeding 
with international certification. With support from the NCP, the parties involved 
jointly drew a roadmap to be implemented by the producer to prevent pollution, 
collaborate with local authorities in detecting pollution- related illnesses and com-
pensate affected communities for medical expenses.123 The action plan further 
called on the producer to: facilitate access to drinkable water, education, and elec-
tricity for affected communities; support village plantations and harvesting; recruit 
local workers for its own plantations; and ease the dialogue with local communi-
cates to address land issues. The parties also agreed to report on the implementa-
tion of the action plan to the NCP and to select an independent organization to 
monitor its implementation and ensure stakeholder involvement.124 These could 
be considered elements of a benefit- sharing agreement, but it remains to be seen to 
what extent communities have been able to co- identify these benefits.125
The main source of disappointment, however, remains the discrepancy across 
NCPs’ practices. Scholars have therefore underscored as the main source of con-
cern the divergence in whether different NCPs carry out a thorough examination 
of facts and include in their statement an assessment of whether or not the com-
pany has breached the OECD Guidelines.126 It has been argued that NCPs can 
provide ‘significant insights into the relationship between foreign investment and 
environmental protection’127 only when, as a matter of practice, they go beyond 
the mediation phase (which is not the case for the Canadian, Swiss, and US NCPs, 
for instance).128 Furthermore, the US, Mexican, and Australian NCPs do not en-
gage in the investigation of an instance if the company declines to participate in 
the dialogue and mediation, which has been considered at odds with the primary 
function of NCPs to further the effectiveness of the Guidelines.129 All in all, not-
withstanding all the evolution in the process, ‘considerable divergence continues 
to exist among NCPs on their roles and powers regarding individual complaints’.130
Given the disparate results of complaints submitted to NCPs on environmental 
matters, the NCPs’ actual impact on improving corporate environmental ac-
countability and responsibility remains an open question.131 The track record of 
 123 French NCP, Report SOCAPALM, 3 June 2013, available at http:// www.tresor.economie.gouv.
fr/ File/ 397319 (in English). OECD- FAO, Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains 
(Paris: OECD, 2015) Lessons Learnt, 15.
 124 French NCP (n. 123).
 125 See discussion of relevant standards in Ch. 4, Section 3.1.3.
 126 J. C. Ochoa Sanchez, ‘The Roles and Powers of the OECD National Contact Points Regarding 
Complaints on an Alleged Breach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by a 
Transnational Corporation’ (2015) 84 Nordic Journal of International Law 89, 97.
 127 J. Viñuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) 76.
 128 Maheandiran (n. 79) 230.
 129 Ibid. 102– 03.
 130 Ibid. 126.
 131 P.  Feeney, ‘Making Companies Accountable’ (NGO Report on Implementation of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by National Contact Points, October 2002) <http:// www.oecd.
org/ dataoecd/ 16/ 37/ 2965489.pdf>; RAID and SOMO (n. 116); Van der Gaag (n. 26) 5.
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corporate compliance with NCP decisions remains to be studied empirically more 
systematically: in the Vedanta case (discussed above),132 the company refused to 
fully engage in the complaint process including in the sponsored professional con-
ciliation or mediation, and it appealed against the decision of the relevant minister 
to prevent the development of the mining project.133
3 Compliance under the IFC
The mission and functions of the IFC place this organization in a unique pos-
ition to contribute to clarifying international standards on corporate environ-
mental accountability and responsibility at the international level and to the 
monitoring of their implementation. The IFC’s funding to private companies 
allows the Corporation to influence how major development projects are de-
signed and implemented in developing countries in respect of minimum inter-
national environmental standards. Specifically, both in the pre- project approval 
and in the post- fund disbursement phases, the IFC is able to directly assess 
the conduct and performance of private companies, and request or suggest re-
medial action .
Unlike all the other international corporate environmental accountability ini-
tiatives discussed in this book, the IFC is the only one that can make international 
environmental standards contractually binding on private companies as condi-
tions in loan agreements,134 monitoring their application, and even sanctioning 
their violation through the suspension or withdrawal of previously approved fi-
nancing. In addition, it has established a complaint mechanism that can provide 
an additional layer of oversight through the examination of complaints by affected 
individuals and groups.
While the IFC remains still relatively little- studied, it has been considered cap-
able of application and enforcement of its own international standards.135 In add-
ition, the Compliance Advisor/ Ombudsman (CAO) has been seen as a source of 
more expansive interpretation of international standards.136 As a result, the IFC 
has been perceived as being capable of contributing to the hardening of inter-
national standards and the creation of precedents in their application.137 The role 
of the CAO is also significant because in its Ombudsman role, it can contribute to 
 132 Section 1.3.
 133 Simons and Macklin (n. 49) 92.
 134 CAO, A Review of International Finance Corporation’s Safeguard Policies (January 2003) <www.
cao- ombudsman.org/ html- english/ documents/ ReviewofIFCSPsfinalreportenglish 04- 03- 03.pdf> 
(hereinafter, IFC CAO 2003 Review).
 135 D. Bradlow and A. Naudé Fourie, ‘The Operational Policies of the World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation: Creating Law- Making and Law- Governed Institutions?’ (2013) 10 
International Organizations Law Review 3, 59.
 136 Ibid. 41 and 43.
 137 Ibid. 61.
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new standard- setting, by drawing from international obligations and implemen-
tation of practical human rights- based approaches in its mediation activities.138 In 
addition, based on its project- specific experience, it can investigate systemic prob-
lems in its Advisor function and provide recommendations to the IFC,139 making 
reference to international norms for the IFC to take into account.140 The following 
sub- sections will discuss, in turn, the role of the IFC itself in applying and moni-
toring the implementation of international environmental standards (and the as-
sessment of its effectiveness by the CAO in its Compliance and Advisor functions); 
and the role of the CAO to assess the application of these standards on the basis of 
complaints from victims in its Ombudsman function.
3.1 Contract- related procedures
The IFC can ensure that private companies comply with its environmental stand-
ards, in two stages: at the stage of selection and review of projects, prior to allo-
cating funding to private companies; and at the stage of monitoring of companies’ 
operations, through the Environmental and Social Review Procedure, once funds 
have been disbursed.141
During the project approval phase, the IFC reviews its clients’ assessment of en-
vironmental risks and possible impacts of the project; assists them in developing 
measures to avoid, minimize, mitigate, or compensate for environmental impacts; 
categorizes projects to specify IFC’s institutional requirements to disclose to the 
public project- specific information; and support the identification of opportun-
ities to improve environmental outcomes. According to the Policy, the IFC seeks to 
ensure that the projects it finances are operated in an environmentally sustainable 
manner. The environmental review of a proposed project is ‘an important factor’, 
but not a condition, in the IFC’s decision to finance a project. The basic bench-
mark for determining the environmental sustainability of projects is determined 
in the negative, that is, the avoidance of negative impacts on the environment 
and local communities, or at least their reduction, mitigation, and appropriate 
compensation.142
In the project appraisal phase, the IFC carries out a review of the impact as-
sessment and possibly makes suggestions for the environmental management 
plan, while also encouraging disclosure of information and ensuring public 
 138 B. Saper, ‘The International Finance Corporation’s Compliance Advisor/ Ombudsman (CAO): An 
Examination of Accountability and Effectiveness from a Global Administrative Law Perspective’ 
(2011– 12) 44 NYU Journal of International Law & Policy 1279, 1300.
 139 Ibid. 1297.
 140 Ibid. 1306.
 141 IFC, Environmental and Social Review Procedure (1 January 2012).
 142 Ibid. 4– 8.
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involvement. One of the crucial elements of the review is its determination of the 
scope of the environmental conditions applied to the IFC financing.143 In a way, 
the IFC is, therefore, aiming at damage control or avoidance, which could be con-
sidered in line with the ‘no harm’ approach of UN Framework on Business and 
Human Rights and the international law principle of prevention.144 As a result, the 
Corporation could stipulate prior conditions with respect to the entry into force 
of the loan agreement or the disbursement of the loan upon compliance with cer-
tain environmental standards, or include a covenant committing the client to exe-
cute specific measures by a certain date145 in accordance with the environmental 
management plan.
After disbursing the funding, the IFC is expected to supervise the clients’ en-
vironmental performance and bring clients back into compliance or exercise rem-
edies as appropriate.146 Another responsibility of the IFC is to help the project 
sponsor select technologies that meet environmental standards and are energy- 
and cost- efficient.147 Attention should be drawn in particular to the possibility of 
making a site visit by the IFC staff.148 This can provide the most direct opportunity 
to assess the environmental impacts of the project, the use of appropriate tech-
nologies, compliance with loan conditions and the environmental plan, as well as 
the participation of affected communities on the ground. However, due to budget 
and human resource constraints, only a fraction of projects receive a visit from the 
IFC staff. In some of the environmentally harmful projects funded by the IFC in 
the past, the lack of site visits was considered by environmental activists to be one 
of the missed opportunities to exercise pressure on improving environmental per-
formance by the companies and devise mitigation measures through an inclusive 
process.149
In this second phase, following site visits and other forms of monitoring that 
reveal clients’ poor compliance with environmental standards and conditions, 
the IFC is in a position to make recommendations on remedial action and im-
provements in performance. It may suggest modifications to the environmental 
management system and draw together with the client a timetable for improved 
 143 Ibid. 9.
 144 Section 2.2 in Ch 4.
 145 L. Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Policy Guidance and Compliance:  The World Bank Operational 
Standards’ in D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance— The Role of Non- Binding Norms in the 
International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 281, 290.
 146 IFC Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability (2012) para. 24.
 147 C. Lee, ‘International Finance Corporation: Financing Environmentally and Socially Sustainable 
Private Investment’ in S. Schlemmer- Schulte and K. Tung (eds), Liber Amicorum Ibrahim F.I. Shihata 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 469, 473.
 148 IFC Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability (2012) para. 28.
 149 J.  Hay, ‘Pangue Hydroelectric Project (Chile):  An Independent Review of the International 
Finance Corporation’s Compliance with Applicable World Bank Group Environmental and Social 
Requirements’ (1997), cited by CIEL, ‘Analysis of IFC’s role and Impact’ (September 2000) <http:// 
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compliance. In case of persistent substandard conduct, the IFC is also in a position 
to suspend or withdraw a loan for breach of the loan agreement.
The Corporation could equally ensure a systematic inclusion and disclosure of 
environmental conditions in its loan agreement, to allow NGOs and local com-
munities to identify corporate environmentally irresponsible conduct. Indeed, the 
IFC could allow communities to monitor the project, given its limited resources 
for field visits.150 Another important measure is the requirement to conduct post- 
project evaluations, to assess the ultimate environmental aspects of funded pro-
jects and identify lessons learnt for similar projects on the basis of the performance 
standards involved.151
In cases of non- compliance, the IFC could request from the company measur-
able progress against time- bound action plans in the next semi- annual or annual 
review152 and may even suspend its funding to a project. A possible withdrawal 
of IFC funds, however, seems less appropriate, since it would result in the IFC’s 
exit from the project and in the termination of its oversight role.153 Thus, the 
Corporation should ensure that this ‘sanctional aspect’154 of its involvement in pro-
ject development is fully taken into consideration by private companies and used 
as a deterrent against substandard environmental performance.
The IFC could further start including in its loan agreements provisions for con-
tinued monitoring of environmental performance in case of prepayment of the 
loans by the private company, to avoid the risk of companies escaping its control at 
an early stage of the project life- cycle. Finally, the Corporation could enforce the 
client’s commitments even after the completion of the project and full disburse-
ment of the loan, by declaring the client’s default in performing its obligations 
under the agreement and, where the client does not take any action, this could ac-
celerate the maturity of the loan or affect future relations with the IFC.155
Against this background, the following sub- sections will discuss the CAO’s as-
sessments over time of the IFC’s practice in applying its own standards, including 
 150 Eg the case in which it contracted an NGO for an environmental appraisal of the project (IFC com-
missioned the NGO Flora and Fauna International to investigate illegal logging in Liberia when consid-
ering financing a project in the same area; reported by G. Saul, ‘Liberian Agricultural Project: Can’t See 
the People for the Trees’ (September 2000) <http:// www.ciel.org/ Ifi/ ifccaseliberia.html>.
 151 Boisson de Chazournes (n. 144) 291.
 152 WWF, ‘Guidelines for Investment in Operations that Impact Forests’ (September 2003) <http:// 
www.forestandtradeasia.org/ files/ WWF%20FOrest%20Investment%20Guideline.pdf> 11.
 153 Boisson de Chazournes (n. 144) 291, also observed that in the case of the World Bank loans to 
governments, an interruption of the contractual relationship impedes ‘the continuation of a dialogue 
that may find ways to correct the non- complying situation’.
 154 So defined by I. Shihata, ‘Implementation, Enforcement and Compliance with International 
Environmental Agreements— Practical Suggestions in Light of the World Bank’s Experience’ (1996– 97) 
9 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 37, 48.
 155 I. Shihata, ‘The World Bank and the Environment: A Legal Perspective’ in A. Parra, F. Tschofen, 
M. Stevens, and S. Schlemmer- Schulte (eds), The World Bank in a Changing World (Boston: M. Nijhoff, 
1995) 135, 154.
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recent insights into the application of the 2012 standards on biodiversity and eco-
system services.
3.1.1  Internal assessment
It was in the aftermath of an independent review of an IFC- funded project in Chile 
in 1997 that the need for an independent compliance mechanism for the IFC was 
identified. The independent review concluded: ‘there is no indication at this time 
that IFC has in place the necessary institutional operating system or clarity in its 
policy and procedural mandate to manage complex projects in a manner that com-
plies consistently with World Bank Group environmental requirements’.156 As a 
consequence, the CAO was established to provide the IFC with policy and process 
advice on environmental and social performance (Advisor function), and con-
duct environmental and social audits and reviews as an aid to institution learning 
(Compliance function).157 The degree of independence of the CAO is, however, 
subject to debate,158 although the selection process of the Vice President that serves 
as CAO has been considered extraordinarily independent, with interviews being 
conducted by civil society and private sector representatives, and a recommenda-
tion being made directly to the President of the World Bank Group, not through 
IFC management.159
In 2003, the CAO’s review concluded that the IFC environmental standards 
were having ‘some positive effects’, at the same time cautioning that the necessary 
systems to guide implementation and interpretation of such standards were lax 
or absent.160 Indeed, NGOs had been very active in documenting the environ-
mental damage caused by IFC- funded projects, showing how major projects that 
purportedly complied with IFC environmental safeguard policies did not achieve 
the minimum environmentally sound practices and impacts expected. Several 
drawbacks had been highlighted in the literature as possible causes of the poor 
environmental record of IFC- funded projects in the past. Some underscored the 
fact that the IFC applied different standards of compliance to different clients, 
depending on their sense of the company’s commitment to environmental is-
sues.161 Others noted that EIAs were often inadequate, when IFC funding was 
sought at a late stage in the project development.162 The IFC replied to these 
criticisms in 2006, noting that it evaluated the client’s willingness or ability to 
 156 Ibid.
 157 The CAO role in addressing complaints will be discussed in detail in Section 3.2 in this chapter.
 158 A. McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010) 215.
 159 CAO, ‘CAO at 10’ (CAO, 2010) 4– 6.
 160 CAO, A Review of International Finance Corporation’s Safeguard Policies (January 2003) http:// 
www.cao- ombudsman.org/ html- english/ documents/ ReviewofIFCSPsfinalreportenglish 
04- 03- 03.pdf 21.
 161 Ibid. 26.
 162 Ibid. 7.
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take remedial action to meet IFC requirements also at a later stage of the project 
development.163
The CAO also raised other concerns, such as on the selection of clients, par-
ticularly on the need to assess a proven commitment to positive environmental 
outcomes and for specific assessment of the client’s capacity at the pre- appraisal 
stage.164 In 2006, the IFC pledged to have put in place systems to review clients’ 
past practice, noting, however, that assessing client commitment is a ‘business 
judgement call’.165 Another critique centred on the role of the IFC to engage 
government authorities and strengthen their capacity166 to hold companies 
accountable. In addition, continued concerns were raised about a conflict of 
interests between the World Bank’s public lending operations and the IFC’s 
private loans, as the World Bank was pressing a government for restructuring 
certain economic sectors to the benefit of the private sector financed by the 
IFC.167
From a corporate environmental accountability perspective, the CAO identified 
as one of the most serious drawbacks in the past implementation activity of the 
IFC its limited practice in including environmental conditions systematically in its 
loan agreements168 and in not making such conditions publicly available.169 It sug-
gested, therefore, that similarly to the World Bank and other private banks, the IFC 
should consider suspending loans or withdrawing from projects whose environ-
mental performance presented unacceptable risks to the Corporation.170 Another 
significant flaw in past implementation occurred when a company decided to 
prepay its loans to the IFC, thus effectively precluding the Corporation from any 
further involvement in the project, including its ability to monitor and oversee the 
environmental performance of its loans.171 Environmental NGOs proposed as a 
possible solution to this situation that the agreement between the IFC and the pri-
vate company could state that the loan is contingent upon the client’s commitment 
to continue, after the IFC funding, environmental assessment procedures, and 
 163 IFC, ‘Response to the Compliance Advisor/ Ombudsman Review on IFC Policy and Performance 
Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability’ (22 September 2005) (IFC Response to CAO 
Review), 3.
 164 CAO (n. 159) 8.
 165 IFC Response (n. 162).
 166 CAO (n. 159) 51.
 167 L.  Pottinger, ‘Uganda’s Bujagali Dam:  A Case Study in Corporate Welfare’ (September 
2000) <http:// www.ciel.org/ Ifi/ ifccaseuganda.html>. ‘The World Bank’s public sector arm is pressuring 
the Ugandan government to restructure its energy sector to ensure the smooth functioning of the pri-
vate sector. The IFC is supporting a major project that stands to directly benefit from World Bank- 
sponsored reforms’ through the construction of large- scale dams.
 168 CAO (n. 159) 48.
 169 I. Bowles, A. Rosenfels, C. Kormos, C. Reining, J. Nations, and T. Ankersen, ‘The Environmental 
Impact of the International Finance Corporation Lending and Proposals for Reform: A Case Study of 
Conservation and Oil Development in the Guatemalan Petén’ (1999) 29 Environmental Law 103, 115.
 170 CAO (n. 155) 52.
 171 Bowles et al. (n. 168) 105.
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maintain insurance coverage and other measures agreed with the IFC in addition 
to requirements under domestic law.172
Another shortcoming in past implementation was limited public participation 
in the environmental assessment and management of IFC projects. Public consult-
ations occurred too late to affect the project design, because private companies did 
not facilitate stakeholders’ understanding of the project, and their ability to express 
concerns. Furthermore, companies allowed insufficient time for processing the in-
formation, providing thorough feedback, and did not sustain public participation 
efforts after the project approval.173 Given the fundamental role of affected com-
munities in monitoring the project and their direct interest in ensuring its environ-
mental sustainability, it was suggested that the IFC should recognize communities’ 
greater role in monitoring and supervising IFC- funded projects, with specific 
supervision protocols being developed for certain categories of projects.174 During 
the 2006 review, the IFC considered this option but decided, with a quite restrictive 
approach, that this could be decided on a project- by- project basis depending on 
the interest and capacity of communities involved.175 Concerns about the categor-
ization of projects continued to be raised by the CAO in successive audit reports.176
In the context of a complaint for a project in Chile, which the CAO agreed to 
consider notwithstanding the Corporation’s exit from the project,177 the CAO 
very openly criticized the ‘decree of secrecy and the tentative approach to dis-
closure . . . which hampered the ability of affected communities and internal con-
stituencies of the IFC to understand the project’.178 The CAO further argued that 
given the conditions of the loan agreement, the exit of the IFC should have taken 
place with its independent verification of the fulfilment of the loan conditions.179 
According to the IFC’s interpretation that the agreement was still valid until all of 
its conditions were fulfilled, the CAO requested the IFC to revisit its decision not to 
undertake any further external reviews of the project, to disclose the details of the 
agreement relating to environmental and social conditions, and to press the private 
company to disclose the results of monitoring and supervision in relation to down-
stream impacts.180
In 2010, the CAO continued to underscore in its advisory work the general-
ized need to improve the IFC’s practices relating to consultation and disclosure of 
 172 Ibid. 127.
 173 CAO (n. 159) 27.
 174 Ibid. 52.
 175 Ibid. 3.
 176 Indonesia Wilmar Group 01 West Kalimantan (Complaint filed 1 July 2007), Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman, Audit Report (19 June 2011) para. 2.8.3); discussed by Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (n. 
135) 49.
 177 CAO, Assessment Report in relation to a complaint against IFC’s investment in ENDESA Pangue 
SA, Chile (May 2003).
 178 Ibid. 4.
 179 Ibid. 5.
 180 Ibid. 6– 7.
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information as local stakeholders appear to be unaware of the IFC’s support to pro-
jects and the requirement for ‘broad community support’ is limited to ‘a very small 
number of the most sensitive projects in the [IFC’s] portfolio’.181 In addition, the 
CAO identified cases in which the IFC interpreted ‘too narrowly’ its policies, even 
in cases where there was full awareness of significant environmental and social 
concerns in certain sectors such as palm oil plantations.182 The case led to the set-
ting up of a panel of experts to audit the IFC, on the basis of which (and also due to 
resulting pressure from international civil society) the President of the World Bank 
placed a moratorium on IFC investments in the sector and carried out a global re-
view of the sector.183
Other cases have led to the CAO underscoring the need for more disclosure of 
information on environmental performance that can impact on affected commu-
nities’ livelihoods, including the outcomes of monitoring and supervision activ-
ities in relation to downstream impacts.184 Furthermore, the CAO called attention 
to the IFC’s responsibilities in assessing more systematically the adequacy of cli-
ents’ capacity at pre- investment stage so as to identify specific requirements to en-
hance environmental and social capacity where needed; and to risks arising from 
well- known deficiencies or contradictions in the national legal framework applic-
able to the proposed project.185
In some instances, the CAO’s review focused on specific substantive matters 
related to the environmental dimensions of projects: for example, in one case it 
considered insufficient the IFC’s narrow assessment of water availability only vis- 
à- vis the client’s own operational needs, as opposed to the sustainability of the 
aquifer and impacts on vulnerable users.186 Since 2010, the IFC has responded to 
CAO’s advisory notes finding by finding, providing explanations of follow- up ac-
tion and its rationale where the IFC is in agreement with the CAO’s assessment.187 
Generally, concerns remain about the lack of timeliness of information disclosure 
to communities by the IFC, usually following the conduct of ‘significant prelim-
inary planning work’.188 Once the IFC has committed to fund a project, it becomes 
very difficult and costly to withdraw its support, so a suggestion has been made to 
 181 Ibid. 64.
 182 Indonesia Wilmar Group 01 West Kalimantan (Complaint filed 1 July 2007), Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman, Appraisal Report I  (September 2008); discussed by Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (n. 
135) 33– 35 and 43.
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Naudé Fourie (n. 135) 44.
 185 Bolivia Comsur V- 01 Bosque Chiquitano (Complaint filed 1 June 2003), Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman, Audit Report (June 2004); discussed by Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (n. 135) 50.
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4.1.1); discussed by Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (n. 135) 53.
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widely publicize the IFC’s initial consideration of projects to allow potentially af-
fected communities to provide inputs into the process at a sufficiently early stage of 
decision- making within the IFC.189 Disclosure of subsequent environmental and 
social assessment and monitoring documentation is also a shortcoming, as is local 
language information on project environmental and social risks and impacts.190
All in all, the CAO’s advisory and compliance roles, and its own efforts to im-
prove its effectiveness, should be assessed against the background of the IFC’s 
immunity to national courts’ jurisdiction,191 which is increasingly challenged— 
including on the basis of CAO’s findings.192 This should also be contextualized 
with other World Bank activities, such as the Doing Business model, which sup-
port fiscal and regulatory practices that have detrimental effects on the environ-
ment and on human rights.193 The UN Independent Expert on the promotion of 
a democratic and equitable international order thus suggested that CAO recom-
mendations are publicized, and its reports include explicit reference to negative 
impacts on human rights on the basis of recommendations from human rights 
treaty bodies and special procedure mandate holders.194 The UN Independent 
Expert also advocated that the IFC waive institutional immunity when gross viola-
tions of human rights have occurred.195
Empirical research is limited on how the IFC management and staff apply the 
operational policies, as ‘technical compliance’ based on narrow interpretations of 
policies could nevertheless lead to ‘problematic results.’196 More research should 
also be carried out to assess the evolution of the CAO’s relationship with the IFC, 
in order to better understand the impact of the CAO’s recommendations on the 
functioning of the Corporation, including how direct recommendations to private 
companies are treated by the IFC President.
3.1.1.1  Implementation of biodiversity standards
A 2019 compliance investigation underscored the IFC’s shortcomings in 
implementing the 2012 Performance Standard on biodiversity,197 providing a host 
of considerations in relation to the integration of biodiversity concerns in impact 
assessments, the consideration of high biodiversity value and nationally protected 
areas, as well as ecosystem services.
 189 Ibid. 1320 and 1324.
 190 Ibid. 1320.
 191 Ibid. 1322.
 192 Report of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international 
order, (2017) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 36/ 40, paras 55– 57.
 193 Ibid. paras 50– 54.
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order (n. 191) para. 91(k) and (o).
 196 Bradlow and Naudé Fourie (n. 135) 27– 28 and 31.
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256 International Oversight
The CAO found that the IFC at the pre- investment phase overlooked gaps in 
the prospective client’s assessment of risks for engendered and endemic species, as 
well as cumulative impacts on freshwater systems.198 The CAO, however, remarked 
that while the IFC did not require the client to remedy these gaps in assessment, 
it requested the retention of a biodiversity expert to design and manage the im-
plementation of a biodiversity monitoring programme.199 This led to biodiversity 
concerns being addressed during project implementation on the basis of add-
itional biodiversity studies and a biodiversity monitoring programme. In addition, 
the CAO found that the IFC took adequate steps to assure itself that the client man-
aged risks in relation to the protection and conservation of biodiversity in compli-
ance with the requirements for critical habitat.
With regard to standards related to an area of high biodiversity value, the CAO 
looked into whether the project had ensured environmental flows (the quantity 
and quality of water flows allocated to sustain riverine ecosystems), in accordance 
with the IFC’s own good practice methodology.200 It observed that the minimum 
environmental flow described in the environmental assessment was prescribed 
without assessing the adequacy of the proposed environmental flow regime or al-
ternative flow scenarios. But the CAO also noted that the complexity and chal-
lenges of validating the environmental flow, and the IFC’s recommendation to the 
client to adopt an adaptive management framework as part of the monitoring of 
biodiversity impacts. Considering ongoing monitoring results did not point to 
measurable adverse impacts, the CAO found that the IFC’s supervision of the en-
vironmental flow issue was adequate.201
Another important finding was the location of the development within a na-
tional park (not its core zone, but its sustainable use, recreational, and traditional 
use zones).202 This had not been mentioned or noticed at the pre- investment stage, 
thus no relevant IFC requirements, or the need to respect Albanian law on pro-
tected areas, had been triggered, even if the client had obtained necessary permits. 
The CAO therefore recommended ongoing supervision to ensure that the client 
activities respect the park management plan (which had been developed a couple 
of years after the start of the project and of which the client was unaware at the time 
of the CAO’s involvement).203 The client’s consultation with protected area stake-
holders was also to be ensured.204
 198 CAO, 2019 Annual Report, https:// cao- ar19.org/ , 18.
 199 CAO, Compliance Investigation Report (IFC Investment in Enso Albania, complaint 01), 25 June 
2018, 15.
 200 IFC Good Practice Handbook, Environmental Flows for Hydropower Projects, February 2018— 
https:// goo.gl/ nVD85b.
 201 CAO, Compliance Investigation Report: IFC Investment in enso Albania, Complaint 1 (2018) 21.
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 203 Ibid. 28.
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In addition, in this case the CAO also investigated how the IFC applied its 
standards on ecosystem services, notably cultural services that could have been 
negatively impacted by the ecotourism project, and that the client was expected to 
analyse in the context of the project’s areas of influence, and co- defined in consult-
ation with affected stakeholders.205 The national park’s management plan empha-
sized the development of low- impact tourism and recreational activities, as well as 
the need for stakeholder engagement and resourcing challenges to the realization of 
the national park’s conservation objectives the differing values attached. The CAO 
therefore considered that the IFC did not ensure that the client took measures to 
minimize, mitigate, and/ or offset project impacts on the touristic value of the area, 
and did not ensure adequate stakeholder consultation. At the pre- investment re-
view stage, therefore, the CAO noted the need for the IFC to carry out further ana-
lysis of risks and impacts related to ecosystem services (including impacts on the 
area’s visual and touristic appeal). Even if the IFC’s supervision had captured im-
pacts on ecosystem services related to ecotourism and the broader touristic value 
of the area, the IFC had not ensured that the client’s consultation and disclosure re-
quirements were met in relation to assessments carried out during supervision.206
3.2 Ombudsman function of the CAO
Having examined the role of the IFC itself to apply its Performance Standards to 
private companies, this section examines the role of the CAO in its Ombudsman 
function to serve as an independent oversight authority that receives complaints 
directly from affected communities through a flexible problem- solving approach 
aimed at enhancing the environmental outcomes of IFC- funded projects. The 
section will discuss the role of the Ombudsman and the evolution of its practices, 
with the following sub- sections focusing on the various outcomes that can result 
from the Ombudsman’s involvement and comparing them with those arising from 
the OECD Implementation Procedure discussed earlier. In addition, another sub- 
section will focus specifically on the insights that the Ombudsman’s activities have 
provided to better understand practical challenges in implementing international 
standards on fair and equitable benefit- sharing.
As opposed to the other two functions of CAO, the Ombudsman interacts dir-
ectly with private companies and looks into their conduct, as well as that of the 
IFC. Outcomes of the Ombudsman’s cases are made publicly available. Issues 
that cannot be resolved by the Ombudsman can be referred to the CAO in its 
Compliance and Advisor functions. Lessons learnt from the Ombudsman’s cases 
are also used to inform more generally the other two roles of CAO.
 205 See discussion in Ch. 4, Section 3.2.
 206 CAO (n. 198) 22– 23.
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According to one commentator, the CAO ‘is meant to provide a voice to project- 
affected people, so that the host state, the project company and the IFC itself are 
not the only voices in the conversation’.207 An additional rationale for its creation 
was, however, identified in the private sector’s desire to create a new institution fo-
cused on problem- solving, rather than relying on the pre- existing Inspection Panel 
of the World Bank that was seen as more concerned with ‘fault- finding’.208
While it has been argued that the CAO provides ‘an opportunity for greater con-
sideration of human rights obligations and the implementation of practical human 
rights outcomes’ as a result of its emphasis on mediation,209 the CAO itself has not 
yet addressed human rights in explicit terms in its mandate. In its tenth anniver-
sary review of activities, the CAO noted that it has ‘not yet conducted a robust 
analysis of human rights aspects of [its] caseload’, although universities and think 
tanks have remarked that its Ombudsman work has addressed matters related to 
the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to health, the right to food, the 
right to property, and the right to life.210 In addition, most cases involve proced-
ural human rights (including procedural environmental human rights),211 such 
as access to environmental information and consultation.212 In its self- reflection, 
the CAO added that its own experience provided an indication that more ‘recog-
nizable’ human rights language in IFC policies that reflects companies’ own better 
understanding of their responsibility to respect human rights could benefit com-
munities in understanding the role of the IFC Performance Standards and CAO in 
preventing harm and protecting their rights.213
The modus operandi of the Ombudsman includes field visits to the site of con-
tested projects and interviews with all concerned parties: staff of the private com-
pany, local authorities, affected communities’ representatives, other relevant local 
organizations, and IFC staff. The Ombudsman usually concludes its consideration 
of complaints within six months to one year from receipt. Complaints, reports of 
field missions, and recommendations are all published on the CAO website, to-
gether with updates on ongoing investigations.214
After considering complaints, the CAO formulates recommendations not only 
to the IFC itself on the basis of its Environmental Performance Policy, but also dir-
ectly to the private company involved, albeit such recommendations will then need 
to be endorsed by the IFC President. The latter would transmit the CAO’s recom-
mendations to the private company and/ or request the IFC to take the appropriate 
 207 Saper (n. 138) 1288.
 208 Ibid. 1291.
 209 McBeth (n. 157) 231.
 210 CAO (n. 159) 58– 59.
 211 See Ch. 4, Sections 2.4 and 2.5.
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action.215 In some instances, the CAO also engages in follow- up monitoring and 
site visits.216 Its assessment report is intended both as a summary of factual find-
ings by the CAO in relation to allegations contained in the complaint, and as an 
assessment of the ‘ripeness’ of any conflict or tension for resolution or manage-
ment.217 The report can serve to identify actual substandard corporate conduct in 
the natural resource sector, and equally to look into whether allegations against 
companies are well- founded in a particular case.
After 2006, however, the CAO abandoned its practice of establishing its own 
findings and making its own recommendations,218 and has focused instead on 
creating the conditions for more collaborative interactions between the company 
and stakeholders, setting out steps for establishing or strengthening dialogue,219 
or where dialogue is not favoured by the complainants, proposing to refer the case 
to the Compliance facility.220 This is confirmed by the fact that in recent reports 
the CAO explicitly cautions that it merely ‘summarizes the views expressed by the 
various stakeholders without the intention to validate or deny any issues’,221 with 
the explicit aim of serving as a ‘trusted third- party facilitator focused on collabora-
tive problem- solving with stakeholders’.222
Self- reflecting on this change in 2010, the CAO indicated that this was a stra-
tegic change in direction aimed at ensuring practical effectiveness on the basis 
of evidence accrued in its first ten years of experience:  it first noted ‘confusion’ 
among complainants about the CAO’s role, next steps, and implementation of re-
commendations arising from the inclusion in the same report (and in the same 
modality of operation of the Ombudsman) of ‘technical analyses and an opinion 
on the merits and neutral recommendations about how the parties might work 
together’.223 On that basis, the CAO considered that this prevented it in its 
Ombudsman capacity from facilitating the reaching of a collaborative agreement 
between parties, with the effect of increasing local ownership of solutions and the 
identification of scalable response, which was further supported by the CAO’s en-
gagement of local and regional partners as mediators and facilitators.224 The CAO 
itself could then arguably focus on creating a neutral space for dialogue that would 
 215 Ibid. 4.
 216 CAO, Follow- up Assessment Report on Complaint regarding the Marlin Mining Project, 
Guatemala (May 2006).
 217 CAO, Assessment Report on the complaint concerning COMSUR/ Don Mario Mine, Bolivia 
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prevent a cycle of conflict, mentoring parties to ensure that the dialogue would re-
flect sufficiently and accurately their interests, while understanding the constraints 
of the dialogue process and committing to ongoing monitoring as long as parties 
committed to a monitoring plan with milestones.225 On the one hand, this more 
recent approach has effectively stopped the CAO’s factual assessments of private 
companies’ conduct. On the other hand, it has allowed consideration of the con-
nections between conflicts around projects and broader historical issues within a 
certain country, and the employment of trust- building processes through scien-
tific assessments that respond to questions co- identified by concerned communi-
ties and addressed by independent experts co- selected by communities through a 
competitive process. The CAO claims that this aims at changing the ‘dynamics of 
long- term conflicts’.226
Commentators argued that the CAO’s mediation function provides ‘an oppor-
tunity for greater consideration of human rights obligations and implementation 
of practical human rights outcomes’.227 The CAO, in effect, ‘is meant to provide a 
voice to project- affected people’.228 This is particularly relevant as the IFC has been 
criticized for relying heavily on information about compliance from clients, leaving 
them considerable discretion, and for negotiating with them rather than applying 
sanctions, to bring them back into compliance. As a result, the IFC’s withdrawal is 
rarely, if ever used, with concerns remaining about the extent of the Performance 
Standards’ effectiveness in influencing business behaviour, given the limited track 
record of enforcement.229
The Ombudsman practice of the CAO reveals a proactive approach in 
interpreting the IFC’s environmental standards and suggesting ways of enhancing 
their implementation by private companies. The fact that its decisions are publicly 
available and easily accessible at all stages of consideration of complaints is another 
positive feature of the mechanism. The move away from determining if private 
companies are at fault in respecting the IFC Performance Standards towards a col-
laborative approach to co- identifying root causes and possible ways forward has 
both disadvantages and advantages from the perspective of international standard- 
setting on corporate environmental accountability and responsibility. On the one 
hand, the change in practice of the Ombudsman has meant that the CAO no longer 
assesses private companies’ compliance with the IFC Performance Standards, 
allowing more limited discussion of the practical application of relevant inter-
national standards. This is lamentable as the IFC Performance Standards remain 
the most explicit and elaborated substantive standards on corporate environmental 
 225 Ibid. 27 and 29.
 226 Ibid. 29 and 31.
 227 Saper (n. 138) 1300.
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accountability and responsibility on the basis of the CBD,230 and could provide im-
portant lessons learnt for other international oversight mechanisms discussed in 
this chapter. On the other hand, the more recent practice can allow experienting 
with collaborative approaches to use the international standards to better clarify 
the responsibility of the private sector and that of the government and of inter-
national organizations. This can allow the co- identification with communities of 
the root causes of complex issues and a move beyond the timeframe and scope of a 
particular development project to identify ways to enhance environmental protec-
tion and the respect of human rights. In that sense, the CAO can provide important 
lessons learnt for the contextual application of international standards.
3.2.1  Variation in outcomes
Some of the outcomes from the CAO procedure can be compared with those under 
the OECD implementation procedure, notably support towards a mediated agree-
ment. In addition, the CAO has also led to the creation of local platforms for dia-
logue or has assessed whether private companies have undertaken appropriate 
prior impact (self- )assessments.231 In addition, similarly to the OECD Guidelines 
NCPs, the Ombudsman, even in the absence of formal non- compliance with IFC 
standards, recommended that companies still build a climate of trust and under-
standing with local communities with regard to the environmental impacts of the 
project. Other outcomes range from information sharing to joint fact- finding, 
participatory monitoring, and establishment of grievance mechanisms.232 This 
sub- section will focus on how the Ombudsman has contributed to clarify the ap-
plicability of international standards related to environmental impact assessments, 
disclosure of information, consultation, and benefit- sharing233— increasingly as 
part of its support for a mediated agreement between communities and companies 
(and occasionally the government).
With regard to implementation of international standards on EIAs, the 
Ombudsman pointed to insufficient methodological rigour in impact assessments 
that led to the provision of insufficient information for decision- making. This in 
turn indicated that the relevant information was not made available to the com-
munities concerned and that environmental commitments were not developed to 
adequately address the ‘perceived social and cultural concerns of people affected’ 
by a river diversion.234 In a complaint regarding a pulp mill in Uruguay,235 the 
 230 In addition to 2012 IFC Performance Standard 6 (discussed under Section 1 in this chapter), also 
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Convention on Biological Diversity’.
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 233 Discussed in Ch. 4, Sections 2.1.1, 2.4, 2.5, and 3.1.3.
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Ombudsman underlined the lack of consideration of cumulative environmental 
impacts and the possible transboundary environmental effects of the project, as 
well as the limited public consultation process that did not involve concerned com-
munities in Argentina. The Ombudsman regretted that there was ‘not sufficient 
acknowledgement of the concerns and fears of communities that are local to the 
project’.236 It further recommended that the impact assessment demonstrate the 
application of best available technology.237 The following year, the IFC Board of 
Directors approved a US$170 million investment by the IFC on the basis of the 
positive findings of a cumulative impact study, subsequently reviewed by inde-
pendent experts.238 Nonetheless, public opposition to the project continued, both 
on the part of Argentinean communities and government and of environmental 
NGOs.239 When the case reached the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the ICJ 
considered that the assessments of alternative sites produced under the aegis of 
the IFC paid regard to freshwater habitats, and that the consultations with affected 
communities in Argentina and Uruguay had been adequate.240
The complaint regarding a hydropower project in India provided an opportunity 
for the Ombudsman to formulate recommendations directly to the private com-
pany241 that can be related to Anaya’s recommendation that EIAs are carried out by 
independent experts.242 The CAO recommended that the company provide for an 
independent study of environmental concerns, make it public, ensure the public 
monitoring of resulting commitments, and generally engage local communities 
more constructively, through the intermediation of independent facilitators or 
observers. The CAO further called for developing a schedule for implementation 
of commitments resulting from the EIA on the basis of each of the IFC perform-
ance standards.243 In addition, the CAO provided for both the IFC and the pri-
vate company to engage in quality monitoring. The IFC was requested to appoint 
in February 2006 by an audit of the IFC’s due diligence in applying its environmental standards (CAO, 
Audit of IFC’s and MIGA’s Due Diligence for two Pulp Mills in Uruguay (22 February 2006)).
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 237 Ibid. 11.
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an independent engineer to oversee the project and report on social and environ-
mental matters, while the company was requested to report to the IFC on a quar-
terly and annual basis on social, environmental, and health issues.244 Later on, the 
private company sponsoring the project prepared a register of its obligations under 
the EIA, which was publicly available, and agreed to meet publicly with the com-
munity on a monthly basis to allow participatory verification and discussion on 
progress with respect to commitments made at the outset of the project planning 
process.245 This provides an interesting example of international support to ensure 
that a procedural standard is implemented in meaningful ways that contribute to 
other dimensions of corporate environmental accountability.
Similar to the OECD implementation procedure, the CAO has also concluded 
that no breach of the Performance Standards was found but still called for enhanced 
business practices in consulting with affected communities.246 The CAO has self- 
assessed this kind of intervention as a pragmatic balancing between documenting 
instances of private companies’ non- compliance and identifying a long- lasting and 
satisfactory solution for the parties concerned.247 In the specific case of a gold and 
silver mine in Guatemala, the CAO concluded that no significant environmental 
risk from waterways contamination would result from the project and that the EIA 
had adequately considered the risks and led to substantial improvements in the 
project design. Nonetheless, given continuing public concerns, the Ombudsman 
suggested stepping up an already ongoing consultation process of the private com-
pany with affected communities through participatory environmental monitoring 
and an analysis of Mayan customary perspectives and traditional decision- making 
in matters related to mining operations.248
Where possible, the Ombudsman prioritizes facilitating an agreement between 
the private sector and the complainants, which can also be considered compar-
able to the OECD NCPs’ approach. These kind of cases may in effect provide an 
example in which international oversight bodies support directly the implemen-
tation of the corporate environmental responsibility standard of benefit- sharing as 
an ongoing process of relationship- building. Whether or not the resulting benefit- 
sharing approach is culturally appropriate and has been co- developed by commu-
nities, however, remains to be assessed through empirical research.249 This was, for 
instance, the case with a pipeline project in Georgia,250 which has led to the highest 
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case workload on a single project for the CAO (thirty- two complaints accounting 
for nearly half of all cases assessed by CAO within its first ten years of operation).251 
As the CAO’s mandate does not allow it to enter into complaints about amounts 
of compensation, it has been argued that it should play a role in facilitating agree-
ments on compensation among local authorities,252 private companies, and com-
munities. After a series of findings about the company’s fault, the CAO tried to play 
a more neutral role which led, in its own assessment, to an increased willingness 
from the company and the IFC to constructively engage in a mediation process, as 
well as strengthening grievance mechanisms.253
In the early stages of investigations into local communities’ complaints re-
garding a company’s exploitation of palm oil plantations in Indonesia, which were 
allegedly causing land and primary forest clearing and biodiversity destruction, 
the CAO facilitated consultations. It helped ensuring that the company accepted as 
preconditions for dialogue the freezing of its activities within the plantations, in-
cluding planting, harvesting, clearing, and expansion.254 The resulting settlement 
agreement provided that the company could increase the proportion of land to be 
allocated as smallholdings and return those lands to communities that insisted 
they did not wish the land to be cleared; that lands used for oil palm would be 
leased as community lands and revert to those communities at the end of the lease; 
and that the company would adopt standards in line with the multi- stakeholder 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil.255 The CAO also developed a facilitation 
process that respected customary norms and was eventually able to facilitate the 
payment of compensation, as well as the adoption by the company of improved 
operational standards.256 The implementation of this company– community agree-
ment257 was monitored in 2011 and 2013, giving the community and the company 
an opportunity to change who received the compensation and to assess progress in 
reforestation.258
In a case in the Philippines on the privatization of a large- scale hydroelectric 
facility, the CAO was able to broker formal agreements between the company, the 
community, and local government for benefit- sharing and land- use rights, taking 
into account the community’s desire to address long- standing land claims and the 
opportunities to use the complaint as a basis for developing a shared vision for de-
velopment.259 The agreement provided for a usufruct that handed over to the local 
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government the management of the residual areas of the watershed area for the 
common use by communities, while the company set up a ‘substantial corporate 
social responsibility funds, and alignment of corporate programs with the indi-
genous people’s livelihood objectives’.260
Another case concerned negative environmental and human rights impacts 
from resettlement on nomadic herders in the Gobi Desert in Mongolia, and the 
use of land and water, by gold and copper mining by Rio Tinto. The CAO sup-
ported the establishment of a tripartite council of herder and local government 
representatives focused on livelihood alternatives in the context of mining, but also 
solar- water pumps to address water security, and support for the transmission of 
traditional knowledge as a way to build a lasting partnership.261 This was based 
on a series of: interim agreements on access to information, tours/ inspections of 
the mine site for herders, joint fact- finding, and access to grazing land inside the 
project site; as well as independent socio- economic study of herder households 
over the previous decade, and an independent assessment of project impacts on 
the main tributary of the Undai River. The studies were conducted by independent 
experts jointly selected by the parties. The implementation plan that summar-
izes the substantive content of the agreement reached clearly distinguishes the 
role of the government, of the company, and of joint actions with communities 
in relation to re- establishing grazing systems and herder access to water and land. 
Accordingly, the company is charged with rehabilitating disturbed and abandoned 
sites for pasture, shortening time of dust generation from disturbed sites, min-
imizing risks of accidents in quarries, and supporting livestock grazing in areas 
within the fenced production sites. On water, the company is expected to provide 
collective compensation for constructing new wells that would align with the cus-
tomary livelihood practices of the community and their concerns for impacts on 
wildlife, fund studies on water reserves under pastures, and hand over boreholes 
for local herders’ pastoral water supply needs. Furthermore, it is expected to re-
place outsourced monitoring with local monitoring programmes that are sensitive 
to herding practices and based on joint methodologies and genuine engagement, 
revise the grievance mechanism in light of feedback from communities, and 
widely publicize the changes arising from this process. The implementation plan 
also includes a sustainable livelihood programme, including life skills training, ac-
cess to markets and creation of supply chains, fodder plantations, creating artificial 
water collection points, and supporting the connection of herders’ deep wells with 
renewables, etc.262 The final joint statements, based on monitoring activities over 
2017– 18 expressed satisfaction with the trust and cooperation between parties.263 
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This is an interesting case in which a benefit- sharing agreement supported by an 
international oversight body provides an opportunity to enhance the implementa-
tion of procedural and substantive standards of corporate environmental account-
ability and responsibility.
In another case in Uganda in the context of agri- business, a UK- based forestry 
company was involved in alleged forced evictions and displacement in the area of 
timber plantations. The CAO’s involvement focused on a resettlement and liveli-
hood programme for communities with a forest company, by building the capacity 
of communities and company representatives to enter into a productive dialogue. 
On the one hand, a community cooperative was established to purchase land to 
resettle families and conduct small- scale farming.264 The private company, on the 
other hand, undertook to provide significant financial support to the cooperative, 
expanding its social responsibility investment programme to meet some of the spe-
cific needs of the community, and collaborated with the cooperative to build lasting 
mutually beneficial relations with the community. This could be considered a form 
of benefit- sharing.265 The complainants agreed to respect the company’s legal rights 
to operate within the area, and both the company and the complainants agreed to act 
lawfully and to engage with each other through a joint development forum, which 
was created to facilitate decision- making. The CAO monitored the parties’ imple-
mentation of the terms of the agreement over four years (2014– 18), and appointed 
a community development coordinator to work with the cooperative on resettle-
ment planning and income- generation projects. While not mediated by the CAO, 
this process also led to the conclusion of a memorandum of understanding whereby 
the government provided financial contributions towards the acquisition of land by 
the cooperative for resettling their members and rebuilding livelihoods.266
In conclusion, it is worth underlining the efforts of the CAO in ensuring a stable 
and fair relationship between IFC clients and local communities, even when it is 
threatened by misunderstandings rather than by actual substandard practices. The 
conciliatory approach and creation of roundtables to facilitate dialogue locally has 
allowed the examination of substantive environmental, social, and health issues 
through commissioned studies that show the value added by the CAO and also for 
the start of cooperation between the company and the community.267 The CAO’s 
approach to disclosure of information has also been considered a significant factor 
in helping communities understand the extent of environmental and social risks 
of projects, where previously, their perception had been affected by the insuffi-
cient information shared by the company.268 In doing so, the CAO has also been 
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able to support the start of co- developed solutions with communities, based on 
the information shared, and supports companies’ responsiveness to community 
needs.269 In not all cases, however, does CAO meet the expectations of the com-
plainants. Following the release of the CAO assessment,270 it has been argued that 
the Ombudsman underestimated the environmental harm caused by one project 
in terms of toxic emissions.271 On the one hand, the CAO is seen to provide ‘an 
opportunity for greater consideration of human rights obligations and the imple-
mentation of practical human rights outcomes as a result of its emphasis on me-
diation’272 and offers an easier avenue than other complaints procedures. On the 
other hand, barriers remain due to local communities still being insufficiently 
aware of IFC and CAO and work,273 the CAO’s procedures, and the need to draft a 
complaint despite the limited formal requirements.274 In addition, the CAO finds 
itself in a complex position in striking a balance between the identification of in-
stances of non- compliance by companies and the opportunity to keep companies 
engaged in the progressive improvement of their practices.
In light of the growing number of cases dealt by the Ombudsman, the CAO 
could engage in a comparative analysis of its jurisprudence and its approach to the 
admissibility of complaints, interpretation of performance standards, and drafting 
recommendations.275 More independent empirical study is needed, in addition, 
to understand the IFC’s effectiveness: the CAO review in 2010 underscored that 
only 53 per cent of clients disclosed action plans to communities and none updated 
them on their implementation; only 53 per cent established grievance mechan-
isms; and 33 per cent of annual monitoring reports were found to be unsatisfactory 
due to insufficient information to assess the company’s performance.276 The actual 
impact on the ground of the CAO’s cases, particularly in as far as facilitated benefit- 
sharing agreements is concerned, remains a matter for further empirical research.
3.2.2  Mediation and fair and equitable benefit- sharing
In a particular instance, the CAO did engage in a detailed process of documenta-
tion of lessons learnt and of impacts not only at the community level, but also at 
national level and on the practices of the CAO itself at the international level. The 
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CAO documentation is particularly illuminating to contextualize the international 
standards of fair and equitable benefit- sharing.277
Following a series of complaints in 2000 concerning a mercury spill provoked 
by the largest gold mining company in Peru, the CAO supported the establish-
ment of a permanent roundtable for facilitating multi- stakeholder dialogue and 
resolving issues of concern between local communities and the mining company 
regarding the aftermath of the spill and its long- term environmental impacts (Mesa 
de Dialogo y Consenso). The roundtable was meant to act in a proactive way, rather 
than being retrospective.278 The Mesa eventually established itself as a formal legal 
entity, and succeeded in functioning both as a forum for civil society dialogue and 
a mechanism for providing objective, technical information on communities’ con-
cerns surrounding the company’s environmental conduct (most notably, by pro-
ducing a water quality and quantity assessment). It did not, however, represent a 
formal system of conflict resolution, and its legitimacy was not recognized by local 
NGOs or local authorities, possibly due to the lack of disclosure of members’ direct 
and indirect relationships to the company’s activities.279 Having provided financial 
and technical support to the Mesa since 2001, the CAO concluded its phased with-
drawal from it in March 2006, recommending the continuation of the Mesa’s water 
monitoring programme, as well as the setting up of transparent dispute resolution 
mechanisms.280
Nonetheless, the CAO continued to assess developments under the Mesa, cul-
minating in the publication of three monographs assessing the impacts at different 
levels of four and a half years of work. In particular, from a standard- setting per-
spective, the CAO’s assessment has unveiled the linkages between the implemen-
tation of the international standard of fair and equitable benefit- sharing281 and 
perceptions of risks, mediation training, as well as the independence and transpar-
ency, and monitoring of benefit- sharing arrangements.
First of all, the CAO linked the positive impacts of the Mesa with a combined vi-
sion of: commitment to scientific rigour and simultaneous recognition of the value 
and importance of local knowledge, its own growing expertise on environmental 
issues, and its understanding and practice of conflict resolution.282 It then focused 
on the role of the platform in dealing with different perceptions of environmental 
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risks from the project, arriving at the conclusion that the Mesa was successful at 
dealing with the environmental hazard but less able to compel the mining com-
pany to address community perceptions and emotions about the risks. It thus 
noted the need for distinctive processes and solutions to engage with a discrep-
ancy between people’s perceived risk (such as negative impacts to water quality and 
quantity; loss of land, livelihoods, and traditional way of life; and eroding social 
cohesion) and their perceived benefits (such as economic and educational benefits; 
improved standard of living; and improved infrastructure). To that end, the CAO 
recommended that dialogue platforms be established on the basis of a ‘situation as-
sessment’ that focuses also on the history of the communities and their territories, 
a cultural context assessment to understand the distinctive ways that stakeholders 
approach conflict resolution (influence of power, rights, and interests, availability 
of social capital to obtain compliance with agreements), and corporate culture (its 
leadership, consistent messaging, and track record of compliance with community 
agreements).283
The CAO also assessed the role of mediation training to build capacity for dia-
logue, equipping communities with skills to give voice to the marginalized and 
bring about meaningful change. These skills were considered relevant for building 
trust and reciprocity within an iterative dialogue process that eventually evolved 
from a mechanism to prevent and resolve conflicts to an accountability mechanism 
that could assess the mine’s operations and fulfilment of specific benefit- sharing 
commitments.284
Furthermore, the CAO investigated through the experience of the Mesa the 
conditions to ensure independence and transparency in benefit- sharing arrange-
ments. It noted the importance of a careful structure of governance arrangements 
that can be ‘viewed by the majority of stakeholders as independent, even when 
the company is a major contributor’ and are based on full disclosure and trans-
parency. This is coupled with co- developed selection criteria for technical experts 
to support fact- finding or joint problem- solving; as well as regular communica-
tion on how independence is maintained.285 This extends to co- developing moni-
toring and compliance approaches with benefit- sharing agreements with a clear 
outline of lines of authority, incentives for all parties, and consequences of not 
complying. Pragmatically, the Mesa led to the development of a public tracking of 
benefit- sharing agreements and of the implementation of the recommendations 
arising from a water study and water monitoring program, as well as specific claims 
of noncompliance brought by Mesa members. The tracking system was eventu-
ally used by the local branch of the national government’s ombudsman office and 
supported external monitoring. The local ombudsman made public results and 
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conclusions from its analysis of the tracking results and then met with the mining 
company to evaluate progress and ensure follow- through with implementation.286 
This could be considered a pragmatic approach to considering benefit- sharing as 
an ongoing partnership- building process,287 that can also facilitate external over-
sight of the actual flows of benefits.
The Mesa also led in and of itself to a new benefit- sharing approach, with a 
view to engaging the company towards a more comprehensive development 
programme. As a result, the companies agreed in 2007 to allocate US45 million 
over the next four years for development projects in the region under the aegis 
of a technical commission consisting of the regional government and the munici-
pality and under the administration of the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP).288 The funding was used for social development projects (nutrition, edu-
cation, and health), roads, water conservation programmes, tourism, strength-
ening institutions, and capacity building, as well as for feasibility studies (about 
expanding the regional hospital, constructing a dam) and developing a com-
prehensive urban development plan. The CAO also underlined the ‘pioneering 
independent participatory water study and the community water monitoring pro-
grammes’ developed under the Mesa as the catalysts for a number of projects being 
implemented today.289
The Mesa also led to industry- wide benefit- sharing arrangements at the national 
level. In 2006, an agreement was reached between the government of Peru and the 
country’s mining sector to make a voluntary payment of US$757.5 million over 
the next five years into an equity fund to fight poverty, malnutrition, and social 
exclusion in poor mining regions. The fund prioritized as beneficiaries, commu-
nities near mines, the poorest areas of mining regions, and the victims of political 
violence in those areas. The fund was to be co- managed by companies, beneficiary 
communities, and local and regional governments that would together allocate and 
administer the payments.290 This shows the potential usefulness of documenting 
(and the need to independently research) the impacts of international oversight 
of corporate environmental accountability and responsibility standards across dif-
ferent levels.
Finally, through the assessment of the Mesa process, the CAO also identified 
lessons for its own Ombudsman role. It underscored the need for benchmarks to 
measure progress, the importance of developing clear exit strategies for interven-
tions, and the challenges associated with independence and impartiality.291 This 
particular instance thus shows the CAO’s role in proactively managing conflicts 
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between companies and affected communities. First, it provided communities 
with a structured opportunity to be heard and supported in engaging in complex 
dialogue processes. Second, through that dialogue, it clarified the conditions for 
the applicability of international standards of corporate environmental account-
ability and responsibility. Third, this underscored the capacity needs of private 
companies to take into account broader contextual and historical factors around 
project- specific benefit- sharing options.
4 Human rights monitoring bodies and special procedures
When the domestic legal system of the host State is ineffective, the consideration 
of complaints by international human rights bodies has provided an alternative 
means for individuals and groups to access justice at the supranational level in 
egregious cases of environmental degradation.292 These international initiatives 
may help to remedy human rights violations that could not be asserted at the na-
tional level, and allow individuals to act as ‘guardians of the treaty’.293 These initia-
tives include only to a limited extent international human rights tribunals.294
In an effort to move beyond the current limitations of international human 
rights tribunals, the African Commission has established the Working Group on 
Extractive Industries’ Impact in Africa to formulate proposals on appropriate meas-
ures to prevent right violations.295 The Working Group has a mandate to: under-
take research on the violations of human and peoples’ rights by non- State actors in 
Africa; gather information from all relevant sources, including governments, com-
munities, and organizations, on violations of human rights by non- State actors in 
Africa; inform the African Commission on the possible liability of non- State actors 
for human rights violations under its protective mandate; and propose appropriate 
measures and activities for the prevention and reparation of violations of human 
rights by extractive industries in Africa. The Working Group has been focusing on 
the need for improved protection of human rights and the environment, including 
by developing effective continental mechanisms for monitoring the human rights 
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impact of extractive industries’ activities and the development of jurisprudence on 
holding non- State actors accountable for human rights violations in Africa.296 On 
the occasion of country visits, the Working Group made recommendations dir-
ectly to business enterprises to comply with the principle of free prior informed 
consent297 and to apply a human rights- based approach to development, by widely 
consulting indigenous peoples before developing new projects and recognizing 
their ownership rights over lands and territories.298
Extending classic international human rights monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms to non- State entities, as suggested by the UN Norms on Business 
and Human Rights,299 and even earlier on in the context of the draft UN Code 
of Conduct,300 has a few advantages compared with other oversight mechan-
isms, such as the OECD National Contact Points. Some of these advantages in-
clude: being impartial and independent, instead of being established within a 
national government; providing transparency into both corporate and State con-
duct, thereby incrementally clarifying the dividing line in a context- specific and 
authoritative fashion, on the basis of experience in applying international stand-
ards; and being open to all States rather than just those countries adhering to 
the OECD Guidelines.301 In addition, the universality of the forum could help 
to bring about more pressure and wider publicity.302 But as discussed earlier,303 
the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights played down its role to 
consider individual cases,304 and has been criticized by NGOs and scholars for 
lacking a mandate to assess the implementation of the UN Framework as a whole, 
and to provide a complaint mechanism.305 The UN Working Group, nonetheless, 
conducts country visits, which could allow for a soft approach to monitoring the 
implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
But so far it has not taken the opportunity to play an ‘autonomous’, ‘credible’, 
 296 https:// www.achpr.org/ specialmechanisms/ detailmech?id=13.
 297 Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights Violations in Africa, 
Final Communiqué on the National Dialogue on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Extractive 
Industries, 27– 28 November 2018, Kampala, Uganda. See discussion in Ch. 5, Section 1.2.
 298 Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment and Human Rights Violations in Africa, 
Final Communiqué on the National Dialogue on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Extractive 
Industries, from 7– 8 October 2019, Nairobi, Kenya.
 299 See Ch. 3, Section 4.1. See also D. Kinley and R. Chambers, ‘The UN Human Rights Norms for 
Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 
447, 452; and D. Vagts, ‘The UN Norms for Transnational Corporations’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 795.
 300 See Ch. 3, Section 2. See also W. Sprote, ‘Negotiations on a United Nations Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations’ (1990) 33 German Yearbook of International Law 331, 344.
 301 O. de Schutter, Towards Corporate Accountability for Human and Environmental Rights Abuses, 
discussion paper for the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (April 2007) 5– 6 and 11.
 302 Ibid. 6.
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Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 46) 11, 20– 21.
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and ‘consistent’ interpretative role providing bottom- up evolutive guidance that 
could ‘be taken up by those bodies with substantially more authority to bind’ 
companies.306 In addition, the UN Working Group has not provided sufficient 
information on relevant corporations, action taken and rate of response, so it re-
mains unclear if individual complaints ‘have provided information to Working 
Group that is relevant to its overall mandate and has informed the thematic 
choices of his post- 2013 reports’.307
The country visits of UN Special Rapporteurs have so far provided a richer area 
of practice, including by complementing the work of the UN Working Group on 
Business and Human Rights.
4.1 Country visits by UN Special Rapporteurs
UN Special Rapporteurs have increasingly engaged in assessing whether pri-
vate companies are respecting international standards of corporate environ-
mental accountability and responsibility during their country visits. They have 
done so to different extents, so no coherent practice across mandate holders or 
within the same mandate has emerged yet. Nonetheless they have contributed 
to clarifying how international standards apply in a specific context, provided 
evidence of substandard corporate practice, and reflected on the implications 
for States. They have also contributed to normative coherence by relying on the 
standard- setting and oversight activities of other international human rights 
processes.
The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, for in-
stance, has addressed questions related to corporate accountability and responsi-
bility in a couple of field missions. As part of a visit to Mongolia, the Rapporteur 
recalled concerns expressed by the Committee on the Rights of the Child308 and 
the Working Group on Business and Human Rights309 about the adverse impact 
of mining projects on herders’ human rights, including in relation to free prior 
informed consent and inadequate compensation for the adverse effects of the 
mine.310 The Special Rapporteur’s recommendations, however, were solely ad-
dressed to the government (increasing the transparency of agreements between 
 306 L Catá Backer, ‘From Guiding Principles to Interpretative Organizations:  Developing a 
Framework for Applying the UNGPs to Disputes that Institutionalizes the Advocacy Role of Civil 
Society’ in Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 46) 97, 104– 05.
 307 Rodríguez- Garavito (n. 303) 43.
 308 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of 
Mongolia (2017) UN Doc. CRC/ C/ MNG/ CO/ 5.
 309 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises: Country visit to Mongolia (2013) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 23/ 32/ Add.1.
 310 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoy-
ment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment on his mission to Mongolia, (2018) UN Doc. 
A/ HRC/ 37/ 58/ Add.2, para. 60 and fn. 36. See Ch. 4, Section 3.1.2.
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mining companies and local authorities, ensuring that the conclusions of envir-
onmental assessments are taken into account in the environmental management 
plans for mines, and providing for full transparency of payments by mining com-
panies into reclamation funds, and of payments of royalties to local development 
funds).311 He did not, therefore, drew upon the relevant international standards of 
corporate environmental accountability and responsibility.312
As part of a visit to Madagascar, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
and the Environment commended a specific mining company for its positive 
environmental mitigation and redress measures. He also noted that local com-
munities, however, indicated that the company’s measures had negatively and dis-
proportionately affected the poorest members who were most dependent on the 
forest and the least able to take advantage of new development opportunities. The 
Special Rapporteur, therefore, urged the company and the community to discuss 
these issues. The Special Rapporteur then addressed a general recommendation to 
businesses working in Madagascar, to ‘ensure that in all their actions affecting local 
communities, from conducting mining operations to managing protected areas’, 
they respect community members’ human rights.313
The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment has therefore 
engaged in fact- finding with regard to alleged corporate misconduct. It has done so 
by addressing recommendations to specific companies and to the business sector 
as a whole, while documenting both positive and negative corporate conduct. The 
country visits of the UN Special Rapporteurs on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and on 
Toxics have, in turn, contributed to ensuring coherence between, and filling gaps 
across, international standards of corporate environmental accountability and re-
sponsibility. As will be demonstrated in the following sub- sections, UN Special 
Rapporteurs are emerging as a significant source of guidance on how to imple-
ment these international standards in specific circumstances. On the whole, their 
practices remain quite inconsistent in terms of scope and depth of oversight, and it 
remains to be seen if transnational litigation,314 new international standard- setting 
initiatives,315 and the international negotiations on a treaty on business and human 
rights316 will fully benefit from their insights in further clarifying the content of 
international standards, and the conditions for their implementation in particular 
contexts or sectors, or across levels.
 311 A/ HRC/ 37/ 58/ Add.2, para. 85(c– e). The last point relates to the benefit- sharing standard dis-
cussed in Ch. 5, Section 1.3.
 312 See Ch. 5.
 313 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoy-
ment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, on his visit to Madagascar, (2017) UN Doc. 
A/ HRC/ 34/ 49/ Add.1, para. 85.
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4.1.1  UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights
The UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights has addressed cor-
porate environmental accountability and responsibility issues in the context of 
environmental impact assessments, free prior informed consent, benefit- sharing, 
and compensation.317 The contribution of this mandate- holder has been subject to 
evolution: from a phase of original standard- setting to one more focused on im-
plementation of the standards. In his first report to the General Assembly, former 
Special Rapporteur James Anaya prioritized the task of responding on an ongoing 
basis to specific cases of alleged human rights violations, noting that cases hitherto 
brought to his attention included infringements of the right to free, prior informed 
consent, especially in relation to natural resource extraction and displacement or 
removal of indigenous communities, and denial of rights of indigenous peoples 
to lands and resources.318 Accordingly, Anaya established a practice of gathering, 
requesting, receiving, and exchanging information from all relevant sources, not-
ably from indigenous peoples and governments, and carrying out on- site visits to 
examine the issues raised with a view to providing observations and recommenda-
tions on the underlying human rights issues.
In a case concerning the Marlin mine project in Guatemala and Maya indi-
genous communities, for instance, Anaya focused mostly on the regulatory and 
administrative shortcomings of the State, but did not shy away from noting that 
private companies had an influence on the conflicts with indigenous peoples in 
that context.319 Anaya further noted that the consultations undertaken by the com-
pany did not lead to an adequate understanding of the project impacts on the com-
munities, did not take into account sufficiently the community concerns, and in 
all events should have involved the government more fully. He thus called for a 
new consultation process focusing on mitigation measures, reparation of damage, 
establishment of a formal benefit- sharing mechanism with full participation of 
the relevant communities, and the establishment of a complaint and conciliation 
mechanism.320 In his final recommendation, Anaya confirmed that the private 
enterprises’ faults in due diligence could not be justified by the limitations of the 
host State’s legal framework alone.321 He recommended that private enterprises 
adopt internal policies on indigenous peoples’ rights and independent follow- up 
mechanisms, as well as permanent mechanisms for dialogue and grievance with 
 317 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people: Communications to and from Governments (2010) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 15/ 37/ Add.1.
 318 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people (2009) UN Doc. A/ 64/ 338, Section D.
 319 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous people: Observaciones sobre la situación de los derechos de los pueblos indígenas de 
Guatemala en relación con los proyectos extractivos, y otro tipo de proyectos, en sus territorios 
tradicionales, (2011) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 18/ 35/ Add.3, para. 69.
 320 Ibid. paras 69– 70.
 321 Ibid. paras 69– 72.
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the participation of State authorities.322 It was in effect this monitoring activity that 
led Anaya to develop the guidance discussed in Chapter 5 to give greater substance 
to the UN Framework on Business and Human rights vis- à- vis indigenous peo-
ples’ rights. He concluded that ‘in its prevailing form, the model for advancing nat-
ural resource extraction within the territories of indigenous peoples appears to run 
counter to the self- determination of indigenous peoples in the political, social and 
economic spheres’.323
Following the adoption of his guidance, Anaya continued to investigate the con-
ditions for fair and equitable benefit- sharing as part of business due diligence. In 
the context of a visit to Peru, he differentiated social funds as models that encourage 
the development of social investment projects specifically intended for indigenous 
communities as compensation for the negative impacts of private companies from 
benefits in the form of ‘jobs or community development projects, that typically 
pale in economic value in comparison to profits gained by the corporation’. He 
also underscored that priority should be given at the outset to an alternative model 
for extractive activities in indigenous territories consisting of indigenous peoples 
themselves controlling the extractive operations, through their own initiatives and 
enterprises, through partnerships with responsible non- indigenous companies, 
with the necessary experience and funding to launch projects and with State sup-
port to build indigenous peoples’ capacity.324 He addressed a recommendation 
directly to companies to ensure that indigenous peoples participate directly in 
the distribution of fees or royalties, or in the earnings derived from the extractive 
operations.325
The successive Special Rapporteur, Vicky Tauli Corpuz, has addressed business 
directly and indirectly in most of her country visit reports, in a varied manner, oc-
casionally building upon the reports of the UN Working Group on Business and 
Human Rights. This served also to draw a clearer line between State obligations 
and business due diligence, with the latter including the expectation that private 
companies develop human- rights impact studies in accordance with international 
standards and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, in co-
operation with indigenous peoples.326
 322 Ibid. paras 89– 93.
 323 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
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 326 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples: Visit to Ecuador (2019) 
UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 42/ 37/ Add.1, para. 118; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous 
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As part of a visit to Ecuador, for instance, Tauli Corpuz observed the absence of 
environmental rehabilitation, reparations, and adequate compensation for com-
munities that have suffered for decades the impact of oil exploitation on their lands 
and territories, as in the case of the area affected by the operations of Chevron- 
Texaco.327 She also provided insights into benefit- sharing practices, noting that 
‘[i] n the absence of State services, the companies provided basic social services 
which involved cronyism and paternalistic practices’.328 This is indeed one of the 
main pitfalls in attempting to implement the international standard on benefit- 
sharing.329 During a visit to Mexico, Tauli Corpuz underscored that companies’ 
social and environmental impact assessments were approved before consultations 
were carried out with indigenous peoples and did not adequately identify the real 
impacts that projects will have on the rights of indigenous peoples. She also re-
iterated the findings of an earlier mission by the Working Group on Business and 
Human Rights about competent authorities’ limited capacity to examine these as-
sessments and ensure proper oversight of their activities.330 She further noted that 
contracts between large- scale wind power project proponents and communities 
were not necessarily concluded with representative authorities and had resulted 
in negative impacts on indigenous land tenure, the environment, traditional eco-
nomic activities, and community life.331 During a visit to Guatemala, the Special 
Rapporteur noted that despite having adopted a human rights policy under a co-
ordinating committee of the Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial 
Associations, none of the participating companies had carried out human rights 
impact studies before any activity affecting indigenous peoples.332
A whole section was devoted to business responsibility in the report of the visit 
to Brazil, where the Special Rapporteur highlighted the responsibility of businesses 
to ensure respect for indigenous peoples’ rights in their sugar, soy, timber, palm 
oil, and minerals supply chains, to conduct adequate human rights due diligence. 
She also called on companies involved in mining, hydroelectric dams, transmis-
sion lines, or infrastructure projects to assess whether the State has complied with 
its duty to seek free prior informed consent and has guaranteed that the projects 
will not impact on indigenous peoples’ rights. She underscored that companies, 
including banks, need to ‘know and show’ that they are not complicit in or contrib-
uting to human rights violations arising from the failure of the Brazilian authorities 
to adequately address indigenous peoples’ environmental concerns, provide them 
 327 The case is discussed in Ch. 2, Section 1.2.1.
 328 A/ HRC/ 42/ 37/ Add.1 (n. 326), para. 30.
 329 See Ch. 4, Section 3.1.3.
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with effective remedies333 and implement previous recommendations by the UN 
Working Group on Business and Human Rights.334 Her recommendations high-
lighted the independent nature of companies’ due diligence obligations to respect 
indigenous peoples’ rights, including their land and consent rights, both for their 
own operations and for those in their supply chains. She also underscored the need 
to participate in meaningful remediation processes in consultation with the con-
cerned indigenous peoples, using their leverage to prevent further rights violations 
and ensure appropriate remediation.335 Companies’ independent responsibility 
to respect indigenous peoples’ rights was also underscored in her visit report to 
Honduras,336 in which the Special Rapporteur noted that the Miskito community 
had relied on a ‘biocultural [community] protocol’, as recommended under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity,337 as a basis for the consultations on a pro-
posed hydrocarbon operations, which the government considered ‘a basis for fu-
ture consultations with indigenous peoples on mining projects’.338
During visits in developed countries, however, the UN Special Rapporteur did 
not address recommendations directly to companies, but rather to the govern-
ments. In her visit to the US, after discussing the Standing Rock case, she under-
scored that indigenous peoples’ self- determination extends to control over their 
energy resources and income generated from natural resources not only to sup-
port critical government programmes, but also to reconcile the protection of 
their lands, waters, and sacred places with the benefit of revenue and jobs.339 She 
called upon companies to make committed and meaningful efforts towards mu-
tual understanding with indigenous peoples to meet their responsibilities under 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.340 Her recommenda-
tions, however, were solely addressed to the federal government to ‘take appro-
priate measures to encourage consideration of the Guiding Principles’ by all actors 
in any project that impacts indigenous peoples in the US with regard to environ-
mental harm, and to ‘take measures to encourage private corporations working 
on tribal lands to follow the Guiding Principles, including adequate consideration 
and provision of remediation in advance of project commencement’.341 During 
her visit to Sápmi, the UN Special Rapporteur drew attention to the absence of 
provisions for benefit- sharing with Sami communities when mines are located on 
traditional Sami lands. She also noted the absence of any frameworks for dispute 
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resolution between mining companies and affected Sami communities, as well as 
the lack of cumulative impacts across different applications for exploration and ex-
ploitation concessions,342 although the last point had already been identified by the 
OECD National Contact Point.343 She underscored that notwithstanding govern-
ments’ endorsement of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
and adoption of a national action plan for business and human rights,344 deficient 
national regulatory frameworks created barriers for businesses to carry out their 
operations in a manner consistent with international expectations regarding the 
rights of indigenous peoples.345
Overall, the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights has developed 
a practical understanding of the dividing line between business due diligence and 
State obligations, and with that, of the opportunities and risks in complying with 
business respect for the human rights of indigenous peoples.
4.1.2  UN Special Rapporteur on Toxics
The UN Special Rapporteur on Toxics Başkut Tuncak has increasingly addressed 
private companies’ responsibility to respect human rights in his country visit re-
ports. He has done so in much more detail than any other Special Rapporteur, oc-
casionally addressing recommendations to named companies, as well as to sectoral 
business organizations. On some occasions he has devoted a whole section of his 
report to businesses and human rights, but this is not always an indication that 
his recommendations would be directly addressed to business. 346 Among inter-
national standards of corporate environmental accountability and responsibility, 
he has focused on access to information, impact assessments particularly with re-
gard to vulnerable groups, benefit- sharing to some extent, and remedies.
In his visit report to Denmark, he underscored the extraterritorial environ-
mental effects of private companies’ shipbreaking activities leading to the release 
of toxic substances in other countries where independent judicial systems are 
lacking.347 He engaged in direct dialogue with specific companies, who pointed 
 342 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples on the human rights situ-
ation of the Sami people in the Sápmi region of Norway, Sweden and Finland (2016) UN Doc. A/ HRC/ 
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to the slowness of the evolution of the international regulatory framework, which 
placed them at a competitive disadvantage.348 He then contrasted their views with 
those of civil society, who lamented the lack of accurate environmental data ne-
cessary to confirm improvements in this sector and limited access for civil society 
organizations to conduct visits.349 He also made reference to engagement of the 
company with the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights.350 He 
concluded by raising concerns about the lack of attention to the continued export 
of hazardous pesticides banned by Denmark to countries that have lower levels 
of protection from the adverse impacts of such pesticides on the human right to 
health.351 His recommendations, however, only focused on the government’s ob-
ligation to require companies to conduct human rights- related due diligence to 
identify, monitor, assess, and address any abuses of human rights relating to toxic 
substances, including in relation to international operations and throughout their 
supply chains.352
In Sierra Leone, the Special Rapporteur drew links between the implemen-
tation of international standards related to corruption and to the environment, 
noting that the victims of exposure to toxic chemicals resulting from highly prof-
itable agriculture and mining activities have gone without compensation, finan-
cial or otherwise. He argued that tax avoidance resulted in situations where the 
costs of economic development are borne by the community while the benefits 
are claimed by powerful elites. He concluded that this is ‘threatening the gov-
ernance framework on chemicals management, environmental protection and 
waste management and  . . .  result[ing] in the most vulnerable, including the 
local community, having to pay for the adverse effects of such projects through 
loss of life, health and well- being’.353 He called upon the State to develop strong 
anti- corruption measures to accompany cost- recovery systems and other finan-
cial measures to ensure that resources are efficiently and appropriately allocated 
to protect the public against exposure to toxics.354 He also focused on the right 
to information and extractives, underscoring that information, particularly on 
health impacts, was unavailable, inaccurate, or too technical; and processes for 
gathering information were not reasonably accessible, including the sharing of 
completed evaluations of the social and environmental risk assessments of large- 
scale mining projects with neighbouring communities. He thus called directly on 
companies to take proactive measures to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts on 
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human rights resulting in irremediable harm (such as irreversible health effects or 
biodiversity loss).355
He also contributed to clarifying the application of the benefit- sharing stand-
ards in the context of extractives in Sierra Leone. He noted inadequate guarantees 
of meaningfulness and fairness in the process for establishing community devel-
opment agreements, with the responsibility resting primarily with the business en-
terprise and local chiefs. This is particularly significant in the context of political 
and economic power imbalances between the two parties and generally without 
the involvement of external expert bodies with technical expertise on the social, 
cultural, and economic implications of projects and without a chance of accessing 
remedies.356 As a result, his country visit report included a series of recommenda-
tions addressed directly to business enterprises, such as putting into effect the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights with respect to the pro-
duction, use, release, and other activities that may result in human exposure to 
toxic substances. He also recommended internalizing the costs of chemicals and 
waste management, and increasing transparency with regard to their activities and 
interactions. Based on his observations that children accompany their parents to 
farms, plantations, mines, and other workplaces with risks of exposure to toxics, 
he further called upon private companies to increase the protection from exposure 
to pesticides and other toxic chemicals for children and women of childbearing 
age.357
Direct recommendations to business can be found, in addition, in his country 
visit report to Germany. He called upon German chemical business enterprises to 
engage in capacity- building with developing countries, with a view to eliminating 
the manufacture/ use/ release of hazardous substances, including an orderly phase- 
out of highly hazardous pesticides globally, and transitioning to safer alternatives; 
and work with industry partners to develop global mechanisms to finance the cost 
of chemicals management at the national and/ or regional levels for developing 
countries.358 With specific regard to embedding the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, he called upon business entities to ensure meaningful 
consultation with affected individuals and communities, paying attention to mar-
ginalized persons or those in vulnerable situations in assessing actual or poten-
tial adverse human rights impacts due to hazardous substances and wastes (paying 
particular attention to how human rights risks from hazardous substances and 
wastes affect women, children, the elderly, and men differently). He further called 
upon business to ensure that affected communities have timely and complete 
 355 Ibid. para. 38.
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information about proposed projects, products, or changes that may affect them 
and the capacity to put forward their opinions. He also recommended that the 
German Chemical Industry Association bring to the attention of its board alle-
gations of any chemical company being involved in human rights abuses and take 
appropriate measures; and ensure all member companies embed and implement 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.359
In his country visit report to Korea,360 he included in the recommendations that 
businesses have a responsibility to ensure that information about hazardous sub-
stances is available and accessible, and that it functions to protect the everyone’s 
rights.361 He also made recommendations directly to specific companies, such as 
acknowledging two particular companies for their commitment to ensuring that 
the victims of toxic humidifier sterilizers have access to an effective remedy. He re-
commended that they ensured all victims are identified and receive compensation; 
and to put in place measures to prevent a recurrence of similar incidents, and share 
mistakes made and lessons learned with the global community so that other gov-
ernments and businesses may avoid similar mistakes.362 Finally, in his country visit 
report to Kazakhstan,363 Başkut Tuncak recommended directly to companies that 
they do their utmost to provide remedies to victims, to remediate contamination 
caused by their activities and business relationships, and to adopt policies to min-
imize adverse impacts on the environment and human rights. 364
Overall, the UN Special Rapporteur on Toxics engaged in oversight at different 
levels, documenting both negative and positive business conduct, and assessing 
the interplay between procedural and substantive standards.
5 Complaints before the UN Global Compact
Notwithstanding the emphasis on its voluntary nature, the UN Global Compact 
has also made efforts to improve its implementation through some degree of inter-
national oversight. Although originally there were no mechanisms for monitoring 
or assessing performance under the Global Compact, companies’ compliance with 
the reporting requirement has been monitored since the introduction of ‘Integrity 
Measures’ in August 2005.
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Former UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan endorsed a new governance struc-
ture for the Compact to ‘improve its focus, transparency and sustained impact’.365 
Besides a new policy to protect the use of the Compact name and its logo, the most 
notable feature of the new governance structure is the possibility to submit com-
plaints of ‘systematic or egregious abuses’ of the aims and principles of the Compact 
to the Global Compact Office.366 The procedure is not a compliance- based initia-
tive, but has the objective of assisting participants in aligning their actions with 
the commitments undertaken. Essentially, it aims to safeguard the reputation and 
integrity of the Global Compact.367
If a complaint is not found prima facie frivolous, the Office will forward it to 
the concerned company requesting written comments to be addressed to the com-
plainant. In addition, the company is to keep the Office informed of any action to 
be taken to remedy the situation. The Office may also provide guidance and as-
sistance to encourage the resolution of the situation. Among various options, the 
Office may also decide to refer the complaint to the Board, which comprises repre-
sentatives of business, civil society, trade unions, and the United Nations, or refer 
the matter to one of the UN agencies that are guardians of the Global Compact for 
advice (such as the UN Environment Programme). Interestingly, if a company re-
fuses to engage in the dialogue on a complaint, the Office may decide to have the 
company labelled as ‘non- communicating’ on the Compact website (as it is also 
now possible to do for failure to report to the Global Compact). It may further re-
move the company from the list of participants and indicate that fact on the website 
when the company is considered to be detrimental to the reputation and integrity 
of the Compact.368
Although the Compact has already listed as inactive several companies that 
failed to comply with the minimum requirement to report on their activities 
implementing its principles,369 there is no information on complaints related to al-
legations of systematic or egregious abuse on the website. This was already under-
scored by the UN Joint Inspection Unit in 2010.370 Information on integrity cases 
 365 UN Global Compact Office, ‘The Global Compact New Phase’ (6 September 2005) <http:// www.
unglobalcompact.org/ AboutTheGC/ stages_ of_ development.html>.
 366 UN Global Compact Office, ‘Note on Integrity Measures’ (26 November 2007).
 367 U. Wynhoven and M. Stausberg, ‘The United Nations Global Compact’s Governance 
Framework and Integrity Measures’ in A. Rasche and G. Kell (eds), The United Nations Global 
Compact: Achievements, Trends and Challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 251, 
262– 63.
 368 Ibid.
 369 UN Global Compact Office, ‘Update: Over 900 Global Compact Participants Marked “Inactive” 
or Delisted’ (28 January 2008)  <http:// www.unglobalcompact.org/ NewsAndEvents/ news_ archives/ 
2008_ 01_ 28.html>.
 370 Joint Inspection Unit, ‘United Nations Corporate Partnerships: The Role and Functioning of the 
Global Compact’ (2010) UN Doc. JIU/ REP/ 2010/ 9, paras 70– 73 and Recommendation 6(d). See also 
UN Global Compact Office, A Response from the Global Compact Office (24 March 2011) <http:// 
www.unglobalcompact.org/ docs/ news_ events/ 9.1_ news_ archives/ 2011_ 03_ 24/ gco_ jiu_ response.
pdf> accessed 27 February 2016, 5.
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is being included in the Global Compact Annual Review starting from the 2009 
edition, but to date these reports have limited themselves to noting the number of 
cases received and handled by the Global Compact Office,371 without providing 
any further information— not even with reference to the specific principles that 
were alleged to be seriously violated by the company. In addition, scholars have 
underscored the lack of publicly available statistics on how many matters have 
been submitted, or are deemed frivolous or not, or on the outcome of the cases, in-
cluding whether participants have been expelled under the procedure.372
This practice can be contrasted with that of the implementation procedure of the 
OECD Guidelines: although until mid- 2000s the OECD did not publish the names 
of companies involved in instances under consideration by its implementation pro-
cedure, it did provide an annual update of the status of each instance with specific 
reference to the guideline alleged to be non- complied. This was, however, largely 
considered insufficient, and OECDWatch started to independently produce quar-
terly updates on the filing, conclusion, or rejections of instances.373 Publicly available 
documentation of complaints could, however, increase the credibility of the imple-
mentation of the Global Compact and allow for public pressure to motivate private 
companies towards more environmentally sound conducts. In addition, reference to 
other, more specific standards elaborated by other bodies such as the CBD and co-
operation with relevant secretariats could serve to avoid the difficulty in applying the 
very general Global Compact principles. Finally, the possibility for site visits by the 
UN specialized agencies and bodies to the operation sites of companies accused of 
systematic or egregious abuses could also contribute to an international system of 
fact- finding, to document the actual respect by private companies of international 
standards for corporate environmental accountability.
Global Compact members have been listed as ‘non- communicating’ if they 
missed one deadline for reporting, ‘inactive’ if they missed two consecutive dead-
lines, and some have been permanently removed from the website after missing 
more than two deadlines. The quality or accuracy of reports, however, remains 
outside of any form of assessment. Criticism has been voiced on the lack of evalu-
ation of the effectiveness of the initiative, together with the lack of independent 
monitoring of its actual implementation by adhering companies, on the part of the 
 371 The 2010 edition of the Annual Report states that ‘21 separate matters alleging abuses of the Ten 
Principles by business entities were raised with the Global Compact Office in 2010 [of which] 3 mat-
ters were handled under the Integrity Measures dialogue facilitation mechanism’ (UN Global Compact 
Office, 2010 Annual Report of the Global Compact (UN, 2011) 42). Similar information is provided 
in the 2009 edition (UN Global Compact Office, 2010 Annual Report of the Global Compact (UN, 
2010) 20).
 372 Simons and Macklin (n. 49) 120– 21.
 373 E. Morgera, ‘An Environmental Outlook on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises:  Comparative Advantage, Legitimacy, and Outstanding Questions in the Lead- up to 
the 2006 Review’ (2006) 18 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 751, 774. The 
OECDWatch database can be consulted at http:// oecdwatch.org/ cases.
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UN.374 Scholars have criticized the complaints procedure of the Global Compact 
because the outcome is neither a change of status or a referral to other bodies.375 
It has also been criticized for not engaging in investigations, hearings, or required 
monitoring to check whether corporate conduct has changed or the situation has 
been addressed.376 As a result, the UN Joint Inspection Unit recommended more 
proactive and transparent handling of complaints and more effective mechanisms 
to determine the credibility of a complaint beyond the consultation with the Global 
Compact Board and local networks.377
The system has, however, been subject to progressive improvements:  for in-
stance, the category of ‘inactive’ has been phased out and was replaced with 
delisting in 2011.378 The commitment of the UN Secretary- General to continuing 
to retain the integrity and unique role of the UN Global Compact, and the im-
portance of the integrity measures have been underscored by the UN General 
Assembly in its recent resolutions.379 So, overall, the Global Compact process has 
been less successful in translating business commitments into actual change than 
in supporting a global dialogue and a network of companies across the globe,380 
including developing specific guidance on human rights and the environment for 
business.381
6 Concluding remarks
To a significant extent, the impacts on corporate conduct of these international 
monitoring or complaint arrangements may provide evidence of the practical 
importance of the existing international soft- law instruments on corporate en-
vironmental accountability and responsibility, particularly in the face of sig-
nificant constraints in access to, and limited results obtained from, national and 
transnational litigation.382 All these initiatives, with the exception of the UN 
Global Compact, have engaged, to different extents, in fact- finding on corporate 
 374 Among others, Calder and Culverwell (n. 36) 38.
 375 Viñuales (n. 127) 75.
 376 Simons and Macklin (n. 49) 120– 21.
 377 UN Joint Inspection Unit, ‘United Nations Corporate Partnerships: The Role and Functioning of 
the Global Compact’ (2010) UN Doc. JIU/ REP/ 2010/ 9, 17. This finding is not challenged in the more 
recent report of the Joint Inspection Unit discussed in Ch. 4.
 378 S. Deva, Regulating Corporate Human Rights Violations:  Humanizing Business 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2012) 84 95. See https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/ news/ 104- 02- 25- 2011. See 
UN Global Compact, Integrity Measures (updated June 2016) https:// www.unglobalcompact.org/ docs/ 
about_ the_ gc/ Integrity_ measures/ Integrity_ Measures_ Note_ EN.pdf.
 379 UNGA Res. 73/ 254 (2019) para. 17.
 380 Simons and Macklin (n. 49)121– 22.
 381 See Ch 3, Section 3.1.2.
 382 Eg R. Meeran, ‘Access to Remedy: The United Kingdom Experience of MNC Tort Litigation for 
Human Rights Violations’ in S. Deva and D. Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond 
Corporate Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 378.
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substandard practice and in clarifying the conditions under which international 
standards can be applied in practice. The OECD NCPs and the UN Special 
Rapporteurs have also contributed to normative coherence and filling gaps across 
international standards. They have also further clarified the dividing line between 
business due diligence and State obligations to protect the environment and re-
spect human rights.
The practice of different international monitoring initiatives, however, remains 
to be more systematically compared, with a view to revealing any limitations and 
lessons learnt in the application of international standards. In addition, research 
is needed to clarify the opportunities and challenges for genuine collaboration 
among different international processes in preventing and moderating conflicts 
over natural resources among governments, private companies, and local users.383
Ultimately, there is a need for better understanding, from a doctrinal and em-
pirical perspective, of the role of international monitoring and complaints mech-
anisms in not only testing international standards of corporate accountability and 
responsibility, but also providing remedies for corporate abuses. This is particu-
larly relevant for the ongoing negotiations of a new international treaty on business 
and human rights, which is mainly expected to enhance access to justice for vic-
tims.384 In particular, the experience of the CAO of documenting its own impact 
on communities on the ground provides an interesting example in this connection, 
particularly in illuminating practical approaches in implementing international 
standards such as fair and equitable benefit- sharing.
The balance between pointing at instances of non- compliance with inter-
national standards and keeping companies engaged in the progressive improve-
ment of their practices, including through supported co- development of solutions 
with affected communities, is a difficult one to assess without further independent 
empirical research. But it has the potential to engage companies, and possibly gov-
ernments, in a broader dialogue with communities about pre- existing or systemic 
causes of marginalization in natural resource development.
 383 Notably in consideration of the limited outcomes discussed in Section 2.4 of this chapter.
 384 See Ch 3, Section 7.
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Conclusions: Contributions and Areas 
for Further Research
The progressive development of international law to address corporate environ-
mental accountability and responsibility has intensified since 2010. This has been 
the combined result of the inter- governmental support for the UN Framework and 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the growing international 
recognition of the inter- dependence of human rights and the environment culmin-
ated in the 2018 UN Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment. 
These international developments have fuelled— and have been fuelled in turn by— a 
burgeoning scholarship and transnational practices on business and human rights. 
The area of transnational litigation alone has become a field of study in its own right, 
with sub- fields devoted, for instance, to climate litigation. Against this backdrop, this 
concluding section will reflect on the original contributions to academic and policy 
debates that this book has offered, and identify areas for further research.
The contribution of this book has been, first, to confirm that international standards 
on corporate environmental accountability have translated into procedural bench-
marks for the private sector the general principles of international environmental 
law (environmental integration, prevention, and precaution), thereby contributing to 
clarifying businesses’ due diligence to respect human rights. Another important area 
of international standard- setting concerns procedural environmental rights (access 
to information, participation in decision- making, and access to justice), which has 
built on insights from UN Special Rapporteurs. Furthermore, substantive standards 
of corporate environmental responsibility have emerged, notably in relation to how 
environmental management systems and prevention can contribute to the sustainable 
use of freshwater, the responsible management of chemicals, waste minimization, and 
climate change mitigation. This is also the case with increasingly substantive stand-
ards to ensure business respect for indigenous peoples’ human rights to natural re-
sources, and business due diligence in relation to biodiversity conservation and the 
sustainable use of natural resources. All these developments have drawn significantly 
from the guidance that has been adopted inter- governmentally under the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD), often with significant input from indigenous peo-
ples’ and local communities’ representatives. The cross- fertilization of international 
human rights law and international biodiversity law through international standard- 
setting has benefitted from a clearer identification under international human rights 
law of the minimum content of States’ obligations, notably in relation to necessary 
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procedural guarantees that tend to remain unspecified in international biodiversity 
law. On the other hand, international biodiversity law provides pragmatic indications 
on how to put human rights precepts in practice within the complex landscape of en-
vironmental regulation and natural resource development. The present analysis has 
also underscored that while there is a significant degree of convergence between all 
the standards, remaining divergence points to particularly controversial concepts in 
international law, such as the assessment of cumulative environmental impacts, pre-
caution, free prior informed consent (FPIC), the distinction between benefit- sharing 
and compensation, and agro- ecology, to name a few examples. These are also several 
thematic areas where substantive standards of corporate environmental responsibility 
could be much more detailed, such as in the case of climate change, the use of trad-
itional knowledge of indigenous peoples, local communities', women’s and children’s 
human rights, and the transfer of technology. In addition, the relevance and appro-
priateness of international standards of corporate environmental accountability and 
responsibility for ocean conservation and the sustainable use of marine resources re-
mains to be assessed.1
Contrasted with the traditional sources of international environmental law, 
international standards have clarified how businesses are expected to relate to 
inter- State obligations, in ways that are adaptable from case to case and from one 
area to another of corporate activity. This explains both how States and business 
enterprises are expected to collaborate in the pursuance of international objectives, 
and how businesses are expected to go above and beyond what States require of 
them in their domestic legislation and practices. This is particularly relevant when 
businesses operate in States with poor human rights and environmental records. 
While there is continued opposition to consider or develop international law as 
directly applicable to multinational companies and other business entities, inter-
national standards represent a step forward conceptually from a traditional under-
standing that international law does not matter for corporations if not through the 
State. These standards can then back up victims’ legal claims and advocacy initia-
tives; inform States’ regulatory, implementation, and monitoring efforts; and in-
form judicial practice. They can also inform corporate governance reforms, guide 
legal advisory services to private companies, and be included in legal education. 
Another original finding of this book is, however, that the current scholarly and 
policy efforts on business and human rights have not yet ensured systematic con-
nections with the standards of corporate environmental accountability and respon-
sibility. It thus remains to be better understood to what extent in practice reliance 
on these environmental standards can contribute to more successful litigation and 
law- making efforts on business and human rights, at the national and international 
levels. While this book does not do justice to the highly complex and experimental 
 1 One exception is the translation by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the inter-
national rules on ocean dumping for business: see Ch. 4, Section 2.2.1.
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areas of scholarship and practice making recourse to national law and trans-
national litigation for holding corporations to account in light of international law, 
it has identified the need to contrast these areas of practice and research as an alter-
native to the development and application of international standards of corporate 
environmental accountability and responsibility. Furthermore, more research is 
needed to better understand mutual influences among transnational litigation and 
international standards, as well as transnational contractual practices that seek to 
avoid the shortcomings identified in transnational litigation.
The final original contribution of this book relates to the oversight mechanisms 
that international standard- setting initiatives on corporate environmental ac-
countability and responsibility have set up and the different functions they per-
form. Regardless of the differences in approaches, structures, and coverage, all these 
mechanisms have the potential to further advance international standard- setting. 
This potential includes ensuring further coherence among different sets of inter-
national standards, as well as collecting lessons learnt in terms of their practical 
application in specific circumstances. In light of the growing number of cases dealt 
by the national contact points (NCPs) under the OECD Guidelines, and by the IFC 
Ombudsman, more efforts could be devoted to a comparative analysis of the quasi- 
jurisprudence of these bodies with a view to determining, on the one hand, the im-
pacts on these decisions on corporate conduct and on the standard- setting of the 
international organizations concerned. On the other hand, this comparative exer-
cise could shed further light on missed opportunities for transnational litigation 
and for international and national law- making efforts to build upon the insights 
gathered by these bodies. In addition, UN Special Rapporteurs are emerging as a 
significant source of guidance on how to implement international standards of cor-
porate environmental accountability and responsibility in specific circumstances. 
It remains to be seen if transnational litigation, the international negotiations on a 
treaty on business and human rights, and international standard- setting initiatives 
will fully benefit from these insights. Even more significantly, it remains to be as-
sessed empirically to what extent international monitoring and complaints mech-
anisms can provide effective approaches to prevent or provide more timely remedy 
to corporate abuses than traditional judicial avenues. This is particularly relevant 
for the ongoing negotiations of a new international treaty on business and human 
rights, which is mainly expected to enhance access to justice for victims.
The final area for further research that has been identified by this book relates 
to the need to bring together international human rights lawyers and international 
environmental lawyers in a dialogue with private (international) lawyers.2 This 
 2 See also E. Morgera and L. Gillies, ‘Realizing the Objectives of Public International Environmental 
Law through Private Contracts: The Need for a Dialogue with Private International Law Scholars?’ 
in D. French, V. Ruiz Abou- Nigm, and K. McCall Smith (eds), Public and Private International 
Law: Strengthening Connections (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018) 175.
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is because often private law instruments are critical to encapsulate international 
standards of corporate environmental accountability and responsibility and other 
standards of business due diligence to respect human rights in the relationships 
between companies and potentially affected communities. Much remains to be 
understood about the actual room for communities’ worldviews to be expressed, 
understood, and realized within contractual tools and approaches. Furthermore, 
more research is required on the oversight of the conclusion and implementation 
of business– community agreements, in addition to growing research on their im-
pact on the ground.
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